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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the conflict of values that occurs in Bangladesh between NGOs and wider 
society. It examines the dynamics of BRAC, a large NGO, in order to illustrate the dissonance 
and inconsistencies in development discourse.  Tension is evident in development, which is a 
multi-stranded process, in which each strand may complement or contradict the others.  The 
process may also be understood in terms of the societal change that results from an attempted 
synthesis of the contradictory, clashing values of Western agency (individualism, equality, 
market, etc.) and Bangladeshi rural cultural life (community, hierarchy, subsistence, etc.).    
  
Development processes, backed by strong finance, introduce Western ideas and theories to the 
South.  NGOs subscribe to a global policy language in transforming these ideas into locally 
implementable programmes and projects, ignoring the diverse social, cultural and political 
settings in which they work.  When villagers come into contact with these projects, they are 
pushed towards a sense of individualism, but instead of developing this individualism, they 
produce a new form of collectivism.  In this hybrid environment, actors engaged in development 
adhere neither to the old values nor to new ones.  
 
Projects aimed at modernization, itself, have undergone change from a blue-print approach to a 
process approach. In reality, top-down approaches are renamed but not reformed into bottom-up 
approaches. NGO projects targeting women, notably through micro-credit programmes, 
contribute to the rise of women-only organisations as well as matri-focal groups that constitute a 
challenge to male-dominated village associations.  Micro-credit also polarises the traditional 
notions of money into moral and immoral money to produce new arenas of dispute.  Overall, 
religious groups oppose such NGO interventions.  
 
Conflict occurs within NGOs themselves.  This is evident when BRAC, as an organisational 
entity, seek to accommodate to Western, Bengali and Islamic cultural traits which further 
generate conflict and are managed by a culture of fear or indulgence.  Unless knowledge is shared 
by both parties there is the strong likelihood of increased conflict to the detriment of both NGOs 
and the local people. 
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  CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
A predominant process within developing countries is the ever increasing presence of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in development. The term NGO was 
first coined in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter in 1945 (Chang 2005:442) to 
describe agencies that would remain at a distance from governments, acting as their 
conscience and offering a moral critique of states.  The classification of NGOs is difficult 
as they include a broad and contradictory array of diverse organisations (Leve and Karim 
2001: 53). In this thesis, the term „NGO‟ will be used to define an agency that receives 
foreign aid and donations from Western states and international agencies to carry out 
poverty alleviation activities in developing countries such as Bangladesh.   
 
There are different and diverse literatures looking at the role of NGOs in the politics of 
development. Although numerous scholars have contributed to this, a sense of 
incompleteness remains.  A review of Anglophone literatures on NGOs confirm that most 
of the studies favoured a normative approach underpinned by liberal democratic 
assumptions (Mercer 2002). Their concentration on projects and beneficiaries results in 
an explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology (Goonatilake 2006:24). The 
evolution of the NGO industry is often defined as a linear process and described in terms 
of “four generations.”  The first-generation is where the NGOs aim to deliver services for 
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“relief and welfare”; the second generation is where the NGOs carry out “community 
development” activities; the third generation is where the NGOs promote “sustainable 
system development” and in the fourth generation NGOs are transformed into “people‟s 
movements” (Korten 1990: 113-128).   The four stages of the linear model, according to 
Avina, mark the “start-up, expansion, consolidation and close-out” phases (Avina 
1993:455).  However, these evolutionary notions are inadequate to explain the complex 
growth of NGOs on two grounds: firstly, each country has a unique NGO history, so it is 
difficult to generalise and to establish a common pattern, and secondly, NGOs exhibit 
different organisational characteristics and growth cycles at different phases of their 
development.   
 
These approaches fail to develop an understanding of the complex link of funding 
agencies in the West
1
 to NGOs in the South. The connection between West and South 
occurs through a complex global development bureaucracy (Dar and Cooke 2008).  The 
NGOs in the South are an extension of the West.  The UN System of National Accounts 
considers an organisation that receives more than 50 percent of its income from a 
governmental source to be effectively a part of government. In this sense, most 
development NGOs in developing countries which receive funds from bilateral donors 
even that channelled through Western NGOs should not arguably be recognised as NGOs 
at all, but rather as donor government institutions (Tvedt 1998:14). This global 
development bureaucracy is driven not only by a relatively small number of people and 
                                                     
1
 The West stands for the “First World” developed countries.  Similarly, the South stands for the “Third 
World” developing and underdeveloped countries. 
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source of funds, but also “by a concept that has become accepted as gospel: the idea that 
all economic growth benefits humankind and that the greater the growth, the more 
widespread the benefits” (Perkins 2005:xii). The concepts like gender, micro-credit, 
human rights, livelihoods, etc., contribute to shape the official discourse of NGOs, which 
seeks to portray them as a positive force for alleviating poverty in the Third World. 
However, there are other discourses of development that contradict this image. One 
discourse creates counter-discourses and disputing points of view.   
 
NGOs were the outcome of the global ideological struggle between capitalism and 
socialism that started with the end of World War II. NGOs have experienced complicated 
global processes, where factors such as international ideological trends, donor policies 
and NGO agendas in national, international, historical and cultural conditions interact in 
complex ways.  To understand this complex development process, one has to go beyond 
the idea of an NGO in a developing country as a mere reflection of donor interventions 
and consider it an outcome of international and national development processes (Tvedt 
1998:3).   
 
NGOs are now a part of global cultural flow embedded in globalisation. This global 
cultural flow has five dimensions. Firstly, there are ethnoscapes produced by flows of 
people including tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles and migrant workers. Secondly, 
there are technoscapes, the machinery and plant flows produced by multinational and 
national corporations and government agencies. Thirdly, there are finanscapes, produced 
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by the rapid flows of money in the currency markets and stock exchanges around the 
world. Fourthly, there are mediascapes, the repertoires of images and information, the 
flows which are produced and distributed by news papers, magazines, television and film.  
Fifthly, there are ideoscapes, linked to the flow of images which are associated with state 
or counter-state movement ideologies and comprised of elements of the Western 
Enlightenment world-view – images of democracy, freedom, welfare, rights, etc. 
(Appadurai 1990: 295-310). Within the broader framework of global cultural flow, there 
exist developmentscapes
2
 which refers to the process of shaping the culture of Southern 
NGOs such as BRAC
3
 through the philosophies of many Western agencies and donors.  
These donors and agencies provide financial as well as material resources, and agendas 
and theories to NGOs who, in turn, seek to translate these into practice. Appadurai argues 
that there are disjunctures between these cultural flows, but states, donors, multinationals, 
agencies, interest groups, etc. attempt to manipulate and channel (close or open) the 
cultural boundaries of other to these flows with varying degree or success in relation to 
their relative power resources.    
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 I have coined the term developmentscape following on from Appadurai who has used the suffix scape to 
indicate that given relations which do not objectively look the same from every angle of vision, but are 
rather deeply perspectival constructs.  These constructs are influenced by the historical, linguistic and 
political situatedness of different actors like nation-states, multinationals, religious, political groupings, 
villages, families, etc. (Appadurai 1999: 296).    
3
 The acronym BRAC originally stood for “Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee.”  In 2007, the 
organisation was renamed  “Building Resources Across Communities.”  Since then, however, it was 
decided to drop all such descriptions in favour of the acronym,BRAC.  
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1.2.  BRAC and NGOs in Bangladesh 
 
The independence of Bangladesh and the subsequent political integration of villages into 
the global market have created conditions for NGOs to accelerate the process of rural 
change.  NGOs in Bangladesh have grown from a virtual non-existence in 1970 to a large 
organisational movement by 2005 (Irish and Simon 2005:6). NGOs claim to operate in 
over 90% of villages (Fruttero and Gauri 2005:767), benefiting 35% of the population 
(Thornton et al. 2000).  However, they have not yet effectively reached the poorest parts 
of the community (Gauri and Galef 2005: 2064). NGOs depict their work as success 
stories; mostly a few big NGOs project this positive image. Currently, NGOs are working 
in more than 69,000 villages and receive 14% of total foreign aid.  The foreign aid is 
received by only about 1300 NGOs (Ahmad 1999:27) out of numerous NGOs working in 
different areas
4
. Around 30 NGOs receive approximately 80 percent of all funds 
channelled through the sector, 60 percent of which goes to the eight largest NGOs 
(Sobhan 1997:14). 
 
This study does not seek to examine the rise and role of NGOs (Ahmed 1999, Begum 
2000, Khan 2009, Hashmi 2000, Shailo 1994) in Bangladesh, but rather to enquire into 
the conflict of values that occur within them, exploring the dissonance and inconsistency 
                                                     
4
 There is confusion about the registration of NGOs with different government bodies.  More than 15,398 
NGOs are registered with the Women and Children Affairs department; 55,945 NGOs are registered with 
the Social Welfare department;  9,710 NGOs are registered with the Joint Stock Company; 2,518 NGOs 
with Foreign Donation Registration under NGO Bureau Affairs; 1,62,112 NGOs are registered with the 
Cooperative Ministry; and 1,380 NGOs got registration under Micro-credit Regulations (TIB 2009).   
Government has no idea of over 23,000 NGOs‟ activities (TDS 2009.1)   
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within this development discourse. In the process, NGO contributes to the development 
of a new form of culture related to the social transformation that reflects both the 
consensus and conflict between traditional Bangladeshi hierarchical values and Western 
projects informed by ideas of equality.   
 
Photo 1.1: Head Office of BRAC 
 
Source: Shahadu Zaman  
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This thesis seeks to explore the implications in the context of one Bangladeshi NGO, 
BRAC. BRAC started its development journey as a small relief organisation in 1972 with 
a few staff members. At present, it employs over 100,000 staff to provide various 
services to 110 million poor men and women.  It not only covers most villages in 
Bangladesh, but has also expanded its activities to Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and several 
countries in Africa. The work of BRAC has attracted international attention as it is the 
largest NGO providing various services to the poor (Bhuiya and Chowdhury 2007,  
Chowdhury and Bhuiya 2004, Halder and Mosley 2004, Reza and Ahmmed 2009,  
Smillie 2009).   
 
The structure of BRAC is based on a connectivity between the organisation and the rural 
poor.  Its head office is located in Dhaka – the capital of Bangladesh. The head office 
controls several regional offices, which in turn control multiple branch offices. Each 
branch office organises several village organisations (VOs). Each VO is comprised of 
female and male group members. The structure of BRAC is represented in figure 1.1.    
 
In 2009, BRAC stands for a conglomeration of organisations which typically attribute 
three complex features. The first communicates the image of a “non-profit” non-
governmental organisation. The second feature revolves around the core Economic 
Development Programme with its strong microfinance component that retains the 
features of a “for-profit” non-governmental organisation. These, like social enterprises 
(Mair and Marti 2007), transfer profits from business to poverty alleviation programs. 
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Finally, BRAC operates profit-oriented business enterprises
5
. The organisation has 
shifted to embrace the principles of the market economy.  BRAC now calls its former 
beneficiaries "customers" and others "stakeholders" (BRAC 1994).    
 
The uniqueness of BRAC is its ability to design most of its activities to ensure financial 
sustainability through a mixture of both low-income poverty market activities and non-
poverty business activities. This gives BRAC a new character, which is not of a non-
governmental organisation, social enterprise, or a business concern, but a new form of 
organisation termed as “poverty enterprise” (Mannan 2009a). This poverty enterprise 
pulls together various actors and agencies, from donors, government, civil society, and 
the business world into a complex poverty-production
6
-market framework. The poverty 
enterprise continuously conceptualizes and designs its repertoire of development 
programmes against the poverty canvas (Abed and Matin, 2007:4).   
 
Smillie (2009, 1997) describes BRAC as an organisation with a positive and stable work 
environment.   BRAC operates in Bangladesh as an organisation for putting development 
policies into practice. BRAC has two goals: poverty alleviation and the empowerment of 
the poor.  Poverty alleviation is focused on credit and saving schemes to promote 
capitalist growth.   Empowerment is justified by mixing the “conscientisation theory7” of 
                                                     
5
 BRAC Annual reports of 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 indicate that it has several 
large scale business enterprises, insurance companies, a university, a bank, etc.    
6
 Production of consumer and industrial goods 
7
Conscientisation is a translation of the Portuguese term conscientização, which is also 
translated as “critical consciousness”. 
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Freire (Freire 1972) with the Marxist rhetoric of class struggle (DKA 1990).  Marty Chen 
(1986) writes about the interaction between BRAC and its beneficiaries, observing that  
 
Diagram 1.1: Structure of BRAC  
 
Illustrated by Maliha Moyeed 
 
its engagement with women is causing “a quiet revolution” in women‟s lives. BRAC has 
had no written “theory of development” (Lovell 1992:24), but to achieve its goals, has 
adopted Myrdal‟s concept (1968) of institution building (DKA 1990). Korten has 
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presented BRAC as a “learning organisation,” one that develops a capacity to respond 
positively, learns from previous errors, and plans with the people, thus linking 
knowledge-building with action (Korten 1980:498).  Lovell (1992) describes BRAC as a 
flat organisation which has decentralised its decision making process into small units: 
“BRAC‟s structure is very flat, with few intermediate levels between top management 
and field implementation” (Lovell 1992:123).  Feldman held a opposite view who argues 
that BRAC is an organisation that illustrates the process of hierarchical 
institutionalisation – the professionalism of staff, a growing dependence on a rank 
structure, and a division of labour and specialisation able to sustain a technically 
proficient skill base to meet client and donor demand (Feldman 2003:17).  
 
1.3 Modern Bangladesh and its Ecology 
 
Ibn Battuta, a 13th century Moroccan traveller described Bangladesh as “a hell full of 
good things” (Gibb 2002:267). Since time immemorial, paradoxes and contradictions 
have characterised the cultural, social and political lives of its inhabitants. Bangladesh is 
a land of contrasts.  It is variously described as a land whose „granary is full of rice‟ and 
„ponds are full of fish‟, but it is also a land that experiences famine and poverty (Sen 
1981).  Historically, it has been deemed a peaceful place, but a Mughul ruler considered 
it as a bulghak-khana (house of turbulence). 
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Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971, but its political boundaries were 
decided by the British colonial authorities in 1947. Modern Bangladesh has a somewhat 
negative image.  The former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, described 
Bangladesh as a „bottomless basket,‟ although this basket is now producing a near-
surplus of rice and food crops, and the micro-credit model of Nobel laureate Muhamamd 
Yunus has become a global model for poverty alleviation.  Bengali politicians vigorously 
voice the need to establish democratic institutions, but instead are producing demagogues 
and dictators (Mannan 2008a, Mannan 1993a).  Bangladesh has a fine constitution, but 
politicians not only ignore it, but also fictionalise it in their interpretations.  The majority 
of Bengali Muslims ardently pursue and practice Islam, but they hardly understand, and 
make little effort to comprehend, the true content of the holy Qu‟ran, resulting in the 
creation of an idealistic and popular Islam. After Independence, Bangladesh became „a 
test case for development‟ (Faaland and Parkinson 1976), a place to try out the latest 
development theories. The many development agencies have not eradicated poverty, 
despite having pumped billions of dollars into the country. Such foreign aid has created a 
new rich class and elite to the detriment of ever-increasing numbers of poor people. 
 
Bangladesh is located on a large delta facing the Bay of Bengal to the South.  The open 
plains of India are located to the West and Northwest, and a rim of mountain ranges 
surround it at a distance from the Himalayan Mountains in the North to the disconnected 
hill systems of Assam and Myanmar in the South.  The delta represents the most complex 
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river system of the South Asian subcontinent with three major rivers - the Padma 
(Ganges), the Jamuna (Brahmaputra) and the Meghna.   
 
The country comprises 250 major and small rivers, and more than 3,000 tributaries, 
distributaries, canals and wetlands, silted islets (chars), etc. The mixture of fresh and salt 
water influences the nature of rivers and the shape the character of the Bengal delta. It 
supports a range of dynamic ecosystems, from mangrove forests (about 577,100 
hectares), natural lakes, man-made reservoirs including Kaptai Lake, freshwater marshes 
(about 400 haors), oxbow lakes (about 5,488 baors), freshwater depressions (about 1,000 
beels), fishponds and tanks (about 115,000 hectares), plus estuaries and seasonally 
inundated extensive flood plains (Khan 1993:1).  Water is consequently central to 
Bangladesh life which “is not so much a land upon water as water upon land” (Novak 
1993:22). 
 
The boatmen use the three major river systems to divide Bangladesh into three distinct 
agro-ecological zones (see figure 1.2).   The boatmen have the following saying that 
reflects the ecology of these three regions:  
 
Badhai Jai Ghada; 
The donkey goes to Badha; 
Beel-a Jai Mois; 
The buffalo goes to Beel; 
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Moner Joto Dukkher Khota 
Tell all the sad stories 
Boro Puub-e Jai-a Koish 
at Boro Puub 
 
Diagram 1.2: Map of Bangladesh  
 
Badha refers to the Khulna and Barisal region, which is the immature and active delta 
(Rashid 1991:29-36).  This region is located south of the Padma and West of the lower 
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Meghna rivers.  In the Badha area, farmers sow broadcast Aman
8
 rice.   It is also known 
as the miracle rice region, because the stems of the paddy grow with increasing water 
depth in oxbow lakes.  They harvest the rice in hip-deep water, which is hard work like 
that done by a donkey in the water.  Beel refers to the regions west of the Jamuna river 
and north of the Padma.  This area is a moribund delta (Rashid 1991:29-36) where there 
are many different rivers, often one cross-cutting the other.  In the Beel area, farmers 
harvest Aman rice in neck-deep water, like the water buffalo with its body immersed in 
water. Boro Puub refers to the region that is south of the Jamuna and north of the Padma 
rivers through which the old Brahmaputra flows. This is the central delta basin (Rashid 
1991:29-36) that includes the depressed land of Krishopganj and Sunamganj, located 
within the “haor basin eco-system” (Ali 1990).  In the Boro Puub area, farmers harvest 
Aman rice from small dinghy boats, also hard work.     
 
1.4 Development and Transformation of Rural Society 
 
The political struggles of Bengal have left the villages largely undisturbed (Haq 
2004:92).  This is now changing.  Bangladesh, with its 69,000 villages and 90% rural 
population, is largely an agrarian society. Agriculture contributes 72% of GDP and 60% 
of employment.  In recent years, although there are several large cities, villages remain 
socially important. A village is recognized by a cluster of households functionally tied to 
each other, usually surrounded by lush green trees and bushes and separated by arable 
                                                     
8
 Aman is rice grown in the period between June and October. 
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fields from other villages. All villages have a basic structure built on families with larger 
social groupings that feature traditionally conferred roles and statuses. Villages also have 
secondary structures and organisations, which have evolved through direct interaction 
with outside forces to serve certain purposes and goals. Although the peasantry 
constitutes the subsistence foundation of the country, the governance of politico-
economic affairs of their communities depends on a complex power structure that 
operates beyond their boundaries (Mannan 2005). 
 
The forces of globalization have greatly modified rural society - its social, political and 
economic structures. Local economic activities and needs are interconnected within a 
global web of cause and effect, over which the rural population has little control. Even 
the most remote villages are now drawn into global markets. Such integration has become 
possible in part because Bangladesh has been pursuing development policies aimed at 
achieving a higher quality of life through sustained and rapid adjustments in its society‟s 
productive capacity, and concomitantly its political and social organisation.  These 
policies have large implications for local social and political structure and economy. The 
state has largely failed to mitigate the negative social effects and manage the penetration 
of the market economy.  Its policies emphasise a more democratic and vibrant civil 
society, but political and economic power is still concentrated in the hands of certain 
individuals and social groups, frequently to the detriment of the interests of the common 
people. 
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Villages have factionalised, leading to convoluted power structures. In particular, there 
has been a remodelling of relations between local civil society (samaj) and global society 
represented by NGOs, and traditional markets and external market forces represented by 
multinationals. On the whole, this has resulted in local civil society, traditional markets 
and governance structures slowly disappearing under the weight of the state, 
national/global markets and donor agencies. At the same time, no institutions and 
movements have emerged to deal with the daily anxieties and exploitative relations in 
local village contexts.  
 
 1.4.1 Genesis of Transformation 
 
Bangladesh has made remarkable advances in some areas including food production, 
safety net programmes, rural infrastructure, credit provisions, primary education, family 
planning, drinking water supply and reduction of population growth; all largely 
attributable to state intervention. However, once all gains are taken into account, the net 
rate of reduction in poverty in the 1990s appears to be only around one per cent annually 
(Rahman 2000).  Little progress has been made on the question of landlessness and land 
reform (Mannan 2001a). Modernization processes have led to the breakdown of extended 
families, with increased emphasis on nuclear families. There has been considerable 
erosion of social values, with diminishing authority of elders and an increase in rural 
violence.  
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Many changes have occurred in the semi-feudal peasantry (Mukherjee 1957:53-56) due 
to the activities of donors, multinationals and financial institutions in collaboration with 
the state. The expansion of donor-supported road infrastructure programme and 
communications between villages and urban areas, together with a simultaneous 
transformation of subsistence agriculture into commercialised agriculture, has increased 
dominance by outside institutions such as the state, market and development 
organisations. These processes led to a rural-urban continuum, which has many 
implications for power relations at the village level. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, a tremendous growth has taken place in the road network. In 1947, 
Bangladesh had just 459 kilometres of roads (Jansen et al., 1987:15), whereas by 1999 
there were 17,554 kilometres (BSS 1999: 247).  For example, it now takes only four 
hours to travel from Bogra to the capital city, Dhaka, which previously took nearly 12 
hours even as recently as three years ago. One in every three Bangladeshi villages is now 
accessible by road from their nearest regional cities. The donor-financed high profile 
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and CARE (an international NGO) 
have been central in developing the road infrastructure in rural areas. 
 
The growth of the road network has many implications. Firstly, road communications 
promote rural mobility and migration particularly that of younger men and women 
moving to cities, while married women and elderly men are left behind (Islam and 
Ahmad, 1984). They migrate to urban areas in order to work in the garment industries, 
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public sectors and other urban occupations. These economic opportunities open up new 
horizons for self-advancement, notably for rural young women.  Secondly, remittances 
from migrant workers, especially from the Middle East , are an important part of rural 
household incomes, rising from 3.7 per cent in 1987–88 to 18.5 per cent in 2000 
(Rahman  2001).  Those who remain in rural areas work largely in agriculture, with some 
today finding employment pulling rickshaw vans, and in carpentry, masonry, and so 
forth.    
 
Further rural changes have occurred with the introduction of high yielding varieties of 
rice, known as the “green revolution”. New technologies, together with fertilisers and 
irrigation, have altered agricultural practices. Farmers are now able to extend from 
previous rain-fed practices to dry-season cultivation and are using power tillers in 
addition to draft animals (Adhikary and Rahman 1999:7).  Many development agencies, 
such as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and several NGOs have played an important 
role in helping farmers to diversify their crops. This has created new opportunities for 
multinational companies to market seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation 
technologies even in the remotest villages. The overall result of this agricultural 
diversification is impressive. For example, by the early 1980s, the Bogra district 
produced a grain surplus of 82–100 per cent over local needs (Crow 1999:151). The 
thriving agriculture sector offers employment throughout the year.  A peasant in the 
district proudly told the author: “baro mashe tero foshol.” (We get thirteen crops in 
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twelve months). The rise in agricultural business led an informant to remark, “if we stop 
marketing our crops, people in Dhaka would starve.” 
 
1.5  Bangladesh: Hierarchical Structure and Values 
 
Bangladesh is currently experiencing rapid social change and transformation, with 
cultural flux and fluidity resulting in changes in values. There is an interplay of 
international and local forces in this transformative process. Globalisation is partly 
responsible, as Bangladesh is increasingly integrated into the wider world. And local 
NGOs are prominent agents of change. This thesis asks: to what extent do NGOs, as 
bearers of international/universal values (e.g. gender issues, human rights, political 
equality
9
, etc.), contribute to the changing of hierarchical and community values in rural 
Bangladeshi society. It focuses particularly on the extent to which the poor, and 
particularly poor women, accept or reject these values.  In promoting 
international/universal values, as required by funding agencies, NGOs may knowingly or 
unknowingly, decentre and decontextualise their development agendas.  This may occur, 
for instance, through negotiation or even confrontation with other interests, such as those 
represented by religious leaders and local elites, which are also seeking to influence, even 
control, the process of change.  
 
                                                     
9
In the development world, it is believed that the Western ideas comprise of equality and liberty, although 
in reality they may not reflect equality, and appear as signs of a hegemonic presence.       
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This requires an analysis of human behaviour and hierarchy in Bangladesh.  Bangladesh 
Muslim society composes a social formation wherein a class-based society is emerging 
from a large peasant one (Mannan 1990a). The coexistence of peasant and capitalist 
classes results in the rise of new values, but some peasant values are either reproduced to 
cope with the new situation or simply disappear. This happens because the development 
of class relations, which is hierarchical too, has not completely been able to eliminate 
age-old hierarchical values and ideology; traditional hierarchy shows resilience as it 
accommodates to the values associated with capitalism.  Thus, like Malaysia, the 
emerging Bengali capitalist class “has been steadily shedding its ties to labourers and 
tenants but…acts in a largely pre-capitalist normative atmosphere that makes it extremely 
difficult to justify the actions it has taken” (Scott 1985:184).   
 
Bengali society is divided into urban and rural and also divided along class lines 
informed by kinship.  The urban side grew from 1947, during the second colonial phase
10
 
as  East Pakistan, and the urbanization process accelerated after independence in 1971.  
During the second colonial phase the middle class grew and subsequently polarised into 
rich and middle classes in post colonial Bangladesh (Mannan 1990a; Siddiqui et al. 
1990).  However, class divisions are cross cut by kinship relationships.  Many rich 
persons have poor kin (Mannan 1990b:143-169). 
  
                                                     
10
 The first colonial phase ends in 1947 with the end of British colonial rule.    
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Traditional village structures (Bertocci 1970) and peasant society generally (Hashmi 
1992), shaped by syncretistic tradition (Roy 1983) and rural Islam influence Bengali 
culture (Eaton 1997).  New capitalist informed arrangements are emerging in villages 
(Mannan 2005) with the gradual integration of Bangladesh with the West and Middle 
South through the process of Westernization and Islaminization (Gardner 1997).  While 
many modern urban Bengali are adopting the western life style, language, eating 
behaviours, fashion, etc.; others reject western ideology in favour of Islamic revivalism 
while adopting western technology and economy.  Consequently, modern Bengalis 
encompass both western and Muslim identities, while the rural population adheres to 
popular Islam (Haq 1975).   The implication is that there are three sets of values that are 
complementary at some points and contradictory at others.  Capitalism values 
competition, but Bengalis organise competition by reproducing groups according to 
traditional loyalty, clan lines, kinship, districtism, etc.  Islam values moral order and 
focuses on the community ethic of ummah. Rural values emphasize the maintenance of 
hierarchical relations and subsistence stability. 
 
This social formation exhibits the complex equation of three ideological values, namely, 
individualism induced by westernization, the hierarchy that characterises peasant society, 
and behaviour shaped by the religion of Islam
11
.  Individualism refers to the indivisible 
elementary person (Dumont 1980:9) who is supposed to be self-driven, pursues personal 
                                                     
11
 Bengalis typically accommodate three value systems, which is captured by all daily news papers.  Daily 
news papers ritually publish English, Islamic and Bengali calendars indicating how a populace maintain 
their different life-styles and value systems.     
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goals, is rational and aggressively competes with other individuals.  Individualism is the 
result of people‟s interest to obtain western commodities, values and ideas.  The urge to 
conform to the West (Barth 1996:28) creates a basis for flourishing industrial 
technologies and knowledge that in turn cause deep structural changes in the 
organisations and traditional technologies of the developing countries (Mannan 1995a, 
1995b).   
 
Hierarchy constitutes a system of individuals, social classes or groups ranked from higher 
to lower in terms of status.  Hierarchy refers to “the conscious form of reference of the 
parts to the whole in the system” (Dumont 1980:65) and to “the principle by which the 
elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole” (Dumont 1980:66).  Hierarchical 
values and associated entrenched ideologies continue to inform social relationships in 
Muslim Bangladesh society.  In the context of wider Indian society, Muslims reproduced 
the caste hierarchy (Ahmad 1978: xviii-xix).  It comprises an ideology in which people 
allocate social and cultural values vertically. However, rank for Muslims of Bangladesh 
is qualitatively different from that found in the Indian caste system.   
 
Hierarchy informs much Bengali behaviour.  Rank depends on wealth, education, 
lineage, clan, employment, and differences in age.  When people meet everyday, they try 
to assess and establish each other‟s relative rank.  Maloney provides an excellent 
discussion on the cultural roots of the power and paradoxes of Bengali hierarchy 
(Maloney 1988: 40-66).  Behaviour reflects hierarchy in two ways.  In the first, there is 
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the idea of patronage that operates both above and below the self (Maloney 1988:42). A 
person of higher rank expects to demand service and respect in exchange for patronage.  
Bengalis feel it is their moral right to share the wealth and goodness of persons above 
them in the hierarchy.  Patronage creates an expectation in the lower ranks for daya 
(indulgence) and doya (blessings).   It implies redistribution of wealth and personal aura 
that are central to the Bengali notion of hierarchy.  The lower ranks accept and accredit 
the personalization of the authority of the patrons through their reliance on daya and 
doya.  Bengalis do not usually give themselves over to abstract goals, social programmes 
or ideologies (Maloney 1988:52-53), rather follow a person who they recognize as of 
higher rank and giving patronage.  But Bengalis also show pragmatic individualism 
which may caught with the structure of patronage.  They are individualists in that they 
behave to maximize opportunities through social relations, giving weight not to 
ideologies, institutions or abstract rules, but “to the reality of dyadic human relations” 
(Maloney 1988:52). 
 
The Bengali normative culture stresses the fusion of the individual with family, attiya-
svazan (kinship), gusthi (lineage), bangsha (descent), samaj
12
 (social collectivity), etc. 
(Mannan 2002)  For most of the villagers, it is important to be “a member of a samaj.  
The samaj upholds a moral order which acts as a compelling force on its members and in 
recent history at any rate, membership into samaj has been seen to be more enduring than 
that in a state (Blanchet 1996: 27). Morality is an ideology of attiya-svazan, gusthi and 
                                                     
12
 For detailed discussion on samaj see chapter 7. 
  
24 
 
bangsha.   The moral order of the Bengali peasant system, like that of South East  Asia, is 
characterised by the obligation of reciprocity, the right to subsistence, just prices for 
goods, etc. (Scott, 1976). However, the Bengali moral economy is not influenced by risk 
aversion, assumptions of scarcity or subsistence woes, but derived from locally generated 
values of abundance and indulgence (Greenough 1982:832).   
 
The framework of the moral economy in Bengali peasant society also features amoral 
individualism (Greenough 1982:833), in other words, “robust individualism” (Khan 
1996:145)
13
.  However, a Bengali should suppress his individualism in a hierarchical 
situation where there is a dominant figure to whom he must show respect – father, elder 
brother, employer, or officer.  He observes the moral order that expects the person of 
higher status to exert more personal force (Maloney 1988:52).   Recognition of patron 
relations and pragmatic individualism result in tension, rivalry and flux where differences 
in rank are small.  Upper and middle class Bengalis tend to be shaped by corruption, 
chicanery, perjury, and smooth promises that create jealousy, cynicism about the human 
character, and slanderous, loose talk about others‟ corruption (Novak 1993:102).  Against 
such trends in behaviour, there also exist honest, idealistic, humane and philanthropic 
people.  
 
                                                     
13
 Bangladesh villages are not tightly organised communities under individual village heads.  Instead, they 
are dominated by continually shifting alliances between family and hamlet leaders (Schendel 2009:10)  
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Religion plays an important role in bringing cohesiveness to the moral order which 
provides a collective identity to manage ranking and hierarchy in the society (Dumont 
1980:66).  The hierarchical values and norms of Bangladeshi Muslim society can be seen 
on three levels: (i) the structure of society, (ii) its language, and (iii) patron-client 
relation.   
 
 1.5.1 Hierarchy and the structure of society 
  
The ideology of the Muslim umma (community) defined by the institutions of Islam and 
family laws (Rippin 1993: 115–16,  Carroll 1978), shape the hierarchical relationships of 
Bangladesh.  The Muslim umma lays emphasis on a community within which all – 
women and men – are equal in their relationship to Allah.   People argue that Islam is the 
only religion which ensures women‟s rights.  The notion of umma, at least  in theory, 
allows women to enjoy these rights. The Qur‟an provides many rights for women (Doi 
1993).   In the context of rural Bangladesh, Bertocci views the samaj as the local 
expression of the umma (Bertocci 2001:76-80).   In reality, older males dominate the 
samaj having social authority over young males and women.  The concept of umma is a 
loose category that exists in the imagination of believers; but they cannot articulate the 
true meaning of umma (Ahmed 2001:2). The problem with umma is that Muslims are 
unable to combine the numerous global notions of umma with the local notions of 
community (nations) in the long run (Uddin 2006:178).  
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While the idea of umma emphasizes balanced gender relations, Islamic societies 
systematically exclude women from powerful institutions.  For example, men are allowed 
to enter and pray in mosques; while women are not.  When different Islamic schools of 
thought like Hanafi, Hambali, Shafi, etc., interpret the Qur‟an, they appear to be gender 
blind.  Male theologians have historically misinterpreted the equal Qur‟anic rights of 
women, so as to produce a male biased system of Islamic laws (Hassan 1991a, 1991b, 
1994).   As a result, men‟s views are put higher then women‟s views, and they create 
obstacles to the equal participation of women in traditional institutions (Mannan 
2004:311).  Islamic laws are concerned with inheritance, marriage and similar issues, and 
these constitute a social system that encourages the reproduction of extended family 
groupings (Rippin 1993: 115–16). This ideology of the family places women in the 
private sphere to undertake household duties, and raise children
14
.   
 
 1.5.2 Hierarchy and language 
 
The Bengali language, that is the shadu vasha has been influenced of modern English 
prose form.  In the process of evolution, it would form a syntax that incorporates 
individualism into social ranking and hierarchical social relationships.   People define 
their lives in hierarchical terms, boro-choto (big-small). murubbi-choto (elder-junior), 
guru-shishaya (teacher-disciple),  adab-beadab (respect-disrespect), sroddha-osrodha 
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 The problem is that when people accept Islam, the resultant hierarchy tends to informed by gender 
relations.  The religious construction of hierarchy works in a complex way in a class society.  For example, 
many rich religious women dominate over poor men.  Moreover, when people irrespective of their class 
background cultivate kinship relations, they blur the class relations and produce holism (Mannan 1990b).           
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(deference-disrespect), jat-bejat (honoured-dishonoured), binoyee-abinoyee (polite-
impolite), etc.  These criteria of rank are embedded in Bengali behavioural codes (Davis 
1983:69).  For example, the English pronoun „you‟ is used in Bengali in a hierarchical 
order of apni, tumi and tui.  The application of apni, tumi and tui also shape the tone, tune 
and grammar of language to determine one‟s own position in the hierarchy.   Apni is the 
highest category and used to show deference and respect. This form, as assumed, was 
introduced by the Aryans
15
.   
 
The use of tui is contextual as it can be used either to address a person of an inferior 
status or to express affectionate relationships.  The tui form is carried over into Bengali 
language from its erstwhile clan culture and many small ethnic groups of Bangladesh still 
talk in tui form.  Tumi is a middle order which indicates neither respect nor inferior 
status.  This form has evolved with the mix and intermarriage of Aryan and dark skin 
Bengali people.   
 
As an outcome “a lower class of Aryan society, less hostile to agriculture pursuits, was 
gradually developing" (Ling 1968:35). Both Aryans and proto-Australoids required new 
terms to address the lower class Aryans. On the one hand, Aryans could not address the 
                                                     
15
 Human biologists hold the view that Bengalis are a hybrid people. The four races of proto-Australoid, 
Negritos, Mongolians and Aryan admixed in the prehistoric period (Ray 1994:15-49, Sengupta 2001: 8-11, 
Gunewardena 1980: 54-57). It is possible that these four groups migrated to and settled in ancient Bengal, 
which possessed not only rich and fertile land, but also was located on the periphery of Indian and Chinese 
cultures (Zaman 2005:39). Prior to the advent of Muslim rule in 1204, it is possible that no notion of 
Bengal or Bengali existed. During Muslim rule (1204-1757), the land acquired the appellation Bangala or 
Bangalah (Rahim 1963:2-9). In common parlance, Bangladesh, which comprises two words: „Bang‟ and 
„Desh,” stands for the „land of Bengali speaking people,‟ although this meaning is contested.  
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lower class Aryans with the proto-Australoid term tui as they were of higher status than 
proto-Australoids. On the other hand, proto-Australoids could not use the Aryan term 
apne as lower class Aryans‟ status did not deserve such a mark of respect. Thus, both felt 
the need for a middle category, which they developed from the word tumik-kha 
(Shahidullah 1999:69).  Later, tumik-kha was simplified to tumi.    
 
1.5.3  Hierarchy and  patron-client relationships 
 
An uneven economy also reinforces the structure of hierarchy where a few patrons 
exercise control over resources, with others as their clients.  The traditional patron-client 
relationship evolved from the land-centric economic and social activities of peasant 
society and represents a uni-focal power structure (Jansen 1987). The traditional patron-
client relationship is influenced by numerous factors including: the multiple inheritance 
system with many heirs to a family land plot; individual property rights to land; scarcity 
and unequal distribution of land; lack of employment and other sources of livelihood; the 
need for political and physical protection; and access to resources in rural areas made 
available by government (Jansen 1990:25-6). The patrons as local heroes have always 
existed in Bangladeshi villages at different times; they manage the affairs of village 
communities (Arens and van Beurden 1977; Bertocci 1970; Chowdhury 1978; Islam 
1978; Jahangir 1979; Karim 1990; Thorp 1978; Wood 1976).     
 
  
29 
 
The gradual integration of villages into the wider society and also the penetration of the 
state, market and development personal have given rise to a multi-focal power structure 
with patrons in the market elite, political elite, NGO elite, etc.  However, these patrons, 
instead of developing class-based relationships with peasants, reproduce the traditional 
patron-client norms to define their ties with clients (Makita 2007, Mannan 2005). This 
has created two problematic situations. First, the clients felt that the culture of loyalty, 
deference and respect did not serve their purposes because the patrons were failing to 
honour their traditional obligations (Greenough 1982: 832).  Secondly, the multi-polar 
power structure gave rise to a multiplicity of elites and patrons where no single patron is 
able to dominate the rural power structure as in the case of erstwhile land-centric patrons. 
The competition among patrons created a situation of balance as hardly any patron could 
dominate the social and political order in the absence of “champions” (Rahman and Islam 
2002:159).  
 
In this new situation, peasants are at a crossroads between traditional forms of loyalty 
based on patron-client relationships and class-based economic relationships. While the 
elite compete with each other to ensure their influence over multi-focal power structures, 
poor peasants try to use both traditional normative patron-client values and their class 
consciousness, whichever fit them best. This also suggests that while a peasant may show 
respectful behaviour to a patron, he may also criticise the same patron behind his back in 
order to win favour from other competing patrons.   
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1.6  Individualism versus Hierarchy  
 
There is a complex relationship between hierarchy and individualism. The degree and 
magnitude to which either hierarchical or individual values are complied with vary from 
person to person. Bengalis creatively accommodate competing and often mutually 
opposed configurations and cultural values in their personalities. At the present time, both 
hierarchy and individualism influence each other.  Overall, individualism is seen as 
selfish as it tends to separate, instead of uniting, individuals with the group. People use 
the concept poro-sri-katorota to talk about individualism.  Poro-sri-katorota means that 
one becomes kator (piteous or plaintive cry) by observing the sri (fame or reputation) of 
por (others).  The poro-sri-katorota occurs when individuals achieve social and economic 
ascendancy, accumulate wealth and manipulate power, creating a distance from amader 
lok, one‟s own people who are ideally equal in rank and status.   
 
The term poro-sri-katorota captures the paradoxes and contradictions. First, when 
individuals are successful, their peers praise and take pride in their achievement. 
However, they feel a certain sense of sadness and sorrow at the same time as the 
successful individual breaks away from the village community. Peers exert pressure on 
the successful to take their kin and family along with him.  If they fail to support their 
own people and kin folk, peer‟s criticise them behind their backs.  This sort of hidden 
criticism is often seen as countervailing pressure to create obligations among successful 
individuals to do more for their kin. Kin obligations assert the intention to return favours 
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through reciprocal exchange, even in situations where acquisition is illegal, while 
denying the same benefits to others. The same behaviour is open to very different moral 
evaluations (Wanner 2005:519-20). 
 
Another dilemma is finding a balance between individual and hierarchical identity. Often, 
successful individuals support their kin in attaining new status and wealth, but at the 
same time, they would wish to avoid the imperatives of traditional hierarchy to maintain 
individual class identity. For example, one has to delicately balance the relationship 
between class peers and unsuccessful kin. A rich man may feel sympathetic when his 
brother fails to prosper. At the same time, he may also feel ashamed or embarrassed if he 
has to introduce his unsuccessful brother to his wealthy class peers (Mannan 1990b:171). 
This situation reproduces traditional hierarchy and the maintenance of kinship, but at the 
same time, produces individualism in the maintenance of enhanced class status among 
class peers.  The dilemma is acute in the values of modern Bengalis; the situation fits 
well into Marx's analysis on the middle class, where a person deep "down in his 
heart…flatters himself that he is impartial and has found the right equilibrium, which 
claims to be something different from the just-milieu. Such a petty bourgeoisie glorifies 
contradiction in the essence of his existence. He is himself simply social contradiction in 
action. He must justify in theory what he is in practice... " (Marx 1978:178).   
 
There is a tension between hierarchy and individualism. Individualism undervalues 
hierarchy, and hierarchy tends to neutralise individualism. Many modern Bengalis aspire 
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to become elementary rational people.  At the same time, Bengalis think of hierarchy as 
moral and individualism as immoral.  The morality of hierarchy is measured against the 
immorality of individualism.  At some moments, individuals are recognised, but at others 
the boundary is blurred between self and society, individual and role.     
 
1.7 Hierarchical values and the structure of NGO projects 
 
In development contexts, hierarchical values are manifest in complex ways.  
Development seeks to bring educated NGO staff closer to the rural poor.  NGOs 
implement projects informed by the idea of equality and liberty.   When people come into 
contact with projects they develop a sense of individualism, but instead of developing 
individualism, villagers reproduce a new form of collectivism.   
 
Projects attempt at modernization maintain that certain sets of values, those considered 
universal such as gender equality, good governance, human rights or right based 
approaches, environmental sustainability and market capitalism, are not negotiable 
(Marsden 1994:35).  Global policy language, which seeks consensus and equality, shapes 
these assumptions (Arce and Fisher 2003:74).  Despite diverse social, cultural, political 
and economic settings around the world, NGOs frequently seek to talk the same language 
and follow similar development agendas (Mawdsley et.al 2002:1).    
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Development agencies believe that women are not treated equally in many parts of the 
world, including Bangladesh.  The assumption is that all women wish to be „free‟ like 
Western women.  Many people in development cannot understand (or believe) that 
women elsewhere may have other values, for example, they may wish to wear a veil  
(Rozario 2006).   The emphasis placed on gender as development attempted to impose 
“universal values”  over the last twenty years has had some unforeseen consequences. It 
sets women against men rather than developing equitable relationships between men and 
women (Mannan 2004).   For example, many believe that poor women want to become 
secular and shun their purdah.  On the contrary, many women think that if they were 
more affluent, they would buy a burka (veiling cloak) and observe purdah properly
16
.  
The engagement of women in development results in at least  three images of women in 
Muslim society.  First, there is the image of modern and secular women promoted by 
NGOs. They are measured on a poverty scale by which international organisations assess 
modernity and progress. Second, there is the image of Muslim women promoted by the 
Islamic patriarchy.  Women wear the hijab as a symbol of their Islamic identity. Such 
Muslims believe that the West, as in the colonial days, is employing NGOs to promote 
poverty and pollute the Islamic faith (Mannan 2004:313).  Third, there is the image of 
women based on local ideas, constructed by local customs and beliefs (Shiva 1988).  
These three interpretations conflict with each other in depicting the lives of women.  In 
reality, women in villages continue to live beyond the Western and Islamic paradigms as 
they have for generations (Mannan 2004: 313).    
                                                     
16
 When I interviewed 60 women on what they would do when they become richer through a micro-credit 
project, 46 of them replied that they would first buy burka  to observe purdah to maintain piety.  
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The idea of socio-economic development came from the West (Herbon 1994). “The 
Northrern notion of development has characteristics that derive from its own historical 
evolution – starting with the industrial revolution and colonial expansion -  and so has 
cultural and ethical foundations that are peculiar to the North” (Tegegn:1997:8). It 
ignores the reality of the poor and their local knowledge, which are the products of their 
society and beliefs and their individual experiences (Eade 1997:6).  Many projects fail to 
link with the knowledge of the people (Sillitoe 2002a). Many, especially the proponents 
of modernization theory, think that the value system embedded in Bengali hierarchical 
relationships needs to change in order for economic development to proceed.  
 
It is interesting that NGOs give the impression to outsiders that they agree with 
modernising agendas and values, while within they maintain hierarchical relationships 
like those in the wider society. The question now arises: How do local NGO staff 
members manage the tensions that arise when promoting development programmes that 
are opposed to their own cultural values and norms? There are two answers.  Firstly, in a 
country with high unemployment (above 45%), among both the educated and the poor, 
people take whatever project work comes along, even though it may be contrary to their 
values. They do not think of the long term consequences, but only of immediate gain. As 
one commentator put it, “they don‟t reject or oppose them, because, in their poverty, they 
feel that some little benefit might eventually be derived from them.  Poverty is indeed 
relieved by such projects to a small extent” (Menike 1997:27).  Despite the acceptance of 
projects and gradual domination of NGOs over their lives, poor people endeavour to 
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protect, whenever possible, their cultural norms and nuances. “It is cultural barriers 
provided by the norms and values of religion that serve to protect the poor from total 
domination” (Menike 1997:27). 
 
Secondly, although projects nurture a sense of equality, they often achieve the opposite in 
developing countries.  Projects of modernization create new hierarchical relationships, 
reinforcing the idea that local knowledge is inferior to the knowledge of modern science 
and technology (Sillitoe 2002a:112).  A new hierarchy emerges with the donor at the top 
followed by the NGO, and beneficiaries at the bottom.  Even though many donors and 
NGOs talk about participation of the poor in agency and NGO designed projects, no 
projects evolve from the poor.  In this sense, projects represent a „constructed reality‟ of 
the poor, which often opposes the „grounded reality‟ of the poor.       
 
The direction of development is not unilineal, but multi-lineal.  The dynamics of NGOs 
depend on dealing with internal negative attitudes while building an external positive 
image. It is important for NGOs to project a positive image, as this plays role in attracting 
foreign aid. Unfortunately, the more an NGO attempts to promote a positive image to the 
outside world, the more it appears to nurture and cultivate exploitative relationships both 
with its staff and beneficiaries.  The further one is away from NGOs the easier it is to see 
them in a positive light, but the closer one is the more one sees a negative image. Insiders 
experience social relationships shaped by exploitation.  
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1.8 Development and Hybrid Culture 
 
When projects are implemented, interactions take place between Western values of 
equality and Bangladeshi values of hierarchy.  They interfere with the hierarchical values 
and the indigenous knowledge of people to produce many forms of new culture, some of 
which may be termed as a „hybrid culture.‟ Hybrid culture is a “product of modern and 
traditional cultural practices and the many forms in between” (Escobar 1995:52).  
Hybridity involves the mixing together of previously discrete cultural elements to create 
new meanings and identities (Barker 2004:89). It creates a connection between two 
cultural realities “that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” 
(Bhabha 1994: 4).  Hybrid culture results from two processes.  First, when NGOs adopt 
global policy language, this may result in syncretism between indigenous hierarchical 
cultural norms and nuances and the Western ideas of equality and rights.  Second, the 
global policy can be at odds with local understanding, so conflicts arise as intentions 
differ (Arce and Fisher 2003:74).  Hybridity in the age of globalisation means that the 
different parts of a cultural environment, and the life-worlds of people, are affected by 
outside influence at different speeds and to differing degrees. “Sometimes people are 
acutely aware of changes taking place in their immediate environment, and take measures 
to stop it, to enhance it or to channel it in their preferred direction. At other times, people 
may be unaware of these processes, even if foreign influences and cultural mixing may 
change their cultural environment profoundly” (Eriksen 2007:113).  Hybridity is not a 
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single idea or a unitary concept, but it “is an association of ideas, concepts, and themes 
that at once reinforce and contradict each other” (Kraidy 2005:vi).     
 
The expectations of hierarchy and equality meet to form a new hybrid culture in 
development.  In this new context, projects speed up the erosion of hierarchical values.  
One may neither adhere to hierarchical values, nor become the overt bearer of new values 
of equality. Rather, traditionally cherished hierarchical values and ideologies are 
fragmented in order to allow access to sets of „ideas‟ about development and projects.  
There is tension, as the hierarchy demands acceptance and loyalty, but equality 
encourages debate and criticism.                
 
NGO intervention causes change in the structure of society with deep implications for 
behaviour.  NGOs might bring short term economic gain, but cause social confusion, 
friction, tension and even conflict in the long run. The social and cultural confusion 
accumulates as NGOs, in general, do not asses the sensitive cultural and social problems 
that arise.  Instead, they continuously introduce new projects upon completion of the old 
ones in a culturally insensitive way. Projects change the local reality and behaviour of 
project beneficiaries, particularly that of women, without modifying the wider 
environment.  
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1.9 Outline of Chapters 
 
This thesis views development as a multi-layered phenomenon, where each layer 
influences other layers. This chapter (Ch 1) has introduced NGOs in Bangladesh and the 
issue of development and explains the problematic relations between hierarchy and 
equality. Chapter 2 explains the methodology used to collect the data. It also reviews the 
debate between development anthropology and the anthropology of development.   
 
Chapter 3 describes the history and evolution of NGOs in Bangladesh, as informed by 
development concepts, theories and ideas.  It is in this context that Bangladesh‟s largest 
NGO – BRAC – operates.  The thesis will trace how new development agendas, 
influenced by global politics, are brought in every few years to replace the previous ones, 
just as the latter are establishing themselves. The result is tension, or even conflict, 
between those who have to carry out the new agendas.   
 
Chapter 4 deals with the notion of projects as a feature of NGO organisational culture.  It 
argues that describing NGOs, such as BRAC as organisations, is a misnomer.   While 
BRAC portrays the image of an organisation, it actually comprises numerous projects 
implemented in village communities. An „onion‟ serves as a metaphor for the 
organisation, each layer of the onion comprising a project.   
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Chapter 5 focuses on the organisational culture of BRAC.  It shows how in seeking to 
reconcile Western and Bengali values, it creates a new hybrid culture, which may or may 
not be conducive to development.  The governance of BRAC features traditional Bengali 
norms which create tensions for staff who seek to run BRAC according to the principles 
of modern professionalism.       
 
Chapter 6 discusses the organisational culture of BRAC from the view point of the 
relationship between researchers and development managers, who both seek to effect 
BRAC policies, but have different views resulting in what may be termed „cooperative 
antagonism‟ (i.e. they try to cooperate, but their different views lead to antagonism).  The 
ever-changing nature of the development projects that BRAC implements informs this 
cooperative antagonism.  This chapter also investigates the power structure of NGOs in 
order to show the imbalance between researchers (including anthropologists) and 
development managers.   
 
Chapter 7 outlines the process by which BRAC forms village organisations (VOs) to 
implement development projects locally, and how these conflict with the traditional 
social structure. VOs organise women for credit and saving purposes, giving rise to 
matri-focal groups previously unknown in village society.  Although such matri-focal 
groups are a positive development for women participating in VOs, it challenges the male 
dominated samaj (village associations). There are many instances of samaj opposing 
NGO organized VOs that are central to the delivery of micro-credit.          
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Chapter 8 examines the implications of micro-credit for Bengali village culture.  Money 
received in micro-credit may be “moral” (noitik/vhalo) or “immoral” (anoitik/kharaf).  
Although micro-credit offers immediate economic advantages, it creates cultural 
problems in the long run as it encourages Western-style individualism that conflicts with 
Bengali hierarchical values.  As people begin to feel that micro-credit is distorting their 
lives, they start to oppose it and this has proved fertile ground for religious leaders 
wishing to oppose NGOs. 
 
Chapter 9 analyses the tensions between NGO personnel and the religious leaders.  It 
argues that NGOs promote religious opposition. The politics of NGOs, with their talk of 
empowerment through development, disturbs the balance of village society.  NGOs take 
for granted that local people approve of their activities, and ignore the counter tendencies 
working against them, which are manifested in alliances of religious groups that oppose 
their work.     
 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by showing how the NGO‟s approach interacts with 
Bengali value systems to spark a social transformation through interaction with diverse 
ideologies, institutions and individuals.  NGOs also promote dependency of the poor on 
their projects. 
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GCHAPTER TWO 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I shall discuss two aspects of methodology central to this study.  Firstly 
the justification for doing fieldwork within my own culture.  Secondly issues concerning 
the field itself.  The ethnography of development agencies and NGOs is a growing area of 
study.  A large number of studies are available on NGOs, but only few studies deal with 
the anthropology and ethnography of development organisations (Crewe and Harrison 
1999; Gellner and Hirsch 2001; Harper 2000; Lewis 2003; Mosse 2005; Wright 1994; 
Zaman 2005, 2001). Traditionally, some anthropologists worked for colonial 
administrations (Asad 1973), the majority independently in communities (King 1999, 
Salem-Murdock et.al. 1990) and, later some in development (Grillo and Stirrat 1997), a 
few were employed by governments or organisations.  Anthropologists are even 
employed by superpowers like the U.S. government in order to make its military presence 
tolerable in the Third World  (González 2007, Keenan 2008, Price 2003).    The 
management practices of development agencies and NGOs in Bangladesh have received 
little attention, primarily because of the problem of access to these organisations.  
However, NGOs do allow the carrying out of impact assessment studies and evaluations 
of projects, but they are sensitive about allowing, or may even forbid, any study of their 
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own management culture and organisations.  Impact assessment studies provide a cushion 
for both NGOs and donors, with donors observing NGOs' activities from a distance.   
 
2.2. Rationale of the Study 
 
There is a distinction between development anthropology and anthropology of 
development.  Development anthropology “has been termed the work of practitioners 
who actually design, implement or evaluate programmes of direct change” (Edelman and 
Haugerud 2005:40). The anthropology of development, on the other hand, is the study of 
development agencies and activities and may go so far as to call for a “radical critique of, 
and distancing from, the development establishment” (Escobar 1997:489).   Additional 
differences are: 
 
While development anthropologists focus on the project cycle, the use of 
knowledge to tailor projects to beneficiaries‟ cultures and situation, and the 
possibility of contributing to the needs of the poor, the anthropologists of 
development centre their analysis on the institutional apparatus, the link to 
power established by expert knowledge, the ethnographic analysis and critique 
of modernist constructs, and the possibility of contributing to the political 
projects of the subaltern (Escobar 1997: 505).  
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My research, incidentally, falls within the framework of both development anthropology 
and anthropology of development.  In fact, I worked as a development anthropologist for  
 
Photo 2.1: Author with Villagers 
 
 
nine years (1990-1999) in a large national NGO, various international NGOs and a donor 
agency.  I gathered most of my data and developed my understanding of NGOs through 
personal encounters while working for development organisations. Over the next ten 
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years (2000-2010), I spent time interpreting data, articulating my experience and 
returning to the field to cross-check information. I also collected new data, and observed 
further developments. In this way, I have been able to enrich my ideas with emerging  
 
Diagram  2.1: Fieldwork sites 
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new knowledge on development. This thesis is built on the ideas of many NGO staff, 
along with local information that I have collected over a period of eighteen years. I 
articulated the ideas here to place them within a broader perspective.   
 
In the beginning of 1990, a Norwegian anthropologist advised me, “whatever jobs you 
do, consider those jobs as your fieldwork and take notes on the culture of development 
practitioners.  At the end of the day, you will not only be able to collect and collate lots of 
data, but also will understand the pattern and trend in development.”  He encouraged me 
to study the anthropology and ethnography of development organisations, which was rare 
at that time and, also, to show how non-anthropologists can play an instrumental role in 
the development process.  This advice would enable me to locate myself as an 
anthropologist within the nexus of development actors and practitioners.  When 
reviewing my notes, I can discover how they define and construct the role of 
anthropologists.   
 
The suggestion that the anthropologist should write about development organisations also 
raises at least  two thorny issues.  The first is related to the justification of doing 
ethnography in my own country and culture as an “auto-anthropologist.” Auto-
anthropology occurs when anthropology is carried out in the social context which 
produced it (Strathern 1987:17).  Formerly, the tradition in anthropology was to do 
research in other cultures in foreign locations.  Doing fieldwork “in one‟s own society is 
not always so easy since there is so much to know beforehand about the general 
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background; more difficult to get to know is the local knowledge since this is rarely 
written down, yet can be vast” (Jackson 1987:13).  There are multiple realities in 
Bangladesh which is not a homogeneous society.  It is divided into various classes within 
two distinct social formations: the urban and rural.  There are also numerous dialects, 
around 57 dialects across Bangladesh.  These divisions have implications for the 
research.  Bangladeshi privileged elites maintain their own class exclusiveness which 
alienates them from the large mass people. This class alienation is informed by their 
indifferent attitudes toward the poor.  These members of the elites, such as NGO leaders, 
tackle poverty do so not from any social pressure or moral conscience but according to 
the development framework informed by Western concerns of poverty alleviation 
(Hossian 2005).  Born and growing up in an elite family, speaking a dialect of Chittagong 
and schooled in an elite institution, were sufficient to isolate me from the poor in 
Bangladesh society.   My family background made me an interloper.  However, my 
family‟s Sufi heritage created a context for interaction with poor rural people within the 
context of religion.  Furthermore, anthropology equipped me with the tools, methods and 
attitude to do fieldwork within my own culture using “self as informant” (Mascarenhas-
Keyes 1987:187-189). 
 
The second issue was: could I claim my long work experience in development and NGOs 
as fieldwork?  In other words, was I turning my life into a research project?  I think that I 
  
47 
 
am turning "knowing how" into "knowing that"
17
.  This is unusual, and presents its own 
problems in the sense that, on many occasions, I become a respondent and an investigator 
at the same time.  A strong point is that I know the language, the customs, etc. in the way 
that most anthropologists would only dream of knowing
18.  Doing research in one‟s own 
country and culture as “native anthropologist” means that one has to maintain a boundary 
between “own self” and “professional self” (Mascarenhas-Keyes 1987:180).  However, I 
am also aware that most experience “goes without saying because it comes without 
saying” (Bourdieu 1977:167).   I took notes regularly, on everyday interaction within 
NGOs.  For example, how junior staff meet senior managers, they expressed their total 
loyalty and remained submissive, but behind their seniors‟ backs they complained and 
grumbled because the decision-makers did not appear to bother about how their orders 
would be implemented.  Any success rewards the managers, but failure was the 
responsibility of the field workers or subordinates (Ahmad 2002:179).  These notes might 
be considered as a hidden transcript (Scott 1990).  Moreover, with a view to ethics, the 
informants and respondents were given pseudonyms where necessary.  This established 
me as an insider to negotiate “a shared reality with these Others and, with them, enters 
the realm of intersubjectivity” (Weil and Weil 1987: 189).   At the same time, I tried to be 
reflexive.  Reflexivity is a turning-back of one‟s experience upon oneself (Steier 1991: 
2).  From the beginning, I have divided NGOs into what Nolan calls the three 
environments in collecting information: inner environment, proximate environment and 
                                                     
17 “Knowing that” depends on the logical notion of “true proposition” and “knowing how” is associated 
with “practical performances” (Hirst  1981). 
18
Personal communication with Professor Michael Carrithers.   
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outer environment (Nolan 2002:108).  The first area is the inner environment of NGOs.  
The second proximate area deals with aspects of the inner environment that influence 
projects, but are in turn influenced by it.  The third area is the outer environment where 
NGOs do not have any control.  I was always careful to observe how these three areas 
maintain boundaries and different interfaces between them.  
      
An NGO must not be understood as a separate organisation, rather it should be 
understood as part of the global development bureaucracy or what is fashionably called 
„the development industry‟ (Nolan 2002).  Therefore, the anthropology of NGOs is both 
multi-layered and multi-sited.  The former is expressed through the relationship between 
donors and southern NGOs; southern NGO headquarters and its field/branch offices 
(Suzuki 1998); branch offices and beneficiaries; beneficiaries and their communities.  In 
other words, NGOs can be seen as intermediate organisations that link global 
organisations to grassroots organisations and communities.  The problem lies in that the 
global or Western donor organisations are non-visible to many in the South, who are 
unaware how they influence the southern NGOs and the life of millions.   It is a 
methodological challenge to capture, studying NGOs, the development presence of donor 
organisations in the life of poor men and women. This study is also multi-sited because 
the data come from many locations and communities within Bangladesh.   
 
Doing participant observation is difficult in a multi-layered and multi-sited contexts, 
because it requires, firstly, continuous deconstruction of ideas and notions from different 
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layers in the light of new knowledge.  Secondly, it also demands that one goes beyond the 
informants‟ explicit statements, assertions, accounts, etc. so as to discover their inner 
meaning.  People have developed sophisticated norms and nuances when answering 
questions from outsiders, instead of being direct.  The value and action found in one layer 
may be interpreted as dramatically opposite to that found in others.         
 
2.3. Experience, Methods and Development Narratives 
 
Much of the information produced in this thesis is derived from the author‟s own 
experience and practice, gathered from BRAC and several other NGOs, while working as 
a researcher, trainer and manager.  My knowledge of development and NGOs has grown 
over the years.  Table 2.1 summarises my experience.   
 
Table 2.1: Chronology of experiences in development  
Date Project and Place Research Topics Methods 
September 1990- 
March 1991 
NORAD. Nakalia, 
Pubna 
Mechanization of Country Boats Participant Observation, 
Questionnaire Survey. 
June 1991-
December 1991 
NORSK-Bangladesh 
Association, Dhaka-
Chirttagong 
Impact of Foreign Aid on 
Orphanage  
Semi Structured 
Questionnaire,  Dialogue  
January 1992-
January, 1993 
Intermediate 
Technology 
Development Group 
(ITDG), Bangladesh 
Medical Textile and Traditional 
Weaver Community; Fishery 
Project; Food Technology, 
Improved Stove Project 
Workshop, Reporter,  
Facilitator to 
Foreign Experts, 
Participant Observation, 
Formal Interview, Focus 
Group Discussion 
February-April 
1993 
NORAD. Dhaka, 
Meherpur,  Kishorganj, 
etc 
Evaluation of Five NGOs Interview, Field Visit 
May 1993-1997 BRAC Formation and analyses of 
Village Organisation; Religious 
Opposition; Gender in BRAC, 
Competency of NGO Managers; 
Democracy Partnership 
Participant Observation, 
National investigation on 
Religious Opposition, 
Semi-structured 
Questionnaire, 
Questionnaire Survey, 
Interviewing NGO 
Leaders,  Email survey 
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with global NGO Leaders, 
Workshop and Brain 
Storming; Participatory 
Rapid Appraisal (PRA); 
Managerial Role, Trainer 
Role  
1998 Save the Children, 
Australia  
Developing Strategic Plan; Street 
Children; Safe Home for Sex 
Workers‟ children 
Interview & Workshop 
with Partners, Participatory 
Research; Interview 
January 1999- 
July 1999 
NGO-EC Dialogue 
Project  
Developing Strategy and Data 
Bank for small NGOs  
Countrywide workshop to 
generate data, Structured 
Questionnaire Survey 
August 1999-
Present 
Professor, Independent University, Bangladesh 
 
2.3.1 Country Boat Project     
 
In 1990, I started my career in a donor agency as a consultant.  My job requirement was 
to evaluate the impact of mechanisation on the country‟s boats and boatmen.  A large 
boat fleet flourishes in the Bangladesh delta.  For the purpose of the study, I was assisted 
by Shahid Ali, who had an interesting background.  In his early days, he was a boatman, 
and later he completed a university education.  We selected for study Nakalia, an inland 
river port, situated at the confluence of Ichamoti river, Boral river, Hur Sagar and the 
mighty Jumuna river.  We selected Nakalia because of its fame for building large boats 
up to two-tonnes.  This boat building industry had declined due to the expansion of the 
road system (Mannan and Ali 1991).   When we arrived at Nakalia bazaar (market), it 
was almost evening.  We found shelter in a dingy and dirty jute-storehouse as there were 
no hotels, where we stayed for two days.  The Headmaster of Nakalia High School 
subsequently allowed us to live in one of the school rooms.  From the beginning we 
became aware that we were not only observing the „others‟ in the community, but the 
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„others‟ were also keenly observing us.   It is a common practice in Bengali culture to ask 
one‟s income or salary.  The boatmen were no exception.  Jokingly, we avoided such 
questions.  If we told them our income from the consultancy, it would create a power-
distance.  Moreover, it might also raise suspicions why so highly paid researchers were 
living in such a remote rural area.   We did not think ourselves doing fieldwork in adverse 
conditions and avoided an ego-centred personal experience as fetishised in anthropology 
(Kapferer 1998).   
Photo 2.2:Country boats of Bangladesh 
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In the daytime, we used to sit at a market tea-stall by the river, where boatmen came to 
drink and relax.  We offered them tea and interviewed them in an informal manner.  In 
the evening, we invited the boatmen into our room and over cups of tea and biscuits, we 
continued our discussion until late night.   
 
Frequently, we travelled in small kosha boats run by shallow engines to different chars 
(silted islets) where many boatmen, boat-builders and their families lived. We quickly 
gathered information on local knowledge of river behaviour, bank erosion, morphology 
and cosmology of the rivers (Mannan 2001b). In the meantime, we learned, gradually, 
how boat mechanisation created problems.   This started with boatmen fitting shallow 
engines, usually used for irrigation purposes, into their boats.  The government and 
donors would now like to spread the use of shallow engines and mechanise the whole 
country‟s boat sector.  This idea of mechanisation was opposed by some of the boatmen.  
They were willing to get support from the government and donors, but not for shallow 
engines. They needed a solution to the problems that had been caused by the installation 
of these engines (Mannan and Ali 1991; Mannan 1995a).   
 
2.3.2 Experiences at an International NGO 
 
Another major engagement began with my appointment in 1992 as a Social Scientist in a 
globally recognised international NGO in Dhaka.  This international NGO had a mandate 
to work and develop projects with local partner NGOs.  During my 13 months job with 
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this NGO, I saw more than 25 consultants flown into Bangladesh to work with local 
partners.  These consultants are categorised as mercenaries, missionaries and misfits 
(Stirrat 2008).  My task was to assist these European and American experts in developing 
project ideas, writing terms of reference (ToR), project planning and to organise brain 
storming sessions, workshops and seminars, etc.  Apart from engaging with the foreign 
consultants, I completed three major research and evaluation tasks.   
 
The first was to explore the possibility of employing the traditional weaving community 
to produce medical textile products, for which I did fieldwork at Sathkhira.  The weaving 
community was already producing gauzes, bandages, etc. and supplying them to the local 
markets and hospitals. It had developed, earlier on, indigenous mechanisms and further 
outside technical input appeared to be irrelevant (Mannan 1995b).    
 
The second study was related to the introduction of improved stoves among rural 
households.  At that time, a development fashion was that improved stoves would save 
energy and the environment and also women from the health hazards of traditional chulla 
(stoves).  These assumptions led scientists to develop 18 or more models of improved 
stoves, without any understanding of women‟s traditional local knowledge of stoves and 
environment.  Conducting indepth interviews and facilitating participatory research with 
village women, I became aware that the scientific assumptions about improved stoves 
were not conducive to traditional practices and cooking culture.  As a result women, 
across the country, overwhelmingly rejected the improved stoves despite the persistent 
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efforts of development staff (Mannan 1996).  The failure was the result of a “mismatch 
between development initiatives and local cultural understandings and environmental 
management” (Sillitoe 2004:19).   
 
The third project was the International NGO‟s partnership project with a local NGO for 
processing sugarcane using an experimental machine to make gur (brown sugar).  An 
evaluation was carried out by holding focus group discussions during the last phase of the 
gur-project (Mannan and Bush 1992).  While conducting a focus group discussion, I 
faced a problem that illustrates the hierarchical nature of Bengali society.  In the 
discussion, only one or two old men spoke and the rest, particularly women, hardly 
talked.  I was unable to overcome this cultural hierarchy. However, the same women 
became talkative when I interviewed them while they were operating machines to crush 
sugar canes.  At some point in the evaluation, I asked people about the possibility of 
continuing the project.  One of them replied that they would like to learn more about 
project „knowledge‟; rather than merely getting technological support or capital.  Their 
„knowledge‟ seeking attitude impressed me, but subsequently I learn that NGO personnel 
had trained them in questions to ask. It is a common practice of NGOs to provide people 
with certain standard development responses to use when they meet evaluators and 
foreign visitors.    
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2.3.3 Experiences at BRAC 
 
Later in 1993 I received an offer from BRAC, to work as a Research Anthropologist.  My 
association with BRAC provided me with further exposure to the world of Bangladeshi 
development. BRAC is a world within the development world.  Immediately after joining 
BRAC, I was sent to the Titpolla branch of the Rural Development Programme (RDP) at 
Jamalpur where the Research and Evaluation Division (RED) had opened a Village Study 
Project (VSP).  The VSP was endeavouring to gauge the impact of the RDP.  Before my 
departure to Titpolla some colleagues suggested that I should see how BRAC operates. 
However, I thought it was better to know why BRAC works so.  In the morning I took a 
train for Jamalpur.   
 
The rickshaw puller who took me from the station to the RDP office supplied my first 
information about BRAC. His wife was a BRAC member. She purchased the rickshaw 
for her husband using a BRAC loan.  He was repaying the loan from his income on an 
instalment basis.  When I asked about his marriage, he told me that he and his wife had a 
love affair before their marriage.  He was working for a man called Mohazon who owned 
a rickshaw and dreamt of owing one, but could not afford it.  The rickshaw puller knew 
that BRAC provided loans, but he was unable to get one because he did not fall within 
BRAC's category of borrower. So he approached an unmarried BRAC member and 
convinced her that she was the woman in his life.  She fell in love with him and they 
married and with a BRAC loan she helped him to purchase a second-hand rickshaw. I 
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asked him, whether or not he received a dowry from his bride. With a big gesture, he 
replied that the best dowry was his wife and her BRAC loan.   The rickshaw puller was 
worried because a few days ago BRAC staff had locked a women defaulter in an office.  
Due to the insult, she committed suicide.  Later I found out that the story was just a 
rumour, but many people believed this sort of story about BRAC.     
 
When I arrived at the RDP office I found it in turmoil, staff and a group of defaulters 
involved in a heated argument.  Someone with a large debt was absconding from her 
Village Organisation (VO)
19 
and had been dodging BRAC staff for sometime.  They had 
got hold of her and brought her to the RDP office.  The defaulter was also a wife of local 
leader and many men came to rescue her. The outcome was a heated argument and 
confusion. 
 
The same day Programme Organiser (PO: suspension) dropped me at the Village Study 
Project (VSP) centre of RED.  I asked him why after his designation the word 
„suspension‟ was used.  Did BRAC suspend him?  He started laughing and said his task 
was to trace defaulters and pressure them to pay the loan money regularly, often with a 
threat of litigation. In the beginning I understood little about the functioning of VOs 
except for a few observations.  On a visit to one where two members had became 
defaulters and had fled the area (perhaps to Dhaka), I saw angry Area Manager (AM) 
demand the group pay on behalf of the defaulter, but the other members refused to do so 
                                                     
19
 For discussion on Village Organisation see chapter 7 
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and threatened to make the VO collapse.  Subsequently I visited the Non Formal Primary 
Education (NFPE) schools and was impressed with the performance of the students, who 
were aged between seven and ten years.  They performed dances, music and songs.  They 
were assertive and confident, which contrasted with their submissive poor parents. I 
thought NFPE was the best of the BRAC programmes.     
 
2.3.3.1   Religious Backlash on BRAC 
 
Subsequently, BRAC placed me at Matlab to carryout anthropological research under a 
collaborative project with ICDDR,B‟s (International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease 
Research,  Bangladesh). The research team comprised anthropologists, sociologists, 
economists, demographers and epidemiologists working at Uddamdi, a remote village 
which was one hour walking distance from the ICCDR,B hospital.  The aim was to assess 
the impact of BRAC and ICDDR,B‟s interventions on various aspects of village life.   In 
Uddamdi village we worked intensively with a group of 60 members of BRAC and we 
also visited other villages frequently.  On visits to villages I observed Programme 
Organisers mobilise villagers to form Village Organisations (See Chapter 7).          
 
Gradually I became friendly with the villagers, including women members of BRAC.  
This helped breakdown formal hierarchical relations.  The other project staff maintained 
a hierarchical distance with women.  In the beginning of September 1993, a woman  told 
one of the research team that she had Qu‟ranic evidence that BRAC was a Christian 
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organisation, which seeks to convert the poor to Christianity.  I tried to convince her that 
it was not possible to find BRAC in the holy Qu‟ran, as when the holy book was revealed 
it did not exist.  I asked her to show me the evidence.  She went inside her home and 
returned with a leaflet.  The leaflet which was written by Kuami Madrasha (Orthodox 
religious school) attacking BRAC (see Chapter 9).  Since the woman could not read the 
leaflet, she thought that it contained verses from the Qu‟ran as distributed by a Moulavis 
(priest).  The leaflet contained anti-NGO and anti-BRAC messages.  It had three aspects: 
 
 BRAC was an agent and symbol of Christianity.   
 Before converting people, Christians establish rapport by opening hospitals and 
schools.  BRAC had both hospitals (health programme) and schools (NFPE). 
 Once Christians have established relations, then they seeking to convert people.  
Christianity creates avenues for colonisation, seeking to control and exploit the 
local economy, by introducing credit and loan scheme to transfer money to a 
foreign country.         
 
These were recurrent themes in Islamic religious opposition to NGOs.   We found such 
anti-BRAC leaflets widely distributed across various villages.  I discovered that the 
leaflets were distributed from a small local mosque connected to a wider network of 
religious organisations.   When I talked with the programme staff, I found that they knew 
about the activities of the religious organisations.  They had not reported this to their 
superior, as it was difficult to convince their superiors because BRAC‟s organisational 
  
59 
 
culture and hierarchy discourage it (see Chapter 4).  When I informed the Director of the 
RED, he advised ignoring such local opposition, as something not new to BRAC.  When 
I discussed this further with a programme coordinator, he said bluntly: “don‟t try to create 
an anthropological fiction.  I have been working in development more than 25 years, and 
I am not aware of any such conflict.  You may believe there is but you are novice to 
development.”  
 
Some senior staff asked why I thought religious conflict was an issue.  I argued that the 
presence of the three “Ps” suggested that it was a political phenomenon.  The first “P” 
was the “print media” owned by religious leaders that publishes leaflets, news papers and 
weekly Islamic magazines.  The second “P” was the “people” who believed the religious 
leaders.  The third “P” was the “power network” of the religious organisations from 
national to local level, as well as sufficient money to distribute free leaflets, newspapers 
and magazines.  Moreover, they had organisational capability to mobilise anti-BRAC and 
NGO sentiments.  They also regularly used both mosques and waaz mahfil
20
 to propagate 
anti-NGO sentiments. In November 26, 1993 BRAC management commissioned me to 
study the religious leaders and why they were opposing BRAC (see Chapter 9; Mannan et 
al. 1994).    
 
                                                     
20 
Waaz mahfil is a religious gathering and congregations where religious leaders gives sermons, lectures 
and talks in the presence of hundred to thousands people, usually at winter night.  Waaz usually starts late 
at night and finishes in the early morning. 
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We devised a semi-structured questionnaire that we distributed to 435 branch offices of 
BRAC across the country.  We also asked the branch offices to collect anti-BRAC and 
anti-NGO leaflets, booklets, magazine, papers, etc.  Whenever I received the news of a 
conflict, I went to the place to investigate the reasons for the confrontation.  I interviewed           
many Moulavis (priests).  The religious opposition came from a clash between two 
 
Photo 2.3:   Religious people force the removal of the sculptures. 
 
Source: Star Weekly Magazine. Volume 7 Issue 43. October 31, 2008. 
http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/.  Accessed on 12.12.2009 
 
different views
21.  The first view held by development, was that the „reality‟ of the poor 
was man-made and their situation could be changed only through empowerment and by 
creating an enabling environment with support from foreign aid.  The second view, of 
                                                     
21 
For clash of two views between NGOs and Islamic forces, see Hashmi (2000).   
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religious leaders, was that the “huq” (truth) was that poverty is God given, and while 
men could make efforts to change it, ultimately it was up to God.  
 
Why was BRAC, a large organisation with a strong monitoring division and programmes, 
unable to read the signs of religious opposition?  BRAC developed an organisational 
structure and mechanism which was so busy in addressing the poverty of the men and 
women that it was unable to grasp and understand the emerging social movement, created 
by its own activities.  Escobar‟s observation is relevant here: “development proceeded by  
 
 
Photo 2.4: Cultural activists, students, and artists are protesting against Islamists  
 
         Source: Star Weekly Magazine. Volume 7 Issue 43. October 31, 2008.  
         http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/. Accessed on 12.12.2009  
 
creating abnormalities („the poor,‟ „the malnourished,‟ „the illiterate,‟ „pregnant women,‟ 
„the landless,‟) which it would then treat or reform” (Escobar 2005:343).  Such 
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development policy of NGOs clearly ignores the poor people‟s knowledge on their own 
poverty.  Joe Devine captures two phrases, amar kichu ney (I have nothing) and amar keu 
ney (I have no-one) which the poor use (Devine 2006:91).   Symbolically “kichu” 
indicates assets, money, wealth, etc. and “keu” indicates relationship of trusted social 
networks like kinship, trusted neighbours and friends, reliable patrons, etc. Devine 
provides further ethnographic understanding of amar keu ney by drawing a distinction 
between the genuinely poor with little money, debt, etc. and the poor who are potentially 
socially and economically active. This distinction is important because many potential 
poor with social (keu) and economic (kichu) support from NGOs could overcome the 
hurdle of extreme poverty (Devine 2009). The poor simultaneously require both social 
and economic support, but NGO emphasis on promoting economic welfare and wellbeing 
may have negating consequences on the poor‟s existing social network.      
 
2.3.3.2 Democracy Partnership Programme 
 
The religious backlash against BRAC had implications for the NGO movement as a 
whole.  BRAC group members as its beneficiaries, remained neutral neither supporting 
BRAC nor the religious leaders. The NGO thought they played a passive role because 
they lack a democratic culture.  This is not credible, since in the local and national 
elections the poor vote in large numbers.  Nevertheless in 1995 USAID, The Asia 
Foundation and BRAC cooperated in a “democracy partnership” programme for the poor 
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(Hirschmann 1999) to be implemented by NGOs to develop a democratic culture among 
the poor.   
 
There was some debate over the definition of participation, as the experiences of the three 
organisations dealing with the poor were different.  USAID, a bilateral donor 
organisation, thought that the notion of participation meant the acceptance of the pre-
fixed agenda of USAID by the poor.  The Asian Foundation thought participation meant 
evolving ideas with the poor and building a programme from them.  BRAC‟s staff  tried 
to compromise by promoting the idea that the „content‟ of the programme should be 
developed by the staff, but the „context‟ of the programme would be provided by the poor 
men and women, meaning that some components of programme might need to be 
changed. In the dispute between the USAID director, a diplomat, and The Asia 
Foundation‟s Representative, an academic, BRAC‟s Director acted as a mediator for the 
benefit of the programme.   
 
The staff in all three organisations were convinced that the poor lacked a democratic 
spirit.  They used PRA to identify the democratic needs of the poor.  The assessment 
found that poor men and women confirmed what the staff thought that they would 
participate if there were proper democratic structures in place.  The “democracy 
partnership” programme was implemented by NGOs that had little idea how it had 
developed, unconsciously implementing the democratic ideology of foreign aid agencies. 
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 2.3.3.3 Global Partnership Project 
         
The Democracy Partnership programme developed in 1995 through action research, 
novel experience of research contributing to a programme structure.   I had a similar 
experience when BRAC carried out an action research on the competency of mid-level 
development managers and senior executives of NGOs and development agencies to 
develop the “global partnership” programme for “NGO Leadership and Management.”  It 
comprised of BRAC, Bangladesh; Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress 
(ORAP), Zimbabwe; and the School for International Training (SIT), USA.   The 
research began by developing a Need Assessment Protocol.  After that several brain-
storming sessions with NGO managers, including from BRAC, identified 186 tasks that 
NGO managers perform in their daily work.  A questionnaire was developed by 
organising the 186 tasks into 36 broad categories under seven major working areas:  
Administrative, Finance, Programme Management, Community Development, Research 
and Evaluation, and Policy Issue.   The questionnaire was sent to large, middle, small and 
international NGOs, and 83 NGOs returned the questionnaires. We also carried out 
interviews with NGO leaders, and conducted an email survey of leading 70 NGO leaders 
across the globe.  The findings were presented in an international workshop, leading to 
the foundation of the Global Partnership Programme (Mannan, et al. 1995b). 
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2.3.3.4 Training Division 
 
After work with Democracy Partnership and Global Partnership I entered the Training 
Division (TD).  It was quite unusual for a researcher to join and work in the TD. Most 
trainers, after serving a few years in TD, return to programmes.  Trainers develop and 
modify programme manuals and training courses following feedback from different 
programmes.  Closely related to the TD is the Monitoring Division that provides reports 
on different aspects of programmes.  These reports are of high quality and only a few top 
executives usually have access to them. First, I worked in TD as a trainer and provided 
input to courses such as Development Management, Training of Trainers (ToT), 
Operations Management, etc. for the mid-level staff of Rural Development Programme 
(RDP) which is the core programme of BRAC.  I adopted an „experiential learning 
methodology‟ (Pfeiffer 1994), which allowed me, quickly, to accumulate data and 
information on the internal dynamics and organisational culture of RDP.  Second, I was 
the Programme Coordinator for the Global Partnership Programme on “NGO Leadership 
and Management.”  Overall these two positions exposed me to three different realities: 
the experiences of researchers, trainers and managers who had diverse perceptions and 
insights into BRAC.  They were often both contradictory and complementary. There is a 
gap between the roles of researchers and development managers.  For example, 
researchers provide a critique of ongoing development projects, which the managers 
disapprove of and dislike.   Managers worried that then how were they to scale up and 
expand projects, if projects were defective, as BRAC was intending to expand in to an 
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even larger organisation.  Similarly, managers ardently believe that their projects were 
alleviating poverty as intended by the donors, and became defensive when asked why 
poverty is increasing in Bangladesh.   Researchers were often critical about projects, 
whereas managers were interested in fulfilling their annual targets.  Trainers tended to 
play a compromising role between researchers and managers.   The rift between 
researchers and managers is rooted in the fact that researchers try to generate knowledge 
for understanding what is happening, whereas managers want knowledge to aid action 
(see Chapter 5, Mannan 2006).    
 
2.4. Experiences at an International NGO and the European Commission  
 
Later I left BRAC in 1997 to work with an international NGO helping underprivileged 
children. I immersed myself with poor street children, doing participatory research to 
understand their attitude to the future.  They were brought into a partner NGO‟s office 
and given food.  It is a difficult working with street children.  They have chaotic lives. As 
soon as they were gathered in a room, they tried to leave. I had the impression that these 
children, who frequently roam the streets, felt that they were in a cage.  They were not so 
interested in the food as receiving cash.  The NGO staff thought it unethical to give 
money to children.  The children were more interested in begging or selling products in 
the streets, than talking to a researcher.  They would talk, laugh and play, whereas the 
moderator continuously tried to bring order so that they could have a sequential dialogue. 
However, amidst chaos, we asked questions. One lesson was that although they were 
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children in age, their lives turned them into mature persons who talked like elderly men 
(Mannan 2007, 1998a).  Apart from working with the street children, this NGO was also 
implementing a project to rehabilitate the young and adolescent daughters of sex workers 
(Mannan and Monira 1998b).  Most are rural women.  When they leave home, they tell 
their parents that they are going to the city to work in a garment factory, but they end up 
working as prostitutes for a higher income.  Many young sex workers told me that they 
were saving money to pay the dowry for their marriage.  
 
Next I received an invitation to join the NGO-European Commission dialogue-project, 
which aimed to develop a mechanism so that small NGOs could receive European Union 
grants.  One of the problems with the European Commission is that it disperses large 
sums of money, for which small NGOs either do not qualify for or are unable to handle: a 
few big NGOs had a monopoly over European Commission grants.  As a part of my job 
requirement, I developed a database on small NGOs.  I gathered data in two ways: 
questionnaire survey and organising a series of workshops in different regional zones to 
catch those NGOs that missed the survey.  The reports from workshops were 
systematically documented.       
 
The European Commission job was my last engagement in development.  My   university 
position has given me time and space to look back on what NGOs are doing in the name 
of poverty alleviation.  In this thesis, I organize and discuss information collected over 
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several years of work in development.  I have had the opportunity to visit NGOs to cross-
check information gathered to validate my findings and understanding of NGOs.   
 
2.5. University, Research and Fieldwork 
 
In August 1999, I joined the Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB), the only liberal 
arts university in Bangladesh. The liberal arts-oriented intellectual environment at IUB, 
which encourages critical thinking and analysis, has provided me with the support and 
space I needed to reflect on and write about my experiences in countless debates with 
colleagues at various NGOs and development agencies, fellow scholars and students. It 
has also given me the opportunity to share my understanding of NGOs and the 
development world with students to prepare them for work in these areas.  
 
My teaching position has two advantages.  A university teacher in the hierarchical society 
of Bangladesh enjoys the highest respect and symbolises the moral conscience of society. 
People trusted me with information (I consider the ethical implications later in this 
thesis). At the same time, although I remained at a distance from development, I 
considered myself a development researcher because of my work on NGO activities. I 
have always felt part of the NGO movement.   
 
During my time as an NGO worker, I accumulated a wealth of data and information, 
much of which was either irrelevant for or conflicted with NGO work and interests. I had 
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systematically gathered a body of material that was beyond the scope of my official job 
descriptions of writing research and evaluation reports for NGOs and development 
agencies.  These were nevertheless, I thought, of academic interest. I concluded that 
reflecting on my experiences and the relation of NGOs to wider societal change in 
Bangladesh would further understanding of important issues both academically and 
practically. Although, I documented my experiences and critical reflections on NGOs, the 
nature and pressure of working at NGOs had hardly given me the time to write.  I decided 
on the basis of my experience to pursue a PhD drawing on my development experience.  
 
The data that I had collected over a period of ten years (1990-2000) comprised oral 
histories, anecdotes, life histories, people‟s ideas, events related to conflict, qualitative 
and quantitative information, secondary data, etc.  Various methods were used to collect, 
collate and cross check this data. Among these were triangulation, a technique used to 
validate the information using separate sources, and reiteration, where the researcher 
returns to the same informant to clarify information collected previously.  The long 
period of time that I spent working in the NGO world afforded many opportunities for 
applying these methods. Another method that I used was to match informal data with 
formal sources. For example, when some informants claimed that in 1972, NGOs in 
Bangladesh were influenced by a Christian denomination, I went back to the literature to 
check whether or not this was reported on and to verify whether any public statement 
made by priests matched people‟s memories. An advantage of being at IUB is that it has 
allowed me to validate my data against numerous reports produced by students for the 
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“Live-in-Field Programme” (LFE).  The LFE Programme requires every student to spend 
two weeks in rural Bangladesh, after which they write a report on their experiences of 
rural life, development and NGOs. 
 
I organised the data that I had gathered along a time line separated into three distinct 
periods.  The first period (1947-1990) covers the history of the evolution of NGOs in 
Bangladesh.  Here, I relied on the memoirs of development practitioners together with 
other written sources. The second period (1991-2003) covers the data that comes from 
my experience working with different NGOs. The third period (2003-2010) covers the 
period during which I reflected on, and wrote about my experience, and critically 
engaged with the wider literature. One of my concerns, during this time was that my data 
were becoming dated and losing their relevance. In order to overcome this problem, I 
frequently visited my previous research sites, cross-checked information, gathered new 
information and, where necessary, updated and modified my data. In order to ensure the 
general validity of the data, I compared what I had collected from one research site with 
that from other research sites. 
 
The nature of data also shaped my analytical approach. Since 1990, NGOs have not only 
been challenged by religious forces, but there have also been ideological struggles within 
the NGO community itself.  It was broadly a conflict between two different points of 
view. NGOs believed that their development agenda and projects benefited the poor 
according to the philosophy of Western funding agencies, while religious leaders saw 
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NGOs as a threat to the legitimacy of Islam.  The conflict reveals how NGO projects are 
imbued with western ideas of equality, which clash with hierarchical values of 
Bangladesh society.  In the process new forms and variations of values emerge, some 
consciously, but many intuitive. The result may be described as a process of social and 
cultural change, which represents an attempt to accommodate the contradictory, clashing 
values of western agency (individualism, equality, market, etc.) on the one hand, and 
Bangladeshi rural cultural life (community, hierarchy, subsistence, etc.) on the other. In 
this transformation, people engaged in development adhere neither to western values nor 
to local ones. Occasionally, they seek to manipulate rural ways so as to fit and define new 
values associated with development. 
 
Another problem that I grappled with is how to analyse the ever-changing nature of 
NGOs, particularly BRAC, in the context of rapid social change. I decided to delimit my 
study to the period from 1990 to 2003.  This was a critical period for BRAC. During this 
time BRAC made a strategic decision to transform itself from a development NGO to a 
market-oriented development corporation.  The organisation has since experienced 
management problems related to staff stability and it has introduced ombudsmen to 
adjudicate disputes, which has resulted in highly reputed professionals joining its upper 
echelon and contributing to its international identity. 
 
As I began to think about how to organise my data, I encountered two particular ethical 
challenges. The first related to BRAC, the organization under study. I faced the question 
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of how a former employee turned external researcher should conduct research on his 
employer. The data that I had collected had not initially been intended for a thesis and I 
faced the challenge of potentially being accused of dubious whistle-blowing.  On top of 
this, I wondered whether BRAC would allow me to work on such data, considering my 
critical position and attitude. I approached BRAC and had helpful negotiations with both 
the Deputy Executive Director and the Director of the Research and Evaluation Division 
(RED). The RED Director, later promoted to the position of Deputy Executive Director, 
told me that he consented my study legitimate “for the sake of knowledge.” The second 
ethical issue was related to the NGO‟s beneficiaries and my respondents. I have taken 
care to protect their identities by maintaining anonymity and confidentiality.  I have 
sought the permission of respondents and key informants. I often shared my results and 
discussed my findings with them. I also invited key informants to visit me at IUB for 
discussions. These meetings allowed me to clarify my work to them, in addition to 
consolidating relevant data. 
 
There was also a problem regarding my approach to analysis, which was related to the 
issue of translation. Most of my data was in Bengali which I have translated into English. 
Although collecting the data in Bengali enriched their ethnographic quality, the process 
of translation might give a generalised and homogenised impression. This occurs because 
Bengalis have a tendency to express themselves in a collective way.  For example, during 
interviews individuals usually say „NGOs believe..‟, „the poor think that….‟, etc., 
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although these sort of statements were intended to express personal and individual 
opinions. 
 
2.6. Discussion 
 
The anthropology of development organisations is relatively uncharted territory. It 
features extensive contact with a community and organisation; involves direct or indirect 
participation in activities and focuses on individuals‟ perspective and interpretations of 
their world (Miles and Huberman 1994:8).  The development reality is that interventions 
take place in a country in the South, but its culture and dynamic originates in the West.  
This requires anthropology to go beyond a single site location to multi-sited locations to 
deal with the global, national and local levels of development.  It is also multi-layered, as 
it focuses on different levels and issues such as the culture of NGOs, credit management, 
how organisational growth invokes social and religious opposition, etc.  The 
anthropology of development also increasingly concerns people's counter-tendencies to 
modernity (Arce and Long 2000); for example, how a poverty alleviation strategy, which 
aims to reduce vulnerability, allows NGOs to grow and creates, inadvertently, conditions 
which makes the poor more vulnerable. 
 
The multi-sited ethnography encompasses several tracking strategies which are located 
within the sphere of interdisciplinary work.  The ethnographer might begin by developing 
a research strategy that recognizes the macro-theoretical concepts and narratives of the 
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world system, but does not rely on them exclusively for the framing of questions (Marcus 
1995:96-97). The anthropology of NGO management should promote a deeper 
understanding of  development culture, going beyond a reified notion of culture, evolving 
to bridge  the gap between the Western and traditional cultures of development managers, 
and  by evolving a new form of culture.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT AND NGOS IN BANGLADESH 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh have become a part of the 
institutional framework of international intervention for managing developmental 
outcomes.  Over the last 38 years, they have achieved organisational capacities to manage 
schemes for poverty alleviation and income generation.  Some NGOs have gained world 
reputations for their roles, for example, Gonoshasthaya Kendra (GSK) for its contribution 
to community health management, BRAC for Non-Formal Primary Education, 
PROSHIKA for the environment and social mobilization.  Dr Yunus Muhammad of 
Grameen Bank received the Nobel Prize for micro-credit programme. However, NGOs 
do have a chequered history when dealing with development.   
 
This chapter is divided into three sections in order to construct the NGO history of 
Bangladesh.   The first section, termed the NGO gestation period, covers 1971 to 1975; 
the second section is the consolidation stage of NGOs, which covers from 1975 to 1990, 
and the last section is the NGO industry in the age of globalisation and this covers 1990 
up to the present.   
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Photo 3.1. Dhaka Slums Surrounded by High Rise Buildings 
 
Source: Sk Enamul Huq 
 
3.2  Phase One: The Gestation Phase (1971-1975) 
 
The emergence of NGOs began at the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Global as 
well as internal Bangladeshi politics complemented, to a large extend, the growth of the 
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NGO movement. The 1970s, which saw the global crisis bring about a modification in 
the international system of capitalism (Hewitt 1992:221-237), also witnessed the 
formation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971.  Through their independence struggle 
Bengalis aspired to not only emancipate themselves from the “internal colonialism” of 
Pakistan (Jahan 1973), but also to become a partner in global capitalism (Mannan 1990a).  
The nine month war of liberation against Pakistan ravaged the Bangladesh economy, 
society and polity (Maniruzzaman 1980). The Awami League formed the first 
government in 1972, helped by both India and the Soviet Union.  It became pro-Soviet 
and anti-Western because Western governments, led by the USA were opposed to the 
liberation war (Mannan 1990a).  
 
The Awami League government had policies that appeared contradictory.  Firstly, 
although the new government‟s rhetoric took a pro-socialism stance, in reality they 
pursued a policy to develop capitalism in Bangladesh. A strong Western trained pro-
capitalist military-bureaucratic oligarchy managed the anti-capitalist posture of 
government.  It represented middle class interests.  It nationalised the industries of 
Bengali rich classes, but allowed the middle classes, supported by state patronage, to 
invest in them (Mannan 1990a).  Secondly, the new government‟s pro-socialist policy 
was strongly opposed by grassroots radical movements led by pro-Chinese and anti-
Awami League radical forces (Maniruzzaman 1980:154-198; 1975).  Thirdly, the new 
government clearly demonstrated its inefficiency and incapacity to rebuild the war torn 
economic infrastructure and so reduce poverty. Internal opposition to the Awami League 
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government, encouraged by USA policy, resulted in the outbreak of an infamous famine, 
which led to the death of millions of people in 1974 (Sen 1981, Sobhan 1979).  The 
following year the Awami League sought to establish BAKSAL - a Soviet style one party 
system.  Within three months a military coup had overthrown the Awami League 
government.  
 
Amidst the political turmoil, NGOs began to emerge with financial support from Western 
capitalist countries.  The paradox of the Awami League was that while they opposed 
Western governments, they allowed NGOs to work with the financial support of 
governments and donors from the capitalist west. Consequently, NGOs grew in a context 
where the intense struggle between capitalist and socialist worlds contributes to the 
postcolonial state becoming dysfunctional (Sobhan and Ahmed 1980).   
 
This situation prompted many to portray the growth of NGOs as associated with post-
independence economic and humanitarian crises (Karim 1996, Lewis and Sobhan 
2000:204).  The war ravaged country with humanitarian aid needs provided fertile ground 
for NGOs to develop.  The new government gave concessions to NGOs as it was forced 
to look for external assistance to deal with the humanitarian problems (Gary 1999:52).  
Furthermore, the government might have thought that the work of NGOs would shore up 
its weakness on two fronts.  In the first place, West humanitarian aid financed NGOs 
would provide some comfort to the poor people, as its regime began to display its 
inability to manage poverty, distribute relief, and reconstruct infrastructure.  In the 
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second place, NGOs would also work to counteract grassroots Marxist organisations, to 
which the state had become vulnerable.   
 
At the outset, the Bangladeshi NGOs tried to portray themselves as voluntary 
organisations focusing on providing humanitarian services.  They sought to build up a 
consensual society among the over populated poor class in the remotest villages, at a 
level where the government and state had a weak presence.  So the NGOs started their 
development journey with a clear commitment to carry out value-driven voluntary 
programmes on the "high moral ground” (Holloway 1997).   Throughout the 70s and 80s, 
NGOs promoted the idea and image that they were a value driven social movement.  This 
allowed them to represent particular non-market values, while expressing interests in the 
broadly-defined political process (Morrow 1997:9). 
 
Although, NGOs have emerged as a prominent movement since 1971, the impulses for 
NGO intervention were founded in the pre-Independence 1945-1970 period (Devine 
1996:16).  NGOs use development theories not only to clarify their ideological positions 
but also to justify their poverty alleviation activities.  As Korten observes, “an 
organisation cannot have a meaningful development strategy without a development 
theory” (Korten 1990:114).   The theory that shapes the character of Bangladeshi NGOs 
has three aspects. The first is anti-Marxism.  Western financiers and politicians feared 
socialism shaping the voluntarism of Bangladeshi NGOs.  Capitalists funded NGOs 
manipulated their activities and projects to defuse any revolution.  This anti-Marxism 
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also promoted, simultaneously, the second aspect, that is a mistrust of governmental 
actions.  An extension of Western donor and international influence, Bangladeshi NGOs 
contrasted their voluntarism with government activities, many of which they resist
22
.  The 
third aspect is the anti-Islamic posture of NGOs, aspiring to introduce modernisation and 
secularism to Bangladeshi society.  They consider Islamic values and elements anti-
development (Abecassis 1990).  These three aspects are believed to influence three 
issues:  (i) missionary voluntarism and religious conversion, (ii) cooperative movements 
in rural development, and (iii) family planning and population control.  
 
3.2.1 Missionary Voluntarism 
  
Initially, Christian missionaries had an indirect influence on NGO activities. The earliest 
missionary activities date from 1795 when William Carey was sent by the Baptist 
Missionary Society to Bangladesh (Hussain 1980:2). Sixteen 16 missionary organisations 
worked in the pre-Independent period (McNee 1976:42).   In the post-independence 
period, European Churches played important roles in promoting the NGO movement, for 
example, the Dutch Catholic institution, Cebemo (now Bilance); the Protestant 
missionary group ICCO, along with Novib, extended financial support to various NGOs 
(BENF 1998:16-17), and Misereor, from Germany, funded CARITAS.  Swiss 
Missionaries also gave support to many NGOs and the Lutheran Mission associate itself 
with the Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service (RDRS) to work in the border areas of North 
                                                     
22
Many NGO leaders believe the term NGO is often mistaken politically as implying that government is the 
centre of society and the peoples are on its periphery.  
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Bengal. The presence of the USA was strongly felt through the activities of American 
missionaries such as Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Seventh Day 
Adventist Welfare, etc. (Khan 1987: 36).  Apart from Christian Missionaries, a few 
Western NGOs played a pivotal role in shaping the NGO movement.  The largest BRAC, 
started with OXFAM's support at Sulla, Sylthet (Black 1992:193).  CARE expanded its 
pre-independence networks.  The second largest NGO, PROSHIKA, and Gonno Unnayan 
Prochesta (GUP) and the Bangladesh Institute of Apiculture (BIA) were initiated by the 
Canadian University Service Organisation (CUSO)
23
.  
   
NGOs started their operations in the remote rural areas where missionaries had activities 
from pre-Independent days.  Donors were familiar with these areas through their 
connections to the activities of missionaries and their family planning programmes
24
.  
NGOs in the post-Independence period learnt from the Christian missionaries how to use 
ideology and vision in their development activities.  In the beginning, the NGOs 
employed a „community approach‟, which was shaped by the evangelism and voluntary 
spirit of Christian missionaries.  The evangelist promoted a "people movement" which “is 
a movement from one non-Christian caste or tribe to the Christian faith (McNee 
1976:104-51)”.  The salient features of the people movement were (i) one-caste, one tribe 
or one-sect movement (McNee 1976:106-107); (ii) the wellbeing of the whole family 
                                                     
23 
CUSO was headed by a Christian Priest 
24
A number of key informants, who have been working in NGOs and donor agencies since 1972, have 
expressed this opinion.   
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(McNee 1976: 11);  (iii)  effective movements start “in the villages” (McNee 1976: 112).   
It is understandable that the Christian missionaries focused their activities among the  
non-Muslim community, especially among ethnic tribals and lower Hindu castes such as 
Namasudra, sweepers, Muchis, etc.  There is a close resemblance between the initial 
NGO community approach and the people movement of the Christian missionaries 
shown at Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Ideological influence of Christian missionaries on NGOs 
Missionary People Approach NGO Community Approach 
Works in remote villages. Works in remote villages. 
Focus on the whole family. Focus on the whole family. 
One-caste, one tribe or one-sect movement 
with impoverished people 
Confines activities to the community as 
if comprised of one sect, caste or class.  
 
NGOs started their activities in remote areas and communities, particularly in the 
catchments areas of Christian Missionaries where dominant Islam and Hindu religions 
had a lesser presence and people were poor.  NGOs had several advantages working in 
the hinterlands of missionary activity, strategic entrance points for their work with the 
poor people.  Associated with Christian mission, they could draw on it to attract donors' 
financial support.   
 
3.2.2 Family Planning Programme 
 
The second issue that shaped the growth of NGOs is the strong family planning 
movement of pre-independence.  It promoted the idea of engaging women‟s issues in 
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projects.  Supported by the USA, family planning focused NGOs have maintained a 
separate constituency within the growing and diversified NGO movement in Bangladesh.  
The present evolution of those NGOs has its roots in the family planning programmes 
started in 1953 with the formation of Family Planning Association of Bangladesh 
(FPAB).  Since 1965, FPAB has worked to remove widespread misconceptions, 
deep-rooted religious inhibitions and other social taboos associated with family planning 
and reproductive health.  It complements government programmes through information, 
education and communication, and tests methods in the field of programmes and delivery 
of services
25
.   
 
3.2.3 Village Cooperative Movement 
 
The third issue concerns the 1959 experiment in rural development and agriculture at 
Bangladesh Agricultural Rural Development (BARD) which started as an experimental 
project of V-AID (Village-AID) the acronym taken from USAID in 1953 to contain the 
growing radical nationalism and Marxism at village level in parts of Asia.  For this 
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Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1972, NGOs in the Health and Population Sector (HPS) are 
evolving with heterogeneous approaches and characters.  From the perspective of HPS, NGOs could fall 
into following three categories:  (i) NGOs carry out activities only on reproductive health and family 
planning issues;  (ii) Many NGOs have population and health "plus" programmes or multi-sectional NGOs 
tag some component of HPS and Essential Service Package (ESP) with other ongoing projects; and (iii) 
NGOs without HPS and ESP components. The growth of NGOs also caters for the need to establish 
support NGO at an intermediary level that led to the formation of the Voluntary Health Services Society 
(VHSS).  VHSS acts as a mediator between NGOs and Government with a purpose of advancing health 
policies and priority issue.  It promotes need-oriented activities that are appropriate, realistic and equitable 
partnership between NGOs and GOs so as to achieve optimum health for all.  Apart from VHSS, a few 
NGOs work as quasi-donor like the Path Finder Fund, the Family Planning Service and Training Centre 
(FPSTC), the Swanirvar Programmme, Family Planning Management Development (FPMD) and 
Bangladesh Family Planning Association (BFPA), USAID, etc.  (Mannan 2001c).   
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purpose peasants were brought into various cooperatives, which were to operate as 
primary units or catalytic agents to disseminate the ideology of development (Bhuiyan, et 
al. 2005:349).   BARD provided a two-tier model of village co-operatives and sub-district 
federations (Sattar 1993:111-127).  The model was used to establish smallholdings and 
peasant credit cooperatives around Deep Tube-well and Low Lift Pump schemes.  It 
provided an important lesson for NGOs on how to develop an organisation and mobilize 
poor people.    
 
In a short, NGOs learnt four early lessons – (i) use of ideology from Christian 
missionaries, (ii) engaging women from family planning programmes, (iii) how to supply 
credit and (iv) organisation building activities with the poor people from BARD. These 
developments were influenced by global capitalism in its ideological struggle against 
communism and rural radicalism.    
 
3.3.  Phase Two: Consolidation Phase (1975-1990) 
 
The mid-1975 military coup and the election of a pro-Western and pro-Islamic 
government had a tremendous impact on the direction of NGO activities.  The post-1975 
government adopted policies favourable to the growth of NGOs (Sanyel 1991:1369), 
which helped NGOs to restructure and improve their ability to implement new projects 
and programmes.  At the same time, the government began to cultivate friendly relations 
with oil rich Muslim countries from the Middle East  in order to attract petro-dollars and 
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also ensure a potential job market for migrant Bangladeshis. The policy shift of the 
government had opened up an avenue for the activities of Islamic NGOs.  These Islamic 
NGOs in turn pressured the government to impose restrictions on the activities of church 
based NGOs that enjoyed considerable freedom during pre-1975 period.  As a result, 19 
Christian NGOs threatened withdrawal from Bangladesh as a way of dissuading the 
government from giving favourable treatment to Islamic NGOs (Kalimullah 1991:143).  
Sensing the tension between the Islamic NGOs and Christian NGOs and afraid that the 
situation would antagonize both Western and Islamic donors, the government formulated 
the Foreign Donation (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act 1978 (revised in 1982), the 
first act of its kind in Bangladesh. Western donors, however, rebuked the Government for 
formulating such an act (Uddin 1984:47).  
 
By 1978, NGOs had realized that if they were to work with the Muslim population, they 
had to disassociate themselves from the missionary „people‟s approach.‟  It had several 
weaknesses, as Bangladeshi villages not only are stratified along class lines (Adnan and 
Rahman 1979), but also have strong social relationships which can undermine loose 
economic and administrative structures (Khan 1996).  The community concept might be 
appropriate to the Hindu caste community or tribal society, but highly inappropriate in a 
class divided peasant one featuring kinship relations (Kramsjo and Wood 1992:9).  
Furthermore, "Bengal did not appear to be a favourable place for missionary activity 
(McNee 1976:43)”.  Also, the ever-growing grassroots Marxist movement‟s opposition to 
the government had created an unfavourable situation for working with the poor.      
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NGOs quickly learnt that if they did not adopt the right ideology in right context, any 
development intervention would be jeopardised.  For example, they found that the 
relatively well off people had misappropriated the resources they had distributed under 
the community approach
26
.  Moreover, they saw that the elite began to dominate and take 
decisions on behalf of the poor.  Thus, NGOs were looking for an alternate ideological 
position to give them a new direction, but still provide a radical flavour to their activities 
in working directly with the poor. 
 
They found that Pualo Freire's conscientisation approach (Freire, 1972)
27
 fitted well 
contemporary socio-economic reality.  The conscientisation approach provided NGO 
practitioners a way to promote development in apolitical language, which they hoped 
would act as a compromise, or complement to Islam. The supposed advantage of 
accepting Freire‟s humanist theory of liberating the oppressed poor through a 
conscientisation process is that it neither denied the reality of the mystery of God nor did 
it affirm it.  The NGO view was that a humanist approach would inspire poor people. The 
conscientisation strategies aimed at “generating a consciousness among the rural workers 
to develop their capacity as claimants over a range of issues such as wages, access to 
rural works employment, occupation of khas
28
 (government) land and so on” (Wood 
                                                     
26
 Interviews with BRAC persons.  
27
An informant opined that in 1973 an American Consultant from the World Education introduced Pualo 
Freire's approach through BRAC‟s Functional Education Project at Sulla. 
28
 Khas land is government-owned and acquired through accreditation from the sea or rivers, purchased 
from auction sales, or consolidation of abandoned or confiscated land, etc., (Devine 2002: 404).     
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1985:457). This would enable the poor to fight against prevailing socio-economic 
injustices.  NGOs added secularism to conscientisation, not to discourage religion, but to 
give equal space to all religions in development.  However, many failed to see that the 
ethical, humanistic, philosophical principles upon which Freire's pedagogy rests have a 
close relationship with Christian theology (Nunez 1985:58).  
 
NGOs put the conscientisation strategies into operation by evolving a „target group‟ 
approach .   In the beginning, the term „group‟ was differently interpreted by different 
NGOs.  It could either involve the recognition of the collective income generating 
activities to support a „delivery concept‟, or the value of collective solidarity across a 
broad range of issues to support the idea of „empowering the poor‟ (Wood 1985:458).  
Moreover, NGOs began to confuse the distinction between Bhumihin (landless) and 
Bittaheen (assetless) classes.  Subsequently, NGOs evolved a standard definition for the 
target group.  It is those people who own less than 0.05 decimal lands and earn their 
living by selling physical labour for at least  100 days in a year.     
 
The conscientisation approach became popular among NGOs as a way of limiting 
conflict with the exploitative power structure. The post-1975 development approach may 
be summarised as follows.  Firstly, emphasis was placed on organisation building through 
group formation, which would enable the poor to improve their living conditions, 
especially by collective action.  Secondly, this was supported by the training of leaders 
and other group members in skills required for a viable group-based organisation and by 
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education aimed at everyday problems of group members.  Thirdly, confrontations with 
rich and powerful peasants in the villages were accentuated. Fourthly, the process of 
changing the socio-economic and political conditions in villages should be accomplished 
by the poor themselves. And finally, NGO staff should increasingly withdraw (Streefland  
1993:159-160).     
 
This approach by NGOs caused confusion among the poor.  They thought NGOs and 
Marxism were similar in supporting the causes of poor people.  Furthermore, NGOs came 
to see poverty not simply as a problem of income differentials but also of the power 
relations present in rural society.  “Many NGOs began to lay emphasis on consciousness-
raising with the aim of forging class-based alliances among the poor” (White 1995:101).  
Many NGO staff, also, argued that the first step in bringing about a revolution was to take 
„reformist‟ measures which would significantly improve the health and nutrition of the 
masses and make them receptive to political education conducive to revolution (Ray 
1986:2).  One such NGO leader, much later declared, “Now we NGOs can do the job.  
We do not need the left” (Karim 2001:98).  On top of all this, many NGOs had adopted a 
policy of recruiting radicals associated with Marxist parties (Ahmed 1985; Muhammad 
1988:1).  These Marxists accepted jobs in NGOs because disillusioned with the future 
prospect of Marxism and mass revolution in Bangladesh (Kalimullah 1992:64).   
 
The recruitment of Marxists had further implications for NGOs. Many NGO staff also 
misinterpreted the conscientisation approach associating it with Marxism. So many began 
  
89 
 
to mobilise group members to attack the “class enemy” (Kafi 1992:1), such as rural elites 
and police stations, so as to disrupt in the power structure
29
.  This role of NGOs produced 
a controversial image.  The rural elites thought that NGOs were Marxists who mobilised 
poor peasants against the rich, but Marxists interpreted NGOs as the agents of 
imperialism as the latter were using the “red flag” (i.e. NGOs) to de-radicalise the 
Marxist “red movement” (Azad 1997:56). 
 
In general, many donors became nervous that NGOs could be mobilising poor men and 
women with foreign aid in order to attack the pro-establishment political structure.  They 
met with NGOs to evolve strategies to defuse the tension.
30
. During the meetings, two 
issues emerged.  Firstly, much discussion focussed on how to serve poor people without 
radicalising them and also, ways to avoid antagonizing the powerful.   BRAC 
subsequently played a pioneering role in evolving a mechanism that aimed at delivering 
services to the poor people and peasants by bypassing those in power (NET 1979, BRAC 
1989).  Secondly, many NGOs sought formal co-operation with leftist and Marxist 
groups in shaping the development discourse.  They organized a joint conference in 1980 
with those on the left (Kamaluddin 2000:24-25).  The NGO participating were dissuaded 
from going further, sensing that the better-organized Marxist forces sought to manipulate 
them to serve their radical reformation aims (Kafi 1992:2).  The Marxists argued that the 
„target group‟ approach would reinforce the antagonistic boundary between the middle 
class and poor peasantry (Kamaluddin 2000: 24). Overall, NGOs were successful in 
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Interview with ex-BRAC staff   
30
 Interview with NGO staff and leaders 
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initiating a process of “anti-statism” which was the ideological transit ticket from class 
politics to community development, from Marxism to the NGOs (Petras 1997).  
 
In the late seventies, NGOs gradually began to change their focus and concentrate more 
on income generating projects.  Nearly seven hundred NGOs implemented income 
generating projects, but these lacked economic effectiveness, and featured poor 
management and marketing of projects (Sanyal 1991:1372-73).  Many NGOs blurred the 
distinction between income generation and conscientisation.  However, they realized the 
importance of establishing savings and credit schemes so as to enhance the economic 
changes of poor people.  Many also advocated the need for credit to reduce radicalisation 
of the poor people.  Thus NGO increasingly focused their activities on the mobilization 
of savings under the canopy of the conscientisation approach, and provided credit to 
facilitate exploitation of rural resources.  The mobilisation of credit and savings involved 
both men and women.  Many Marxists interpreted this as a capitalist ploy for starting the 
process of capital accumulation in the rural economy by developing pro-capitalist 
organisations among the poor people
31.
  Furthermore, during the early eighties, loans 
were given to poor people on the assumption that they would invest the money to 
accumulate further capital which in turn would help them to escape the yoke of money 
lenders
32.
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An interview with a Marxist leader.   
32
NGOs argued that the problem of the poor people was the borrowing of money from the money lenders at 
an exorbitant rate.    
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By the beginning of 1980, NGOs had started to capitalize on their experiences with the 
poor.   Despite the NGO politicking, the large inflow of foreign funding allowed NGOs 
to work continuously with the poor; and to seek co-operation and support from 
Government organisations, the permanent bodies of the state.  For example, the Oral 
Therapy Extension Programme (OTEP)
33
 experience in 1980, BRAC showed how 
important it was to obtain government backing in the implementation of a national 
programme and how supportive the government bureaucracy could be.  When BRAC 
received clearance from the government to carry out the OTEP, it tried to involve local 
government to give local government staff a sense ownership in the programme, and to 
increase the credibility of BRAC staff (Chowdhury and Cash 1996: 81).       
 
As they started to expand their activities into new areas, the government began to 
consolidate various local bodies and extend its administrative reach, so the two came 
closer to watch the activities of the other.  The government was unsure about what NGOs 
were doing and became suspicious. The boasting of NGO staff about their success 
exacerbated this growing suspicion especially when accompanied by a critique of the 
government's failure. This mutual suspicion led to antagonism.  
 
The populist military regime of General Ershad in 1982 promoted NGOs. His populist 
politics needed the support of the resource rich NGOs.  In collaboration with the NGO 
leader, Dr. Zafrullah Chowdhury, he adopted a national drug policy which forced all 
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 OTEP was programme which offred a oral therapy solution to diarrhea cases, especially to children.   
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multinational pharmaceutical companies to produce life-saving drugs locally (Chowdhury 
1996).  The credit approach, by 1983, became a well-accepted phenomenon, primarily 
because of the recognition of Grameen Bank by the military government (Siddiqui 
1985:155).  The Grameen Bank, although is not an NGO, showed the way to manage 
collateral free loans by using peer group pressure to ensure repayments (Fuglesang, et al. 
1993).  The Grameen Bank set an example with women deciding to take out loans and 
deciding how to spend their earnings. The success of Grameen Bank had a seminal 
influence on those NGOs implementing income-generating programmes other than 
micro-credit.  They now began to engage in micro-credit projects and evolved projects 
such as „credit and appropriate technology‟, „credit and reproductive health‟, „credit and 
rural development‟, etc.    Importantly, the government also learnt from the Grameen 
Bank approach.  Earlier, the government had attempted to use the cooperative model 
developed at the Bangladesh Academy of Rural Development (BARD) at Comilla as the 
basis for a nationwide credit programme for small and landless farmers.  The programme 
fell into difficulties but “is now being revived with group-based lending technology 
borrowed from Grameen Bank” (Hossain et al. 2000:67). 
 
By 1986, a clear consensus had formed in the NGO sector that its sustainability, in the 
face of constant rural radicalism, depended on combining savings and credit in order to 
bring about the integration of group members into the market economy.   At the same 
time, donors were willing to pump more money to the NGOs.  Two important factors 
played a significant role by the mid-eighties in the shifting the focus of donors to NGOs.  
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Firstly, they were dissatisfied with the government's inefficiency in using aid.  By the end 
of 1986, a large amount of money was held up in the government bureaucracy.  At the 
same time it pressured donors to disburse money under its Aid Programme
34
, and they 
found in NGOs an alternative outlet (Tvedt 1995:11).  Secondly, NGOs received a further 
boost during the floods of 1987 and 1988, when foreign countries hesitated to provide 
direct help to Ershad's military government with its rampant corruption and 
mismanagement of aid.   
 
Some NGOs rejected the credit model of Grameen Bank and BRAC (Kabeer 2002).  
They were led by the PROSHIKA, which offered a model of social mobilization which 
reduced the emphasis of the role and need of credit in development.  The mobilization of 
the poor was thought to be important in breaking the power structures (Kramsjo and 
Wood 1992) that keep millions of people the prisoners of poverty.   The poor people must 
be empowered to do so as expressed at the international meetings organized by 
PROSHIKA at Manikganj. The Manikganj meeting decided that “the rural poor must 
…be empowered not only to fight back, but to regain the ownership and control of the 
resources that were originally theirs” (Carmen 1990:59).  The problem of the poor is not 
that they are unaware of their exploitation, but their inability to act on it.  Thus, 
conscientization reminds people of their vulnerability as individuals and families, and 
encourages the idea that strength lies in unity with other similar families (Kramsjo and 
Wood 1992:7-9).  
                                                     
34 
Discussion with a donor staff 
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In 1986, NGOs and the government jointly participated in the Facilitation Assistance 
Programme on Education (FAPE).  In 1987, a further collaborative programme, the 
Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD), was launched.  It was 
the outcome of interactions between district level personnel of the Department of 
Livestock services (DSL) and NGOs.  The IGVGD is an example of a successful attempt 
at transforming a relief programme into a development one. The target of IGVGD was 
poor women previously invisible in the development process (Matin and Hulme 2003).   
Although mutual suspicion remained, the NGOs were relatively successful in developing 
co-operation with government, for example, participating the Expanded Programme on 
Immunization (EPI).   
 
General Ershad needed NGOs in wake of the land reform policy in 1984 to legitimate his 
military government.  The government issued the circular Land Reforms Action 
Programme (LRAP) in 1987 that converted the Bangladesh Land Reforms Ordinance, 
1984 into the centrepiece for land distribution (Devine 2002:405).  Many NGOs were 
directly involved in land reform.  The new military regime, to increase its popularity, 
decided to involve the poor through the Land Reform Campaign.  General Ershad revived 
the government‟s policy which recognised "the right to use all Khas and Char lands or 
ponds of Bangladesh must be given to some landless cooperatives" (Dumont and Paquet 
1983:20).   Social mobilization NGOs jumped onto the bandwagon seeing an opportunity 
to engage the landless people in land reform.  The thrust also came from the debate about 
Bhumihin (landless) and Bittaheen (assetless) classes as indicated earlier.  NGOs knew 
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from experience that the question of poverty was intricately related to land reform.  
While they were not in a position to bring about any structural reformation of land tenure, 
they devised a strategy to take advantage of the government‟s policy on land reform, 
mainly to occupy and redistribute the khas (government) land among the poor landless 
class
35
.   The prevailing pattern of village politics was polarised along class lines 
(Mannan 1990a).  Thereby, the “struggles for access to khas land and representation in 
positions pivotal to access to resources have been the main conflict issue” (Streefland 
et.al. 1993: 163).   When the government announced that the land would be distributed to 
the landless, the Communist Party of Bangladesh and its satellite organisation Khet 
Mujur Samity started to mobilise the landless poor to occupy the khas lands
36
.   Their 
activities deeply disturbed the military government.  General Ershad in retaliation 
supported the NGO establishment in order to divide the communists (Karim 2001:98) and 
tempted a section of the Khet Mujur Samity to accept donor funds (Holloway 1998; Stiles 
2002:838). 
 
The overall policy of the government favoured NGOs by taking up land issues as part of 
its development agenda.  In 1987, the government formed the gucha grams (clustered 
villages) for landless people.  Each gucha gram comprised 30 families and NGOs would 
oversee their affairs (GOB 1987:28). Several NGOs took the opportunity of cooperating 
                                                     
35
The NGO aspirations for land reforms are rooted in the principle laid down at the Economic and Social 
Council of United Nations, at its Thirteenth Session on September 7, 1951.  The United Nation adopted 
Resolution 370 (XIII) which recommended "that governments institute appropriate land reforms in the 
interest of landless farmers and those with small and medium-sized holdings" (United Nations. 1954). 
36 
Interview with NGO employees. 
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with the government on land distribution tasks.  They also assisted the government in its 
other programme of adarsha gram (Ideal Village) that aimed to help the distressed poor 
by constructing houses for them. The European Commission also supported the adarsha 
gram programme (Mannan 2001a, Saha 1997:11), and the World Food Programme 
supported the government effort and activities to build up the rural infrastructure by, for 
example, re-excavating ponds for fish cultivation by the rural poor.  However, the 52 
Members of Parliament (MP) from the opposition parties criticised the government for 
engaging NGOs in land distribution (AR 1987:7). 
 
The activities of General Ershad made him extremely popular with  NGOs.  On 24 and 25 
June 1987, the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) in 
collaboration with USAID and in the presence of 1,200 representatives from 600 NGOs 
gave General Ershad a public reception. In return, General Ershad announced the 
formation of a cell under a cabinet ministry to clarify and coordinate NGO functions and 
roles  (Kalimullah 1991:145), which eventually led to the establishment of the NGO 
Bureau in 1990.  Meanwhile, during the 1988 flood, the government allowed NGOs to 
carry out operations beyond government control and monitoring.  
 
Another significant move of the military government was to support, in 1988, the NGOs‟ 
move to decentralise the country‟s health system.  The NGOs proposed to appoint doctors 
and nurses in upa-zilla (local government) hospitals under their patronage.   The plan was 
to break the monopoly of the powerful Bangladesh Medical Association (BMA) and 
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ensure that rural people received medical services and health care.  The move was 
vehemently opposed by the BMA and created a heated debate.  The plan of decentralising 
the health system was eventually abandoned.           
 
The politicking of General Ershad did not help the growing suspicion between the 
government and NGOs.  The decade was marked by „co-operative antagonism,‟ each 
trying to define the methods of intervention for poverty alleviation. They came 
increasingly into contact as the government extended its administrative reach to the 
remotest village with its experiment in local government and Union Parishads 
(Aminuzzaman 1998).  The NGOs, beneficiaries of the military government, made a U-
turn during the popular uprising of 1990 that rejected General Ershad in favour of 
democracy (ADAB 1991, Shailo 1990: 20-24). 
 
3.4 Phase Three: Globalisation and the NGO Industry 
 
The downfall of Soviet Union in 1990 changed global politics with the end of the Cold 
War (1947-90), or what is fashionably called the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1995), 
symbolised by  the fall of Berlin Wall.  The new era features globalisation prominently, 
process by which decisions and events in one part of the world can have significant 
consequences for communities in other distant parts (McGrew 1992:262).  It features the 
movement of „international capital‟ within the „free market‟ and important to this thesis‟ 
argument, aid fatigue.  There were changes in the priorities of Western donors in favour 
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of market, state and civil society interventions.  The global paradigm shift was also 
influenced by the growth with equity development formula which replaced the perceived 
tension and opposition between the state and NGOs with the idea of common interest 
between the two arenas (White 1999:308). 
 
Donors increasingly placed conditions on NGOs.  The financial support that had 
stimulated the growth of the NGO sector in Bangladesh became more conditional. They 
contributed significantly to the transformation of the NGO movement into the NGO 
industry.   Now donors put an emphasis on „capacity building‟ addressing issues of 
poverty, democratisation, strengthening of civil society, human rights, sustainable human 
development, etc.  The aim was now to build a multi-stakeholder forum in which NGOs 
engaged donors and Western NGOs in debate and innovation.  It was hoped that such a 
dialogue  would shape conceptual approaches, policies and practices for more appropriate 
future interventions.  It was expected, also, that capacity-building activities would 
generate an enabling environment, increasing access to intellectual, institutional and 
material resources. Capacity building took place in a context where donors had to be 
careful not to undermine the experience of NGOs with their networks among the poor, 
seeking to link to the market.  The NGOs had to phase out previous social mobilisation 
projects in response to market demands.  
 
The donors encouraged NGOs to reduce their dependency on foreign funds. This 
prompted a major rethink among leading NGOs at a workshop organized in Rajour by 
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Gonno Unnoyan Prochesta (GUP). Many NGOs had thought, previously, a way to 
reduce dependency was to „scale up‟ projects in order to earn from the market. Others 
found it difficult to believe that donors would stop funding (GUP-ACFOD 1989).   By 
1994, NGOs were placing more emphasis on the sustainability and financial viability of 
their activities.  In this respect, three debates emerged among NGOs.  The first was about 
NGOs promoting their „image‟ as pro-people organisations to encourage people to buy 
their products and services. The second focused on people and communities becoming 
„owners‟ of the development process, giving them responsibility to sustain NGOs.  The 
third was where NGOs argued that the cultivation of good relationships with donors and 
promoting their globally driven agenda would attract them more support.   In reality, 
more funds flowed to those NGOs committed to the „full flowering‟ of the market 
economy, production for export and aimed at domestic upper-income earners (Sanyal 
1991:1373).     
 
The transition of NGOs involved discarding old projects developed during the cold war 
era, to take on new projects attuned to globalisation.  But with the introduction of these 
new ideas and projects, the potential “customers” or grassroots beneficiaries became 
suspicious of the motives of some NGOs. Over the years, they silently witnessed NGOs 
introducing new projects and phasing out old ones.  People decided that NGOs were  
non-permanent entities, shifting their allegiance to new opportunities without completing 
the previous task.  New projects would mean new identities and opportunities (Mannan 
2000a).    
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The Government became more suspicious as more funds were diverted to the NGO 
sector, heightening competition between them over control of donors‟ resources.  The 
Government was dependent on donors to finance its „development budget.‟  The total aid 
to Bangladesh government was $1640 million in 1988 and $1443 million in 1996, 
whereas NGO aid increased from $150 million in 1990 to nearly $450 million in 1995 
(Stiles 2002:836-837). The ever-growing influence of NGOs on the donor community 
also led to increasing criticism of government inefficiency.  The Government criticised 
NGOs back for „lavish‟ spending of donors‟ money and for carrying “poverty with 
Pajeros”37.  The widespread belief is that NGO staff are getting more benefits in 
comparison to government staff.  Although this might be true for the NGO leadership, 
which enjoys large salaries and other financial benefits, NGO staff do not generally 
receive larger salaries than their government counterparts (Siddiqui et al. 1987).  It was 
probably this growing belief that prompted the government to initiate in 1992 an 
investigation, at the request of the Prime Minister, into the role of NGOs.  The resulting 
report criticised NGOs on two grounds: (i) 52 or more NGOs were seeking to convert the 
poor to Christianity, and (ii) many NGOs had financial anomalies in their accounts, as 
they did not report to government the amount of donations they received.  This report 
prompted the government to cancel the registration of a few leading NGOs.  But it was 
forced to nullify its decision under heavy pressure from some leading ambassadors of 
donor countries (Ishatiaq and Mannan 1993).      
 
                                                     
37
 Pajeros are expensive Japanese jeeps that symbolise the neo-rich in Bangladesh  
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3.4.1  NGO Industry and New Direction 
 
NGOs began to transform under the influence globalisation into a “development 
industry.”  NGOs took on industry-like characteristics leaving behind norms of voluntary 
association (Hulme and Edwards 1997:3).  NGOs globalisation involves a combination of 
at least  four factors: (i) the market economy with its focus on capital and profits; (ii) the 
mass production of industrialized goods with associated continuous technological 
advances; (iii) parliamentary democracy combined with a multiparty system, and (iv) the 
ideology of human rights, which today supplements Christianity (Godelier 1996:66). 
 
3.4.1.1  Market Economy: Transformation of Money into Capital 
 
Under financial pressure from the World Bank, IMF and donors, the government has 
begun to emphasize privatisation focusing on capital.  Many NGOs took the opportunity 
of privatisation to enter into business.  This is a marked departure from their earlier 
commitment to „value-driven‟ voluntary social movements occupying the high moral 
ground (e.g. the conscientisation approach) which allowed the NGOs to represent 
particular non-market values and to express an interest in the political process, at least  in 
theory, to „market driven‟ agencies seeking to provide services at a lower price than the 
commercial sector.  
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Some NGOs worked to increase the economic power of poor women through 
engagement with the market particularly through micro-credit projects.   Out of 1300 
donor supported Bangladeshi NGOs, more than 800 in 1999 dealt with micro-credit 
projects (Huq 2000:21).  By 2000, NGOs disbursed micro-credit amounting to over $ 
2500 million to the poor.  This has increased cash flow in villages with a qualitative 
change in the relationship between men and women. Credit transactions and increased 
money circulation changes the life style and consumption pattern in households (Rahman 
1999; Mannan 1998b). Some women became mini-money lenders.  Most women 
however who received NGO credit transferred the money to their male kin for 
investment.  This affected the informal credit system controlled by moneylenders, who 
were forced to charge much lower interest rates (Begum 1994).  These NGOs expanded 
with what Robert Chambers (1983) describes as roadside bias, with the expansion of rural 
roads giving NGOs the opportunity to reach the remotest villages.   
 
The dominant micro-credit ethos of NGOs has to be understood against their approach to 
social mobilization
38
, organizing the poor to act against the social injustice, moneylenders 
and exploitative power structure.  One-way to reduce the power of moneylenders is to 
provide credit.  Once NGOs engage in credit transaction, they found it as a lucrative 
business that provides financial sustainability.  
                                                     
38
Under the influence of micro-credit programmes, as NGOs sought to reengineer themselves, this created 
cultural tension within organisations.  For example,  Ghimiri  (2001:143-146) observed the proactive role 
of the third largest NGO Gonoshahajjo Sangstha (GSS) in providing legal assistance to peasants and poor 
women, but this NGO disintegrated and was abolished in 1998, as they tried to reengineer organisational 
culture from a social mobilization to a micro-finance institution.    
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In order to ensure their organisational sustainability all major NGOs accommodated, to 
varying degrees, the Grameen Bank‟s practice of micro-credit into their programmes, 
resulting in the emergence of three distinct approaches. The first is the “credit-only” 
approach of the Association for Social Advancement (ASA), which abandoned its radical 
empowerment policy to development. The second is the “credit-plus” approach of BRAC 
which it uses empowerment ideology to protect its micro-credit model. The third, the 
“credit-plus-plus” approach of PROSHIKA uses a micro-credit model to promote 
empowerment.             
 
 3.4.1.2  NGOs: Market Driven Agency for Mass Production 
 
NGOs follow a common formula to transform money into capital.  They provide loan 
capital to their group members for investment at a stipulated rate of interest.  It is 
supposed to help members enhance the productivity of their land and labour.  NGOs take 
a share of the profit from work of group members, which they accumulate.  The interest 
income allows NGOs to develop fixed capital consisting of buildings, business 
equipments, etc. In this way money is concentrated not in the hands of group members, 
emancipating them, but in NGO coffers. 
 
Many NGOs work in two ways.  They modify traditional products into handicrafts for 
which there is a market. The income affords people access to mass produced 
industrialized goods. A few NGOs, such as BRAC, became agents for multinational 
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companies such as Monsanto
39
, or IT businesses
40
. Three largest NGOs - Grameen Bank, 
BRAC and PROSHIKA - dominate the information technology business in Bangladesh.  
The Grameen Bank has directly linked global and local society by supplying mobile 
phones to its group members (Aminuzzaman et al. 2003).   
 
The impact of NGO work is to make the poor more financially accountable in integrating 
them to market.  It is increasing the capacity of the poor to shift their labour from 
traditional occupations to opportunities in the non-agricultural sector such as rural 
construction, transport business, trade and services.  The transformation of the labour 
market took place in various ways.  Piece rate labour contracts and fixed rent tenancies 
increasingly replaced the traditional occupational hierarchy where the poor preferred 
employment as casual daily labour (Rahman 2001). 
 
NGOs see poverty as a business, redefining their group members as market actors.   They 
not only provide loans, but also create opportunities for credit receiving women to enter 
into business transactions with them. They sell agricultural seeds, medicines, poultry 
products, micro-dairy equipments, etc. to their group members. They also take 
responsibility to market the produce as a further extension of NGO business (Makita  
2009).  They seek to act as a catalyst for prospective entrepreneurs.    
                                                     
39
In late June of 1998, Monsanto, the US agri-business company announced that it was forming a 
partnership with Bangladesh's Grameen Bank.  After a national protest, Grameen Bank denounced 
Monsanto, but the company made a deal with BRAC and CARE (UBINIG 1998) 
40 
An other aim of some Bangladeshi NGOs is to evade tax after the Carnegie, Sage, Rockefeller 
Foundations, etc. that deduct charitable donations from their income tax.  Bangladesh Tax Officials fined 
BRAC Taka 99 lakh ($ 202,040) for evading value added tax (Jonakhontho 2001:12). 
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3.4.1.3 NGOs and Parliamentary Democracy 
 
The capacity displayed by NGOs to promote the market economy has a disruptive affect 
on the wider society. As the social problems began to emerge, some NGOs took the 
opportunity to start projects on democracy with their groups.  This had a deep impact on 
traditional social institutions notably the samaj (see Chapter 7).   The rural poor and elites 
were unable to comprehend the process of change and thought that the NGOs were the 
root cause of it.  Thus, they started to oppose NGO interventions and activities (see 
Chapter 9).   
 
There were several rural uprisings. The first one took place in 1993-94 against BRAC 
and a few other NGOs (see Chapter 9; Mannan et al. 1994). Peasants continue to 
challenge the wisdom of modernisation and development as they spontaneously rise up 
time and again, culminating in events like the fertiliser revolt of 1996 (Samshir 1996), the 
Brahmanbaria Islamic uprising in 1998 (Karim 2004), religious tensions in 1999 (Rafi 
and Chowdhury 2000), the Shonir Akhrah revolt, the Kansat revolt and the Phulbari, 
Dinajpur uprising against a multinational company in 2006 (Muhammad 2007), the 
Nachole fertiliser revolt in 2007, etc.  The Government felt helpless because, by then, it 
had, under the pressure from the World Bank and donors, made fertiliser distribution over 
to the private sector and market, which had mismanaged distribution. These crises created 
a dilemma for NGOs.  They did not support the peasants for fear it might disrupt the 
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donor‟s policy of privatisation. As an outcome, the NGOs lost their credibility in 
claiming to be the moral representatives of the poor in Bangladesh.   
 
These rural uprisings could be interpreted as rural opposition to outside NGO 
intervention.  Many people portray NGOs as agents of neo-imperialism, like latter day 
Christian missionaries.  People believe that when Christian missionaries started their 
activities, they established both schools and hospitals, instead of converting people. 
These won people‟s trust, who began to accept and tolerate them.  Once socially 
accepted, it is claimed that the Missionaries gradually began to proselytise people with 
increasing Colonial power, the missions acting as an advance post for colonial 
expansion
41
.  In the post-colonial times NGOs use funds from donors to establish further 
schools as well as health and family planning clinics.  Once NGOs had built up a rapport 
with the population through schools and health programmes, they gradually engaged the 
population in savings and credit projects in support of the neo-liberal market policy of 
donors.  Thus, NGOs came to replace Christian missionaries as an advance post for 
Western capitalism to exploit developing Bangladesh. 
 
The religious opposition became a milestone in NGO history. This situation also deeply 
divides NGOs (Devine 2006:86).   BRAC and allied NGOs felt the need to compromise 
                                                     
41 
This interpretation is not true.  In Bangladesh, first the colonial power established its authority and then 
Christian missionaries came.  However, people believe the above interpretation which is spread by their 
religious leaders. 
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with the forces of religion, but the overall NGO body ADAB
42 
and PROSHIKA the 
second largest NGO saw an opportunity to mobilize against fundamentalism (Seabroke 
2001), interpreting it as a threat to secularism and democracy.  The religious backlash 
was widely interpreted as a sign that NGOs were effective at  secularising rural society.  
They cited the clash of civilizations view (Huntington 1993) to justify their activities.  
They convinced the donors to direct more money to the NGO industry.  
 
NGOs used religious opposition to take new projects in two directions.  Firstly, they 
introduced projects on democracy to neutralise the influence of religious forces.  The 
democracy issue began to creep into the NGO community from 1990.  Following the 
popular upsurge that brought about the downfall of the military regime, NGOs quickly 
abandoned their alliance to it, to become pro-people (ADAB 1991).  They jumped onto 
the new „bandwagon of democracy‟ with support from donors aiming to become agents 
for promoting parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh. Democracy projects have 
flourished in three ways.  The first is the emergence of Fair Election Monitoring 
Activities (FEMA), to monitor elections and promote transparency in the national 
election process, reporting back to donors.  The second is the establishment of the 
Democracy Partnership Programme
43
,
 
which supports NGOs to prepare the poor for the 
elections.  The third is the broader voter education programme of ADAB (Ashman 1997), 
involving various NGOs in projects from selecting party candidates to national elections.     
                                                     
42
 ADAB was split in 2004 and a new NGO Federation was formed under the patronage of BRAC.   
43
The Democracy Partnership programme had an external impulse as the USAID under both the first Bush 
administration (1989-93) and the Clinton administration (since 1993) had been pushing democratic 
development as a centrepiece of foreign aid strategy (Blair 1997: 23).    
  
108 
 
Secondly, NGOs anti-fundamentalism stance translated into projects on Human Rights 
and social mobilisation.  PROSHIKA and some NGOs were successful in a showdown 
which brought out thousands of their beneficiaries on January 1, 1995, at Manik Mia 
Avenue, Dhaka. Encouraged by their capacity to mobilise the poor, PROSHIKA prepared 
for a larger demonstration in 1998 at one of the bastions of fundamentalism, entering into 
conflict in Brahmanbaria with so-called local religious groups (Biswas 2001, Karim 
2004).  BRAC opposed such activism and wrote a letter to all donors disowning the 
confrontational politics of PROSHIKA
44
. BRAC had learnt in the 1994-95 period that 
both NGOs and religious forces had to coexist, NGOs for example working with family 
planning and reproductive health (Mannan 2001b).  
 
3.4.1.4 NGOs and  Human Rights 
 
Associated with the democracy programme, NGOs aspired to work with human rights 
and civil society, incorporating these issues into their programmes (Zafarullah and 
Rahman 2002).  A few NGOs such as Ain Salish Kendra, Madaripur Legal Aid, Mannob 
Unnayan Kendra, etc. worked solely with human rights issues.  But they disagreed about 
the meaning of human rights.  Some provided legal education to make their beneficiaries 
more aware of individual, marital and moral rights; some pursued litigation on their 
behalf, and at least  one NGO, creatively, linked the human right issue to sanitation. 
 
                                                     
44
 BRAC on January 31, 1999 wrote to all donors against the PROSHIKA‟s antifundamentalist movement 
and disapproved such move.  
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The NGOs considered human rights and democracy to be linked to the notion of civil 
society.  Although NGOs claimed to be part of civil society, it proved elusive (Lewis 
2004).  Until 1994, the concept of civil society was hardly heard and understood within 
NGOs (Smillie 1997). An important distinction is drawn between NGOs that receive 
international capital (Mathews 1997) and other civil society organisations that depend on 
local resources (Ahmad and Jahan 2002).  The lack of definition of a civil society has led 
to rifts within NGO community and with local civil organisations.  For example, NGOs 
involved in social mobilization programmes consider religion as fundamentalist 
opposition, whereas NGOs with strong credit and family planning components consider 
religion as an aspect of civil society with which they work.     
 
A budding trend in some NGOs is the protection of indigenous knowledge, including the 
preservation of local varieties of seeds against the massive onslaught of HYV and 
genetically modified seeds.  PROSHIKA developed extensive organic farming 
programmes which shun modern agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, pesticides, etc.  
UBINIG (Unnayan Bikalper Nitinirdharoni Gobeshona) made impressive achievements 
in the conservation of indigenous varieties of seeds, preserving more than 700 local rice 
varieties. It started Nayakrishi Andolon (New Agricultural Movement) to encourage 
peasants to reject High Yielding Variety (HYV) and Genetically Modified Seeds and 
cultivate traditional varieties of seeds.  Such movements exposed the weakness of many 
NGOs to learn from the poor and explore the potential of their indigenous knowledge.  
Involvement with civil society requires the development of critical understanding of 
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indigenous knowledge (Sillitoe et al. 2005).  The awareness, attitude and behaviour of 
many development practitioners have changed less than the language they have learnt to 
use. The majority of development professionals in international agencies, national 
governments and field agencies continue to "undervalue indigenous knowledge and the 
capacities of local, especially rural, people" (Chambers and Richards 1995: xiii).   
 
3.5  Goverment and NGO Politicking 
 
The role of NGOs is best viewed from their relationship to the government‟s position in 
changing global and local contexts.  For example, if Marxist and nationalist inspired 
peasant movements instigated the approach of the state to land reform in the fifties and 
sixties, the government now allows NGOs to work on the issue of land reform, seeking to 
create a market that might eventually curtail the present rural violence. The powerful 
presence of NGOs in development is also to be viewed from the perspective of the 
historical failure of governments to alleviate poverty. This has not so much to do with 
formulating approaches and laws, but their failure to implement these (Mannan 2001a: 
89).    
 
A problem is the government‟s weakness in supporting appropriate agencies and 
structures to carry out development activities.  The failure of government has created 
scope and space  of the NGOs to work with the poor.  They do so particularly in three 
areas of activities.  Firstly, NGOs are involved in mediating conflicts, helping the poor to 
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understand the law and right to legal aid.  Secondly, NGOs work where there is an 
absence of well-defined property rights and access of the poor to resources.  Thirdly, 
NGOs are increasingly taking up policy work, employing advocates to redress fraudulent 
practices and anomalies.   
 
NGOs increasingly combine the roles of both market and social actors.  This has resulted 
in some contradictions, the pro-poor NGOs dividing into two streams.  The market based 
NGOs, with leadership from BRAC, started to implement anti-environment and pro-
fundamentalist policies, whereas NGOs that support social movement under the 
leadership of PROSHIKA adopted pro-environment and anti-fundamentalist policies.  
Pro-market NGOs increasingly deal with micro-finance and expansion of the market. 
This has allowed them to compromise with religious forces, but has done damage to the 
environment, agriculture and ecology. The NGOs that promote social movements oppose 
the ecological costs and promotion of fundamentalism.   
 
Over the years, NGOs emerged with a distinctive characteristic of a non-party political 
formation, previously unknown in Bangladesh, capable of influencing supporting and 
mobilising the poor (Karim 1999; Devine 2006:81).  The non-party political formation of 
NGOs has several political overtones. Despite NGOs claim of lifting the poor out of 
poverty, it deeply divides the leadership of NGO community itself.  The leadership is 
polarised between BRAC and PROSHIKA over the control of small and medium NGOs 
as the latter organisation today faces problems in accessing both donor finance and 
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government funds. Both donors and the government have problems not only in financing 
and monitoring ever growing numbers of small and medium NGOs, but they also rely on 
large NGOs and support organisations (SOs)
45
 to channel the funds for development.   
         
The conflict between PROSHIKA and BRAC further intensified on the eve of formation 
of the Bangladesh NGO Foundation (BNF) in December 2004 by the government.  The 
BNF started with US$ 750,000 in seed funds to support small NGOs (Agarwal et.al. 
2007:15). The BNF plan is to rely on SOs to disburse funds to small NGOs.  ADAB, an 
association of NGOs over which PROSHIKA has complete control, is perfectly placed to 
channel BNF fund. However, the ruling political government (2001-2007) of the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) disliked PROSHIKA because of the organisation 
alleged “political linkages” with its arch rival the Awami League (AL). The BNP 
government accused PROSHIKA of mobilising millions of group members from 
numbers of small NGOs to vote for AL in the 1996 election. In anticipation of the 
influence of PROSHIKA over BNF funds through its influence on small NGOs, the 
government not only systematically harassed PROSHIKA by blocking its fund from 
donors (TDS 2003c:1) and suing its leadership for treason (TDS 2004:1), it also 
encouraged BRAC to form a rival association, named the Federation of NGOs (FNG) in 
2003 (TDS 2003a:1).  This move brought about an effective division after 30 years of 
ADAB leadership.  Immediately after the formation of BNF, the BNP finance minister 
held discussions with the BRAC leadership (TDS 2003b:12).   
                                                     
45
SOs are intermediary organisations between donors and NGOs. SOs play an important role in channeling 
funds from donors to NGOs which implements projects in different thematic areas of development. 
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Photo 3.2:  Students of Dhaka University form a human chain on campus demanding 
establishment of women's rights. 
 
Source: Zahedul I. Khan 
 
One reason why the government failed to formulate time-honoured rules and regulations 
to control and monitor NGO activities (Abbey 2008) is related to the opposition of NGO.  
A deep implication of such opposition is that the government had hardly any statistics on 
the number of NGOs.  The government claims that over 2000 NGOs have registered with 
the NGO Affairs Bureau, but the aspiration of NGOs to register as Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFI) under the Micro-credit Regulatory Authority in 2006 suggests the 
existence of over 4,000 organisations.  As indicated earlier, in 1992 the government was 
forced to withdraw its order to cancel the registration of a few NGOs for financial 
irregularities.  In 2007, NGOs resisted the government‟s attempt to modify the 1978 
regulation (Agarwal et.al. 2007:15). NGOs were successful in opposing the 
implementation of the MCR for 26 years, but in 2006 the government was forced to 
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impose it (Jumma and Nasir 2007) because of widespread financial corruption and 
swindling of the poor‟s money by many NGOs.  Anticipating the reality of obligatory 
registration under the MCR, over 30 NGOs preferred the easy option: disappearing with 
over Taka 500 million (TDS 2008a). The NGO leadership, however, remained silent 
regarding the misappropriation of the poor‟s money by dishonest NGOs. 
 
The morals of NGOs leadership were further questioned on the eve of the tidal wave Sidr 
which ravaged the whole coastal belt of Southern Bengal.  When people throughout the 
country volunteered to rehabilitate the tidal victims and lives of millions who were 
struggling to survive, NGOs, like predators, put pressure on the suffering poor to repay 
loans taken in the pre-Sidr period.  This disturbed the national consciousness. Amid 
nation-wide protests, the head of the care-taker government
46 
advised NGOs to suspend 
their loan operations, waive interest and behave humanely (TDS 2007a:1). 
 
The influence of NGO non-party political formation is clearly felt by the care-taker 
government (2007-2008).  NGOs were successful in installing a leader to supervise two 
ministries: that of Primary and Mass Education, and Women and Child Affairs.  This   
advisor played an instrumental role in ensuring the interests of large NGOs, but in the 
process of “NGO-ising” development (TDS 2008b:16) 47  created countrywide opposition 
on two fronts.  First, the adviser tried to introduce “Women Development Policy,” which 
                                                     
46
The care-taker government is an interim non-political government that is formed to ensure a neutral 
political environment to carry out the election of political parties. 
47FH Abed, the Chairman of BRAC, used the expression “NGO-nising” development (TDS 2008a:16)  
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was vehemently opposed by religious forces; the general population endorsed the views 
of religious leaders in this case.  
 
The government eventually abandoned the Women Development Policy which only 
strengthened the forces of religion and fundamentalism.  Secondly, the government 
appointed BRAC to monitor the quality of primary schools across Bangladesh.  Primary 
school teachers opposed this plan to ensure that the suspected conspiracy of NGOs would 
fail (TDS 2008c:5). This opposition was in line with earlier opposition to NGO activities. 
The success of the largest NGOs like BRAC and PROSHIKA, are widely recognized, but 
these NGOs face civil society challenges (TDS 2007b:1; TDS 2006a:1). The aspiration of 
PROSHIKA‟s Chief Executive Officer to contest in 2006 election was opposed by the 
people (TDS 2006b:6).  The High Court cancelled the permit of BRAC Bank, but this 
ruling was later nullified by the Supreme Court (Sidel 2004).  
 
3.6.  Discussion and Reflection 
 
NGOs and donors continuously introduce new Western concepts, ideas and theories, 
while replacing earlier ones and creating the basis of development discourse in 
Bangladesh.  Development issues flow into country at an amazing pace; these sets of 
issues change completely within five to six years.  For example, Gender discourse, 
Women in Development (WID) was replaced by Women and Development (WAD), then 
by Gender and Development (GAD). Perhaps, as many practitioners say, the next issue 
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would be Men and Development (MAD).  The implication is that development 
practitioners are not always able to keep up with expectations of change nor are they able 
to understand the sophisticated assumptions that underlie development concepts and 
theory.     
 
NGOs also continuously change in response to new issues while discarding old ones. But 
in the process they mature in dealing with development ideas, ideologies and agendas. 
The development agenda during the Cold War period (1945-1990) had completely 
changed by the age of globalization (1991  to present).   During the Cold War period, 
NGOs worked to develop consensus among the poor to develop “anti-statism” and 
secularism as a countervailing force to offset the growth of Marxism. In the age of 
globalization, the same NGOs are working to develop market-based neo-liberal economic 
philosophy. As a result ideas such as micro-credit, grassroots democracy, human rights, 
etc. come to dominate development scenarios. Some of these NGOs now target Islam and 
religion; others adapt or compromise with the forces of Islam.  During this phase, we also 
experienced the rise of Islamic NGOs. Overall, NGOs transform the NGO movement into 
a development industry. 
 
The principle modus operandi of NGOs is to translate and transform Western 
development ideas, issues and ideology into projects for implementation among the poor 
for poverty alleviation. The next chapter (ch.4) explains the notion and integrity of 
projects as an important element of development discourse.  It explains that projects 
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aimed at modernization have themselves undergone a change from a blue-print approach 
to a process approach. In reality, top-down approaches are renamed but not reformed into 
bottom-up approaches. 
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  CHAPTER FOUR 
 
NGO, PROGRAMME AND PROJECTS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Development projects shape NGO culture. An NGO‟s major concern is its projects. 
Donors provide NGOs with funding to implement projects which primarily fall into four 
broad categories: social mobilization, education, health and micro-credit.  Social 
mobilization projects can range from discrete projects which may involve participation 
and action by local people, to non-discrete projects, dealing with advocacy, good 
governance, etc.  In the case of education, NGOs deal with two types of discrete projects: 
education for adults and non-formal primary education for children. Health-related 
projects primarily focus on family planning and reproductive health.  Micro-credit 
projects may start small but tend to transform into larger microfinance programmes.  
Unfortunately, development practitioners often fail to understand the nature of project-
centred organisations which results in the blurring of distinctions between projects and 
assets, and the systems, schemes or institutions that they create (Cusworth and Frank 
1993:4-5).  Projects are artificial in that the development process follows dynamics 
separate from society at large (Mikkelsen 1995:48).    
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The sustainability of NGOs is shaped by a number of interdependent factors relating to 
the strategies employed in response to the changing development paradigm within the 
framework of the market economy.  The best way for an NGO to adjust to paradigm 
shifts, is to organize itself into project modes, which allow flexibility for both donors and 
NGOs, who can then reorganize themselves in response to available funding and 
economic opportunities which arise.  All NGOs implement donor driven agendas such 
that NGOs are an extension of the donor organisations.  Donors see NGOs as a means to 
implement projects to justify their development paradigms, “the bread and butter, rice 
and fish, the atmosphere and horizon of NGOs” (Timm et al. 1993:27).   
 
A mechanism to cope with changing context and time is needed so as to, if necessary, 
modify the project nomenclature of existing or old projects to form new ones to adjust to 
new realities.  In the process, NGOs must manage the projects in such a way that projects 
are neither transformed into movements, nor continue with the same themes or character 
as before.  More importantly, the sustainability of NGOs depends on economic projects 
aimed at utilizing the opportunities of the market. At the same time they must implement 
social projects in order to show that they are voluntary organisations promoting human 
well-being and welfare and not market interests.   
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4.2. Project Context 
 
This chapter draws inferences from the history of project evolution of a large NGO, in 
this case BRAC, and comparing it with five other small NGOs.  Appendix One represents 
the project history of BRAC‟s Rural Development Programme (RDP). Appendix Two 
represents the project history of the five small NGOs
48
. 
 
NGO emerged from their position as insignificant agencies for development in the 1970‟s 
and 80‟s and have come to dominate the development scenario at the beginning of the 
21
st
 century. The basis for the rise of NGOs lies in their capacity to implement numerous 
projects covering diverse thematic areas for poverty alleviation. This topic also lends 
itself to a discussion on the development character and nature of NGOs. Over time, 
NGOs have often become equated with their projects, programmes and organisations, 
which are, in turn, dependent on the NGOs‟ ability to change and grow. In order to shed 
light on the dynamics of NGOs, it is important to analyze the linkages between their 
constituent projects, programmes and organisations. Without such an analysis, it would 
be difficult to fully understand how an NGO operates and functions.  The ability of 
NGOs to change over time has frequently led to the conclusion that NGOs have an 
amorphous character.   
 
                                                     
48
These NGOs are Bangladesh Institute of Apiculture, Kanchan Samity for Women, Church of Bangladesh 
Social Development Programmes, Dharma Bishyak Gobeshana O'Samaj Kallyan Sangastha and Young 
Women Christian Association 
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4.3 The Project History of the Rural Development Programme of BRAC (see Appendix 
One) 
 
At present BRAC broadly operates in four areas of development, namely rural 
development, education, health and urban development. The history of BRAC‟s Rural 
Development Programme (RDP) shows a positive progression and evolution, which has 
availed itself of the opportunities that have arisen with the paradigm shift in development.  
The RDP came into being in 1986, when two BRAC programmes, namely the Outreach 
Programme and Rural Credit and Training Programme (RTCP), merged into one.  The 
Outreach Programme was a social mobilization programme that mobilized poor men and 
women with the aim of political and class awareness-raising, whereas the RCTP had 
worked as a credit-supplying programme for the mobilization of economic resources 
available to the poor.  The need to create the RDP came about when the Outreach 
Programme transformed into a radicalized movement. Outreach Programme group 
members had, at available opportunities, attacked police stations as well as landed and 
rural elites. This made BRAC‟s donors nervous.   Donors met BRAC and other NGOs in 
order to find a way to defuse the rural radicalism instilled in the groups by the Outreach 
Programme and also to incorporate social awareness components into the credit 
programme
49
. As an outcome, BRAC worked to reduce the level of radicalism of its 
beneficiaries by merging the Outreach Programme into the RCTP to create the RDP. The 
RDP retained the social awareness components, but rejected the class and political 
                                                     
49
Personal Communication with Shadat Hossain, who resigned from BRAC and joined PROSHIKA. 
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awareness components of the Outreach Programme. This merger created unease within 
BRAC, as Outreach Programme staff believed themselves to be a progressive programme 
that prepared the poor to fight against the exploitative economic and social structures of 
rural society. The Outreach Programme had a seminal influence in the creation of social 
mobilization NGOs like Nijera Kori
50
, Urban, etc.     
 
Since 1986, BRAC has remained cautious about turning projects into movements, but 
retaining the process by phasing out projects in favour of phasing-in other, less 
contentious, projects.  Whilst continuing to expand credit focused economic projects, 
BRAC has not discarded its social mobilization projects. Rather, social mobilization 
projects have undergone a transformation, from the “class and political” awareness 
projects of the seventies, to “legal and gender” awareness projects by 2000. Currently, 
BRAC‟s human rights and gender projects are subtly designed to promote economic and 
sectoral projects. BRAC requires its social mobilization projects to counteract the 
antagonism and violence that may be generated by its economic projects. In the present 
era of globalization, BRAC‟s experience suggests that it has taken up social mobilization 
projects for two concrete reasons. The first reason was that the scaling up of its economic 
and business projects might create opposition from local social and religious forces. It 
had already established, by 1994, that the attacks by fundamentalist forces against BRAC 
programmes and projects could be directly attributed to consequences created by its 
economic projects (Mannan et.al 1994). The second reason was that the scaling up of 
                                                     
50
 Large numbers of field organisers, who were unhappy with merger of outreach programme with RCTP, 
left BRAC to join Nijera Kori (Kabeer 2002:1).  
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activities by peer NGOs could, also, affect BRAC‟s economic projects. BRAC was 
attacked at Brahmanbaria in 1998 because of the politics of another NGO, PROSHIKA 
which had mobilized its female groups against the religious forces. This led to the 
damage of BRAC property.  
 
Thus, BRAC felt that there was a need to mobilize its 21 million beneficiaries as a 
mechanism to protect all its projects and programmes. In 1998, BRAC began a process 
for the formation of Federations among its beneficiaries organized through its primary 
Village Organisations (Mannan et al. 1995a).  A Federation is an apex organisation 
comprised of alliances of a number of village organisations in a particular region.  BRAC 
has borrowed the Federation concept from its earlier experiment with the Outreach 
programme. The social mobilization projects were designed to minimize conflict, so VO 
formation became an important structure for BRAC to sustain its credit and sectoral 
programmes. Social mobilization projects do not seek to change society through violent 
means, but to accommodate forces of change through organisational learning in order to 
promote economic and business projects.  BRAC has learnt from incidents in 1986, 1994 
and 1998 that any confrontations with fundamentalists have economic consequences and 
for the interest of its projects and programmes, it is important to achieve rapprochement 
with respect to religious forces (Rafi and Chowdhury 2002).         
 
The RDP is a combination of multiple projects. BRAC has mastered the art, skill and 
experience of modifying projects, within the space of three to five years, in such a way 
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that the modification of a project ensures its further growth. This ability of BRAC to 
create and evolve new projects or modify its old ones makes it an appealing organisation 
to donors. BRAC is a pioneer organisation, demonstrating how to transform and develop 
as an organisation which can carry out business alongside poverty alleviation 
programmes. This ability to change with the times and the changing context of 
development has ensured BRAC‟s reputation as an innovative organisation.   
 
BRAC‟s success derives from the fact that its savings and credit projects are increasingly 
supporting its beneficiaries who are able to take up numerous sectoral projects in 
different areas of economics. As more and more group members take up sectoral projects, 
BRAC‟s business and trade complement the process. Moreover, BRAC‟s business is 
transferring traditional women‟s activities from the private sphere to the public sphere by 
commercializing women‟s activities.  For example, the hen rearing skills of women are 
utilized in poultry rearing; household cooking practices are transformed on a large scale 
into cooking at restaurants, etc.   
 
4.4 The Project History of Five Small NGOs (see Appendix Two) 
 
A European donor extended support to five small NGOs with the aim to make these small 
NGOs sustainable. The donor expected that while the NGOs would receive financial support 
in pursuit of their aims to help poor and disadvantaged communities, they would grow into 
viable organisations.  The policy of the donor was to extend support for a maximum of ten 
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years to particular projects and organisations. In all cases, after extending the support, the 
donor stopped funding, not because these NGOs did not use the support effectively and 
efficiently, but because these small NGOs failed to carry over their projects into new 
phases, in line in the donor country‟s strategy.  It was also found that the projects 
implemented by these NGOs had neither met their stated objectives nor had they been 
guided by the target groups or beneficiaries. A problem for these NGOs was the frequent 
use of words like "target groups", "sustainable development", etc. in their project proposals 
without themselves being aware of what all these terms actually implied. These NGOs have 
had a number of positive achievements at the operational and field levels, but at the 
organisational level, their senior executives were unable to articulate and conceptualize the 
impacts of their projects.  This problem was specifically related to a lack of proper 
understanding of project planning and management, and as a result, they were not 
particularly efficient at reporting and evaluating their own performances. They were unable 
to submit any evaluation reports to donors. As the donors were eager to know whether their 
financial support was properly used or misappropriated, consultants were appointed to 
evaluate projects. The major problems these NGOs experienced, was that not only did they 
fail to evolve from initial project support, but they had also failed to produce evaluation 
reports as per their commitments. Moreover, they had not done sufficient groundwork to 
convince the donors that they were attaining financial viability. Despite repeated 
warnings from the donor‟s office, these NGOs naively thought that the donors would 
continue to fund their projects, so the withdrawal of funds took them by surprise (Mannan 
1993b).   
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4.5. NGOs: Projects, Programmes or Organisation 
 
The case studies presented above show that BRAC has emerged as a model for NGOs for 
coping with changes and that the five small NGOs‟ failure to adapt to change led to the 
closure of their projects. The five smaller NGOs, unlike BRAC, could not bring 
dynamism to their organisations and, therefore, might have appeared uninterested to the 
donors. A closer look into the project history of NGOs in Bangladesh reveals two clear 
pictures.  The first picture shows NGOs as organisations. This becomes clearer as the 
NGOs‟ capacity to grow with projects increases and the outcome of discussions on 
NGOs, due to the huge amount of literature and mass media produced (Jamil and Mannan 
1996) become available. This picture of NGOs has led to international, national or local 
NGOs being typified as large, medium or small organisations.  The second picture shows 
NGOs as successful instigators of projects. This picture follows from a large number of 
monitoring and evaluation reports, annual reports, and impact studies of NGO projects, as 
well as the submission of NGO project proposals to donors.  
 
Almost all of the discussions on NGOs are made as if NGOs exist as organisational 
entities.  This impression of NGOs as organisational entities is a misnomer on two 
grounds.  First, NGOs comprise of a number of separate projects, but the coordination of 
these projects brings into being umbrella organisations. These umbrella organisations are 
now depicted as NGOs.  Projects constitute the bottom line of NGOs, which, in turn, 
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shape the character of NGOs. Secondly, there is a need to deconstruct NGOs in order to 
show the relationship between projects, programmes and organisations.  
  
The capacity for NGOs to manage various projects produces multiple organisational 
images.  The larger an NGO, the larger is its capacity and ability to manage and 
implement multiple projects in diverse thematic areas.  However, there remains a 
problem in defining project-oriented NGOs, which depend on how donors construe them. 
Donors may view the projects of NGOs in different ways. As one donor states: “some 
NGOs have only one project with several service components – which conceptually and 
practically they can not isolate from the whole organisation. Some NGOs have several 
projects with different donors with one service component or integrated and compact 
components – which is understood and operated as a project by them” (Hossain 2001:27).  
Projects may differ to the extent to which they are oriented to the target group and how 
intensively the latter cooperates with the NGOs.  In relation to target groups, three 
categories of project are identified: (i) those projects that are not oriented to a specific 
target group - mostly institution-building activities such as support for research 
institutions, building training divisions, promoting network organisations, etc. (ii) 
projects which are indirectly benefit the target group to provide them with goods and 
services such as provisions for agricultural inputs, curriculum development services, 
operations of hospitals or health centres, etc. and (iii) projects cooperating directly with 
the target groups. The objective of a project is to bring about a change in behaviour 
patterns of the target groups (Lang 1989: 19-20). 
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The definitional problem of NGOs from a project perspective could be better articulated 
through a debate on projectization. There are, at least, three perspectives on the question 
of defining projects: positivist, social constructionist and peoples perspectives on 
projects. Positivists view a project as the investment of „capital‟ in a „time-bound‟ 
intervention to create productive assets (Cusworth and Franks 1993:3). The social 
constructive perspective views a project not as a bounded entity formed around  
consensual goals and ideas (even though it may represent itself as such), but a „political‟ 
system in which different perspectives contend for influence and authority. Such a project 
involves multiple actors and stakeholders; not only project staff and participating 
villagers, but also donors, consultants, bureaucrats, senior agency managers, and local 
government representatives, among others. Within each of these there are distinct 
interests, concerns, and priorities (Mosse 2001:159-160). The third definition is provided 
by the „peoples‟ perspective. People use the term project in three different ways: as 
community improvement by government; as an instrument of welfare to help people in 
need and support kinship; and as personal enrichment for people who participate in 
tendered contracts to obtain projects (Hilhorst 2003:86-87). 
 
The positivist viewpoint is the subject of criticism. A project encompasses the energy and 
inventiveness of people supported by physical and financial resources, so that „capital‟ 
can refer both to human and material resources.  Such a definition of a project often does 
not capture the reality of developing countries for two reasons.  First, projects in 
developing countries invariably deal with the transcultural values which originated in the 
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West. The problem of transcultural values is that, as we have seen, the development 
agenda not only varies with time and may experience a paradigm shift, but, also, depends 
much on the value-based projects determined by the donor‟s country‟s strategies. A 
change of paradigm invariably opens up the scope to work within new thematic areas. 
Secondly, the idea of „time-bound‟ development projects to create productive assets has 
led to the recognition of phases within the project process from which the concept of a 
project cycle originates. Project cycles illustrate the difference between the „blue print 
approach‟ (also known as the input-output model or top-down approach) and the „process 
approach‟. There exists a tension between the blueprint and process approaches (Wield 
2000: 56).  The term „blue print‟ comes from engineering images of detailed drawings 
showing exact product specifications.  The term suggests “that projects need to be 
systematically and carefully planned in advance, and implemented according to the 
defined plan” (Cusworth and Franks 1993:8; Gido and Clements 2003).  The „blue print 
approach‟ starts with a project cycle that incorporates the identification, formulation, 
implementation, commissioning, operation and evaluation of projects (Cusworth and 
Franks 1993:5-7,  EU 2004). With the project cycle framework one can complement 
various tasks from conceptual mapping and implementation to learning and evaluation 
(Moris and Copestake 1993:15). In practice, the blue print approach is applied with the 
help of the Logical Framework Approach (LFA).  LFA comprises management tools and 
methods used intensively by donors and NGOs to control and monitor actions of others as 
a part of management discourse (EU 2004). The management discourse works in two 
ways.  First, the project moves diachronically through time and across space, and 
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secondly, it simultaneously controls the action of distant others through time and across 
space (Kerr  2008:91)   
 
Diagram 4.1: Project Cycle Management 
 
Source:  EU 2004:19 
 
On the contrary, the „process approach‟ allows a project to be designed with built-in 
flexibility, so that local institutions and groups can learn to develop the capacity to design 
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and manage projects in an ever-changing social and economic environment (Eyben 1991: 
1). The „process approach‟, which is also known as the „bottom-up approach‟, starts from 
a base and grows from a real need of the people.  The process approach “allows for 
flexibility in project design: although wider objectives must be defined from the outset, 
project inputs and outputs…..and lessons are learnt from past experience” (ODA 
1995:104). Table 4.1 lists the differences in assumptions of the blueprint and process 
approach of projects: 
 
Table 4.1: Assumptions behind projects 
Blue Print  Process Approach  
1. Projects start with transforming ideas 
and assumptions into action; experts play 
important roles. 
1.  Projects start from the concrete 
experience and active experimentation of 
ideas and assumptions; people play an 
important role. 
2. The future can be planned; managers 
control the projects 
2. The future cannot be planned in a 
predetermined way; the project reaches 
its goal to the satisfaction of all 
stakeholders  
3. Emphasis placed on economic 
rationality; actions are assessed against 
planned objectives and which inputs they 
require 
3. Emphasis placed partly on economic 
rationality, but also on cultural, social 
and political rationality.    
4. A tendency to separate persons from 
things and reasons from emotions  
4. The difference between subject and 
object is usually deemed irrelevant. 
5. The analytical breakdown of 
relationships 
5. A holistic approach taken to map 
complex relationships between different 
contexts  
6. Teamwork approach to examine all 
assumptions and interests 
6. Participatory approach of different 
stakeholders 
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The ongoing debate on projectization reveals wide ranging discussions on the types and 
nature of projects. The debates on projects can be divided into two periods: from 1970 to 
1990; and from 1990 onwards. 
 
4.5.1  1970-1990 
 
Most of the debate originates from poor results and the negative findings of projects in 
developing countries. Such results intensified the projectization debate and raised many 
questions. What form of blue print should be used? What process approaches should be 
considered, and under what circumstances? How should projects be implemented? The 
ongoing debates about project models tend to revolve around the question of measuring 
the impact of development projects. Hulme (1988) reviewed the debate on projects and 
found three basic responses. The first response is „loyalty,‟ that is, leaving things as they 
are. In a narrow sense, experts are committed by their professional competence which is 
assumed to be based on correct procedures and universal principles. All constraints, be 
they political or otherwise, are external to their frames of reference and, thus, failures are 
attributable to individuals not fully understanding how the procedures should work.  The 
second response is the „voice‟ which modifies the orthodox model. This develops from 
the dissatisfaction with the orthodox approach to projects and its outcome, but it does not 
reject the orthodox models.  Such a response stresses the need to develop projects from a 
variety of perspectives and a range of proposals, from modest tinkering to demands for 
radical overhauls. The third response is „exit‟, which rejects the orthodox model and 
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introduces alternative models. Some of these models have populist orientations, but in the 
end they strengthen the case to adopt a process approach, in order to be able to cope with 
the high degree of uncertainty and constraints not recognised during project 
identifications and appraisals (Hulme 1988: 277-287). These three responses are 
measured against three categories of project initiatives: (i) orthodox model; (ii) hybrid 
model; and (iii) political model.  The orthodox model confirms blue print approach. The 
political model provides a conflicting image of projects as political arenas, in which 
powerful groups conflict and bargain in their attempts to set and manipulate the agenda 
for public action. The hybrid model is grounded between the orthodox and political 
models to offer opportunities for the development of project methodologies that are both 
desirable and feasible (Hulme 1988:287). The debates between the orthodox model, 
hybrid model and political model are summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
The orthodox project planning model includes following studies: Gittinger (1982) adopts 
the position of a technocrat, so as to avoid personal responsibility for the outcomes of 
project that do not match with the assumptions of the models [A-1]. Conyers (1981:103) 
places emphasis on the orthodox model, but, in addition, argues for social analysis with a 
greater focus on participatory and social planning [B-4]. The focus of Cernea (1985) is on 
sociological variables whereby people should be considered first in rural development. 
According to him, sociologists have one hundred “don‟ts” for every five “do‟s” [B-4]. 
Smith (1987) offers the teleological systems perspective, to overcome the limitation of 
orthodox models by including project beneficiaries in the process of identification 
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problems [B-4]. The work of Rondinelli (1994) indicates that the orthodox models are 
acceptable for certain kind of projects like construction and infrastructure building, but a  
 
 
Table 4.2: Various Responses to Project Planning Models*  
Response ORIGINS OF THE RESPONSE 
Orthodox Model Hybrid Model Political Model 
A 
Leaving things as 
they are (Loyalty) 
1 
Orthodox model  
(Gittinger 1982) 
2 
Pragmatism 
(Johnson 1985) 
 
Sensitized Orthodox Approach 
(Pratt and Boyden 1985) 
3 
Use Political 
Model (Schaffer 
1984) 
 
SOSIP- 
Sophisticated 
Obfuscation of 
Self Interest and 
Prejudice  
(Stern 1976) 
B 
Modifying the 
orthodox model 
(Voice) 
4 
Social Planning (Conyers 
1981) 
 
Consideration of  
„sociological variables‟ 
(Cernea 1985) 
 
Teleological Systems 
Approach (Smith 1987) 
5 
Whistle Blowing (Clad 1986) 
 
Commitment Analysis  
(Heaver and Israel 1986) 
 
Separation of Technical and 
Political Roles  
(Hinchiffe and Allan 1983) 
 
Simple is Optimal  
(Chambers 1987) 
6 
Search for 
„Room for 
Manoeuvre‟ 
(Clay and 
Schaffer 1984) 
 
Real World 
Tactics  
(Ferguson 1990) 
C 
Rejecting the 
orthodox model 
and introducing an 
alternative (Exit) 
7 
Adaptive Management and 
„Process Approach‟ 
(Rondinelli 1994) 
8 
Learning Process Approach 
(Korten 1980) 
 
Local Organisations  
(Esman & Uphoff 1984) 
 
Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(Chambers 1983) 
 
Liberalization & Market 
Mechanisms (Davies 1987) 
9 
Class Analysis 
(Barnett 1977) 
 
Conscientisation 
and Community 
Empowerment 
(Freire 1972) 
 
*Names in brackets indicate an author who has proposed or illustrated a particular 
response 
Source: Hulme (1988: 278-279) 
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„process approach‟ is required in others so that projects may have adaptive management 
to be used as an instrument for facilitating innovations [C-7].     
 
The hybrid project planning model covers the following studies: Johnson‟s (1985) 
emphasis was on the orthodox model, but acknowledges the fact that other processes are 
operating which need to be dealt with pragmatically. He recognises, also, that the existing 
project identification methods are not perfect, but admits that no better approaches are 
known [A-2]. Clad (1986) „blew the whistle‟ as an insider to projects. His critique 
involved the public denunciation of the weaknesses of a specific project by someone 
involved in its design [B-5]. Heaver and Israel (1986) recognised that commitment 
analysis is required to create consensus on a project. They proposed that this could come 
about through a stakeholder analysis where all the key actors are identified at the project 
identification stage and the assessment of the official, informal and personal goals of 
these actors are taken into account [B-5]. Hinchliffe and Allan (1983) argue for a 
separation of the technical and political roles within a project framework [B-5]. 
Chambers (1987) called for a new professionalism in which all personnel involved in 
rural development should be sensitised through training and other means to the biases 
that their professions and social positions are likely to induce [C-8].  Korten (1980) has 
proposed a learning process model against orthodox donor funded projects for a better 
and sustained result. The behaviour of national and international agencies is seen as being 
guided by organisational goals to the detriment of proclaimed objectives [C-8]. Esman 
and Uphoff (1984) focused on local organisations as intermediaries and voluntary 
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associations of individuals with a common interest which are neither part of formal state 
structures, nor a part of primary political groupings [C-8]. 
 
The political project planning model encompasses the following studies: Schaffer (1984) 
showed that a project, within the orthodox model, is able to achieve some of its 
objectives whilst avoiding responsibility for outcomes [A-3].  Stern (1976) offered the 
„Sophisticated Obfuscation of Self Interest and Prejudice‟ which placed emphasis on 
neutral technical analyses, which are incomprehensible to non-specialists to the 
advantage of technical specialists and their companies [A-3].  Clay and Schaffer (1984) 
held the view that the political model permits few opportunities for 'room for manoeuvre" 
and allow leads to modify project‟s practice [B-6]. Ferguson‟s (1990) real world tactics 
[B-6], Barnett‟s (1977) class analysis [C-9] and Freire‟s (1972) conscientisation and 
community empowerment,  see projects as a subcategory of societal actions, which can 
only be understood through an analysis of the distribution of social and economic power 
[C-9].   
 
Although, many of the studies could be placed within Hulme‟s framework, one distinct 
weakness with such a framework is its inability to provide space for cultural models for 
development (Grillo and Rew, 1985; Cernea, 1991; Pottier, 1993; Verhelst, 1992; 
Manger 1985:56). Therefore, the need for a rethinking of development practices and the 
reconstruction of development theories should be emphasized by, for example, focusing 
on the management aspects of the projects which have gender implications (Moser 1993).  
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In this way, the emphasis is not only placed on economic indicators, but also on the 
development managers who steer the development projects. 
 
4.5.2  1990-beyond 2000 
 
The projectization debate has taken a new turn since 1990 with the manifestation of 
globalization, which significantly influenced a policy shift in the priorities and 
preferences of Western donors toward their southern development partners. Development 
interventions are now seen not as the simple outcome of a value-free and linear planning 
process, but rather as the changing and negotiated manifestations of diverse and 
sometimes competing interests. NGO intervention previously viewed as a discrete 
project, with a clearly identifiable beginning and end, is replaced with one of intervention 
as a set of social practices, arising out of the interlocking of different stakeholders‟ 
strategies and intentions (Crewe and Harrison 1999:19). In the process of intervention, 
the concept of capacity building in different thematic project areas finds fertile ground 
under the following imperatives:   
 
• Transitions:  Donors place emphasis on policies for reducing NGO dependency 
on them for project funding. In this view NGOs should plan a transition process 
for reducing dependency on donors by reconfiguring the power relationship such 
that NGOs can generate funds from the various stakeholders in the state, market 
and civil society at large.   
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• Phase Out: Western donor countries have come under pressure from the public 
and taxpayers who begin to question the historic efficacy of overseas 
development assistance.  This phenomenon allows donors to reformulate their aid 
policies and priorities. Donors prefer to „phase out‟ funding for government 
development projects in the South, but have renewed policies to promote NGO 
projects which aim to work within market and privatization frameworks.   
 
• Scale Up: Western countries have put pressure on southern governments to scale 
down centralized bureaucracy in favour of the devolution of power, so as to make 
local bodies more effective. At the same time they have encouraged southern 
NGOs to scale up their projects to ensure compatibility with the government and 
the market. The scaling up of southern NGOs and the scaling down of 
government intervention have provided incentives for striking a balance between 
the two.  As a result, governments become increasingly interested at working at 
the project level.   
 
• Sustainable Development: Donor country policy is geared towards privatizing 
development so as to promote a liberal market economy in the South. The process 
thus nurtures the notion of sustainable development which places emphasis on 
southern NGOs and Government Organisations (GOs) in the search for alternative 
financing sources from within the country, as well as beyond national boundaries.      
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The new imperatives of globalization have brought about shifts in donor policy that allow 
NGOs to venture into uncharted territory. NGOs, for the first time, have begun to rethink 
the future of their organisations. Donors help NGOs in their rethinking process by 
supporting the development of strategic plans for NGOs.    
 
4.6. Organisation, Programme and Project Linkage 
 
Overall, the notions and concepts of development have begun to change and enter into 
new phases under two compulsions: (i) global experience suggests that development 
projects and programmes are failing to alleviate poverty and (ii) the question of 
sustainability of organisations is raised, because NGOs are the ones who are involved in 
the poverty alleviation endeavour.  These compulsions engage NGOs to formulate 
strategic plans for locating their positions within the emerging power structure and the 
market. The urge to scale up programmes and projects also inspires NGOs to engage in 
the exercise of strategic planning. The need for strategic planning is also the result of both 
NGOs and donors feeling the need for developing effective management systems, the 
collaborative development of project management and for „localization‟ (as well as 
internationalization) of project management shaped by universal values. The majority of 
NGOs, except for a few large ones, lacked the expertise and skill to develop strategic plans. 
Thus, donors contacted and commissioned BRAC, in 1996, to facilitate the strategic 
planning process for more than 150 NGOs.    
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4.7 Organisational Strategic Plan 
 
As NGOs began to develop strategic plans and produce documents, they began to see 
themselves as organisations, rather than projects, for the first time in the history of NGOs 
in Bangladesh.   Strategic planning helps NGOs to grow and adopt their policies to ever-
changing environments. The important outcome here is that they developed into dynamic 
structures able to adapt to change.  One of the aims of strategic planning is to develop 
effective strategic management systems for development by taking into account the 
following considerations: 
 
 Existing staff strength, skill, experience, etc. which are available within the NGOs 
 The political environment in which the NGO operates 
 The need to adopt a variety of forms and styles that are directly related to the major 
functions in the policy making process 
 The fashioning of a variety of interventions and interaction techniques into strategies 
required to influence not only the choice of alternatives but also the implementation 
of selected policies 
 
NGOs have also worked to develop policies such as "articles of faith" which work as 
pointers for philosophical and operational preferences.  They focus on issues such as: 
 
 The type of activities donors are likely to support 
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 Who determines the recipients of support 
 How such support is channelled 
 What is/will be the nature of the partnership, e.g., between NGOs and Donors; 
NGOs and governments, or NGOs and the communities involved 
 
Large-scale NGOs have played important roles in organizing strategic plans for smaller 
NGOs.  The strategic planning framework incorporated different aspects of the planning 
process, supported by an organisational and management sub-text.  A causal planning 
framework is outlined in Box 4.1. 
 
Strategic planning enabled NGOs to not only rethink their development practices and 
projects within the organisational context, but also encouraged them to reconstruct 
development theory, so as to focus on the management aspect of development projects.  
New emphasis was placed on not only economic indicators, but, also, on the quality of 
development managers and the overall management strategy for accelerating the 
development projects. However, the strategic planning of NGOs exposed weaknesses in 
the organisational viability of NGOs, rather than focusing on the future shape of 
programmes and projects. During this process, NGOs are compelled to identify linkages 
and boundaries between organisations, programmes and projects.   
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Box 4.1: Planning Stages and Aspects  
Planning Stages Planning Aspect 
Strategic Planning Operational Planning  
 
Strategic Planning 
(e.g. missions, 
visions, policy, 
documents reflecting 
strategic thinking 
about what an 
organisation intends 
to be in the future and 
how it will get there, 
etc.) 
 
 
Operational Planning (e.g. 
planning Manuals and 
guidelines for activities, 
tasks, etc. for 
implementation within the 
framework of the strategic 
plan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning Design (e.g., 
idea, objectives, purpose, 
size, results, activities, 
assumptions, etc.) 
Project Effectiveness (e.g. 
planned results and actual 
benefits, unforeseen 
results, etc.) 
Project Efficiency 
(conversion of inputs into 
outputs, means and cost, 
intervention methods, etc.) 
Project Relevance 
(stakeholders determine 
high priority issues; not 
the project) 
Project Effect and Impact 
(e.g. improvement of child 
health, increase in 
contraceptive use, 
mortality decline, etc.) 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
(for measuring and 
assessing progress) 
  Sustainability and 
Community Ownership 
(financial viability and 
continuation of  the 
project) 
Organisation and Management Subtext (e.g. appropriate project structure and 
practice) 
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4.8 Project and Programme 
 
One way to explain the relationship between organisation and its projects is to view 
NGOs as evolving from projects. All NGOs, large or small, start their development 
journey with projects supported by donors. Once NGOs receive funds from donors, they 
experience continuous pressure to start new projects or to extend their ongoing projects. 
A project occurs, by definition, within a set time frame and a largely unfamiliar area. A 
project is usually phased out within three years.  Since the objectives of projects are 
temporary, the organisation that carries them out must also be temporary. Rather than 
being an ongoing activity, the project has a very specific outcome.  The continuing ability 
of NGOs to phase-in and phase-out projects allows NGO projects to grow over time, so 
as to give them a larger framework as programmes.  
 
A programme is difficult to define, as it comprised of several projects and continuously 
phases-in and phases-out projects to strengthen particular thematic areas of activities of 
development. A project in a particular thematic area grows as it branches out its activities 
to form a higher level of programmes.  A programme provides an umbrella framework 
for a number of projects.  Projects are built into a programme, so that when they complete 
their cycle, the programme can start new projects as a continuation of the old projects.  
The causal diagram 4.2 represents this process.      
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In brief, NGOs have made attempts to conceptualize projects as part of several major 
programmes, which in turn encourages the implementation of an even larger programme.  
Sound project planning should, therefore, link project objectives with programme 
objectives, which in turn should be linked to the policy goals which the NGOs support 
(Goodman and Love 1980:23).    
 
 
Diagram 4.2. Organisation, Programme and Project Linkage 
 
                             ╔══════════════╗ 
                             ║Organisation  ║ 
                             ╚═══════╤══════╝ 
                                     │ 
                                     │ 
                                     │ 
                                     │ 
                   ┌─────────────────┼──────────────┐  
                   │                 │              │   
             ╔═════╧═════╗     ╔═════╧═════╗   ╔════╧═════╗ 
             ║Programme 1║     ║Programme 2║   ║Programme3║ 
             ╚═══════════╝     ╚═════╤═════╝   ╚══════════╝ 
                                     │ 
                                     │ 
                                     │               
                       ┌─────────────┼────────────┐  
                       │             │            │  
                  ╔════╧═════╗ ╔═════╧═════╗ ╔════╧═════╗ 
                  ║ Project 1║ ║ Project 2 ║ ║Project 3 ║ 
                  ╚══════════╝ ╚═══════════╝ ╚══════════╝ 
 
 
As NGOs become experienced in strategic management and planning, they attempt to 
demonstrate the linkage between organisational strategic plans, programme plans, 
projects and activity plans. Usually, NGO strategic, programme, project and activity 
plans have time periods.  A donor, normally, funds a project for three years, and thus, a 
project is designed for three years. The project also elaborates activity plans for one year 
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which details activities, the allocation of tasks, people, available timescale and budget. 
The programme‟s strategic plan covers a period of five/six years. Since a programme is 
comprised of multiple projects, it is framed in such a way that it provides spaces for new 
projects which come into the picture to replace old projects. All the projects within a 
programme are developed from the programme objectives.  Similarly, the programme‟s 
strategic plan is built upon the organisational strategic plan. Strategic plans incorporate 
„key issues‟ supported by the NGO‟s „policies‟ and  strategy‟. Typically, organisational  
 
Diagram 4.2: Linkages between the Organisation‟s Strategic Plan, Programme and 
Project 
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strategic plan „covers a period of five/six years.  This is because of the fact that, as 
described in Chapter three, key development issues change every five to six years 
which, in turn, affect donor policy.      Diagram 4.2 shows the critical linkages 
between the organisation‟s strategic plan, programme strategic plan and project plan 
of an NGO. 
 
4.9 Donors and Projects 
 
NGOs search continuously, for prospective or alternate donors to finance ongoing or 
new projects. Many NGOs, like BRAC, also promote the idea that donors are 
dependant on NGOs to implement the donors‟ projects, envisioned in their country‟s 
strategic plans. It is imperative for donors to show that they are committed to the 
development of their aid recipient countries.  Therefore, they need to take great care 
in locating suitable prospective NGO partners for development projects. Donor 
organisations repeatedly urge improved planning and project preparation, with more 
emphasis on monitoring, analysis and evaluation during the lifetime of the projects.  
There is ample evidence to show that a modest investment in improved planning 
usually pays off in terms of better projects and direct savings (NORAD 1993:3). The 
implementation of projects also brings benefit to the donors. On the question of such 
benefits, a Scandinavian donor staff remarked: "within the donor‟s community, there 
is a concern that projects do not always bring benefit to the poor. .... Although, we 
know that big NGOs are not particularly helpful to the poor, we prefer to provide 
support to big NGOs as it saves us from management hassle.  It also helps us in two 
ways - aid to NGOs certainly creates jobs for expatriates; it also confirms our broad 
commitment (1-1.5% of GDP) to deliver and extend help to aid recipient countries."   
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Having received initial funding, NGOs continue to search for project financiers and 
strive to convince their donors to finance their sponsored projects for several more 
years. This search for funding sources is compounded by the dynamic of the aid 
system. The system “is dependent on proposals from outside the system itself about 
the project ideas, new types of equipment, commodities and technical assistance 
needed” (Jansen 1993:52). Ironically, many NGOs also see donors as projects. NGOs 
can phase-out one donor in order to bring in another new donor to support their 
ongoing projects. Many NGOs are in a position to reject donors. BRAC provides such 
an example, as it does not accept more than 20 percentage of its total budget from 
each donor (Abed 1988:43). This gives BRAC the necessary leverage to overcome 
pressure from donors and no donors are in the position to dictate priorities and 
motives to BRAC.   
 
4.9.1  Projects, Process or Movement 
 
NGOs receive donors‟ support for implementing projects and programmes. The 
continuous funding of programmes develops aspirations and tempts many southern 
NGOs to transform their projects into movements. NGOs‟ desire to transform projects 
into movements stems from the donors‟ wish to see projects as part of a process. 
Although both donors and NGOs work within a project mode, they think in terms of 
processes. An NGO worker commented that, “donor agencies think in terms of 
processes, but act in terms of projects” (Timm et.al.1993:38).  The idea of „process‟ is 
contested. It is possible that donors view „process‟ as part of the continuity of 
projects, that is, one project will lead to new innovative projects in the future, but 
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many NGOs interpret this „process‟ as movement. Donors do not always welcome the 
NGOs‟ movement approach, as donors are only capable of dealing with projects and 
not with movements. Donors discourage movements as they may lead to radicalism. 
In South Asia, two NGOs suffered in recent years as they tried to emerge as 
movements. The first case is the Sorvodaya movement in Sri Lanka. When the 
Sorvodaya movement began to flourish, its donor withdrew funds, forcing it to shrink 
into a smaller organisation (Perera 1997). In an informal talk, FH Abed of BRAC 
provided an insight into donors‟ political motives:  
 
Interviewer: The assumption is that the Western donors never like to see southern 
NGOs become large. It appears that if NGOs grow into large organisations, 
donors clamp down on them.  Sorvodaya was an example of this, as it was 
forced to downsize its organisation because of a change in the donor‟s policy. 
BRAC may face the same consequences.  
 
FH Abed: Sorvodaya was a movement, but BRAC's programmes are comprised of 
numerous projects.  Donors give money to projects; not to movements. If an 
NGO goes beyond the project modes, it is bound to experience a backlash. 
NGOs may not realise, fully, that they apply to donors for funding their 
projects and not for their movement. 
 
As discussed, BRAC has learned from experience with the Outreach Programme that 
a project could easily radicalise its beneficiaries. Thus, to reduce the radicalism, the 
Outreach Programme was merged with Rural Credit and Training Programme to 
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create the Rural Development Programme (RDP). This experience was neither shared 
with other NGOs nor have NGOs understood the process perspective in projects.  
 
A second case is that of the third largest NGO in Bangladesh, Gonoshahajjo Sangstha 
(GSS) which suffered a backlash from donors as it tried to transform its programmes 
into a movement. A European Commission expatriate commented, “Dr Mahmud of 
GSS misconstrues donors.  He is trying to promote movement and no donors are 
willing to fund a movement. He is under an illusion. GSS is in a sinking boat and no 
one likes to save a sinking boat." As European Commission refused to release its 
committed funds to the GSS, the GSS collapsed and ceased to be a development 
organisation
51
.                
 
The funding of NGOs by donors on a project basis also shows that the donors‟ policy 
is not to allow NGOs to grow big for two reasons: firstly, big NGOs mean that no 
single donor can support the NGO‟s huge budget and donors are forced to form donor 
consortiums and, secondly, big NGOs are able to work beyond the control of a single 
donor. In management terms, NGOs which are able to grow with large amounts of 
donor finance might be considered efficient compared to NGOs that are not able to 
ensure a continuous flow of funds to finance their projects. Within a project 
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 GSS was a social mobilization NGO established in 1983 and abolished in 1997.  Before the fall of 
GSS, an internal evaluation revealed the cause of organisational erosion within the NGO and warned 
that if they were not corrected, the organisation might collapse. The Social Mobilization and 
Development Programme (SMDP) was a core programme of GSS and the SMDP emerged as a social 
movement.  GSS added credit and saving programmes to SMDP without developing an effective 
system of management for their financial transactions. It expected that SMDP staff would implement 
credit programmes. This policy created tension between trained staff with social mobilization skills and 
staff promoting economisation.  As an outcome of the process, SMDP faced a stalemate and internal 
revolt (Hashemi and Ali 1996). As well as the organisational stalemate, the rhetoric of the social 
movement by GSS was disapproved by its key donors as the latter withdrew their commitment to 
finance the fourth phase of GSS. Thus, the existence of GSS came into question as it faced, on the one 
hand, non-cooperation from donors resulting in its inability to pay salaries and meet the incurring cost 
of programmes. On the other hand, they faced internal revolt and discontent caused by the 
transformation of SMDP from a social mobilization to credit programme. Such internal feuds were also 
fuelled by a few large corporate NGOs who saw GSS as direct competitor and threat.       
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framework, the donor-NGO nexus works in a complex way; the dynamics are shaped 
by development bureaucracy. As constituent organs of a global developmental 
bureaucracy, NGOs import the broader framework of development from the highly 
industrial nations of the West to nations that require small, but time-honoured projects 
to deal with their critical issues (Nkwi 1996:236). The more NGOs are successful in 
developing time-honoured projects, the more they are likely to get funds.    
The approval of funding for projects depends on the role of local programme officers, 
expatriates and lobbyists. Local programme officers in the donor offices play an 
important part in the selection and decision making of projects. They are the 
permanent bureaucrats.  Many NGO-executives spend more time cultivating 
relationships with these local programme officers than with expatriate staff.  Local 
staff work under the expatriate staff, who are the powerful decision makers in the 
donor office. These expatriates typically come to work in Bangladesh for only about 
three years. As a result, they have a limited understanding of NGO politics and 
depend on local programme officers for insights into the working of their respective 
NGO partners. An experienced NGO executive offered this interesting observation on 
expatriates: “they take the first year to get to know the NGO world; in the second 
year, they try to command the world, but in third year they lose interest as they search 
for new positions in some other Third World country. Thereby, the project oriented 
working culture is advantageous to expatriates.”   
 
Another important actor, the lobbyist, plays a crucial role in funding management. 
The role of development lobbyists, both local and foreigners, are of crucial 
importance. Usually, the lobbyist will maintain good relations with the various donors 
and will attempt to sell development projects to them.  In a case study on the 
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Bangladesh aid industry, one showed that the powerful presence of vested interest 
groups rather than the interest of the people determines the nature of projects (Jansen 
1993:50-66). 
 
4.10. Why Projects Evolve, Succeed and Fail 
 
According to Davies, “eight out of every ten development projects fail.  Is it so 
difficult to plan and manage a project successfully or were the groups who undertook 
the projects ill prepared? The answer is partly both” (Davies 2000: ix). The 
organisational success of NGOs to expand their projects does not necessarily mean 
that most projects are successful. However, even a failed development project can 
bring about an important structural change (Ferguson 1990:275).    Kottak examined 
sixty-eight post evaluations of World Bank projects.  He found that thirty-six projects 
were deemed socio-culturally compatible with the project population having an 
economic rate of return more than twice as high as the thirty-two projects found 
deficient  in socio-cultural compatibility (Kottak 1985:350). The history of projects is 
often one of failure, even in the case of the more successful NGOs. One reason for 
project failure is directly related to the fact that the practitioners and managers do not 
have direct access to the kinds of information which are relevant at the community 
level. The inability to obtain such information may result in badly located projects and 
programmes and generate unnecessary opposition to the project on the part of local 
people (Moris and Copestake 1993:32-33).  Sometimes, project managers fail to 
adjust the projects‟ rigid structure to the aspirations of local people and beneficiaries. 
The usual trend among NGOs, therefore, is to modify and rename the projects before 
an evaluation of their effectiveness.  It has been shown in Appendix-1, for example, 
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that BRAC has frequently changed its project nomenclature over the years. This 
masks the fact that in most cases, the same old projects now exist under different 
names. Over time, various approaches and projects for development have been 
formulated, but old approaches are abandoned, or phased out, in favour of new 
projects which have provided a guarantee of success.   
 
For other reasons for why some projects fail, one must first examine how projects 
have evolved.  NGOs are in a continuous search for donors in order to discover which 
donors fund which type of project. Having explored donors interests, NGOs submit 
project proposals, often in line with the project pro-forma developed by donor offices. 
NGOs make elaborate attempts to ensure that the proposals which they have 
submitted to donors reflect the needs of the target population. Whatever the needs of 
the targeted population, NGOs generally try to be identified with the needs of the 
poor, based on contemporary development theories.  In many ways the needs of 
Western donors become the needs of the target groups. The project thus becomes the 
local articulation of global processes. One of the problems of project failure lies in the 
inability of NGOs to match the development paradigm to local realities. Donor 
intentions are not always understood by NGOs. Inappropriate understanding leads to 
turning development agendas into rhetoric while cultural practices continue. Referring 
to a gender project, Timm finds that  “it is mainly the foreign donors who are pressing 
for removing gender discrimination from projects, while local NGOs, often 
unwittingly, continue to reinforce the customary patriarchal male-dominated social 
and economic roles” (Timm et al. 1993:23-24).  The agenda for development is 
evolved in the West, but it is the task of the southern NGOs to respond and translate 
these agendas into action. The paradigms within which NGOs work to transform 
 153 
 
agendas into projects are identified not from information gained from earlier projects, 
but from seminars, closed meetings, donor‟s country policies, etc. Since projects are 
not developed from the experience of the poor, but driven by the need of the donors, 
most of these projects appear to be inappropriate and irrelevant for poverty 
alleviation.  
  
Development projects are framed having identified or anticipated some problems 
involving poverty.  However, worldwide experience shows that when development 
projects are set to solve one set of problems, they create many other problems 
invloving ethnicity, landlessness, environmental degradation, etc. The problems lie 
not in the way the projects are formulated, but in their inability to deal with the 
complexity of the situation. Although development projects are intended to help the 
poor, their application in inappropriate contexts may isolate women and the poor from 
their reality (Mannan 1996). 
 
The failure of projects has been attributed to the following factors: incompetent 
development practitioners with untrained managers who mismanage projects; corrupt 
governments who put in place restrictive regulations; misled project objectives; the 
top-down manner in which projects are implemented; ethnocentric expatriates and 
experts who dominate the development process while ignoring the local knowledge 
base and culture and the local people in the process. Most importantly, projects fail 
because project assumptions are based on past or present problems. For example, 
many NGOs work to establish child rights in the household decision-making process.  
What they fail to understand is that in the face of poverty, when parents‟ rights are 
grossly undermined, the children‟s rights are automatically violated.   
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 Overall, there is a recognition that many projects have failed to meet their objectives 
because they have not taken the `human factor' into account. It is recognized, also, 
that if insufficient attention is paid to the development of appropriate organisational 
forms, on which sustainability might be built, projects are likely to fail (Marsden 
1994:36). Many consider the major cause of poor project performance to be the 
institutional and administrative weaknesses within the developing countries 
(Nicholsen 1994:68).  However, Rondinelli (1994) rejected such a view and argued 
that the real problem lies in the `blueprint' approach to designing projects. Earlier 
Korten (1980) emphasized the need for flexibility in achieving a fit between the 
objectives of a development programme, the needs of the recipients, and the 
administrative structure and processes to articulate the two (Nicholson 1994:68). 
 
4.11  Discussion and Reflection 
 
The success or failure of projects depends, to a large extent, on how NGOs 
conceptualise the transcultural values involved, so as to cater to local needs. It is 
customary to describe the context of projects as being within an “issue-oriented 
idiom” (Timm et al. 1993:26).  It is thought by NGO managers that the flow of funds 
into NGOs depends on how well NGOs transform idioms into projects. The 
philosophical base of a project is rooted in the West and not on indigenous experience 
and knowledge. NGOs do not always have a clear conceptual understanding of new 
and emerging agendas, but they frame projects by responding to transcultural values 
in the hope of getting funds for projects.  
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The notion of a project‟s successes or failures depends on how one sees and defines 
projects.  There are three perspectives on how to assess the success or failure of 
projects: (i) Despite beneficiaries being either positively or negatively influenced by 
proposed projects, many take the view that a project is successful when the 
organisation in question benefits from it and becomes financially sustainable. For 
example, the credit and saving schemes (Mannan 2009a) and sericulture projects 
(Abed and Chowdhury 1997) have benefited BRAC enormously, and thus, these 
projects were deemed successful. (ii) Projects may bring about a „win-win‟ situation, 
when they have proved to be of benefit to both the NGO and its beneficiaries, as 
exemplified by the Non-Formal Education Programme of BRAC or the Health 
Programme (Chowdhury and Cash 1996; Perry 2000) and (iii) When NGO are 
affected by the impact of a project and a situation is created that it is not able to 
control, e.g. the religious backlash on BRAC (see Chapter 9, Mannan 2009b) which 
was considered by BRAC staff to be an indicator of changing traditional conservative 
structures towards modernity and secularism. 
 
The ability to implement, phase-out and phase-in projects gradually builds up the 
organisational culture of NGOs. The next chapter (chapter 5) explores the 
organisational culture of BRAC within the ever-changing context of development. 
Conflict occurs within BRAC, as an organisational entity, as it reproduces Western, 
Bengali and Islamic cultural traits, but conflicts are managed by a culture of fear or 
indulgence.    
 
  
 156 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
BRAC AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
  
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the organisational culture of BRAC within the ever-changing 
context of development. It analyses the organisational culture of the Head Office and 
the core programme of the BRAC Economic Development Programme (EDP)
52
 in the 
period between 1991 and 2000. The challenge is to make clear the internal processes 
which exist behind the external image of BRAC.  BRAC is cited as a development 
model to many organisations in a country where weak management is a problem 
(Mannan et al. 1995b).   The senior managers of BRAC have developed a unique 
culture relevant to working in development. The growth of BRAC‟s organisational 
culture and management practice is contrasts with broader management inefficiency 
of Bengali organisations.  Bengalis realise that their organisations are inefficient and 
generally mismanaged
53
.   
 
The programmes and projects implemented by BRAC staff are carefully controlled by 
rules and regulations detailed in guidelines, manuals, logframes, handouts, etc. The 
capacity of BRAC to manage a large staff has resulted two images.  Foreign donors 
and scholars see BRAC as an NGO successful at poverty alleviation.  Local people, 
                                                     
52
This programme has changed its acronym several times as it has grown.  It was known as the Rural 
Development Programme (RDP), then the BRAC Development Programme (BDP) and now the EDP.   
 
53
 A few leading NGOs like Gono Shajja Songstha, Saptagram Nari Swanirvar Parishad, etc. have 
collapsed due to poor management and leadership.  In the commercial sector,  inefficient management 
lead to shrinkage of the Biman Bangladesh Airlines when other foreign airlines make profits from the 
same market segment (TDS 2007c:1) or the Bangladeshi jute industries have closed down when Jute 
industries are flourishing in India and Nepal with raw jutes supplied from Bangladesh (TDS 2007d:1).  
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including many current and former staff, see it as a negative, harsh and pitiless 
organisation. 
 
5.2. Bengali Culture and Organisation  
 
The culture of an organisation comprises the accumulated experiences and practices 
that develop over time to shape and determine behaviour.  Organisational culture, in a 
narrow sense, refers to a set of norms about the way work should be organized, 
authority exercised, people rewarded and controlled (Handy 1993:181).   The 
organisation theory of Max Weber places emphasis on formal authority, rules and 
roles that inform the character of organisations.  But social action goes beyond formal 
rules.  There are the informal social system and the relations between an organisation 
and its environment (Britan and Cohen 1980:14).   Hofstede (1991) discusses 
organisational culture according to four parameters:  power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and masculinity.   Jamil (1998a:53-54) applied Hofstede‟s 
model to NGO-bureaucracy in Bangladesh and found that organisations maintain a 
high degree of power distance with a masculine hierarchical relationship and an 
absence of collectivism.  Persons feel more comfortable working under superiors than 
with equals.  While Hofstede‟s model is useful in analyzing aspects of organisational 
culture, it overlooks broader cultural values and how the rank and file influences 
organisational dynamics.  Anthropological approaches suggest that organisational 
culture is constantly enacted and recreated as part of an organisation‟s ongoing 
everyday existence (Wright 1994).  Lewis offers two perspectives.  First, 
organisations are best seen as sociocultural systems that are embedded in wider social 
and political environments. Second, the organisational culture concept suggests that 
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significant events within organisations are often ambiguous and uncertain and that the 
same events may mean different things to different people (Lewis 2003:216).  In this 
sense, organisations are filled with internal contradictions and conflicts and cannot be 
regarded as either unitary or predictable structures. 
 
In Asian contexts, the importance of culture in shaping organisational behaviour has 
been widely recognized.   In Japanese bureaucracy, the concept of amae, a desire to 
depend on others and presume upon their benevolence, is reproduced within the 
organisational hierarchy determining authority relationships and reciprocity (Jun and 
Muto 1995:128).   In Chinese administration, Confucianism is a powerful cultural 
force determining values of filial loyalty, reinforced by the tradition of guanxi 
(personalism) that enmesh people in a complex net of obligations to family and 
friends, resulting in value conflicts for officials charged with making decisions based 
on merit (Aufrecht and Bun 1995: 181).  In the context of Bangladeshi public 
administration, modern educated bureaucrats reproduce the traditional samaj
54
 culture 
to emphasize stability, promoting the belief that any deviation from the system may 
bring about its collapse (Jamil 1998b:403).   
 
5.3. Organisation and Reproduction of Culture 
 
The diverse cultural backgrounds of BRAC‟s rank and file create a dynamic tension 
in the organisational behaviour. In the context of development, urban elites organise 
programmes to alleviate poverty, particularly in rural areas, but rely on educated 
middle class staff, from rural backgrounds, to manage them.  In this sense NGOs 
                                                     
54
For detail discussion on Samaj see chapter 7. 
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operate within heterogeneous cultural contexts. Western, Islamic and rural culture 
interrelate in the organisational hierarchy of BRAC, whose staff fall, broadly, into two 
categories: those in the Head Office and those in Field Offices.   
 
The Head Office in Dhaka and the Field Offices nurture two sets of values.  Many 
Head Office staff follow western and modern Bengali middle class life styles whereas 
the vast majority of staff in Field Offices follow modern Islamic and secular Bengali 
culture. The majority of poor men and women who are BRAC‟s clients are believers 
in popular Islam.  The synthesis of western, Islamic and traditional values and cultural 
behaviour in a modern organisation such as BRAC results in a new hybrid culture 
pattern that features “BRAC-values55” compatible with its purpose and ideology.  
Diagram 5.1 represents the synthesis of these cultural streams in its organisational 
hierarchy.  
  
5.3.1  Indigenisation of Western Culture 
 
BRAC incorporates western culture values as way to attract further foreign financial 
support.  This process may be termed as „the indigenisation of western culture‟.  It 
occurs in BRAC as it negotiates with prospective donors for funds to carry out future 
development projects.  Funds flow more freely to those NGOs that have the  
 
                                                     
55
A director floated and promoted 18 attributes that constitute BRAC values on the eve of celebrating 
the 25
th
 anniversary of BRAC at the Sonar Goan hotel. These attributes are: concern for the people; 
human dignity; people‟s capacity; gender equity; fairness; honesty and integrity; discipline; creativity 
and innovation; participation; accountability; cost consciousness; team work; openness; sharing 
information; transparency; professionalism; high quality products and services; and concern for 
environment.  BRAC assertively promotes these 18 attributes, published in the annual BRAC diary, 
they read like the 18 promises that BRAC has made to its beneficiaries.   
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Diagram 5.1: Western, Bengali and Islamic Cultural Adherents in BRAC 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
 
organisational capability to respond to western ideas, theories and issues, and have a 
proven ability to implement projects in villages among poor people.  The greater the 
capacity to respond to Western ideas and ideology, the greater the prospect of a NGO 
growing with foreign aid. BRAC shows this clearly.  It nurtures Western ideas in 
three ways.  Firstly, it translates Western theories, ideas and ideologies into 
programmes and projects to be implemented at the grassroots level, often ignoring 
indigenous knowledge
56
.  Secondly, it uses foreign consultants to develop programme 
frameworks within which a number of projects may be implemented, the foreign 
consultants handing over projects to local staff to manage and implement. Thirdly, it 
creates scope and space for foreign scholars and interns who become ambassadors of 
BRAC in their countries of origin.   
 
                                                     
56
 BRAC rarely tries to explore traditional skills and knowledge to fit into development; rather it 
implements projects, introduces genetically engineered seeds, etc.    
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Foreign consultants seek to translate policies into practice.  BRAC's policy is to ask 
external specialists to comment on various aspects of its work which is designed to 
improve its image both within and outside Bangladesh, particularly in the West. 
BRAC employs two kinds of consultants.  The first works in the Research and 
Evaluation Division (RED), and the second in various programmes. The Training 
Division plays an important role in assigning positions to consultants and interns.   
However, the policy of reliance on external consultants effectively dissuades BRAC 
staff from debating development from the perspective of their experiences.  The way 
external persons influence the development process for BRAC do not reflect the 
experiential learning of BRAC staff, but conform to various Western models and 
theories.  Thus, BRAC's various literature, modules and manuals reflect the positivist 
view of modernization theories.  The weakness of such literatures is that “abstract 
theoretical rhetoric is wedged between extended stretches of description.  
Disconnected from the world being woven around them are transformed into 
assertion” (Kapferer 1988:88). BRAC's staff give priority to normative behaviour that 
accords with its organisational culture, and carry out their activities ignoring manuals 
and modules
57
.  It cannot be said that any particular school has more influence on 
BRAC, but rather the positivist literature used to construct BRAC‟s programmes 
(Bhuiya and Chowdhury 2007; DKA 1990; Chowdhury and Alam 1997; Chowdhury 
and Cash 1996;    Korten 1980; Lovel 1992; Rafi and Chowdhury 2001, Smillie 
2009).  
 
One example of the difference in attitude between expatriate and BRAC staff emerged 
in BRAC's Gender Quality Action Learning (GQAL) programme.  Expatriates, 
                                                     
57
 On many occasions, it is found that the branch office staff hardly follow the instructions in manuals; 
rather they use personal experience to meet the project objectives.   
 162 
 
funded by the Ford Foundation, discovered gender problems within BRAC and 
developed the GQAL programme after an intensive needs-assessment study (Roa and 
Kelleher 1998).  However, when GQAL teams comprising of BRAC trainers and 
expatriates started to implement the programme through participatory methods, they 
found that management problems, rather than gender, were affecting staff relations 
(Fehmin et al. 1997).   GQAL also undermined BRAC‟s culturally appropriate 
Gender Awareness and Analysis Course (GAAC).  One implication of the gender 
policy is that as the recruitment of female staff at Head Office increases, it results in a 
fall in female staff at the Branch Offices
58
.  
 
Throughout its organisational history BRAC has hardly made any effort to document 
the discussions and analyse progress on projects at the branch office level. As a result 
BRAC was unable to build up an organisational memory of the development process 
as experienced by its staff.  Rather, it continues to invite foreign consultants who 
introduce new concepts and theories in response to the donors‟ changing development 
agenda.  They provide guidelines and BRAC‟s management ensures that its staff 
carryout projects in accordance with them.  The outcome is that foreign consultants 
determine development‟s course, ignoring the experience of staff.  The problem is that 
when BRAC‟s staff try to explain development outcomes to outsiders they hide their 
experiences and so appear to support the new proposals.  This undermines indigenous 
cultural knowledge in favour of outsider scientific knowledge, which contributes to 
the growth of ignorance rather than the growth of knowledge (Hobart 1993).  
                                                     
58
Many view that the purpose of female concentration at Head Office is to show donors that BRAC is 
„women friendly.‟  Gender experts are upper class women disconnected from lower class women‟s 
experience.  A female staff remarked: “Women are harsher against women.”  Gender awareness neither 
changes organisational policy nor creates understanding of the cultural problems creating a gender 
balanced environment in BRAC.  BRAC remains a highly patriarchal organisation (Roa and Kelleher 
1995). 
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An outcome of this process is that BRAC responds to and rationalizes Western 
policies and models within its organisation.  These models do not often coincide with 
culture-sensitive approaches which attract the support of local people
59
.  Thus the 
development experience of BRAC reveals three problems: 1) consultants depend on 
their own cursory observations and not taking into account the experience of field 
staff; 2) a tension results between these outsiders with Western ideas and BRAC staff 
experiences; and 3) priority placed on Western ethnocentrism rather than the 
indigenous development reality. The ignoring of BRAC staff experience and 
importance accorded foreigner‟s opinion by elitist BRAC management has led to staff 
discontent.  The mismatch between the expatriates plans and development outcomes 
is largely put down to inefficiency on the part of BRAC staff.  The result is frequent 
termination of staff contracts, which led to a rebellion by BRAC rank and file (Rana 
and Ahmed 2000).  An informant described the rebellion in the following words: 
 
“the rebellion lasted for about a month and a half; the field staff reacted 
particularly violently.  The staff at Jheniadah and Narshindi branches 
organised the rebellion.  Staff members formed a trade union for a short 
period.  The protestors made the following three demands to management: 
i) staff cannot be terminated orally nor be transferred at short notice; ii) 
programme assistants should be offered permanent tenure; and iii) staff 
should be granted the right to join a trade union. The grounds for rebellion 
go much deeper.  It all began when BRAC transferred Tk. 4 crore (Tk. 40 
million) from its development programmes in order to finance the 
commercial BRAC Bank.  This resulted in a cash flow crisis in finance for 
                                                     
59
 Religious backlash against BRAC in 1994-95 and 1998 were outcomes against the cultural 
insensitive development approach (for details see Mannan 2009b,  Mannan, et.al.  1994 , Rafi and 
Mostaque 2000, and also see chapter 9). 
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micro-credit operations. As staff failed to disburse credit to the poor, their 
trust in BRAC also began to be eroded. This also affected loan repayment 
by the poor borrowers. Many just refused to repay loans as BRAC failed to 
disburse new loans. At the same time, management pressurised field staff 
to recover loans from the borrowers. The management tried to convince 
the staff that the cash flow problem was a temporary phenomenon that was 
related to the litigation against BRAC by anti-development people
60”. 
 
Current development thinking in BRAC focuses on finance, economics and business.  
It believes that by supplying services and development input, it can create an 
environment where poverty can be eliminated.  At the core are the roles played by 
credit, food, education, health, etc., for empowering women (Chowdhury and Alam, 
1997:171-194).   The economic focus of development often overlooks the cultural 
roots of religious elite and rural people of Bangladesh, which often conflict with 
modern economics and models of development (Mannan et.al 1994; Rafi and 
Chowdhury 2002). The influence of the West encourages BRAC staff to ignore the 
fact that both development projects and the people's way of life are dynamic and tend 
to adapt to changing external and internal conditions.  A project is culturally 
acceptable if it adapts to a people's values and they can see the advantages of 
supporting it, and are prepared to modify some of their practices so as to attain new 
benefits (Ingersoll 1990). 
 
 
 
                                                     
60
 For litigation against BRAC see Sidel (2004)  
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5.3.2. Reproduction of Bengali Culture and Practices in BRAC 
 
The synthesis of Western, Islamic and rural culture may be seen as the adjustment of 
Bengali culture to fit a modern organisation.  BRAC uses several aspects of Bengali 
culture to neutralize organisational tension.  In addition to formal organisational rules 
and regulations, informal cultural practice is of paramount importance in maintaining 
cohesion within the organisation.  BRAC draws particularly on two aspects of Bengali 
culture, namely, fear and loyalty as management tools manifesting an ideology of 
domination by BRAC‟s decision-makers over its staff.   
 
  5.3.2.1 Promotion of Fear 
 
Many Bengalis fear new rules and regulations.  It is common knowledge that Bengalis 
violate laws and rules if loosely applied, but if strictly enforced, then they abide by 
them. They follow rules of organisations for fear of losing their jobs.  The cultural 
notion of fear is caught by the concept of “personalisation of authority” (Maloney 
1988: 46) of senior/elder over junior/younger staff.  This implies that junior staff 
should show adab (respect and deference) to senior or be branded as be-a-dab 
(indolent and disrespectful).  They should address them as bhai (brother) or apa 
(sister), a mark of respect to elders.  The analogy in English is the use of “sir” to 
address the seniors. Corrective measures may feature the exercise of sanctions that 
create fear involving sroddha (honour) and osrodha (dishonour), etc.  The one who 
enjoys the highest sroddha is able to personalise authority.  In this sense, Chairperson 
enjoys highest demi-god sroddha status (Smillie 1997:31).  BRAC deliberately 
nurtures bhai culture.  Therefore, bhai exercises shashon (rule) over juniors and may 
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employ measures to command respects.  The cultivation of bhai culture distinguishes 
Bangladeshi organisational culture.  It is an ideology of hierarchical authority. The 
use of kinship terminology gives a personalised charismatic character to NGO 
leadership (White 1995:133).  Bhai culture mitigates antagonism.  Fear is a powerful 
weapon to control opposition and improve the efficiency and loyalty of the middle 
class educated staff.  It ensures loyalty with high unemployment in Bangladesh.    
 
5.3.2b. Loyalty 
 
Another aspect of Bangladeshi organisational culture is the demand for loyalty, a 
feature of authority.  Loyalty shapes the exercise of authority within BRAC in various 
ways. Senior staff pressure juniors to express loyalty.  The positive side of loyalty is 
Bhai and the negative is fear within the hierarchy of BRAC.  
 
BRAC develops three forms of loyalty: individual loyalty, organisational loyalty and 
professional loyalty.  Individual loyalty relates to traditional hierarchical values and is 
a synonym for primordial loyalty evident in traditional society. It stems from cultural 
“givens” based on kin connection, religious affiliation, language and social 
conventions (Geertz 1973:259).   Organisational loyalty relates to Islamic values of 
ummah and the traditional collective principle of samaj.  Professional loyalty relates 
to capitalistic aspirations of professionalism and associated skills.  These three 
loyalties and associated values overlap as in Diagram  5.2.   
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Diagram 5.2: Association of Individual, Organisational and Professional Loyalties  
 
 
(i) Individual Loyalty:   
 
BRAC is a centralized organisation with the Chairperson at the apex and the core 
management team comprising Executive Director, Deputy Executive Directors, 
Directors,  Programme Head and the Coordinators of different programmes, all loyal 
to the Chairperson.   
 
Access to the Chairperson establishes the pattern of leadership.  The top people in 
BRAC reproduce the ideology of clanship with traditional loyalty.  Initially, the 
BRAC managing “clan” was formed by a group of people from the Sylhet district, 
also the Chairperson‟s home district.  The Chairperson recognised people from his 
district as “clan,” placing a few Sylhetis in strategic positions in BRAC.  Those from 
Sylhet include the Executive Director, the Advisor, Deputy Executive Director, 
Director of Research and Evaluation, Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, the 
 168 
 
Director of BRAC Printers, the Director of commercial enterprise Arong, the Head of 
the Human Resources Division, the Head of Education Support Programme (ESP), 
 
Photo 4.1: Chairperson of BRAC 
 
Source: BRAC 
 
the Head of the Urban Program, Managing Director of BRAC Bank and the Vice 
Chancellor of BRAC university. In addition to Sylheti, there exists a group of people 
who do not come from the district yet enjoy the direct ashirabad (blessings) of the 
Chairperson.  They included the Deputy Executive Director of Operations, Deputy 
Executive Director of BRAC Economic Programme (BDP), Director of Training 
Division, and the Director of Non-Formal Primary Education (NFPE).  These people 
maintain their positions through their proven professional skills combined with a high 
level of individual loyalty. They are all loyal to the Chairperson and highly reluctant 
to accept any criticism of him. 
 
The personality factor of leadership shapes the character and behaviour of the 
organisation.  Many are of the opinion that BRAC reflects self-image of the 
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Chairperson.   The Chairperson descends from a feudal zamindar “lord” (Elias 1994, 
Smille 2009), which he might use to reinforce his expectation of personal loyalty from 
his staff.  He stresses the need for professionalism by referring to his experiences 
working for the British Oil Company earlier in his career.   This underlines further his 
professionalism as he studied Chartered Accountancy, while allow him personally to 
supervise two divisions of BRAC, namely, the Accounts Department and the Human 
Resources Department.  This allows him to supervise and control both the finances 
and staff performance at BRAC.     
 
It seems that the Chairperson measures staff loyalty by assessing their economic value 
to BRAC.  This is well understood by staff, as illustrated by the following 
conversation that took place at a branch office:   
 
First person:  The Chairperson has developed an attitude and art of measuring 
staff against monetary value.  If he sees no value in staff, he 
terminates them.    
Second person: This view is not right. He actually terminates those who are 
inefficient and corrupt.  Why should BRAC keep the inefficient 
staff? 
Third person: Everyone is working hard in BRAC.  It is difficult to measure 
who is efficient and who is not. The cultivation of personal 
relationship with boro bhais (fictive elder bothers) becomes the 
yardstick of efficiency. 
First Person: But, why should BRAC terminate staff so often?  BRAC is an 
NGO.  Like PROSHIKA and other NGOs, BRAC should 
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protect the interests of its staff.  BRAC staff are committed and 
overworked.  They know if they lose their jobs, it will be 
difficult to get another one.  Frequent termination of jobs is 
inhuman.      
 
The fact that all of the harsh decisions of BRAC, such as firing staff, are carried out 
by the Chairperson‟s loyal senior staff, ironically, allows him to project a kind and 
polite image.  The Chairperson hardly ever terminates anyone whom he has employed 
personally; Expressing loyalty does not guarantee job security.   
 
There is a hierarchy of loyalty:  directors are loyal to the Chairperson and other staff 
loyal to directors and programme heads, in a chain of command.  Those outside 
individual loyalty structure are looked upon with suspicion, as potentially disloyal.  
People are only promoted when they prove their loyalty to the Chairperson although 
this can be problematic.  For example, the Chairperson suffered a dilemma, when two 
directors recommended transferring a staff member from a senior position at the 
Research and Evaluation Division (RED) to the Training Division (TD), the former 
enquired to one of directors: "how long will he stay at BRAC?" 
 
(ii) Organisational Loyalty: 
 
Some staff believe in BRAC culture and promote its cause.  They are completely 
loyal to the organisation rather than to individuals.  Their organisational loyalty is 
shaped by „BRAC values,‟ although there is controversy and confusion in defining 
BRAC values.  These are fluid and are defined to the advantage of the management.   
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These staff have worked in BRAC for over 10 years with exposure to the „field.‟61  
They punish those who seem to be untrustworthy.   
 
The organisational loyalists are usually staff of moderate ability with average 
academic background.  They are loyal to the organisation‟s norms and rules and, 
silently, obey the orders without raising any questions.  They do everything possible 
not to lose their jobs.  They often refuse to accept that there is anything negative about 
BRAC and criticism is taboo to them.  They are functionally powerful, as they are 
familiar with the complex ways BRAC operates.   They form factions with like-
minded staff within BRAC. These staff develop intricate personal relationships with 
each other.  They feel threatened in the highly insecure employment environment 
particularly when they see staff promoted. They are often hostile towards new comers.  
They maintain double standards.  They appear friendly and supportive while  
criticizing people behind their backs, creating unpleasantness that encourages 
newcomers to resign.  It is commonly said that: 
 
"you join BRAC only to leave it.  You are qualified and belong to a „Hi-Fi‟ 
society.  Please do not work for BRAC for long; leave it as soon as you gain 
necessary experience. Search for better opportunities within international 
organisations” or, “working in BRAC is like an addiction. Try to overcome 
it.”  
 
The discouragement of new staff has two sides.  Firstly, the organisational loyalists 
create subtle pressure, procedural harassments and non-cooperation under the guise of 
                                                     
61The notion of „field‟ is explained in Chapter 5 (section 6) and Mannan (2006). 
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friendly gestures and encouragement.  Secondly, as newcomers search for alternative 
jobs, it secures and consolidates the loyalists in the organisation. The organisational 
loyalists, upon seeing a potential newcomer climb up the organisational ladder, react 
with fear for their jobs.  When a new recruit resigns it shows the loyalty of 
organisational loyalists.  On the other hand, they seek to cultivate strategic relations 
with out-going staff, in case they lose their jobs with BRAC.  The organisational 
culture features the possibility of retention or termination.  BRAC encourages the 
loyalty of some persons, while creating uncertainty and insecurity among many 
others.   
 
(iii)   Professional Loyalty 
 
Many people join BRAC with a commitment to increase their professional skills.  
Their professional attitudes may conflict with the individualist and organisational 
loyalists.   The professionals are the first to resign, or be terminated from BRAC, as 
they are often reluctant to express their individual loyalty.   The professionals argue 
that skills and knowledge are essential to BRAC.   They are committed to their work, 
and may be considered as high flyers by others.   
 
A widely held belief is that BRAC faces a crisis in retaining quality staff, namely 
professionals who, when opportunities arise, may take up better positions with 
different organisations.  The problems BRAC has retaining good staff promotes the 
view that it is "helping other organisations which lack expertise," and BRAC argues 
that it sends people abroad to study to contribute to the development of individual 
professions.  These people who go abroad with the financial support of donors, are 
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endorsed by BRAC, with which they have to maintain a bond.  Others consider them 
privileged persons as foreign travel increases status. But it may also make one 
vulnerable, such that even powerful Directors avoid travelling overseas too often.   As 
a Director commented,  
 
"do not visit foreign countries too frequently, as you might be seen, 
upon returning to your service, as no longer being needed by 
BRAC.  BRAC's policy is to send staff to foreign countries for 
education, and upon return, these staff are forced to resign under a 
different pretext."  
 
Many staff find they are unable to continue their employment long term with BRAC  
after studying abroad.  While upon return they have to serve BRAC for a bonded 
period, once this is over, they are usually released from their jobs.     
 
The professional loyalists are often analysts, but BRAC does not like creative 
thinkers.  What BRAC does in the name of innovation is to replicate without 
questions projects within the market model.  Loyalty is the reason why BRAC relies 
on foreign experts rather then encouraging its own.  It knows it can always hire 
"experts", but not get "loyalists."  This policy correlates with funding policies.  
Foreign experts link BRAC to donors and create conditions for funding.  For example, 
a Canadian expert has organised and written the proposal for the Fourth Phase of 
RDP.  The decision-takers are senior managers, who want professionals to recognise 
authority.  Any analysis is seen to question BRAC values.  Any floating of new 
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management ideas is looked upon with suspicion.   Suspicion is deep rooted within 
Bengali culture:  
 
“this undercurrent discourages experimentation, creates scepticism about 
any new course of action, and plays into the culture‟s traditional value 
system, which is based on shunning those who seek wealth or disrupt 
societal values rooted in the rule of elders, as in the villages, and, even more, 
it kindles a corrosive suspicion of other people‟s motives, a suspicion that 
runs deep within those who lead the country” (Novak 1993:101).     
 
The culture of organisation interprets professionalism as working beyond normal 
office hours, putting demands on individuals to ignore family life.  A monograph 
about BRAC‟s branch offices shows how staff are overworked (Zaman 2001), usually 
starting at 6 a.m. and ending after dark or an evening meeting in a village (Lovell 
1992:120).   A director has described this working culture as a BRAC value, “salaried 
staff of BRAC work more, whereas in public offices the salaried class works less.”  
BRAC perhaps places more emphasis on the working culture, to minimize the 
negative aspect of hierarchical behaviour and values (Lovell 1992:125).   The value of 
staff goes up if they combine multiple roles and skills without asking any questions of 
seniors.   Senior staff usually claim all the credit for successful work of juniors.  
Alternatively, juniors are blamed for any job not done properly.  An informant told 
me, "I am blamed for the things which I cannot perform because of my lack of 
authority.  Moreover, my achievements are not recognized.  Whatever good work is 
done by me, the respective directors receive appreciation."  Directors are not 
accountable for any problem they create blaming subordinates.  Tension occurs when 
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seniors demands that juniors write reports and do analysis for them without 
acknowledgement.   
 
Many staff think senior managers undermine professionalism within BRAC.  When 
they talk about BRAC management decisions, they are in effect describing the 
chairperson endorsing them. The chairperson is the chief strategist and ultimate 
arbiter of issues (Terry and Mueller 1997:1).  The politics of management is split over 
attitudes to professionalism.  An outraged informant said:  "boro bhai is a person of 
money-mongering without any social commitment.  Had he been a committed person, 
he would not play with the lives of so many people."  Overall, directors try to promote 
the idea that no one loses his job in BRAC unless involved in financial corruption, 
scandal with women or arguments with superiors. 
 
Professionalism is less assessed by achievement within BRAC, where ascriptive 
criteria dominate. In determining professionalism, it emphasises individual loyalty 
and long working experience within BRAC.  The demand of  boro-bhai for   loyalty 
means that knowledge and skills of younger staff may not be acknowledged, 
discouraging the development of professionalism. Elders often view juniors as not 
having "sufficient experience", suggesting that they know everything and possess all 
necessary skills.  It is not rationality, but intuition that determines professionalism 
within the BRAC.  Within the organisation, much discussion takes place about the 
notion of experience, which becomes a tool by which seniors control juniors.   The 
seniors tend not learn and update professional skills with new knowledge. In many 
new innovative projects that require new management skills and knowledge directors 
lack experience. 
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In a conversation with a senior, I asked   
 
Q: How do you define „experience?‟  
A: BRAC is changing as new projects replace old ones. New projects mean new 
experience.  NGO experience means only experience of BRAC. Seniors know 
only what they have experienced with BRAC.    
Q: What they have experience in? 
A: „Gala-gali‟ (abusive and harsh language) and harsh treatment from their boro 
bhai.  When they become senior, they continue the same practice 
 
The culture of loyalty is expressed by the expression „Zi bhai – ami parbo‟ (Yes 
brother, I can do it).  When an order is given, one is expected to say, “zi” (yes), 
because “no” could be tantamount to insubordination.    „No‟ is not expected, even 
though it is acknowledged that the person may not be capable of carrying out the task.    
The "zi bhai" may be interpreted, as “ami kichu jani na; abar sob-i-parte hobe” (I do 
not know anything; yet I am expected to perform everything).” "zi" does not mean 
one is competent, but indicates voluntary subordination.   
 
The problem in such hierarchical organisations is that, except for a few at the top, the 
rest function without authority.  Juniors are over burdened with tasks.  Before the 
completion of one, they have to fit another.  They may have attended to several 
projects which results in performance failure.  This gives further scope to blame them 
for mistakes.  It may lead to the termination of jobs.   The priority of each project tries 
to supersede others and one has to respond to such pressures on almost a day-to-day 
basis. The problem becomes acute when a person has to deal with tasks within 
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different programmes.  When two people from two different programmes meet, they 
cannot take any decisions that are effective.  As a result, staff try to cultivate personal 
relationships across different programmes to get things done, while they compete with 
colleagues from their own division or programme.    
 
There is a politics of loyalty in operation at BRAC. The type of loyalty one enjoys 
determines one‟s position in the organisational hierarchy.  For example, a junior 
related to a director may enjoy enormous power and status over a senior staff member 
who doesn‟t have the right connections. Rules and regulations may apply loosely to 
juniors belongs to the clan, but strictly to those who fail to cultivate a loyalty 
relationship with top management.  In such a scenario, a junior with the right 
connections and relationships put pressure on a senior and manipulate any situation to 
his/her advantage; the senior staff member may be more vulnerable that the junior 
member in this scenario. This creates problems as some juniors become more 
powerful at the expense of others. Senior staff members usually maintain cordial 
relationships with juniors who have kinship and social ties within the clan.  This 
creates factional relationships between juniors with kinship ties to the management 
and middle ranking staff without such ties. The former are likely to be rewarded at the 
expense of the latter. 
 
Although all senior managers are individually loyal to the Chairperson, they politic as 
equals. In the recent past for example, three directors have competed with each other 
in their aspiration to become Chief Executive Officer of BRAC in anticipation of 
founder Executive Director promoting himself to his present position of Chairperson. 
To make themselves more visible in the organisational structure, these directors tried 
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to bring more of BRAC‟s divisions and programmes under their own control by 
making sure employees loyal to them were in charge of the programmes in question.  
In the process, qualified people immediately below them who were perceived as 
threats were sidelined. The directors enjoyed different advantages. The struggle 
between two of them became so acute that the Chairperson had to intervene in order 
to balance power internally.  One of them had the loyalty of the RDP, the core 
programme, but had minimal acceptance within the donor community. The other 
enjoyed the donors‟confidence and support, but was hardly recognized by programme 
workers.  In order to defuse the tension, as well as to fix the direction of BRAC in 
new millennium, the Chairperson invited two North American consultants to work on 
the governance of BRAC.  In their report on the transformation of BRAC‟s 
governance, the consultants created three new Deputy Executive Directors posts to 
assist the Executive Director (Terry and Mueller 1997). These three positions allowed 
the Chairperson to accommodate the competing Directors‟ aspirations, but he also 
appointed a very competent Civil Servant, someone from the Chairperson‟s home 
district, as an Executive Director. 
   
5.4. The Economics of Staff Retention 
 
The political culture of Head Office differs from that in the Field/Branch Offices.  To 
ensure the expansion of ongoing programmes, BRAC continually recruits university 
graduates.  The vast pool of college and university graduates who cannot find other 
work makes it possible for BRAC easily to recruit staff members at the required 
educational levels (Lovell 1992:20).  A job at BRAC may come at the end of a long 
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period of unemployment.  Naturally, these young graduates commit themselves to the 
cause of BRAC.     
 
The young graduates get a further boost when they receive training on different 
aspects of development.  BRAC invests seven percent of its budget for training and 
staff development via its Training Division.  Training includes approaches to 
development, motivational training, how to acquaint oneself with rural people, 
awareness building, primary health care, operations training, various specialised skills 
training, etc.  Training not only enhances individual skills and builds careers, but also 
promotes confidence.  Staff receive training on a continual basis.  After the 
completion of initial training, staff are placed in branch offices.  Initially new staff 
tend to like the branch office environment.  They get loans to purchase motorcycles 
from BRAC to carryout day-to-day activities, accommodation, etc.  During their 
gradual induction into the competitive work environment, they gain invaluable work 
experience and skills.  
 
However, their satisfaction declines as days pass and many fail to accommodate 
themselves with the working environment.  BRAC acknowledges this fact:  “training 
includes a year of probation at a field office.  The new recruits quickly experience the 
rigors of this life.  About half of all new recruits leave during this period to take up 
easier jobs elsewhere” (Abed and Chowdhury 1997:55).  This indicates that “about 
half of all new recruits could not cope with harsh working” (Abed and Chowdhury 
1997:55).  Over the years, BRAC has generated an environment of insecurity among 
staff.  As an informant observed on the psyche of the staff: "staff talk about resigning 
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when they return home at the end of the day; every morning they go to the office 
fearing termination."  
 
BRAC‟s culture also features frequent staff transfer.  Usually, five-six Programme 
Organisers work under an Area Manager.  In a one-year period, researchers found
62
: 
five Programme Organisers were transferred and eight Programme Organisers 
resigned; of the eight Programme Organisers, four lasted for only one month, three 
resigned after three months and one after one year.  This is a common scenario across 
all the branches.  It is the opposite situation to that observed by a foreign researcher, 
“the staff turnover rate in BRAC is highest in the front line positions, but overall, the 
attrition rate in 1996 was less than four percent, probably half what it is in the private 
sector” (Smillie 1997:31).  There are reasons for resignation involving type of work, 
working environment, conflict between Programme Organizers and lower level, 
reluctance to accept discipline, salary dissatisfaction, being overworked, new staff 
intimidated by frustrated established staff,  no right to express opinion and 
disagreements with Area Managers.   In 1997, a one month informal observation on 
the rate of resignation of staff at the Programme Organizers level and higher found 
that, on average, every day four staff members resign, or are terminated from BRAC. 
It is notorious for hiring and firing staff from its organisation. 
 
Nurturing a culture of insecurity is a deliberate tactic of BRAC, which appoints 
employees to projects who are terminated once they are over.  Also, anyone at 
anytime may lose their jobs.  The policy of continuous recruitment and high rate of 
resignation exerts pressure to maintain maximum output, efficiency and loyalty.  
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 Observation at Matlab Office (26 February, 1994 - 26 October, 1995). 
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BRAC does not hold itself accountable for staff welfare, while reaping benefits of 
their knowledge and labour.  The outcome is that, while BRAC employs thousands of 
staff, only a few hundred staff have worked for more than for 10 years.  
 
Table 5.1: Number of staff working for 10 years with BRAC 
Years Number Total Employee  
1993 177 10,849 
1994 244 11,897 
1995 353 16,083 
Source:  RDP III 1993:100. 
 
The policy is to retain a sufficient number of core staff related to the economics of 
retention.  The policy aims to get maximum service and maintain organisation loyalty.  
It is thought that two levels of staff, are most vulnerable viz., staff at level 10-12 and 
new recruits at 6-7 levels, in a hierarchy of 16 levels.   BRAC uses the energy and 
labour of the new staff, and the expertise of those at level 10-12.  Promotion to level 
13 means not only more salary, but also that more loyalty is expected.   
 
The leadership uses staff skills to set-up a project only to release the "skilled and 
experienced" person at a later date.  These people become high profile staff through 
their efforts, but as such their achievement is looked upon as threat by those who are 
loyal to leadership.  These staff became influential and expect promotion for their 
contributions to BRAC.  When a staff member sets up a project, s/he is recognised as 
an „expert.‟ Removal of that person reduces local expertise.   One informant made the 
following comment:         
 
“these people gave their efforts, use their experience, skills and 
knowledge to develop new projects and programmes.  This means 
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that they gain expertise on projects and earn a reputation as a 
specialist.  The leadership releases these people so as to prevent them 
from claiming „specialist‟ status and undermining the oligarchy‟s 
achievements.  Once a project is set up, the specialist is released and 
a general worker on low pay is put in place to run the projects.  
Perhaps the leadership learn this behaviour from their experience of 
using expatriate consultants who visit BRAC for short periods, 
articulate project ideas, establish a project and then leave by handing 
over the responsibility to local managers to run until donors stop the 
funding.”  
 
This system works to dampen individual vision and creativity; staff members become 
subservient to the system (Bebbington et.al. 2005:612). Such a system creates 
dynamics which encourage one to develop expertise in offering innovative projects; 
but once one establishes a project the same dynamics ironically work against one‟s 
chances to remain in the system.  When someone establishes a project, his/her 
expectations increase. The claim of expertise may be interpreted as a sign of 
disloyalty. It also means that promotion becomes legitimate and one must justify 
his/her expertise.  
 
The person gains a reputation within the "house of BRAC."  However, management 
starts to destroy a person‟s reputation by transferring, replacing, removing, or 
releasing him. It dismisses those who set up a project; demand promotion where over-
due; and appear too critical of BRAC.  This policy has two results: firstly, it 
„defames‟ the person denying their achievements, and secondly, it serves as a warning 
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to others that BRAC does not recognize expertise and that if one becomes successful, 
one‟s employment is in jeopardy.  This policy creates problems: 
 
 it increases distrust amongst staff; 
 it makes one more submissive; 
 planning and operations becomes chaotic as expertise does not grow; 
 job insecurity also reduces corruption; and  
 loyalism dominates BRAC operations.  
 
5.4.1  Economic Value of BRAC Staff 
 
A widely held belief within the BRAC rank and file is that senior mangers equate 
staff with "economic value," i.e., how much value does a staff member add to 
BRAC‟s economic enterprise.  What does BRAC lose or gain from retention and 
resignation?  The programme organisers are of strategic importance in implementing 
projects at the field level.  University graduates are usually recruited to the position of 
POs after intensive interviews and a screening process.  Many are graduates of 
regional universities.  A common belief in BRAC is that the graduates of Dhaka 
University have a tendency to protest at what they see as injustice.  They join with 
enthusiasm and energy, but start to realize that their aspirations are being thwarted 
and come to doubt that they are in the right kind of organisation. They may have an 
elitist attitude and wish to be office bureaucrats, but in BRAC they experience 
working in the field with the poor.  These staff have to spend more time on 
motorcycles than at desks.  It is a cultural shock for many, the difference between 
elitist tradition of their education and the populist tradition of development work.  
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However, high unemployment forces them to work for BRAC.  Many came from 
lower middle class families, a background that allows them to adjust to a harsh 
working culture.    
 
The development work of BRAC requires close management and frequent field visits 
by staff.  In most cases, staff use motorcycles to carryout their everyday activities. 
They purchase these motor cycles not from the open market, but from BRAC, 
financed by loans taken at a predetermined rate. These loans are repaid over a period 
of ten years. If they stop working at BRAC within the ten year period, BRAC 
repossess the motorbikes as a result of the loans remaining unpaid. Moreover, many 
motorcycles reach the end of their useful lives after ten years.  A programme 
organiser shared the following example:  
 
“my salary is Tk. 7,000 per month.  I had to take loan amounting to Tk. 
100,000 to purchase a motorcycle from BRAC at an inflated price. The market 
price of cycle is Tk. 90,000. This loan was repaid from my daily travelling 
allowance (TA). We received Tk. 2.5 per kilometre as TA and one can claim a 
maximum Tk. 1,500, i.e. 600 km per month.  On average programme 
organisers run up 1000 km every month on their motorbikes. Thus, we have to 
pay for the extra 400 km out of our own pockets to serve the BRAC‟s cause.  
Out of each Tk. 2.5, we pay Tk. 1.5 as loan instalments, using the remaining 
Tk. 1 to meet the fuel costs and repair expenses. At this rate, it takes about 10 
years to repay the loan. A problem occurred when I resigned after 7 years of 
service.  I had to surrender the motor cycle to BRAC as well as Tk.1/km that I 
used for fuel consumption and maintenance, amounting to Tk. 33,600 
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(1x400x12x7= 33,600).  In seven years, I had paid Tk. 75,600 instalment and, 
thus, Tk. 24,400 remains outstanding. Since, I am in no position to repay this 
outstanding amount I had to give up the motor cycle.  If you add Tk. 33,600 to 
the outstanding amount, I had paid more than what I borrowed. This is 
exploitation because I spent this money on daily activities for BRAC. 
Moreover, BRAC charges donors for the motorcycles and the daily allowance 
and then resells these motorcycles to new staff members.  Sadly, many 
programme organisers join BRAC with empty pockets and leave without any 
savings”.  
  
The internal business of BRAC with its own staff is a significant one.  In 2006, BRAC 
accumulated assets of Taka 585,738,231 ($ 8,613,798) by selling motor cycles against 
loans made to programme organisers (BRAC 2006: 106).  
  
The aim of most programme organisers is to qualify as a branch office Area Manager 
after four years of service. However, there are few area manager posts. The senior 
programme organisers who stay at BRAC for six or seven years are eventually let go 
and new ones are recruited.  Relentless field visits lead to fatigue among senior 
programme organisers; new recruits tend to me more energetic. The process of hiring 
and firing can be viewed as selecting efficient workers in a country where 
professional efficiency is low.  This process may alternately be viewed as the labour 
exploitation of young, educated and energetic new recruits. On top of all this, until 
1995 programme organisers were discouraged from marrying and needed the 
permission of senior management to do so.  As bachelors they have live in rooms in 
the branch offices, a form of security for the office.  
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5.5. Sign of Change 
 
The organisational culture of BRAC has evolved over a period of thirty years in 
response to the aid system and changes with development policies.    BRAC has 
changed its foci from development imperatives (1972-1990) to institutional 
imperatives (1990-2000) to market imperatives (2000-on wards)
63
.  The capacity of 
BRAC to change with shifts of paradigm has also prepared its management to cope 
with crises, such as violent staff protests.  It faced a major protest in 1986, when 
BRAC decided to merge its Outreach and Rural Credit Training Programme (RCTP) 
programme into Rural Development Programme (RDP).   
 
Behind BRAC‟s image as a successful organisation is harsh culture that seeks to 
transform non-capitalist Bengali culture into a productive one along capitalist lines.  
This culture is described as “hierarchy of silence” (Stuart et al.  1996).   Now BRAC 
is undergoing a transformation from purely a development organisation to a business-
like corporation.  An aspect of this transformation is the fear culture, which affects 
staff morale negatively. There are problems with staff familiar with NGO culture and 
not that of business concerns.  According to Rao and Kelleher, these “very systems 
and procedures are straining now with negative consequences for work and staff 
morale.  BRAC‟s human resource function, for example, is atomized among line 
functions and is perceived by staff to be an arcane process in which they have no 
voice” (Rao and Kelleher 1997:135).  
 
                                                     
63
 See BRAC Annual Reports from 1991 to 2006 and Mannan (2009a:229-230) 
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One emerging factor is shaping BRAC organisational culture: a crisis over future 
leadership.  Will this result in BRAC changing its present centralised and personalised 
structure?  The change in BRAC is a topic of everyday discussion among staff. The 
following are among the questions asked: 
 
 What form will the organisation take by 2015? 
 Will BRAC disintegrate and each division become a separate NGO? 
 Is BRAC going to reduce its development activities and become a business 
and quasi-donor to many small NGO partners? 
 
An informant remarked, “the Tiger (current CEO) is becoming old.  Now he is trying 
to rely more on professionals rather than loyalists.”  BRAC has appointed several 
highly reputable professionals from other organisations to its top echelon of 
administration since 2000 as it needs the support of more professional and 
achievement oriented staff  who can enable it to meet market demand. Their presence 
is contributing to the changing organisational culture of BRAC.  
BRAC management recognises the internal strains. In 2004, it appointed an able 
retired bureaucrat as an Ombudsperson to promote organisational stability.  BRAC‟s 
webpage state: 
“the Governing Board of BRAC has taken this significant innovative step 
in order to further strengthen BRAC‟s own internal oversight mechanism 
and enhance its overall governance performance. The Ombudsperson has 
been given a comprehensive mandate to investigate any incidence of 
maladministration and misuse of power within BRAC, which will include 
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grievances, such as, corruption, abuse of power or discretion, negligence, 
oppression, nepotism, rudeness, arbitrariness, unfairness and 
discrimination specially in the context of gender. Employees will be able 
to lodge complaints concerning any decision taken by BRAC, and after a 
time-bound investigation, the Ombudsperson will present his 
recommendations to the Governing Board of BRAC” 
(www.brac.net/ombudsperson.  Accessed on 15.10.2005). 
5.6. Discussion and Reflection 
 
The successful growth and transformation of BRAC from a tiny organization in 1972 
to a large international development organisation by 2010 lies in its increasing 
management capacity to translate universal values into projects for engaging the poor 
in development. Three strategies are indentified to develop an organizational culture. 
First, it continuously synergises the indigenisation of Western culture, Islamic 
hierarchical values and Bengali holism to create an environment for growth.  
Secondly, the top echelons of management are organized into a clan-like group tied 
by primordial loyalty to the organization and its founder and chief executive. This 
group runs the programmes and takes all management decisions.  Thirdly, BRAC 
strictly maintains organizational discipline in the rank and file by reproducing a 
culture of fear and indulgence. This policy also in turn ensures the interactive 
dynamics of individual and professional loyalty to drive the organization into the 
future. In this environment, BRAC has evolved a management ideology which has 
elements of exploitation of its own staff; they however internalize this ideology into a 
hierarchy of silence.   
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BRAC has evolved an auto-system with several unique characteristics. It continuously 
sieves through a process of hiring and firing to indentify and retain capable staff; but 
these staff members  tend to be released from their jobs at the height of their careers 
only to be replaced by younger staff. This system can  function with new recruits or 
minimum expertise, until a major organizational change occurs. BRAC, unlike many 
government organizations also boasts a highly corruption-free work environment and 
staff members do their best to ensure the maximum programme and project output. 
This organisational culture indicates that “the negotiated and conflictive manner in 
which culture is constructed by behaviours within organisations as an ongoing 
process, not as a set of outcomes.  Cultures shift and change, and a range of 
subcultures may exist, both reflecting and exercising power relations within 
organisations” (Lewis 2003:215-216).   
 
An important aspect of the organisation culture of BRAC is determined by the 
relationship between researchers and program managers. This relationship is analysed 
in the next chapter (chapter 6) in order to show how a cooperative antagonism has 
developed, wherein both the researchers and managers have the common motive to 
strategically represent organisation to the donors while working for the well-being of 
the poor.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
COOPERATIVE ANTAGONISM. RESEARCHERS VERSUS MANAGERS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus on the organisational culture of development research, 
involving both researchers and development managers. As will be highlighted, the 
situation, in this respect, is not without problems. It is only in the 1990s that NGOs 
started to appreciate the value of socio-economic research in Bangladesh.  Research, 
in general, has contributed to development strategies, especially with projects that are 
funded by donors.   Development research is a broad term which includes various 
kinds of research and training, plus monitoring and evaluation. Often both researchers 
and managers cooperate to gauge the impact of development, but such attempts at 
cooperation may generate contentious relationships between the two.   
 
There are at least three stakeholders in development – the donors who finance 
projects, NGOs that implement these projects and the poor people, who are expected 
to be the beneficiaries.  Development researchers often face a dilemma as they 
attempt to decide whose interest should be addressed in their research report.  In 
theory, research is expected to improve the quality of project management in such a 
way that it contributes to the improvement of the life of the poor (Eggers 2002).  In 
reality, it acts in response to donor‟s expectation from the project.  This dilemma has 
implications for the quality and direction of research itself.  To understand the 
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dilemma, this paper attempts to discover how researchers interact with NGO 
managers and how managers relate to researchers.   
 
Development research follows three phases.  The first phase is negotiation with 
interested parties – researchers, development managers, beneficiaries, etc.; the second 
is data collection; and the third phase, following agreement, is to produce a report.  
The latter may be difficult due to the researchers and the NGO managers having 
different views and aims which often result in disagreements.  Little attention is paid 
to the interactive dynamics between those involved, which, ultimately, dictates the 
final form of the reports.  The quality and the outcome of development research, I 
argue, is not so much determined by the quality of findings, analysis and skills of the 
researchers themselves, but also by the power relationships between the researchers 
and NGO managers.   
 
6.2 Development Research and Its Context 
 
Development today increasingly deals with transcultural values such as gender, 
governance, grassroots democracy, human rights, micro-credit, etc. It translates 
Western values in order to implement projects in the South.  These transcultural 
preoccupations suggest that certain sets of values are not negotiable (Marsden 
1994:35). Development aid sets the agenda that defines the „development language‟ 
which also has come to dominate development research (Mikkelsen 1995:27).     
 
The overall priority given to research by NGOs, except for a few large national and 
international ones, is low; most tend not to appreciate the value of research in 
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development.  In most cases, they employ overseas consultants to evaluate projects.  
Even if the evaluations are good, the research recommendations are rarely 
implemented.  For those few NGOs which have a research wing or unit, they tend to 
engage researchers in the following three areas: 
 
 Monitoring of progress of projects and compiling annual reports.   
 Development of base line surveys to measure the impact of the projects at 
some later stage. 
 Carrying out evaluations at the final phase of the project cycle or when 
projects complete their life cycles.  In a few cases, research is carried out 
during projects.     
 
Development research requires international cooperation. Since donors finance most 
of the Bangladeshi NGOs‟ activities, research tends to be donor driven. Research is 
also heavily weighted towards impact studies, as donors want to know the impact of 
projects which are receiving, or have received financial support from them. Donor 
governments are accountable to their own tax payers.  Moreover, impact studies allow 
donors to gauge not only their projects‟ activities but also the performance of NGOs, 
which will inform the selection of suitable partners for future development 
interventions. The donor-NGO relationship places demands on the NGOs, as they 
have to justify projects by providing continuous feedback to donors through suitable 
proposals, documentation, monitoring and evaluation reports.      
 
Although development research is biased towards impact studies, a gradual shift is 
taking place from assessing project impact to focusing on the various aspects of 
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intervention and improvement in project quality. Over the years, poverty has not been 
reduced in the South, but has seen a change in its fundamental character. Research 
tools and methods in the West are constantly evolving in an effort to capture the 
changing face of poverty. By 1990, research and evaluation work which had 
previously emphasised project cycle management and logical frameworks (EU 2004) 
had shifted towards a new emphasis on stakeholder analysis and participatory 
approaches (Cracknell 2002:48). In Bangladesh, to the contrary, development 
research has changed from assessing the impact of projects to evaluating poverty 
alleviation (Chowdhury and Bhuiya 2004).  Poverty analysis expands the scope of 
development research, making demands on development practitioners, managers and 
beneficiaries to become stakeholders in the research process (Ahmad 2002).    
 
Conceptually and theoretically, development research offers an interdisciplinary 
perspective covering a wide range of issues; not only economic but also socio-cultural 
aspects (Sillitoe 2004). Development is subject to the constant introduction of new 
agendas which produce their own problems. Research seems forever trying to catch 
up with projects as researchers are not always able to change their methodologies 
quickly enough to meet new demands. New and innovative research methods have to 
be introduced. The challenge for development research is perhaps due to the fact that 
there is no infallible formula for choosing correct methods, techniques and tools. 
Older development research methods are no longer applicable to today‟s issues 
(Mikkelsen 1995:22).  Research becomes ever more complicated with an increasing 
tendency to mix qualitative, quantitative (Bamberger 2000, Desai and Potter 2006), 
and participatory research methods (Chamber 1995) among others. Today research 
faces real challenges as there are increasing numbers of qualitative projects dealing 
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with issues such as good governance, community empowerment, human rights, the 
role of gender in development, indigenous knowledge, etc (Marsden 1994; Moser 
1993; Sillitoe et al. 2005;  Laws et al. 2003). Broadly speaking, development research 
in concurrent practices is a combination of various research approaches and 
typologies including basic research, applied research, summative evaluation, 
formative evaluations and action research (Patton 1990:160-161).   Researchers, 
particularly those in the West, have found that their competencies and experience, 
developed in industrialized countries, can seldom be applied directly to developing 
countries (Ofstad 1984:12). 
 
6.3. Status of Development Research in Bangladesh  
 
NGOs work in more than two-thirds of the villages in Bangladesh. Over the last 37 
years, NGOs in Bangladesh have reached a high level of organisational expertise in 
managing poverty alleviation. NGOs carry out diverse activities, but the quality of 
these activities has not yet been properly understood and analyzed. One reason for this 
could be that demands for project evaluation are not balanced against the in-house 
research capacity of NGOs. Building up the capacity to conduct research is a 
relatively new arena of activity for NGOs (Chen 1995:5). As NGOs implement an 
increasing number of new activities, the need to understand the growing complexities 
in managing development has also increased dramatically.   
 
The International Cholera and Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B)  
established the tradition for development research in the early 1970s, engaging mostly  
within the sphere of health research. BRAC is also unique, in that it is one of the few 
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organisations in the development community of Bangladesh which not only sustains 
large research wings, but also tries to use the findings of its research to enhance the 
quality of its programmes and projects.  Since 1975, BRAC has commissioned 
research that has gradually focused its activities into both health and non-health 
issues. BRAC values the importance of research, seeing it as an integral part of the 
process of project formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of various 
development interventions (PFRB 1994:1). BRAC has seen the capacity of its 
Research and Evaluation Division (RED) grow over the years, but it seems that RED 
has a definite set of priorities.  The primary audience of its research output tends to be 
donors or outsiders who wish to know more about BRAC.   
 
It will be shown in this chapter that NGO programmers and managers occasionally 
express serious doubts about the quality of research; they are also sometimes unsure 
as to how to apply research findings and recommendations in order to improve the 
quality of projects and programmes. BRAC is aware that donors and consultants refer 
to its internal documents and reports in order to evaluate its ongoing programmes. 
RED plays a strategic role in promoting BRAC‟s image, systematically pursuing two 
strategies.  The first is to create the space and opportunity for foreign researchers to 
engage in research on various BRAC projects and impact evaluations, excluding 
„operations research‟. The resultant published books and articles serve as a 
mouthpiece for BRAC (Chen 1986, Korten 1980; Lovel 1992, Chowdhury and Cash 
1996, Smille 2009 and 1997, Roa and David 1995, Rohde 2005, NET 1979). The 
second strategy is to establish a pool of indigenous researchers, primarily for 
documentation purposes. Until the beginning of the nineties, BRAC discouraged 
individual researchers from claiming authorship of the research and evaluation 
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reports. A teamwork approach was subsequently developed which allowed individual 
authorship of research reports.        
 
BRAC maintains clear a boundary between the respective roles of indigenous and 
foreign researchers. It encourages foreign researchers to write books and articles 
favourable to BRAC‟s image based on project data and information collected by the 
indigenous researchers. Such an approach has created tension over this hegemonic 
presence of foreign scholars and consultants. Indigenous researchers oppose the 
foreign researchers‟ findings at every available opportunity (Mannan 2000b, Mannan 
2006).  
 
One of the accusations against NGOs is that their research results are often 
“managed” or adjusted to suit their own interests and those of donors. Although a 
large amount of research is carried out by NGOs, most of it fails to meet the minimum 
research standards that should be expected. Furthermore, the purpose of the research 
is often misrepresented.  
 
The present status of research in the NGO community reveals the following scenario: 
 
 Few NGOs have their own research wings or units. In these NGOs, wide gaps 
exist between research and programmes. There is usually hardly any attempt 
to develop a rapport between researchers and programmers through a sharing 
and exchanging of their respective experiences  
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 Many NGOs encounter problems in developing their research capacity. They 
also face challenges in translating research recommendations into improved 
programme effectiveness. 
 
 Many NGOs, particularly middle sized and small NGOs, do not see the 
necessity of research or are unaware of how research can contribute to 
expanding project choices for development issues.   
 
In recent years, the changing nature of international aid has created a pressure on 
Bangladeshi NGOs to open up their own internal research wings. This pressure 
originated as a result of the gradual drying up of resources from Western development 
agencies.  Donors seek to maximize the use of remaining aid funds. They seek more 
feedback so as to understand the development problems (Cracknell 2000:28). 
Bangladeshi NGOs feel the need to increase their research capacities in two ways:  
first, they are under a recent obligation to highlight the impact of their project 
activities; secondly, since 1990 they have started to scale up their ongoing projects 
and to implement new projects, which are justified through the production of an 
objective analysis of the projects. There is a growing trend among NGOs to recognize 
the need to produce adequate documentation for the identification, formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of various development interventions. In 
addition, the scope of research has been expanded to: develop proposals; capture the 
concrete and normative experience of managers; develop projects and programmes; 
assess the quality of programmes, capture the impact of development programmes; 
improve organisational and management expertise; identify institutional weaknesses 
to improve performance and manage results; capture the nature of “projectization” of 
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development; articulate and find a “fit” between the objectives of a development 
programme; identify the needs of the recipients; find a way to increase the efficiency 
of the organisational structure of NGOs, and finally, identify the training needs of the 
managers and researchers (Mannan 2000a). 
 
6.4     NGO Power-Structure 
 
There are multiple actors and agencies are involved in the world of development. 
These actors and agencies introduce new concepts, ideas and projects to beneficiaries 
at the grassroots. Over the years, these beneficiaries have silently witnessed the 
continuous introduction of new projects and the phasing out of old projects by NGOs.  
Perplexed by the ever-changing roles of NGOs, one female beneficiary described 
NGO staff as those who have: 
 
Baro Bari Tero Khamer; 
Jei Bari Jai, Shei Bari Tomar 
(12 houses and 13 farms; 
wherever I go, is owned by you) 
 
People have come to realize that NGOs are non-permanent entities with fluid identity. 
They observe that NGOs are always introducing new ideas and projects. NGO 
practitioners shift their focus when new opportunities arise without completing the 
first task.  New projects mean new identities set against the old ones and new 
opportunities.  The process through which NGOs grow and expand creates 
opportunities for anthropological research.  In fact, the NGO sector is the largest 
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employment sector for anthropologists in Bangladesh. The use of anthropology is 
gaining momentum as, “only a relative short time ago, anthropologists engaged in 
consultancy were in a minority.  Now they are probably in the majority, and certainly 
carry a considerable amount of political (intellectual) clout, ……… . The relative 
power of those engaged in practical work is seeing major redirections in the 
anthropological projects” (Morris and Bastin 2004:10).  
 
The need for employing anthropologists in NGOs and development agencies is linked 
to a global shift from a „Development‟ paradigm to an „Aid System‟ paradigm 
(Crooke 1997) shaped by elements of participation . Within the frame of the 
development paradigm, donors were quite flexible and did not  ask NGOs to report on 
the results for the support extended. Under the aid system paradigm, however, donors 
require NGOs to provide results on performance and financial sustainability. The 
reason for involving anthropologists stems from the fact that the majority of 
beneficiaries live in rural areas. Further, development policies of the past and the 
present do not result in a higher rate of economic growth and fail to secure the 
adequate participation of the poor. As traditional economic wisdom has failed, 
economic development has sharpened the process and inequalities have worsened. As 
a result, planners have become more and more concerned with improving the income 
levels of the poorest segment of population. 
 
The growth of social anthropology as a body of theory with a defined methodology 
occurred in the areas today characterized as underdeveloped. The origin and evolution 
of anthropology in non-European and non-Western contexts gives it a clear advantage 
over almost all other disciplines that have originated in the West. Although the 
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strength of anthropology in studying society, culture and people is clearly established, 
other disciplines such as economics, project planning and management are given 
privilege in a development context. The weakness of social anthropology is that it 
does not develop models and theories to explain development and underdevelopment 
(Archetti 1983: 29).  The outcome then is that anthropologists raise criticisms of the 
development models and projects, which fail to achieve the goals of development and 
eliminate poverty. The current approach allows anthropologists to overcome the 
criticism that they “are generally perceived as being highly critical of activities 
undertaken in the name of "development," while at the same time offering little in the 
way of constructive analysis or positive advice on the subject themselves” (Evans 
1986:24). However, anthropologists are slowly overcoming their inherent weakness 
by incorporating other disciplines that strengthen their discipline (Arizpe 1996) and 
by making modest efforts  at developing models (Sillitoe et.al. 2005).  
 
 6.4.1 Anthropologists and Multi-disciplinary Team 
 
There are hardly any development research organisations or NGOs in Bangladesh that 
have core anthropological and qualitative research teams. Anthropologists usually 
become members of multi-disciplinary teams. Being a member of multi-disciplinary 
team comes with several disadvantages for anthropologists, particularly local ones. 
These result in complex relationships with the non-anthropologist members of the 
team. For example, many non-anthropologists portray the job of anthropologists as 
collecting anecdotes, case studies, etc. to complement the main report.    
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On many occasions, the local anthropologists‟ positions are justified by requiring 
them to assist foreign consultants, who may or may not themselves be 
anthropologists. Anthropologists fall into two categories: the first category are 
genuine anthropologists; the second category consist of pseudo-anthropologists (those 
not qualified as anthropologists), who are majority in number and dominate the 
development scene.  NGOs prefer to work with pseudo „anthropologists,‟ because 
they have found that trained anthropologists often fall into an ethical dilemma. On the 
one hand, anthropologists hired by development organisations are required to 
“respond to the clients, and in the process, accept, if not join, in crafting the stories 
people in institutions tell them about what they are up to and why these things are 
important” (Janes 2004: 26-27). On the other hand, they collude “with the powerless 
to identify their needs against the interest of the bourgeois institution” (Scheper-
Hughes 1995:420). Therefore, pseudo-anthropologists need NGOs as their niche and 
NGOs need pseudo-anthropologists to write success stories for them. Even good 
anthropologists often compromise the content of their reports to the ultimate 
satisfaction of the employing organisation (Janes 2004: 22-32). 
 
Some examples of the role of consultants, or pseudo-anthropologists, in NGOs are 
given below: 
 
Example one: Jam-Jelly Anthropologist 
 
In development, we frequently find a category of people who have attended what are 
generally called „sandwich courses‟ at foreign universities. These are three to six 
month short courses in anthropology. As a result, they become the sort of 
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„anthropologist‟ popularly known in Bangladesh as a „Jam-Jelly Anthropologist.‟ The 
metaphor „Jam-Jelly‟ is used because these consultants tend to add jam or jelly to 
bread in the manner in which they add an anthropological flavour to their reports. 
When I worked at the research division at BRAC, one day the senior management 
instructed me that I had to cooperate with a foreign anthropologist who would apply a 
new participatory tool. After the arrival of the foreign anthropologist, we had long and 
lively dialogue that helped us to discover each other.  We soon discovered that I had 
seven years academic training in anthropology from a Western university; and the 
foreign anthropologist had only six-month short courses in anthropology with a major 
in public health and nutrition from a North American university. Yet the foreign 
consultant considered herself an anthropologist, and the senior management placed 
more importance on a foreign anthropologist rather than a local one. Good sense 
prevailed however, and the consultant realised that her involvement would insult the 
local overqualified anthropologist.  She looked for a junior anthropologist who could 
supply her with anthropological data to complete her report.  She eventually found 
such a junior anthropologist.   
 
Example two: Spouse of a Famous Anthropologist 
 
Another informative experience for me was a debate with the indigenous wife of a 
foreign anthropologist. Her background was in political science supplemented by 
extensive and diverse fieldwork experience with her anthropologist husband. Her 
husband was a teacher at a North American university at the time.  Her association 
with her husband had transformed her into an „anthropologist,‟ at least in the eyes of 
NGO management. My problem was that she criticised my written research as 
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violating the norms of anthropological methods and methodology.  I had a difficult 
time so long as she was at the research division. Once, she and her team criticised my 
major work on religious opposition to BRAC and NGOs (Mannan et al. 1994). Senior 
management at BRAC thought that she was right and I was wrong. Out of frustration, 
I requested the senior management to send the report to any foreign anthropologist to 
referee. The management complied with my request, and sent it to a foreign 
anthropologist. The comments of this anthropologist to the RED Director came to me 
as a blessing as he mentioned in his comments:  you also may wish to read it with an 
eye towards rephrasing some parts. No matter what, it will not be well received in 
some quarters – but perhaps some of the inflammatory language can be toned down. 
Take the high moral road as it were.”64  
 
Example three: Ignorant Women and Expert's Technology 
 
Once, I was assisting an international expert on appropriate food technology (he was 
keenly interested in introducing rice-parboiling technology in Chittagong).  I briefed 
him that people in Chittagong did not eat boiled rice and rice-parboiling technology 
might not be accepted there. He argued that „if we could make parboiling technology 
popular in Sri Lanka, then why not in Chittagong?‟  He either did not believe me or 
could not change his fixed agenda. When we went to a remote village in Chittagong, 
he took pains to introduce the new rice parboiling technology to rural female 
beneficiaries of an NGO. The women listened to all the „good‟ points about rice 
parboiling silently and patiently for almost the whole day. The expert interpreted this 
patience as a good sign. At the end of the day, when the expert asked them how soon 
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 Letter “From the Desk of Jim Ross,” n.d.  
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they wanted to implement rice parboiling technology, a woman replied, „Sir, we are 
not interested in rice boiling, because we do not eat boiled rice. We are interested in 
an engine that could be used to thrash rice.‟ This apparently upset the expert who 
remarked that these women were ignorant and without any future. 
 
Example four: Where are the poor? 
 
A multi-disciplinary team, consisting of members of an international development 
agency, an international NGO and a large national NGO, worked together to develop 
a grassroots democracy programme for the poor. The team members wanted to assess 
the need for democracy among the rural poor, in order to develop a democracy 
package to be implemented by the NGOs.  The team members were given a one-day 
training course on Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) and subsequently dispersed 
across the country.  This team conducted several PRAs, but some elite Bengali staff at 
the development agency had a problem finding the „real hardcore‟ poor.  One day, a 
staff member went deep inside a village and requested a poor peasant, “amake akta 
gorib khuze dao…. amra PRA korbo” (would you find a poor person for me; we 
would like to talk with them and do a PRA). The poor peasant was puzzled and the 
rest of the team members embarrassed. 
 
Example five:  The Great Tradition and Little Tradition in BRAC 
 
The wife of a Scandinavian anthropologist, an international consultant and political 
scientist, was appointed to identify problematic gender relationships within BRAC 
and implement a high profile gender programme. The consultant indicated in her 
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report that the gender problem was deeply rooted in the Great and Little Tradition 
within the BRAC. The consultant believed that BRAC represented a Great Tradition 
and its various programmes comprised the Little Tradition.  She wrote in her Training 
Manual,   
“the big tradition is one that external observers of BRAC are familiar 
with: the largest development NGO in Bangladesh with a commitment 
to bettering the situation of the landless poor and empowering women 
………….  .   Of the little traditions, NFPE is so new that it has yet to 
develop its own distinguishing cultural characteristics.  HPD, its soul 
sister, is the current incarnation of various BRAC health-related 
interventions, ……..…. .  The RDP culture is dominant among 
BRAC‟s little tradition” (Stuart 1996:72). 
 
BRAC management was pleased with report, but anthropologists thought her analysis 
to be an abuse of anthropology. One remarked, “had Redfield (1956) known that his 
understanding and concept of peasant society could be misinterpreted and misused by 
an international consultant in 1995, he would not even write about Great and Little 
Tradition!”   
 
Example six:  Epidemiologist's Construction of Fake Anthropology 
 
A senior anthropologist was employed to implement „emic-etic‟65 methodology to 
some epidemiologists and researchers from different disciplines. This person was 
considered an anthropologist by dint of a long period of working experience with an 
                                                     
65 
Emic-etic‟ methodology refers to the insider versus outsider, subjective versus objective view of the 
world.  It represents important guideposts for researchers dealing with cultures other than their own 
(Headland et al. 1990).     
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American anthropologist. He lacked any formal academic training in anthropology.  
He offered a three-day training course on qualitative research and the participants 
became more confused about etic-emic methodology as a result. After the training, 
my epidemiologist colleague jokingly said, „all anthropologists and anthropological 
methods are fake!‟ I understood my colleague's grievances and took another fifteen 
minutes to explain that „emic‟ represents the reality of persons who live inside a 
village while „etic‟ is the reality as seen by the outsider. I explained to him how to 
apply the method in the field. He became convinced that this particular tool was very 
useful in explaining and exploring certain aspects of village life and culture. As a 
result the esteem of anthropology had increased to a certain extent, at least to this 
epidemiologist.  
 
Example seven:   Doing Ethnography from a Helicopter 
 
Often many from other disciplines take on the cloak of anthropology.  In such a case, 
an agriculturalist converted into an anthropologist.  After the great cyclone of 1991 in 
which millions of people died, a donor agency employed a well-connected 
anthropologist to assess the colossal damage caused by the cyclone in order to 
conduct an ethnography of disaster management.  Aided by logistical support from a 
donor as well as a helicopter, the anthropologist flew over the disaster affected areas 
for a few days. The anthropologist referred to this as ethnography by helicopter.         
 
The examples cited above may not be regular occurrences, but such incidents speak 
volumes about the practices and positions of anthropologists in NGOs and the 
development arena.    
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6.4.2 Anthropologist and the Power-Structure of NGOs 
 
The location of an anthropologist within a whole gamut of structures and relationships 
is important. The location of the researcher determines the outcome of his/her 
research itself. The location of the anthropologist is of crucial importance because 
NGO and development research takes place at multiple levels and tiers, some of 
which are beyond the scope of anthropology. These multiple layers are the results of 
the process through which the development agenda and issues are developed which, 
in turn, shape the NGO movement. As a result, the method of inquiry varies 
significantly according to whether the researcher extracts information at the 
organisational level or the impact level, and how one analyses the different interfaces 
between development issues, organisations and society.     
 
The relationship of an anthropologist to other members of a team depends not on the 
knowledge and skills of the anthropologist, but on the position of the anthropologist 
within the power structure of NGOs and development. The power structure is 
important owing to the fact that anthropologists can enter the development world with 
tools and theories that may not be always appropriate for analyzing development 
issues. Therefore findings which anthropologists come up with may upset many 
people. Anthropologists‟ effort to find a „fit‟ with other disciplines may be greatly 
appreciated, although, in many cases, this may mean sacrificing anthropology itself! 
Anthropologists must often reach compromises with others as their future careers 
depend on how they deal with three important actors: the executive agencies, 
international financing agencies and beneficiaries. Anthropologists play creative 
intermediary roles in trying to secure effective collaboration between these groups 
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(Evans 1986:24). In other words, the anthropologist has a tricky role to play as s/he 
could often be caught between the interests of two or more groups and may become a 
scapegoat for project failure. 
 
Despite the rhetoric of involving anthropologists in development, the fact remains that 
anthropologists are only used sporadically. There are encouraging signs, however, as 
the number of anthropologists working at the World Bank has grown steadily from 
twenty-two in 1992 to sixty-four in 1996 (Nolan 2002:74). A study of the World Bank 
suggests that there are three reasons for the sporadic use of anthropologists.  These 
include:  (a) a lack of familiarity amongst Bank staff of anthropology and the 
attendant problems of how to recruit anthropologists as well as how to interpret and 
take on board their recommendations; (b) a lack of institutional basis for the use of 
anthropology; and (c) an absence of in-house capacity (Mathur 1996:26).   
 
These problems of appointing anthropologists are not confined to the World Bank; 
they equally applicable to other development organisations and NGOs. The 
relationship between the anthropologists and development agencies can become 
ambiguous and generate conflict. Despite the rhetoric of people's participation in 
project cycle management, projects today are not based directly on the needs of the 
people. Development agencies usually identify needs in relation to new technological 
means (Archetti 1983: 41). When anthropologists are employed to assess the need of 
the people, they might come up with findings that recommend totally irrelevant 
projects. Thus, the interests of project stakeholders could be put at risk.  At the same 
time, anthropologists might depict the „tradition and culture‟ which might eventually 
hinder the introduction of new technology. The chronic problem in development 
 209 
 
remains: to look at people without a history who need to grow with newly introduced 
projects and programmes. NGOs must ensure the participation of their beneficiaries. 
However, at the end of project life-cycles, it is often these beneficiaries who reject 
projects. There are a few critical anthropological studies that show how people reject 
projects when projects are inappropriate to their culture and traditions (Mannan 1996; 
Mannan 1995a; Mannan et al. 1994).   
 
6.5. Problematic Relationship between Research and Development Management 
 
To illustrate the relationship between research and development management, two 
events are presented which took place before the implementation of projects. The first 
event deals with Save the Children Australia (SCA), an international NGO, which 
supports its partners in implementing educational programmes for underprivileged 
children. The second event took place at BRAC between its Rural Development 
Programme staff and researchers from RED.   
 
The first event took place on the eve of the introduction of a new education 
programme by SCA. The NGO sought the help of an education researcher to 
implement a new approach in order to prepare disadvantaged children for mainstream 
schools. The basic premise of the project was to offer experience-based education 
with a group teaching approach. It also made provisions to have children from both 
underprivileged and privileged children in the same classes. The intention was that 
underprivileged children should learn the culture of more privileged classes, 
considered essential for sustaining higher education. The new approach also made 
provisions for the private tuition of under-privileged children, as their uneducated 
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Photo 5.1:  Knowledge and Capactiy Development 
 
 Source: BRAC 
 
parents were unable to tutor them at home. The aim of the new approach was to foster 
the careers of deprived children upon completion of their education. As discussions 
proceeded, a gulf appeared between the views of the education researcher and the 
NGO managers. This is reflected in box 6.1.   
  
The second event is the result of a dialogue between researchers and managers at 
BRAC.  Each year, researchers and managers at BRAC sat together to determine the 
future research agenda. Although they cooperated over projects as members of the 
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Box 6.1:  The findings for the dialogue between education researcher and NGO 
managers  
Education Researcher‟s Perspective NGO Managers‟ Perspectives 
Emphasis on the modification of existing 
project structures to overcome 
weaknesses and strengthen the system 
Required new programmes as existing 
project structures proved to be 
ineffective  
Emphasis was on school-based education.  Rejected school-based education in 
favour of school teaching practical 
skills.   
Emphasis on isolating children from the 
work-place  
Wished to transform the work-place 
into training schools, e.g. garages and 
workshops to be setup as schools.  
Favoured an academic curriculum to 
ensure a quality education. 
Emphasis on the need to develop the 
curriculum based on practical skills 
acquisition. 
The education researcher believed that 
children lacked real reading, writing and 
motivational skills necessary for school.  
Teachers could motivate children by 
visiting their parents. 
Managers held the view that inducing 
life skills would not only ensure 
income, but would also motivate both 
children and their parents to send them 
to school. 
The method and approach were designed 
to prepare disadvantaged children for 
mainstream schools 
Methods and approaches were designed 
to impart children with vocational 
education so that they could contribute 
to the family economy 
Education was seen as an external input; 
emphasis on children‟s leisure time for 
relaxing and playing. 
Education was seen as an internal 
input; emphasis on utilizing children‟s 
leisure time for lessons.  
 
same organisation, such cooperation was not without antagonism.  An example of 
cooperative antagonism is given in box 6.2, which highlights the dialogue on the eve 
of determining research issues. 
 
Although the aim of both researchers and managers is to ensure that development 
projects yield maximum benefit to their clients, the above dialogue box shows the gulf 
between researchers and managers. Development research and development practice 
may differ in purpose, form, content and duration, but they have one thing in 
common: they both seek information on people‟s lives, their ways of organizing 
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Box 6.2: Dialogue between researchers and managers at BRAC 
Researchers Managers 
1.  Researchers viewed changes brought 
about by projects with suspicion. To 
them, change meant losing the “old” 
values in favour of the “new” values 
which are not always helpful. 
1.  Managers were complacent about 
change assuming projects always 
brought changes which would help the 
poor. Thus, managers were interested in 
expanding projects.   
2.  Researchers measured development 
from either an input-outcome perspective 
or try to capture the process and 
pathways. 
2.  Managers saw development in terms 
of increasing project coverage and 
providing services to more poor people 
by incorporating them into the various 
projects.  
3.  Researchers used various quantitative 
and qualitative indicators to gauge 
poverty and the impact of projects. 
3.  Managers realised that project 
impact was not measurable with the 
researchers‟ indicators.  Managers view 
such indicators are the product of 
researchers preconceived ideas on 
project. 
4.  Researchers were complacent with 
definitions, tables and information. 
4.  Managers were complacent with 
annual target figures and achievements. 
5.  Researchers discovered “problems” in 
the projects  
5.  Managers viewed the problems as 
insignificant  
6.  Researchers had more questions than 
solutions. 
6.  Managers viewed the completion or 
phasing out of a project as steps 
towards the solution of a problem. 
Managers were good at coming up with 
answers to questions posed. 
 
themselves and acting in society (Mikkelsen, 1995:26).
66
 The dialogue between the 
researchers and managers takes place with the implicit understanding that researchers 
evaluate projects in order to enhance the quality of the projects. Research issues are 
also formulated by BRAC management and BRAC's donors (PRRB 1994:1).   
 
There are three ways in which communication gaps may occur between researchers 
and development managers. Firstly, while NGO managers represent mainstream 
development and implement projects, researchers seek to understand the issues when 
assessing and evaluating project performance. When outside researchers offer 
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There might be some cases where people‟s knowledge is ignored in favour of scientific knowledge 
(Alam 2001; Sillitoe 2002b)     
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critiques of NGO projects, they anticipate negative reactions from managers. 
Secondly, managers nurture the idea that researchers are like auditors, whose main 
task is to find weaknesses within NGO projects. They view researchers as project 
overseers with no realistic idea of their operational dynamics. Researchers are forever 
criticizing or finding faults in projects.  Managers are often not in a position to accept 
criticism:  "we have lots of experience that has been developed over 20 years, but 
researchers with two or three years of experience cannot grasp the realities of our 
programmes". 
 
Thirdly, managers start their careers in development with little understanding of 
research techniques and methods.
67
 At the same time, they are under constant pressure 
to use research findings to improve the quality of programmes. Development 
managers may be unable to understand how research can improve programme quality. 
On the other hand, researchers, with training in particular academic disciplines, are 
unable to capture the multidisciplinarity of project dynamics.  
 
Both managers and researchers have a problem in common, that of understanding the 
complexities of development. Neither group tends to have much knowledge of 
development before entering into the profession. They start their careers without 
being familiar with the diverse tools of development research and have problems 
conceptualizing the impact of a project from a development perspective.   
 
Development research tends to cause certain problems. Research attempts to address 
and reflect development reality, but once a report is produced, many managers fail to 
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Until recently, no universities and colleges in Bangladesh offered any courses in development.  Since 
2002, a few private universities and one public university have started courses in development and 
management.   
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comprehend the content of the report. Research reports can easily provoke 
controversy, contributing to mutual misunderstanding between researchers and 
development managers. For example, managers say, “reports are for donors; not for 
us,” or “research reports do not help us to find solutions.” Managers prefer a minimal 
amount of information with which to expand their programmes. Any discovery of the 
problem is met with sharp remarks such as "researchers do not understand the 
programmes"; "researchers only understand their own reports." Similarly, 
researchers argue, “our purpose is not to provide solutions; but to open dimensions 
for increased understanding.” Often, managers misinterpret debate amongst the 
researchers as conflicts within their ranks.                 
 
6.5.1 The Problems of Researcher in Development Organisation 
 
Researchers seek to apply research tools and methods, learnt from particular 
disciplines, to analyse development issues. These are often linear, biased towards a 
particular discipline and inadequate to understand complex development problems.  
Apart from selecting and applying appropriate research methodology, there are 
significant methodological problems in evaluating the impact of development 
projects, which revolve around two traditions. The first tradition is set by a debate 
between process analysis and the outcome model. This debate takes place primarily 
between economists and anthropologists. While economists evaluate a project by 
looking into input and outcomes, anthropologists evaluate projects from process 
perspectives. Economists test whether a modelled process is consistent with measured 
outcomes (chosen levels of farm inputs, rates of inflation, etc.), while anthropologists 
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analyse outcomes in terms of relationships between people with on emphasis on the 
structure and function of these relationships (Bardhan 1989). 
 
The methodological concerns loom large in research, often seen as a waste of time by 
managers. The researchers themselves often struggle to choose appropriate 
methodologies before any research can begin. This often leads to arguments between 
economists and anthropologists, each group trying to negate the other‟s 
methodologies.  Anthropologists tend to think that researchers with quantitative 
methodologies formulate questionnaires for the sole purpose of narrowing down the 
issues in order to discover what they set out to "discover": neither more/less. On the 
other hand, economists accuse anthropologists of being vague and being unable to 
generalize findings which can be usefully compared with findings from other projects. 
Indigenous anthropologists have to occasionally work with both foreign 
anthropologists and pseudo-anthropologists. Their findings could easily be 
complementary, since indigenous anthropologists tend to have intimate knowledge of 
subject while the foreign anthropologist employ the latest methodological tools to 
which indigenous anthropologists can rarely gain access.
68
 However, this dynamic 
may also prove a source of tension. Foreign anthropologists usually prefer to work 
with young local anthropologists. The advantages of this relationship for the young 
indigenous anthropologist are clear: it is an opportunity to learn about the application 
of anthropology to the study of development from foreign anthropologists. 
 
Anthropologists in development usually work with researchers from various 
disciplines.  Indigenous anthropologists tend to become junior partners in research 
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One of the problems encountered by indigenous anthropologists is that Bangladesh has very poor 
library resources and does not have access to the latest publications which are very expensive to buy 
given the average local level of incomes.  
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teams. As a result, indigenous anthropologists in multi-disciplinary research teams 
typically have to deal with (i) a supervisor, who may not be an anthropologist; and (ii) 
team members, who are not anthropologists either. Moreover, the non-anthropologist 
senior members often dictate the terms of anthropological research. They may 
undermine anthropological viewpoints.  However, in multi-disciplinary situations 
there is a tendency to scale down each individual discipline in order to seek a „fit‟ and 
integrate research findings. This often forces anthropologists into simplistic analysis. 
 
There is considerable scepticism about the contribution of anthropologists to NGO 
research in Bangladesh. Firstly, development professionals are often unsure what 
anthropologists do. Anthropologists are not necessarily familiar with the research 
methods of economists, sociologists, engineers or technologists, or quantitative 
methods more generally. Secondly, the transferability (or relevance) of 
anthropological knowledge of a particular society to other societies remains doubtful 
(Evans 1986:27). Tensions can arise in any multi-disciplinary team. What appears to 
the anthropologist as a large difference in social status, for example, may appear 
insignificant to an economist (Worsely 1971). The resultant situation becomes a 
conflict of perspectives as respective researchers analyze development through 
different research „windows.‟ 
 
In dictating the terms of anthropological research in order to establish the supremacy 
of their respective disciplines, non-anthropologist senior members of research teams 
serve to undermine anthropological theory. This often leads to situations in which 
anthropologists are accused of writing anthropological fictions about societies and 
development. 
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As mentioned earlier, in most cases, managers expect researchers to justify their 
actions and praise the programmes instead of critiquing the project and the NGO.  
Wide gaps persist between the research and the programmes of an NGO. 
Programmers understand the figures, statistics and numbers but not the qualitative 
data. To them, qualitative data represents not much more than anecdotes and case 
studies.   
 
In the case of researchers conducting studies in multidisciplinary teams, the gulf 
between differences in attitude and understanding can lead to confusions on two 
levels. Firstly, within a single report, different chapters and aspects may be written by 
researchers intent on establishing their own discipline‟s supremacy. Secondly, 
researchers must reach a compromise of their own discipline‟s tendencies with those 
of their colleagues‟ disciplines. The outcome is that each of the disciplines becomes 
watered-down and loses its relevance.   
 
6.5.2 The Problem of Managers in Understanding Research 
 
The acceptability of research by NGO managers and practitioners is of crucial 
importance. The acceptability of a researcher, regardless of whether or not s/he is an 
anthropologist, depends to a large extent on how well NGO managers understand 
his/her research and accept the research recommendations. Perhaps, because of the 
lack of research experience, managers develop an “anti-research,” “anti-knowledge” 
and “know-it-all-attitude.” They are apprehensive of research which opens up new 
development questions and tend to ignore critical reports. Managers expect 
researchers to justify their actions and praise programmes, rather than offering 
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critiques and highlighting the negative impacts. The problem is that while many 
managers may be good at the implementation of projects, they are unable to analyse 
issues and innovate.  Managers not only manage projects, but are also involved in the 
continuous process of attempting to solve day to day problems. The ability of 
managers to conduct such analysis may lead them to think that they possess research 
skills.  
 
NGO staff are the managers of the development process. They are highly motivated to 
achieve their project targets. They make great efforts to achieve annual project targets, 
but such project targets may not necessarily fit with the ultimate objectives of the 
project beneficiaries. In the absence of any fora for discussion of such problems, 
managers tend not to have appropriate avenues through which to share their 
experiences. Their experiences are often not retained or recorded. Managers‟ 
experiences are often manifest in authoritative control over their subordinates. In most 
cases, their loyalties lie with their project and organisation. They are not 
„discoverers;‟ rather, they abide by the rules, regulations, procedures and guidelines of 
the projects. Moreover, in development programmes managers not only manage 
projects, but are also involved in continuous processes of problem solving. In using 
their intuition to provide “answers” to problems, managers occasionally conduct 
analysis. Such analysis is rarely in the form of „solutions‟ to problems. 
 
Project staff members desire immediate solutions to their problems. Managers want 
any research be to completed within 15 to 30 day. In reality, even minor qualitative 
studies take at least five to six months to complete. Researchers are often unable to 
provide instant solutions, owing to the time required to identify and analyze problems, 
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as well as to produce reports and recommendations. It is often the case that in the 
managers‟ minds, researchers take too long to complete their studies. By the time 
researchers have identified and analysed the problems and made recommendations, 
managers have already gone ahead with the project, “resolved” the problem and have 
possibly created other new problems. By the time reports are submitted, projects may 
have changed their focus.  Project staff may have changed their priorities and be faced 
with new problems.  It is not easy to disseminate research findings in this 
environment.  
 
The overall problem is that the development mangers are unable to use research 
findings to improve their programmes. Development managers complain that they 
seldom understand the research. Moreover, evaluation reports that aim at improving 
the quality of programmes and projects might not have any relevance to managers. 
They also claim that researchers evaluate projects without having any proper 
understanding of project dynamics. More importantly, managers are often puzzled by 
research findings. The language of researchers, which tends to be highly theoretical, 
abstract, subjective and figurative, is not easily communicated between the different 
levels of programme staff. Managers, rather, rely on modules and instruction manuals 
to run their programmes. Programmers feel comfortable with operations management 
and development management modules rather than debating issues such as institution 
building, capacity development or good governance with researchers. Whilst 
researchers are occupied with conceptualizing development, the programme moves 
ahead without any development theory being employed. The apparent gap between 
the two groups continues to grow. 
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6.6. The Field 
 
Managers conceptualize their project activities in terms of „the field69.‟ The field is a 
project activity that has to be understood experientially within changing contexts, 
where projects are phased-in and phased-out. The continuous phasing-in and phasing- 
 
Photo 5.2: Participatory planning with group members in the field 
 
      Source: BRAC 
 
out of projects changes the context of development. The changing context creates 
spaces for new projects without questioning benefits of old projects to the poor. The 
development context changes with the life cycles of projects. This changing context, 
in relation to project growth, results in the expansion of development spaces linking 
transcultural values to poverty alleviation endeavours. Thus, in „the field,‟ projects are 
evolved from transcultural values such as gender and human rights which seek to 
                                                     
69This is entirely different to what an anthropologist means by the term „the field.‟ The field means 
either different geographical locations, or the notion of “other” (Gupta 1997).   
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engage the poor in the achievement of development goals. Researchers often miss out 
on this point because they participate, in most cases, in the final phase of a project life 
cycle. Without an in-depth knowledge of „the field,‟ researchers evaluating projects 
can create hostility. The hostility that managers show towards researchers relates to 
the notion of „the field.‟ Managers believe that it is not possible to carry out effective 
research without intimate knowledge of „the field.‟ The longer one engages in field 
research, the more one gains experience from participation, allowing one to 
deconstruct theoretical orientations and academic biases. 
 
The idea of „the field‟ creates a boundary between managers and researchers.  On the 
one hand, although managers view development from the inside in their daily 
interactions, they are unable to represent development reality in their reports. On the 
other hand, researchers view development from the outside, but comment on 
development using their own disciplinary biases, which may not reflect manager‟s 
experiences. Managers assess research performances by their exposure to „the field.‟ 
They have three categories of researchers in mind: The first group includes 
experienced researchers who have extensive experience and exposure to „the field,‟ 
allowing them to understand the experiences of managers. The second category 
consists of researchers who locate themselves between the research world and „the 
field.‟ These researchers understand less about „the field,‟ but make a real effort to 
develop an understanding of the projects and inform their theoretical understanding 
with field experience.   
 
The third category includes the majority of researchers, both indigenous and foreign.    
Their ideas tend to be shaped by preconceived notions and theories. Visiting the field 
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with such predetermined ideas may result in tensions. Many researchers with 
positivist ideas fail to capture the learning experiences of managers. Priority is 
sometimes placed on western development theories and assumptions which results in 
a confused analysis of the indigenous development reality.   
 
In most cases, managers ignore researchers or often provide them with information 
which researchers expect to find based on their disciplinary biases. In the words of a 
manager:  “we tolerate consultants and researchers because of donors. It is worse in 
the case of foreign consultants who are like migratory birds hardly understand 
development."   
 
It is a common experience among programmers that consultants and researchers seeks 
only information and use it to write voluminous reports. Researchers look into the 
transcultural values, and not the pathways between “inputs‟ and “outputs.” Thus the 
perceptions of researchers are largely construed the impact of the projects on the poor 
and how the poor have benefited from the projects.   
 
Over the years, hostile attitudes regarding normative experiences of researchers, 
particularly foreign consultants, and the employment of expatriates by the elite NGO 
management, has led to much staff discontent. The mismatch between the positivist 
approach of expatriates and experiential learning of local staff is largely interpreted as 
management inefficiency by the senior management level. A manager remarked, 
"Why should we learn about our problems from Westerners? We have a lot of 
experience in changing women‟s social and economic status, but suddenly researchers 
discover that we are wrong because they have their latest theories about women and 
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poverty." Researchers are usually unable to read the hidden transcripts. They are 
considered "problem creators" and "problem solvers" based on their 
recommendations. Managers are considered "decision-takers" and "decision-makers" 
as a result of their project implementation.  
 
The fact remains that many development managers understand research, and 
similarly, many researchers understand programme realities. Development managers 
possess a wealth of experience, but often fail to make the most of their experience. 
Researchers, in carrying out research and evaluation by observing project outputs and 
impact, tend to ignore the learning experience of managers which shapes the impact 
of the project.      
 
6.7 Strategic Research and Development 
 
Does research matter from the perspective of Bangladeshi NGOs? Do NGOs use 
research findings to improve the quality of their projects? The answer is more often 
negative than positive. When researchers attempt to analyze development processes, 
they may find research tools and methods gained from their academic background to 
be inappropriate. Development research requires experience based on 
interdisciplinary research methods in order to analyze the complexities of 
development. The implication is that researchers invariably end up producing 
strategic research papers instead of giving direct feedback on projects in an effort to 
appease the key stakeholders (viz. donors, NGO managers and the poor)  
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The problem between the researchers and managers cuts deeper than their varied 
exposure to development realities, methodological reorientation and the field. A core 
reason for this divergence could be how the research reports represent the poor and 
poverty in general to the donors. Donors tend to assume that NGO managers carry out 
their work for the good of the poor, but often researchers‟ evaluations of projects can 
subtly challenge the work of the managers. Indigenous researchers, as insiders, are 
more feared than foreign researchers as NGO managers believe that they are more 
likely to discover problems with development programme or local management than 
foreign researchers.   
                     
Strategic development research appears to be problematic for both researchers and 
NGO managers. Some managers make systematic efforts to undermine the 
researchers‟ capacity to understand projects and programmes as ongoing processes.  
Researchers have yet to develop the ability to defend themselves effectively. 
Development research requires experience of interdisciplinary research methods in 
order to analyze the complexities of development. 
 
NGOs expect research to investigate the impact of their projects on poverty. In reality, 
research becomes a strategic tool employed in order to comply with the donors‟ 
paradigm; through their output researchers aim to mirror the donor‟s point of view. 
Unfavourable research output may result in a curtailment of funding. There is thus a 
pressure on researchers to „filter‟ research results in such a way that the organisation 
or project retains donor support.   For example, NGOs desire strategic evaluation 
reports to show the impact of their projects on poverty. Experience suggests that 
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donors use a positive project reports as a pretext to phase out financing or negative 
reports to stop funding.  
 
Moreover, in focusing on mere impact studies, development research ignores an 
important aspect of development knowledge. NGOs have generated new knowledge 
which has become the logical outcome of development intervention. However, there 
has hardly been any attempt to make use of this knowledge; NGOs have neither the 
funds nor the capacity to do so. Another important point is that by conducting 
strategic research, researchers aim to mirror donors‟ thought processes. A research 
report can more accurately be thought of as a representation of local reality within the 
donors‟ paradigm. For example, NGO‟s have helped to create the belief that 
development is possible without government intervention. NGO interventions have 
developed a mentality amongst people in favour of private initiatives, a belief that 
they can achieve the necessary results themselves, instead of depending on the 
government. This aspect is never researched.       
 
The problem of research into project evaluation revolves around the question of the 
effectiveness of the project. However, it is much more important to focus on how 
donors will perceive the project having read the report. Research then becomes a 
strategic tool to win the support of donors, and the issue of poverty elimination 
becomes sidelined. Strategic research tries to respond to transcultural values regarding 
poverty alleviation rather than highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the 
project. A report may highlight a problem in such a positive way that it secures donor 
funding for a few more years. Research reports must primarily satisfy donor agency 
staff, NGO manager as well as government officials.   
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6.8:  Discussion and Reflection 
 
Development research has three dimensions: skills, purpose and negotiation.  
Development research is a new multidisciplinary research area which requires 
innovative skills, tools and methods to capture and gauge the various aspects of 
development. The present problem of researchers is that while they may have 
incorporated research skills from their respective disciplines, they fall short in terms 
of multidisciplinary methods. This may be a potential source of conflict because 
analysing development from a particular academic discipline may not only lead to the 
accusation of bias, but may also invite criticisms from other disciplines and 
development managers.      
 
The premise of development research is its readiness to respond to new the 
development agenda while not  losing the experience gained from the old agenda.  
This  calls for an upgrade of existing skills and also the adoption of new skills in three 
areas. First, research requires an analysis of the new agenda, its issues and concepts in 
order to develop project structures.  Secondly, research skills demand continuous 
feedback to the ongoing projects in order to improve their quality.  Thirdly, research 
skills also require the capture, assessment and measurement of project impact and an 
understanding of the relationship of individual projects to wider society.       
 
Development research often faces dilemmas in determining its purpose. Often the 
intention is to gauge the benefit of projects to the beneficiary,  but expectations of 
research may appear different. Development managers may expect research to praise 
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the quality of their project, while donors often expect confirmation that they have 
funded a good project.     
 
Development research is commissioned after a process of negotiation between donors, 
development practitioners and researchers. The nature of this negotiation often 
demands a strategic research plan yet the success of projects is usually highlighted to 
everyone‟s satisfaction. This is why we find that researchers often fail to provide a 
critique that would  improve the quality of projects.  
 
The next chapter (chapter 7), examines the relationship of BRAC to, and the impact of 
its projects on, wider society. It shows how BRAC interventions have brought 
structural changes in society in which women‟s role and position are critical.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SOCIETY AND VILLAGE ORGANISATION 
 
7.1.  Traditional Social Structure 
 
This chapter examines the processes of social change and conflict in a village life 
influenced by the activities of NGOs. We understand that the development activities 
of BRAC bring changes and transforms social structures and relationships.  However, 
there is scarcity of anthropological studies which reveal how BRAC‟s methods and 
approaches not only change social structures and relationships, but also contribute to 
the emergence of new forms of organisation. We have selected a village in Matlab 
Thana of Comilla district to illustrate this phenomenon. For this purpose, this chapter 
is divided into two parts. The first part discusses three important organisations: 
descent and lineage (bangsha/gusthi), the local socio-juridical institution (samaj) and 
BRAC‟s Village Organisations (VOs). The second part of the chapter examines the 
rise of a new form of matri-focal kinship as a consequence of the impact of VOs on 
the traditional organisations.  
 
PART I: 
 
 7.1.1. Descent and Kinship 
  
In villages, people live in several localities known as paras and each para comprises 
several bari. A bari is a cluster of households (grihisto/khana/hissha) linked through 
 229 
 
kinship. A grihisto is a household which owns land and ensures the supply of food to 
its members throughout the year. Hissha is a household which cannot ensure food to 
its members throughout the year.  These households are bonded, loosely, by several 
descent groups. Often people use two alternate terms, bangsha or gusthi, to refer to 
their descent group. A descent group may spread over several paras. Among the poor, 
the term gusthi is more commonly used than bangsha. In rural life, bangsha and 
gusthi membership are defined according to the individuals' relationship to the actual 
or assumed ancestors‟ gusthi identity.  
  
The social stratification of village descent plays a critical role in determining the 
respective ranks, statuses and identities of people. In general, people divide descent 
into high bangsha Ashraf and low bangsha Atraf.  The high bangsha comprises of 
Sayeed, Sheikh, Pathan, Khondoker, Khan, Kha, etc., and the low bangsha comprises 
of Golam, Mir, Pramanik, Chowdhury, etc.  Sayeed is recognised as the highest rank 
because of the group‟s genealogical connection to the holy Prophet Muhammad. 
Sheikh refers to the Arabian tribes and Pathan indicates the ethnic group of present-
day Pakistan and Afganistan.  These ethnic groups or tribes immigrated to ancient 
Bangladesh at a time when Islamisation (1200-1700) took place (Mannan 2002, 
1990b). In theory, people trace their descent from a founding ancestor, but fail to link 
themselves genealogically to a specific ancestor. At present, one enjoys a higher rank 
if one can establish the external origins of ancestors.  On the contrary, one‟s rank goes 
lower if origin lies in an indigenous group and occupational categories. The bangsha 
categories not only assign and place actors according to social status, but also 
represent accepted norms.  
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Bangsha refers to either the actual or the mythical first ancestor in the distant past, 
with or without drawing a definitive genealogical linkage, and it has a wider 
connotation and meaning than gusthi. Gusthi refers to a recent known ancestor i.e., of 
no more than three generations in the past. For analytical purposes, if we consider 
bangsha to be a lineage, then gusthi may be thought of as a lineage segment. Literally, 
and in practice, gusthi is laden with "patri-bias" connotations, i.e. "bap-er gusthi" 
(father's lineage); although people sometimes refer to "ma-er gusthi" (mother's 
lineage) as well. Gusthi is a term for a group of households or families, all of whom 
are related agnatically, with the exception of in-marrying wives and out-marrying 
daughters (Aziz 1979:14).  Therefore, gusthi can be understood as a localised 
patrilineage segment with which one resides in a peasant homestead (Bertocci 
1984:139). However, gusthi has significant implications on affinal kin and 
connections with less direct emphasis on patrilineage (Arefeen 1986: 65). It is 
therefore necessary to explain the "ma-er gusthi."  
 
Ma-er gusthi does not produce any specific pattern. It depending on the woman's 
lineage connection, i.e., whether she marries endogamously within the same bangsha 
and gusthi or married exogamously. There are three forms of ma-er gusthi. In the first 
form, women are considered to have dual gusthi membership after marriage. Upon 
marriage, Muslim women acquire membership of their husband‟s gusthi, and they 
retain membership of their fathers' gusthi (Aziz 1979:25). This is primarily the result 
of their partial legal entitlement to their parents' and husbands' properties under 
Islamic inheritance law
70
.  In the second form, the affiliation with ma-er gusthi may 
be attributable to bangsha endogamy, when women marry their own patrilineal kin.  
                                                     
70
Islamic inheritance law recognises that females will receive half of their male kin‟s and 1/8th of their 
husband‟s property (Mannan 1990b: 101-106). 
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This demonstrates the importance of kin from the mother's side being linked through 
the ancestor's daughter within the gusthi structure. In the third form, a few families 
have a ghor-jamai (ghor is house and jamai is son-in-law) who moves after marriage 
into the father-in-law's house, but not his lineage.  However, one should be careful not 
to confuse the ghor-jamai phenomenon with the uxorial residence (Arefeen 1986:67). 
Ghor-jamai refers to phenomenon more significant than just the uxorial residence and 
indicates a change in kin group.  In such situations, the son-in-law does not acquire 
the gusthi membership of his wife, but their children acquire loose membership of 
their ma-er gusthi.  
 
People try to identify their gusthi to a man of wealth, respect and renown. Both rich 
and poor kin are recognised by their bangsha and gusthi identities.  All gusthi and 
bangsha relatives whether near or distant, are termed „kin‟ [atmiya-swajan] (Aziz 
1979).  However, in cases of conflict, marriage or alliance making in village politics, 
some kin are excluded in favour of the inclusion of non-kin.  There are constant 
alliance shifts.  If two ancestors, especially two brothers from an earlier generation, 
became economically and politically powerful, then their descendants try to 
emphasise their superiority, by verbally belittling and slandering the founders of other 
gusthis. In some cases  conflict between some members of two descent lines that have 
a common origin may appear and the disputants may be reluctant to recognise 
relatedness to the same gusthi, but  usually people do not deny  others bangsha origin.   
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7.1.2 Samaj 
 
Samaj groups, which are determined by kinship and descent, govern the socio-
juridical functioning of villagers. Each village has one or more samaj which are as old 
as the villages themselves, and involve a number of spatially continuous households 
belonging to one or more patrilineages and kinship groups. The head of a samaj, a 
mature person in the community, is known as the matbar. In addition to the matbar, 
the older members of the community also exert their influence on the decision-making 
of the samaj. Across Bangladesh, samaj is the most visible form of social grouping, 
which interlinks virtually all segments of the peasantry (Adnan 1997:277).  Although 
samaj is built on the lineage structure of bangsha and gusthi, it may include non-kin 
members of the village. In reality, samaj operates as social grouping.  Often, the 
courtyards of mosques, or the bari of the richest person in the village, are the centres 
for organising samaj activities. This acts to give religious leaders power by 
integrating samaj activities with religious activities. The samaj also has a civil society 
role to play in disaster management (such as mitigating flood effects), constructing 
bridges, mosques, schools, etc.   
  
A difficulty in conceptualising the samaj is that it is in a state of continuous flux due 
to new alliance formations. This is the result of dola-doli (factional politics). Dol 
means faction, dola stands for casting a stone with intention to harm others and doli 
refers to the politics between factions. Dola-doli makes samaj faction-ridden.  It takes 
place over a range of issues and events such as precipitating factors, conflict, 
adversaries, politics, divorce, land dispute, illicit sex, religious tension, etc. People 
often form shalish to tone down dola-doli. Shalish is an integral component of samaj. 
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Shalish is an Arabic word meaning arbitrator. Not all tensions and conflicts result in 
shalish formation. Usually, shalish occurs when a sequence of incidents disturbs 
village mores and morals with the anticipation of conflict in the public life of local 
society. It can describe the process of mediation with some emphasis placed on the 
people who mediate or act as shalishkar. Shalish is an indigenous court for dispute 
resolution, as well as for maintaining law and order, local norms and traditions 
(Rahman and Islam 2002:108-150).  
   
It is possible to map out the politics of dola-doli.  A case study is presented below to 
show how an event can spark a series of interactions among actors culminating in 
shalish formation.  . 
 
Diagram 7.1: Politics of dola-doli       
 
 
In diagram 7.1, a large high bangsha Sayeed has produced three gusthis over the 
years.  Gusthi-1 has two samaj: samaj-a and samaj-b headed by Shamim and Hadi 
respectively. Shamim is a bhagina (ZS) of Hadi. Shamim‟s father moved into this 
Gusthi after marrying Shamim‟s mother.  Hadi is a religious and pious person, but 
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Shamim is a rural tout. A tout is a person who may be involved in many fraudulent 
transactions and generates friction, tension and conflict among people from which he 
gains. Gusthi-2 has one samaj, samaj-c headed by Liton. He is a member in union 
parishad (local government) and popular with the poor villagers. His two wealthy 
chacha (FB), Azhu and Mozu are settled and live in the city. They cultivate rural 
connections because of their large inherited landed properties and Liton maintains and 
looks after these properties.  Azad is the head of gusthi-3 consisting of samaj-d from a 
neighbouring village. Azhu of gusthi-2 married Azad‟s sister Khoku. All these gusthis 
have non-kin members whose support is critical in carrying out different activities in 
the villages.    
 
The relationship among these three gusthi can be analysed at two levels. First, all 
samaj have standard norms and nuances, and maintain community cohesion by 
applying collective sanctions. These may restrict individual actions, implicit in 
expressions of affirmation such as shobai bole (everybody says), shobai kore 
(everybody does so) or manshi mondo koy (people speak badly of), etc. (Kotalova 
1993: 41-42). All families in the samaj must be invited as guests to weddings, 
circumcision ceremonies, funerals, community feasts, etc.. Secondly, these samaj may 
enter into conflict, quarrel and rift on any silly matters. In general gusthi-1, gusthi-2 
and gusthi-3 maintain cordial relationships.   
 
Given the above scenario, we witness a sequence of events which leads to the 
formation of Shalish.  The process begins with Khoku.  She came to the village on the 
eve of Eid-ul-Fitr (a religious festival) to distribute zakat (religious tax).  Usually, 
Khoku hands over the zakat money to Liton‟s mother who later distributes it at her 
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discretion. The distribution of zakat enhanced the status of Liton‟s mother, 
particularly among the poor women. Now Shamim, at some point prior to Eid, 
convinced Khoku that Liton‟s mother misappropriated the zakat and favoured 
nepotism.  This accusation incited Khoku and she took the decision to distribute zakat 
by herself.  She came to the village and stayed at Liton‟s house. But this year, instead 
of engaging Liton‟s mother, she took the assistance of Shamim‟s wife in distributing 
zakat. This incident gave Shamim an opportunity to spread the rumour that Khoku no 
longer trusts Liton‟s mother but trusts Shamim‟s wife instead. This rumour lowered 
the status and reputation of Liton‟s mother.  A few days later, an argument broke out 
between Shamim and Liton‟s mother. Liton‟s mother angrily addressed Shamim as 
“bhaza” (impotent).  This remark insulted both impotent Shamim and his wife.  The 
quarrel did not remain confined within two families, but spread to all four samaj 
members.   Meanwhile, Liton‟s mother complained to Mozu to take punitive measures 
against Shamim, but the urbanite Mozu ignored it as a matter of silly village politics.      
 
When Shamim heard that Mozu knew about the incident, he anticipated a potential 
backlash.  Shamim rushed to Khoku and told her a different story.  In Khoku‟s words, 
“Shamim told me that Liton‟s mother requested Mozu to take punitive action against 
Khoku because she distributed zakat without the consent of Liton‟s mother.” Khoku 
again believed Shamim‟s story and became furious. Without discussing the matter 
with Mozu, Khoku angrily teased Mozu‟s wife Sonia questioning her as to who gave 
Mozu the authority to take action against her.  Sonia simply expressed her ignorance, 
but informed her husband.  Meanwhile, both Mozu and Azhu became aware of 
intense allegations involving aftermath politics around zakat.  Lately, Mozu discussed 
the matter with Azhu and requested a moulavi (priest) of village mosque for advice.  
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The village mosque is a central place for politics. This mosque was built at the 
initiative of Hadi and the late father of Liton, but heavily financed by both Azhu and 
Mozu.  
 
The moulavi took immediate action because he was in the payroll of Mozu. The 
moulavi confirmed the incident and Mozu asked him to organise a shalish. Hadi 
opposed Mozu‟s move because he was a village murrabi (elder kin) and felt that 
Mozu should have asked for his permission to initiate shalish.  Hadi‟s interpretation 
was that Mozu tried to insult his elder murrabi by empowering a non-kin moulavi.  
Hadi realised that if shalish was initiated by the moulavi, his own social power and 
status would be undermined on two grounds.  First, the power of the moulavi would 
increase as he maintained a close relationship with Liton. Secondly, although Shamim 
did wrong, Hadi as his mama (MB) ought to protect him.   
 
Meanwhile, the moulavi mobilised the village women in favour of Liton‟s mother. 
The moulavi has access to all women.  According to village tradition, all rich 
households prepare and offer the moulavi breakfast, lunch and dinner in cyclical order 
with a specific food-itinerary.  This gives the moulavi an opportunity to develop 
rapport with wives. This is especially true during lunch, when most of the men were 
not at home, and wives can take counselling from the moulavi.  They chat, discuss and 
share their shukh-dukku (happiness and sorrow).  This rapport of the moulavi with the 
women folk made him trustworthy in the women‟s sphere as a moral leader.     
 
In the meantime, Shamim met Azad of Gusthi-3 and informed him that Mozu initiated 
a shalish resulting from a conflict between Khoku and Liton‟s mother.  Any judgment 
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in favour of Lition‟s mother might stigmatise Khoku‟s and Azad‟s family reputation.  
Azad now supported Hadi, who could protect the dignity of his sister and his own 
family reputation.  
 
As tension mounted, the whole village was polarised and all samaj agreed to form 
shalish for Shamim‟s trial.  They realised that if they became involved in mud 
slinging and slandering each other, their bangsha reputation would be stigmatised. 
However, samaj-a, samaj-b and samaj-d formed an alliance to oppose samaj-c.   In 
shalish, a consensus was built quickly and agreed that Shamim was guilty of two 
wrongs.  He not only insulted his elder and lineage kin, but he also insulted a woman 
of high bangsha.  Shamim admitted to his mistakes and apologised to his cousin 
Liton, who pardoned him on behalf of his mother. Liton‟s mother, a high bangsha 
woman was absent from shalish which took place at the premise of mosque.    
 
The alliance formation also changes with events. In the case of local elections, samaj-
a, samaj -b and samaj–c made an alliance to work for and support Liton‟s victory 
against samaj-d who supported another candidate in the union parishad.  This alliance 
took a new turn, when Liton decided to perform Urs (death celebration) for one of his 
pir (spiritual leader) ancestors. Both samaj-b and samaj-d, under the leadership of the 
moulavi made an alliance to oppose samaj-a and samaj-c who organised the big Urs 
festival. The Moulavi, as an orthodox preacher, believed in religiosity whereas 
devotees of Pirs believe in spirituality and religious plurality.        
 
The dola-doli is part of a broader process of erosion of the gusthi groups which can 
result in the loss of power due to the breakdown of joint families and the simultaneous 
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growth of nuclear families. Other factors having the same effect include the rise of an 
educated class, extended reach of state administration into the heart of villages and 
increased scope for diversified livelihood opportunities for the poor. Such changes 
have brought about an erosion of the traditional structure of loyalties to elders and 
patrons who primarily exercise power through high bangsha status and control over 
lands (Jansen 1987). The weakening of power of the samaj is also associated with the 
(i) declining centrality of land in rural life, (ii) gradual dominance of modern seed-
fertilizer-irrigation technology over traditional modes of ploughing and rain-fed 
cultivation (Alam 2008); and (iii) emergence of women-only associations organized 
by NGOs (Mannan 2005). 
 
  7.1.3 BARC and Village Organisations
71
.   
 
BRAC initiates activities in each area of its operation by mobilizing women through 
the formation  of Village Organisations (Mannan et al.1995a).  Village Organisations 
(VOs) provide the venue for transactions between the poor female beneficiaries and 
BRAC staff. For the first time in their lives, women are mobilized through purely 
female VOs.  More than 90 per cent of BRAC‟s 21 million members are women who 
receive direct benefits such as credit, appropriate technology, education, health 
services, etc. through its various programmes.   
 
VOs are outposts of BRAC‟s organisational outreach wherein peer pressure is applied 
on group members to attend weekly meetings, borrow money and repay weekly 
 
                                                     
71
My narrative on VO formation was developed over a period of six months (Februay-July, 1995). I 
accompanied POs almost daily to various villages, to formulate and organize VOs.
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Photo 7.1: VO Meeting 
 
Source: BRAC 
 
instalments. Village Organisations play a critical role in building the capacity of 
group members to not only to save, but also to enhance their capacities to borrow 
money in increasing amounts from BRAC‟s coffer (Mannan 2009a).  
 
Prior to forming a VO, BRAC establishes a local office and carried out a survey 
within a 10-mile radius to identify the prospective and potential target groups (TG).
72
  
The BRAC then sets a yearly target for POs to form VOs.  The POs act as catalysts, 
playing an instrumental role in VO formation. The ways in which a PO mobilizes a 
VO may have consequences for the subsequent development and continuation of the 
VO.  During the initial phase of intervention, the concern of each PO is to identify the 
TGs and convince them to form and participate in VOs.  It is fair to say that there is 
no single strategy or common formula which may be applied to convince all the poor. 
                                                     
72 
Selection criteria of VO membership dictates that potential members should not own more than 0.50 
acres of land or sell more than 100 days of physical labour in a year. 
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The way staff approach mobilizing women and forming VOs varies greatly according 
to personality, experience, etc.  
 
A successful PO is able to make convincing arguments. The strategies employed vary 
according to situations. When a PO first enters a village, he attracts a crowd around 
him. After observing the villagers, he decides how to deal with their curiosity. A PO 
tries to discover the local people‟s perception of BRAC and whether or not they have 
knowledge of its activities. This helps him to establish a strategy and initiate a 
dialogue, explaining to the villagers what BRAC is all about. In my experience, I 
came across three situations: 
 
 a new area where people have no prior knowledge of BRAC activities; 
 areas where people are aware of BRAC, but know little about it;  
 areas where people are willing to form new VOs due to the trickle down effect 
of an existing BRAC VO. 
 
7.1.3.a  A new area where people have no knowledge of BRAC 
 
When a PO reaches a village, he first tries to identify the poor households. He must 
find persons with whom he can start a dialogue. This may be viewed as a first step 
towards gaining entry. He may settle on a seemingly friendly man, certainly not a 
woman, with whom he can initiate conversation. The approaches vary according to 
age.  If he meets an elderly person, he begins by greeting him politely. If he meets a 
younger person, however, the PO begins by asking after the welfare of his family. 
Local people may also, out of curiosity address the PO with questions such as: Who 
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are you? What do you want? Are you married?  Such questions are advantageous for 
the PO. 
 
When they have become more familiar to one another, the PO usually asks more 
intimate questions of the villagers. These could include: Do you have children? How 
many? Do they attend school? Are they married? The PO usually encourages his 
respondents to narrate their life story, so as to give them the feeling that they are of 
„importance‟ to him. The PO learns from experience that when educated persons 
listen attentively to the life story of the poor, the latter feels good, which in turn may 
lead to him being more forthcoming with information. 
 
When POs visit households, they are usually offered chairs or stools to sit on. As a 
matter of strategy, POs often sit on the floor despite such offers. This may, at first, 
embarrass villagers, but subsequently please them. They are embarrassed to see an 
educated outsider sitting on the floor, but later they are pleased as, in doing so, the 
newcomer avoids establishing social difference. Villagers realise that they do not have 
to worry about arranging stools or chairs, as they would be expected to do for a 
superior.  The PO will sit for hours, chatting about the family‟s well-being and its 
problems. If the problems concern illness, the PO may offer advice about the 
treatment.  If a child comes near, he notices and may see to engage him/her. During 
the conversation, the PO  usually tries to stimulate discussion about exploitative 
relations between poor and rich by invoking a relative sense of deprivation. A typical 
comment may be: "if a rich person visits you, then you will offer him the best of what 
you have in your house, but when you visit the rich, they will g only give you a pira 
(stool) to sit on."  
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Whatever is discussed, the aim of POs is to identify people who can mobilize and 
influence other poor people to join and form a VO. POs try to cultivate fictive kinship 
relationships with the prospective TG. For example, if a PO meets an elderly woman, 
he addresses her as chachi (FBW) and says: "I am like your son. Why are you too shy 
to come in front of your son?"
73
    When a PO talks to male kin, women usually gather 
around and watch from a distance. POs generally avoid women, because in many 
villages people consider it a sin to interact with unknown men dressed in "trousers 
and shirts." Moreover, a direct approach to women will certainly upset the traditional 
norms, resulting in a probable backlash as it violates village customs and religiosity.  
 
Women remain quiet initially, and instead listen with curiosity to discussions between 
their male kin and POs, especially those which occur within the homestead. The PO 
may use various ploys in order to draw the attention of such curious women. One way 
to create communication is to pretend that he is thirsty and request the husband for a 
glass of water.  Having drunk the water, he may loudly praise the freshness of the 
water and the cleanliness of the glass it was brought in.  The purpose of such a ploy is 
to send an indirect message to the wife and communicate with her.   
 
POs initially talk little about the formation of VOs, but make frequent visits to the 
village so as to familiarise themselves with the poor. The PO, gradually introduces the 
idea of VO formation, by pointing out that every other group has its own samity 
(cooperative) except the poor: workers have trade unions; bus and truck drivers have 
drivers' unions; rich bureaucrats have their own associations, while the poor lack 
anything.  
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PO tries to establish fictive kinship wherein the term bhatiza (HBS) is used as a metaphor for son.   
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7.1.3.b People are aware of BRAC   
 
The strategy of POs differs considerably in situations where people have some prior 
knowledge of BRAC.  Even then, POs must be confident that they are initiating 
dialogue with the appropriate people. For example, in searching for prospective TGs, 
we entered a village where we met a man. Owing to our assessment of his debilitating 
health, we initially thought that he might fall within the prospective TG category. A 
PO approached the man by addressing him: 
 
"salaimaliakum chacha! How are you? We are visiting your village to look 
into the general welfare of village folk."  
 
The man, without paying attention to what we were saying, instantly asked us who we 
were and what we wanted. The PO responded, "we are from BRAC and have come to 
observe the locality.” Perhaps he did not believe us and thought we had ulterior 
motives. He asked whether we had come to survey the village in order to help the 
villagers. Instead of giving him a direct answer, the PO asked him:  "where is your 
bari?” and “how many children and brothers do you have?" The man then began, 
enthusiastically, to describe his family and said that his brothers were working in the 
Middle East and remitting money to him. During the course of our conversation, he 
tried, repeatedly, to show his poverty.  The PO then observed, "your cows look 
healthy. How many cows do you have?" The man replied, "I have four cows and one 
calf.”  It dawned on us that he was not particularly poor.   During our conversation 
with him, however, we got a fairly clear picture about the economic situation in the 
village. This, in turn, enabled us to identify poor households. 
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When we approached the occupants of a poor household, we had the impression that 
they were waiting for an NGO to appear and work with them. When we entered a 
bari, they gave us chairs to sit on.  A crowd of more than 15 people gathered, four 
men and the rest women.   
 
The PO started a discussion with the people who come to see us. Most of the queries 
came from two women and an elderly man:  “is BRAC a relief organisation?  If so,  
why does it charge shud (interest)?”  Many fall into this dilemma when they learn that 
BRAC is not a relief organisation.  Such confusion arises because many POs declare 
to villagers, “we provide shahajjo (help) and shohojogita (cooperation).”  The PO 
cautioned me by saying:  "the few talkative persons are certainly not our desired TG. 
The actual TG are those who were silent during our conversation. They seem 
submissive and passive."   
 
They thought of BRAC as primarily a money-lending samity (association). They were 
eager to learn the procedure for receiving loans and financial support from BRAC. 
The more they showed their eagerness, the more the PO moved away from their 
personal interests and tried to dissuade them from thinking of BRAC as merely a 
money-lending agency. The PO later told me that, at this initial stage, it was better not 
to give off the impression that BRAC was a loan-providing organisation.  Any such 
impression could have negative implications for a newly formed VO because people 
suspect any direct approach.  At this stage, the PO thought that the participants should 
think of BRAC as working for the wellbeing of the poor, instead of as just a money 
lending organisation. 
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Most of the assembled persons were quite reluctant to talk to us or reply to our 
queries. They listened silently to the conversation and our explanations of the role of 
BRAC in poverty alleviation.  We felt a distance between us and the silent members 
of the assembled group.  The PO eventually successfully communicated with them, 
without upsetting the others present.  
 
At the outset, the PO asked: "has anyone from BRAC, at Matlab, visited your 
locality?” and "what do you know about BRAC?"  One informant, nodding in the 
affirmative, tried to start a discussion on how soon they could form a samity and 
receive money from BRAC. At this point, the PO reiterated: "we came here to talk to 
you about your circumstances and not whether you are interested in forming a 
samity.” The PO diverted the discussion by asking about family well-being and the 
economic situation of the people present at the meeting. He tried to create a situation 
where the respondents could express their „needs‟.  
  
The PO showed little inclination to directly address BRAC‟s purpose and successes.  
Instead, he talked about the history of BRAC. He asked, "have you heard of 
OTEP?"
74
  The villagers had not. The PO then asked, "have you heard of EPI
75
?" This 
question drew an immediate positive response. He grasped this opportunity, and said, 
"BRAC has been working for them
76
 for the last 20 years."   The PO gradually 
narrowed his discussion to the activities of the RDP. He tried to tell them about 
sericulture and mulberry tree programmes, but they did not show any interest. Next, 
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 Oral Therapy Extension Programme (OTEP) is a synonymous with lobon-gur.  Lobon-gur is a 
traditional method of preparing oral saline used to treat diarrhoea, which BRAC popularised in rural 
areas (Chowdhury and Cash 1996).  The PO did not refer to the term lobon-gur. This was, perhaps, 
because the young PO was not aware of the fact that people were more familiar with lobon-gur 
compared to OTEP. 
75
 EPI stands for Expanded Programme on Immunization. 
76
Emphasis on them (Apnera) and not on the poor!  Apnera, as a respectable form of address, could 
stand for both community and the poor. 
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he talked about poultry rearing. They were interested and asked many questions. The 
PO said, "BRAC supplies foreign hens and ducks." Everyone wanted to hear about 
how they could profit from the rearing of hens and ducks. The PO provided lively, but 
detailed, economic calculations demonstrating the profitability of rearing hens and 
ducks. He added further that: "if one borrows birds from BRAC, BRAC also provides 
medicine." The PO then asked whether they wanted to know more about samity 
formation.  
 
During the conversation, one actor wanted to know if BRAC was like the Socio-
Economic Development Organisation (SEDO) which misappropriated the poor's 
money before it disappeared.  As a response, the PO invited them to visit BRAC 
office at Matlab to observe BRAC‟s activities. He said, "observe us not by talking and 
believing, but by seeing our activities."  One observation I noted was prospective TG 
villagers remained submissive during the discussions, relying too much on village 
elders.  
 
7.1.3.c Trickle down from existing VOs  
 
In many instances, the aspiration on the part of villagers to form VOs, may be seen as 
a trickle down effect of existent VOs. Many prospective TGs are suspicious of 
BRAC's role, and chose not to join VOs initially, but instead wait to observe the 
effects of VO membership. Their initial distrust of BRAC deceases once they realise 
that BRAC remains in the village, providing services. When we suggested to an 
aspiring TG that BRAC, like SEDO, might disappear with their money, she replied: 
"in a neighbouring village, BRAC members deposited Taka 500 in a savings scheme, 
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but BRAC disbursed more than Taka 40,000. How could it be possible for BRAC to 
disappear?”  It is often the initiative of a few village members with knowledge of 
BRAC that leads to the formation of a new VO.  
 
PART II: 
 
7.2.  VO Formation and Dynamics 
 
A VO creates an opportunity for interaction between BRAC staff and the poor. 
Through VO formation, BRAC penetrates the domestic sphere of households. A VO 
is framed according to BRAC's organisational principles, but group members 
participate following local traditions. BRAC recruits and organises the poor in VOs; 
each VO is comprised of 45-50 members who are split into different groups, each of 
which consist of five members. All VOs name their own presidents, secretaries, 
treasurers and group leaders.  
 
The selection of group members may not strictly follow BRAC's official procedures. 
Several factors explain this. Firstly, POs want to be sure that future members have the 
minimum capacity to repay their future loans.  Thus a PO systematically discourages 
the hardcore poor to join VO in anticipation that they will not be able to repay. He 
also allows poor women to mobilise their own social networks to form VO. Women 
usually try to recruit their kin first and only later approach non-kin. This tendency has 
implications. The VO members systematically discourage the hardcore poor, but 
inspire non-TG to become VO member. This helps VO cohesion in the assumption 
that all members have the minimum capacity to repay the loan, whereas the hardcore 
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poor may not have such a capacity.   Thus, it is possible that some hardcore poor may 
be prevented from becoming VO members as a result.  Thirdly, potential TG villagers 
might decide not to join VOs of their own accord.  In other situations, POs may be 
unable to prevent non-TG villagers from joining a VO, since they have to comply 
with the imperatives of local power. 
 
Generally, married women are encouraged to join a VO, while unmarried women are 
discouraged. One argument for such a policy is that the unmarried will likely move 
their husband's home after marriage. Such marital transfer will not only affect the 
function of the VO, but will also create problems in saving and credit transactions.  
This, also, will mean a loss of VO experience that might affect, in the long run, the 
organisation‟s building process.  At the same time, a new bride's presence in a VO is 
not socially desirable. Their participation is actively discouraged because of local 
traditions and the value system. As an informant stated: “new brides do not join VOs. 
Older wives join because they need money to support families”.  
 
After the formation of a VO, the members have to do three things.  Firstly, they have 
to save regularly for three months. Secondly, they must complete the Social 
Awareness Education (SAE) course
77
. Thirdly, they have to attend VO meetings 
regularly, so they may learn about organisational discipline.  The VO meets with them 
once a week for an hour or so, usually in the courtyard of a bari. 
 
The fact that their wives attend the weekly VO meetings irritates some husbands. 
There are several reasons for this.  They may feel pressure when, i) their wives ask for 
                                                     
77 
SAE is merged with Human Right and Legal Education (HRLE) project since 1995 
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money for saving; ii) they are deprived of their wives‟ services while they are away at 
a meeting, especially if prolonged.  This may create pressure on wives since they may 
be accused of neglecting household duties. 
 
During the first three months or so of existence, three trends are evident: (i) some 
group members start to think of the changes occurring in their lives with sense of 
achievement and hope prevails. Their traditional world views are apparently being 
shaken up by VO formation. (ii) Women meet at least once a week, independently of 
males.  As women become more visible, they acquire a new gender identity.  This 
new identity also contributes to the development of a loose gender alliance. BRAC 
makes women visible in the development process and, thus, it is involved in 
transforming local politics.  (iii) They get their first taste of mobility, which was 
previously unknown to them, when they attend and participate in VO activity.  Their 
participation also creates a dilemma, for example, as they are caught between "lozza" 
(shyness) and "sharom" (shame); asha (hope) and akhankha (aspiration).  This 
dilemma can be explained in an informant‟s words: 
 
"to participate in samity, women have to break purdah only to give away 
man-somman (honour-respect) and adob-kaida (etiquette).  Women have to 
break lozza without which they will not get much desired money from 
BRAC." 
 
BRAC‟s initiative to mobilize women sparks off a series of interactions and 
exchanges of opinion among husbands, wives, kin, neighbours, etc. The decision of 
women to join a VO is a collective one, resulting from multiple interactions between 
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husbands, wives and family elders. Decisions are influenced, also, by an intense 
exchange of opinions among the prospective beneficiaries. Most importantly, the 
attraction of access to credit from BRAC influences women to join a VO.  When 
wives approach their husbands for permission to join a VO, they usually give 
permission, as they know from their social and market contacts that BRAC provides 
loans.  So they encourage their wives to join when a VO is established in their 
locality. We enquired of husbands why they allow their wives to join VOs. 
 
 They see many advantages coming from the financial benefits obtained from 
their wives' joining a VO.  When in need of money they usually approach 
local mohazans (money lenders), friends, neighbours, or borrow household 
essentials from shops. It is often quite a humiliating experience to approach 
others for money. If wives borrow money from BRAC as members, it may 
save them the shame of approaching others. 
 
 They feel that under present economic conditions, their incomes are not 
enough to support their families. Thus, additional income from wives seems 
like a good idea. 
 
Husbands may be more enthusiastic than their wives that they join a VO.  The 
opinions of few husbands are given below:   
 
 "I knew that one can get loans from BRAC. I got to know this when three 
officers of BRAC rented my boat for a whole day and they paid me Taka 65."  
This informant with his wife's loan has established a grocery shop. 
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 "I knew how samity works.  A few years ago, I was a member of samity while 
I worked in Dhaka. Lately, I became a hawker of saris and cloth in Matlab. I 
encouraged my wife to join the BRAC samity. With the first loan, I will invest 
the money to expand my existing business. I advised my wife: "samity is like 
twenty people with a one mind. Everyone must act in consensus; otherwise, it 
will cease to operate”. 
 
 “Now I am a rickshaw-van puller.  I wanted a loan to purchase my own van, 
but I lacked capital. I saw an opportunity when I met an unmarried female 
member of a VO, knowing that females have access to the loan scheme. I 
gradually developed a relationship with her and we married. After marriage, 
my wife took out a loan to buy a van.”    
 
Some women are also keen to join a VO.  They see the various opportunities of which 
they could avail themselves. Their aspirations are related, directly, to how soon they 
will receive a loan.  Some remarks of members on this issue are as follow: 
 
 People will say: "if I enrol my name in BRAC, then BRAC will wrap my 
dead body with black cloth and put me into a grave." I pay no attention to 
them and I have enough courage to join BRAC. 
 
 Many said: "BRAC will wrap your dead body with black cloth and put you 
into a grave, but I did not cancel my name. I joined because my husband 
told me to do so.” 
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 "I joined VO because CARE78 could leave any time." So as a security 
measure she joined BRAC.  Now, she has a plan to use the loan money, "I 
am saving because the loan money will be used to provide a dowry for my 
sister's marriage." 
 
There are various reasons why women join a VO.  Some join because they simply see 
the benefits; some join because their neighbours are willing to become VO members; 
and others join because of kinship. Some join knowing what VO does, some join 
blindly; others join having been manipulated by the interested members without 
knowing the purpose of joining. 
 
7.3 VOs, New Sphere and the Rise of Matri-focal Kinship 
 
Before the arrival of BRAC, the only buildings in the village, apart from a mosque 
and a moqtab (primary religious school) are villagers‟ houses. The social and 
religious elite held sway over the poor households.  Being a patriarchal society, males 
exerted influence over the lives of the females. This pattern of social structure begin 
to change as BRAC introduces VOs for poor women.  The poor members term the 
VO as samity.  The presence of BRAC in villages polarises the local power structure. 
 
The changes that have been brought about by BRAC can be illustrated by Diagram 
7.2.   
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 CARE is an international NGO. 
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Diagram 7.2: Structure of VO with respect to other institutions 
 
 
 
 
The emerging situation is that the female-only VO contests with the male biased 
samaj and non-formal primary education (NFPE) school for the children of poor 
households contests with moqtab.      
 
The VO became a new public sphere at the grass-roots level and so created social 
space for interaction and development transaction between the unmarried BRAC staff 
and the married poor women. Once a week, women and BRAC staff sit together in 
open uthan (courtyard) to discuss and make loan transactions.  BRAC staff members 
educate and orient women with new ideas and knowledge. BRAC has structured 
guidelines to follow. On top of this, all women have to memorise 17 promises 
developed by BRAC as a part of its empowerment ideology.  However, the 
empowerment ideology consists of more than “purely symbolic resources and 
arguments, but [also] resources that may be politically invested by the social actors 
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(such as government, or non-government organisations) to particular ends” (Seidel 
and Vidal 1997:59).  It appears that the empowerment ideology is a systematic effort 
to control women‟s lives so that they develop and maintain loyalty to their VO 
(Mannan 2009a).   
 
BRAC‟s empowerment ideology is designed to promote individualism.  The training 
documents and materials
79
 that are used to train women nurture the western notion of 
“being”, “self”, “actor”, “agency,” etc.  Indoctrinated with empowerment ideology, 
the participating women in the VO are careful to avoid communicating with their 
family members who cherish collective identities and hierarchical values. For 
example, BRAC staff inform beneficiaries about human rights and the rights of 
women to divorce their husbands. After listening to a BRAC staff member, an 
informant remarked: "if I listen to what BRAC says, my husband will throw me out of 
the house/divorce me”.  Thus, husbands and male kin of participating women usually 
remain in the dark about the internal dynamics of VOs. Neither male kin nor the 
social and religious elite have access to the affairs of the VO. The approach of not 
informing male kin exposes women to a whole set of religious and cultural criticisms 
as the activities of male BRAC staff with females of the VO are looked upon with 
suspicion  (Mannan 2009b, Mannan et.al. 1994).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
79
 I am grateful to Md Illais, ex-trainer of BRAC, who handed over to me large number of training 
manuals and modules that are used by BRAC between 1980 and 1995.        
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7.3.1 VOs and the Rise of matri-focal Kinship   
 
The samity has implications for the gusthi.  Among poor households, after marriage 
there is a trend to make individual households, as opposed to joint families.  There are 
two patterns.  First, if sons‟ incomes are high, then they, with their wives, separate 
from their parents and establish their individual households.  Second, if sons‟ incomes 
are low or irregular, the parents encourage, or force, sons to make separate households 
with their wives.  In both cases, wives are blamed and are seen as the cause of the 
separation, and thought to bring about a split in the partilineage or gusthi. There are 
several traditional proverbs that make women scapegoats for the division of 
households. Two examples of such traditional sayings are:  
 
Bhai Boro Dhon 
Rokter Bhondon 
Zodi-o Prithak Hoi 
Nari-r Karon 
 
(Brother are 
Related by blood, 
(are) set apart 
by wives) 
Shashuri Morlo Sokale 
Khe-a De-a Ghum Ze-a 
Kadbo Ami Bekele 
 
(I shall first eat and rest, 
But will have to weep   in 
the afternoon  
[Because] my mother-in-law  
died this morning) 
 
Such accusations make wives more submissive. They would like to contribute to the 
cohesiveness of gusthi.  Now samity offers an opportunity to build on kinship ties.  
Women (as wives) participation in samity brings about new opportunities for them to 
contribute to cohesion in their husband‟s bap-er gusthi.  
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In a study of two VO
80
, we found widespread kin ties among its female members.   
 
Diagram 7.3: Matrifocal group 1  
 
 
In Diagram 7.3, ego [1] is a leader of a small group.  Her group members consist of 
her three ja (HyBW) [3, 4, 5].  This membership brings closer all the wives of 
brothers and establishes stronger ties among husband‟s bap-er gusthi.  Ego also 
played a role in recruiting the bhatiza bou (BSW) [2].  This suggests that ego also 
contributed to developing closer interaction with her ma-er gusthi.   
 
Diagram 7.4: Matrifocal group 2 
 
 
In Diagram 7.4, the kinship ties spread over two small groups.  Ego [1] recruits her 
sons‟ wives (puter-bou) [2,4], konna (daughter) [3] and mami (MBW) [7] in her own 
                                                     
80
The kinship genealogy of VO members were collected over a period of two years (1994-96).  Masud 
Rana assisted me in collecting the genealogy.   In constructing the relationship, we first identified ego 
and then traced their kin network in a VO.  
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small group.  Her nonod (HyZ) [5] and ja (HyBW) [6] are members in another small 
group. 
 
Diagram 7.5: Matrifocal group 3 
 
 
In Diagram 7.5, ego [1] is an outsider to the gusthi, but she influences her chachi-
shashuri (HFBW) [2], chachato-ja (HFBSW) [3] and chachato non-nosh (HFBeD) 
[4] to become samity members.  Her role is evaluated positively by her husband‟s 
natal kin.    
 
Diagram 7.6: Matrifocal group 4 
 
In Diagram 7.6, one small group is comprised of ego [1] and her three ja [6,7,8] and 
also chachi shashuri (HFBW) [9]. The other group consists of ego‟s bon (Z) [3], 
sister‟s puter-bou (ZSW) [4, 5] and chachi (FBW) [2]. In this case, ego‟s husband‟s 
bap-er gusthi and her own ma-er gusthi make a powerful alliance in the samity. 
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 Diagram 7.7: Matrifocal group 5 
 
In Diagram 7.7, ego [1] is a leader and divorced. She needs economic support.  
This small group comprised of her ma (M) [2], chachi (FBW) [3], bhabi (eBW) 
[4] and bhatizi-bou (BSW) [5].  
 
Diagram 7.8: Matrifocal group 6 
 
 
 
In Diagram 7.8, ego [1] has recruited her bhatiiza-bou [8] and her nonod (HyZ) 
[2] and two ja [3,4]. Their other atmiya also belong to other small groups. This kin 
are chachi-shashuri (FBW) [5] and her two puter-bou (FBWSW) [6,7]. In this 
case, her husband‟s bap-er gusthi has a powerful presence in the samity.    
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Diagram 7.9: Matrifocal group 7 
 
 
In Diagram 7.9, ego [1] is unmarried. In this group, her bhabi (eBW) [5], fufu (FZ) 
[2], two chachi (FBW) [3,4] became samity members.  It is understood that if ego 
marries out, her membership will continue as her relatives will act as proxy for her. 
 
Diagram 7.10: Matrifocal group 8 
 
 
 
Diagram 7.10 represents two small groups of a VO.  Here ego [1] is again divorced.  
One group comprises of her bhabi (eBW) [2], chachi (FBW) [3] and chachi‟s mother, 
i.e. nani (FBWM) [4] and nana bhai-er bou, i.e, nani (FBWFBW) [5]. Here the 
starting point was the bap-er gusthi, but with the recruitment of chachi, the kinship 
terminology changes to chachi‟s ma-er gusthi.  Now, ego addresses chachi‟s father 
(FBWF) as nana (FBWMF).  In other words, chachi‟s bap-er gusthi is now 
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considered as ego‟s ma-er gusthi81. Thus, the other group is comprised of two nani 
(FBWFBW) [5, 6], and nana‟s natin bou  (FBWFBSSW) [7, 9], nani  (FBWFBWZ) 
[8]. 
 
Diagram 7.11: Matrifocal group 9 
 
 
In diagram 7.11, kinship is spread over three small groups. One group is comprised of 
ego [1], her ma (M) [2], mami (MBW)  (3,4,5). The second group consists of two ja 
(HyBW) [6,7] and non-kin. The third group is comprised of chachi shashuri (HFBW) 
[8] and her three puter-bou (HFBSW) [9,10,11]. 
 
The above case studies on kinship genealogy suggest that women combine different 
categories of relatives in forming VOs.  This relationship is captured in table 7.1 and 
table 7.2.  
 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 establish a new pattern.  In table 7.1, out of 45 women, 20 (39%) 
are affines and 7 (14%) are affines from husbands‟ fathers.  In table 7.2, the 
relationship among ma-er gusthi, i.e., uncles wives become closer. Thus, the VO 
creates a situation which offers close collaboration among sister-in-laws. The pattern 
 
                                                     
81
 The complex Bengali Muslim kinship has not yet been fully studied by anthropologists.   
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Table 7.1: Baper Gusthi 
 
 
 
 Table 7.2: Ma-er Gushi  
 
 
 
shows the rise of matri-focal group within the patrilineage. This is possible because of 
the consensus among male kin to allow their spouses to be member of the VO. The 
new ties are making it possible for women to gain collective bargaining power over 
their male kin and the samaj.  It is also helping women to overcome the cultural 
stigmatisation endured by married women, due to the belief that they cause fissures in 
gusthi ideology.  This exerts social pressure on them to prove that they can play a 
positive role in household.  Kinship ties are visible in the VO and, also, play an 
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important part in disciplining members. However, many non-kin women also see the 
VO as a site for dola-doli among the female members.  As a disgruntled member 
complained, “the Secretary has a lot of atmiya-swajan in the VO.  BRAC staff respect 
her and she manipulates them to distribute most of the spoils among her atmiya-
swajan.  Although we all save regularly and qualify for loans, most of the projects 
benefits go the secretary‟s kin.”    
 
7.4. VO versus Samaj 
 
The formation of „women-only‟ VOs could also be interpreted as an attempt to create 
parallel organisations to the male dominated samaj.   NGO-sponsored “women-only 
groups” has had an impact on the structure and functioning of the samaj as a male-
dominated organisation (Mannan 2005).  I came across several cases, where women‟s 
samity challenged male samaj. For example: 
 
Case 1:  The samaj elders and leaders put pressure on women to 
abandon VO membership on the pretext that BRAC had forced a 
member, in a distant village, to bury her dead infant son in a grave, 
wrapped in black cloth without a janaja (death ritual). The samity 
members discussed the issue and decided to send their male kin to the 
village to check the accuracy of the story about BRAC. They found the 
allegation against the BRAC untrue. This strengthened the women‟s 
position.     
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Case 2: A husband wanted to divorce his wife due to a family feud.  
She was a VO member. The female members of the VO worked 
together to thwart the husband and to persuade him not to divorce her.  
They argued that since the wife‟s loan was used by the husband, he 
was obliged to pay the loan with interest before he could divorce his 
wife.   
 
Case 3: A wife received a house loan with which she constructed a tin 
shed house on her husband‟s property. After some time, the husband 
with consent of the samaj decided to divorce his wife. As a result of 
the divorce, the wife would lose house because it was built on her 
husband‟s property. In this situation she had to continue to repay the 
loan. The women of her VO came to her rescue. They engaged in 
negotiation and exerted a two pronged pressure on the husband. They 
argued if the husband divorced, he would have to repay the loan; if he 
refused, he would have to stay with her. Secondly, after complete 
repayment, he could divorce her. In such situations, the wife may 
dismantle the house constructed with loan money. This indicates that 
the house belongs to the wife, but the property belongs to the husband. 
Under pressure, the husband agreed to defer his decision to divorce his 
wife. Meanwhile, everybody hoped that the couple could minimise the 
differences between them to sustain their family. 
  
Case 4:  Many women believe arguments employed by moulavis and 
murrabis (samaj elders) to be ridiculous. According to them, “by 
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meeting with BRAC bhais (brother) we violate purdah (veil).  
However, when moulavis visit us and talk to us, it is not a violation of 
purdah.” 
       
Once a VO is formed, BRAC staff attitudes change and they behave like patrons. 
Montgomery et.al. view when “middle class and university-educated staff come to 
„instruct‟ the poor about their own „situation of exploitation‟ and „anti-social 
practices‟… without any real participation by the listeners, it seems unlikely that this 
method reverses the patronising tendencies already entrenched in a status-conscious 
and highly stratified society.”   They further add, “certainly, rural people are highly 
critical and sceptical (although not often openly) of lecturing outsiders, whose life-
styles and priorities are so different from their own.  Given the predominance of male 
field staff, the hierarchical interaction between BRAC and its clientele appears (to the 
outsider) even more pronounced in the case of women‟s samitys” (Montgomery et.al. 
1996:158).   
 
As a result, a VO is looked upon with suspicion by the social and religious elite and 
considered a threat to local agnatic ideology.  Men face a dilemma.  On the one hand, 
they encourage their spouses to join samity and on the other hand, the elite exert 
pressure on them to force their wives to leave.  Men see the advantages of the VO, in 
that it means their wives bring economic resources to the household and their children 
will receive an education from NFPE, but they have to rely on elite for various types 
of patronage (Mannan 2005).  This dilemma can be explained from a feminist 
perspective. The VO creates a situation wherein BRAC staff mobilise women from a 
situation of “private patriarchy” controlled by males to that of a “public patriarchy” 
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controlled by NGOs (Townsend et al. 1999: 78-79).  In other words, the lives of 
women become the subject of struggle between capitalist patriarchs and Islamic 
patriarchs. Capitalist patriarchs operate through NGOs and international organisations 
while religious patriarchs operate through traditional social structures, mosques, local 
power structures, etc. (Mannan 2004:312-313).  
 
The rise of matrifocal groups with the formation of VO could be seen as a positive 
development in the life of the poor households.  However, such matri-focal formation 
cannot be sustained without the economic patronage of BRAC‟s economic projects 
and micro-credit schemes.   Matrifocal group is the natural outcome resulting from 
BRAC‟s systematic attempt to transform women into small scale commodity 
producers for its “internal market” (Mannan 2009a).  
 
7.5. Discussion and Reflection 
 
BRAC‟s intervention expedites processes of social transformation. The transformative 
politics of BRAC‟s mobilization of women has gradually led to female-only village 
organizations, evolved historically from traditional hierarchies of rural society. These 
polarise both the traditional structure into samaj, and the women-only village 
organisations and gendered nature of social relationships into male-dominated kinship 
and matrifocal groups. The emergence of women-only groups has had deep 
implications, as women, in many instances, collectively thwart the power and 
decisions of men and samaj.   
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Once the women-only organizations are formed, they began to reconfigure some 
aspects of gender relationship within households, at least in terms of men conceding 
some decision-making power to their wives. Women are empowered, gain bargaining 
power and are able to negotiate with men.  Women‟s graduation to new positions is 
possible with BRAC‟s intervention which partially dislocates them from historically 
evolved social networks and structures, but partially relocates them into BRAC‟s 
emerging network.  This new position of women within the social structure leads 
many to construe that both Islamic patriarchs and BRAC as capitalist patriarchs are 
competing to control the lives of women; neither of them is in a position to fully 
control women. This situation gives rise to confrontation and tension. However, the 
sustenance of VOs at this current stage of development relates to continuous 
patronage from BRAC. This makes BRAC and women-only organization mutually 
dependent on each other.   
 
The VOs are an important innovation of BRAC. One of the main objectives of VOs is 
to mobilize and reorganize women to utilize the micro-credit supplied by BRAC.  The 
next chapter (chapter 8) examines the deep impact of micro-credit on women‟s lives, 
society, culture and impact on traditional notions of money.  
 
  
 267 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
MICRO-CREDIT AND MORALITY OF MONEY 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
“We used to have to run after money; now money runs after us.” 
- A villager 
 
The poor of Bangladesh are distressed borrowers. Their lack of cash in hand shapes 
their behaviour into that of “cash hungry” people.  Prior to the advent of micro-credit, 
the poor did not earn much money. This situation has changed following the supply of 
money to the poor by NGOs.  The NGOs‟ goal of linking the poor to the mainstream 
market economy now brings money to them.  By 2007, NGOs circulated Taka 1,126 
billion ($16 b) to the rural economy, of which BRAC alone disbursed Taka 271 b 
(24%) (CDF 2007:84).  This created an excess supply of money beyond the 
requirements of the local economy.    Some NGOs channel donor‟s money under the 
rubric of micro-credit, a model which views “money as an agent of globalisation and 
modernity” (Roca 2007).  Money flows into the country as either long-term low-
interest loans, or grants which are translated via the banking system into something 
resembling economic, in other words, loans at market-rates of interest   (Elyachar  
2002:498).   
 
The demand for cash and subsequent engagement of the poor in NGO micro-credit 
schemes should be understood in a context in which the local and village economy 
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lacks the organisational capacity to generate sufficient capital to mobilise its own 
resources. Historically there were no rotating credit associations (RCA) or 
organisations like dhikuri in Nepal (Chhetri 1995) that have evolved to serve the cash 
requirements of poor villagers in Bangladesh.
82
 Geertz suggests that RCAs appear in 
societies which are in transition from a traditional agrarian order to an increasingly 
fluid commercial one (Geertz 1962:260-261). The RCA is an association founded 
upon a core number of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund, 
which is then offered, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation (Ardener 
1964:201). However, mohazans (moneylenders) who operate in rural Bangladesh 
satisfy some of the cash requirements of the poor, charging an extremely high rate of 
interest in the process.   
 
This chapter examines how micro-credit schemes foster capitalist values of 
individualism which are in conflict with the traditional hierarchical values of village 
life.  The circulation of money furthers the transformation of a predominantly non-
capitalist agrarian economy toward capitalism.  The non-capitalist village economy 
and culture is decaying, taken over by burgeoning capitalistic values which are yet to 
take full shape. It will also be shown how the notion of money as understood in the 
non-capitalist economy begins to shift. These differing ideas on money relates to how 
it affects individual interests compared to the enduring collective social order (Hamer 
2009:1)  
                                                     
82
An organisation by the name of Rotating Saving and Credit Association (ROSCA)
 
exists in urban 
areas.  ROSCA is a fluid credit organisation, which usually dissolves having operated for a specific 
period. ROSCA members place their trust in a fund manager. This trust is further strengthened when 
the fund manager successfully shuts down the old ROSCA to form a new one. Upon termination of the 
ROSCA, the profits are shared equally among its members. ROSCA allows its members to borrow 
money at an interest rate of 6-10% per month. The sharing of money implies that all ROSCA members 
have equal status compared to other members and enjoy equal shares. No one member can benefit at 
the cost of other members. (Rutherford 1997) In principle, ROSCAs oppose NGOs in the sense that 
NGOs accrue profit towards organisational sustainability from the money they lend to borrowers.  
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In a non-capitalist society, money is used for the specific purpose of embedding the 
economy into society and its moral laws (Parry and Bloch 1989:9). People make 
conscious efforts to control money in order to support the features of the social order, 
the political and ritual exchanges. This control has implications for the reproduction 
of kinship in society (Geschiere 2000:68).  Under capitalism, the money began to 
serve an all-purpose and generalised means of exchange to signify “a sphere of 
„economic‟ relationships which are inherently impersonal, transitory, amoral and 
calculating” (Parry and Bloch 1989:9). Micro-credit has been introduced to promote 
capitalism and market involvement. In this way, it introduces a conceptual revolution 
where the poor can, at least in theory, save money. Money is not only an agent of 
alienation, but also a tool of self-creation. The rationale behind providing micro-credit 
is to help the poor overcome their poverty and their situation of unfair debt with its 
high interest rates. The underlying assumption here is that debt evokes passivity in the 
face of power and credit promotes individual empowerment (Hart 2007:12). Once a 
poor person is linked to micro-credit, he or she is able to have more control over 
money flows and is able to access material rewards “that bring prestige, status, and 
power” (Sillitoe 2006:20).  Indeed, micro-credit justifies the institutions and 
discourses through which empowerment is produced rather than empowering women 
in its own right (Moodie 2008:462).     
 
8.2. Culture and Money 
 
Money has always played a part in the everyday lives of Bangladeshi villagers. In the 
non-capitalist economy, the culture exerts social control over money transactions. 
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Money transactions comply with the notion of „the morality of exchange.‟  In 
traditional society, money expedites a cycle of long term social exchanges concerned 
with the reproduction of the social and cosmic order (Parry and Bloch 1989:2).    The 
social and cosmic universe of Bangladeshi villagers is made up of what people 
frequently refer to as din-dunia (religion-worldly affairs).  Din (religion) represents a 
total way of life (Davies 1988:64). The rules and rituals of Islam govern all worldly 
affairs of dunia such as habits, customs, speech, behaviour, the economy, etc.  Proper 
religious observance of din perfects the affairs of dunia. Din-duniya must be balanced 
in such a way that din encompasses and directs money circulating within dunia. The 
relation of money to din and dunia is complex, but can be understood by looking at 
the role of money in samaj and how money informs the meaning of morality and 
immorality.  
 
8.2.1 Money: Individual, Culture and Samaj 
 
Money is always earned from the market and accumulated by individual effort, but 
many link such efforts to acquisitive activity. Money is itself subject to cultural rules 
in order to sustain the social order.  The social order is based on the samaj wherein 
people share some “world of values and conduct” (Gupta 2006:273). A person is 
always enmeshed in a complex network of family and samaj (Kotalova 1993:191). 
From the perspective of samaj, the relationship between money and culture is 
grounded in two elements.  Firstly, money must serve to signify unity in the 
relationship of atmiya-swajan, that is, “one‟s own people.” For example, it is common 
practice in villages that a person with his earned money purchases land or property 
under his father‟s or brother‟s name.  The purchase of property on behalf of kin is 
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considered a moral act as it solidifies family ties.  Thus, the value of not upsetting 
one‟s own relatives is deep.  According to one male informant, his wife hands over 
loans borrowed from the NGO to his father. To not do so would be considered be-a-
dab (insolent and disrespectful). Secondly, money must also serve to regulate 
individuals and social groups according certain specific norms, mores and codes of 
morality. One can enhance one‟s prestige, honour and power if one spends money on 
social feast, religious events, supporting poor kin, etc. This allows one to go beyond 
individual greed, sharing money to cement relationships among kin and within social 
groups. People share common concerns to discourage individual autonomy in favour 
of customary communal systems (Amin 1997:62). 
 
The redistribution of money as gifts and hospitality enhances one‟s social status and 
rank (Hamer 2009:1, Maurer 2006:19).   The maintenance of rank and prestige relates 
to the maintenance of hierarchical values.  For example, although an elder may smoke 
in front of juniors, juniors are not allowed to smoke in front of the elder. Such an act 
on the part of juniors would be considered be-a-dab behaviour and a waste of money. 
Money for cigarettes could instead be used more productively for family welfare. The 
underlying notion here is that when juniors spend money, they are making narrow 
individualistic decisions; but when an elder spends money, it is for the good of the 
family.   If people see that the growth of individualism disturbs hierarchical values, 
they may claim to not need much money or lead a lavish life, this world being 
temporary. The protecting of hierarchy is also contrasted with the idea that “rich 
people live in cities and are unsocial and inhuman.” The community promotes social 
values that regulate monetary behaviour. The moral code expresses sanctions 
maintaining and reinforcing the status quo (Wanner 2005:516). From a hierarchical 
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point of view, any individual‟s accumulation of money can be the morally indicted for 
obtaining to much goods and wealth. One can then be morally absolved by sharing 
this money with kin and poor in the community.   
 
People‟s behaviour depends on a social network83 for mutual support featuring 
exchange relationships and mutual rights to diverse resources. The social relationships 
of poor households depend particularly on reciprocal support. This helps them to 
manage crises, especially when households require money, food, rice, etc., when they 
seek the support of their kin and neighbours.  An ethnographic study on the relocation 
of poor landless families due to river bank erosion explored the role of women in 
securing and maintaining such social arrangements for mutual aid.  Women 
innovatively use kinship and other ideologies through the practice of uthuli to protect 
their homeless and landless status from impoverishment.  In uthuli, people legitimise 
reciprocity and mutual aid to re-establish themselves rent-free on the land of kin and 
relatives. This is especially true of women who as daughters, sisters or mothers settle 
on their kin‟s land without monetary payment demonstrating the reestablishment of 
their property entitlement disinherited upon marriage (Indra and Buchignani 1997). 
 
Poor rural households have elaborate subsistence strategies and risk minimising 
practices to secure their well-being (Casper n.d.:2). The most common practice is the 
exchange of rice between women to support households in need. Men usually remain 
disinterested in this system of mutual exchange of food. Any rice borrowed is usually 
returned within a day or two. No interest is charged on such exchanges. Similarly, 
millions of rural Bangladeshis are protected from absolute starvation or household 
                                                     
83 
NGOs create an impression of helpless poor who need support as they do not have any social 
networks. 
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dissolution through their reliance on small-scale inter-household exchange, extended 
entitlements and exchange of commodities. Women play an active role in raising 
money for commitments such as dowry payments, buying emergency medicine and 
meeting immediate ceremonial expenses such as death rituals, marriage costs, aikika 
(newborn-naming ceremonies), khatna (circumcision), religious events, etc. They 
consider such practices as an investment in social relationships in the hope of being 
able to access favours in future time of need. They depend on a system of informal 
insurance relationships and associated threats which range in form from social 
isolation to retribution.  
 
8.2.2 Money: Moral or Immoral?   
 
The Bengali terms for money are taka and poisha (banknote and coin).  The word 
taka originates from the Bengali word tonka which means creating noise; poisha is a 
word with Persian roots. People talk about nogod taka (cash in hand) in everyday 
conversation. The possession of nogod taka endows one with khomota (power) to 
show either omaik (humility) or dhamvik (arrogance).  The different meanings and 
evaluations of money transactions depend on whether they serve a moral or immoral 
purpose. 
 
My discussion with a mastan (spiritual bohemian) at a rural shrine illustrates immoral 
aspect of money:  
 
Mastan: Beware of money! 
Me:   What is money? 
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Mastan:   Money is a second god! 
Me:  Who is the first god? 
Mastan: No one has seen the first invisible God. But money is god because it 
nore-chore (creates noise). One has to be very careful of money 
because it makes one happy or unhappy.      
 
The mastan‟s idiom of nore-chore explains the popular adage: “artho shokol onor-
ther mul” (Money is source of all evil).  He observed that those who consider shrines 
to be a source of spiritual sanctuary for wealth, having lost or gained wealth, will visit 
shrines and offer prayers for protection.     
 
Immoral money transactions take place in markets and the public sphere. They are 
disruptive and evil as they can lead to exploitation. This immoral nuance manifests 
itself when money is used as capital accumulation. Money used in this way creates a 
distance between the rich and poor and disrupts kin and social relations. Thus, in this 
context, money appears to be both demeaning and sinful. Many feel that the 
accumulation of money contributes to the rise of commodity fetishism as money 
appears as “a god among commodities” (Roca 2007:320).    
 
Although money, wealth and capital are required for investment in production or 
business enterprise, these all fall into an immoral area, and therefore must be carefully 
dealt with. People  feel the need of religion to minimise immorality as it controls one 
from spending money extravagantly. It is money and wealth which creates fitna 
(quarrel, conflict, unhappiness) and makes people corrupt. A way to reduce fitna is to 
offer daan (donations with religious and cosmic implications). The more one offers 
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daan, the more god protects one from evil‟s influence. The relationship between fitna 
and daan can be explained through the following example. Karim is an extremely rich 
person, but he hardly offers daan.  As he neglects to fulfil his religious obligation and 
duty, fitna begin to affect his family life.  Now his son becomes drug addicted as a 
result of his family‟s extravagant and uncontrolled life. Now Karim spends a lot of 
money to cure his son and unhappiness engulfs his family. Had he practiced daan, 
Allah would protect his son and family from falling into evil‟s trap. 
 
Moral money transactions are outside markets and occur in social relationships. Moral 
money is regularly exchanged in terms of helping one‟s kin, gift exchange, giving to 
the poor, etc. Moral exchange is often subtle as people observe prohibitions based on 
social conventions.  For example, when moving to a new house, people hold milad 
mahfil (religious house-warming events) in order to receive duo-a (blessings) to 
protect their homes from evil spirits. Petty-traders believe in jatra and sell goods to 
their first customers without making a profit. The belief is that the first customer is 
lokkhi
84 
and if such a person does not buy from them, then their business will suffer 
losses. 
 
The moral meaning of money finds its fullest expression in the concept of daan 
(donation)  Daan given to the poor or religious leaders is believed to ensure soab 
(divine blessings) from the almighty Allah (God). Daan is associated with sacrifice 
and the rejection of greed. Daan has a neutralizing effect on an individual‟s effort to 
make a profit and accumulate wealth and demeaning himself with acquiring money. 
Daan also purifies money earned from dubious sources or exploitative means. The 
                                                     
84
 Lokkhi is a Hindu goddess, but Muslim traders use the term to indicate divine blessing against curses. 
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extensive practice of daan enables one to earn soab that brings borkot (divine impact) 
which in turn increases a-ii (income).  It is a commonly held belief that: Taka daan 
korle, bhu-gune borkot hoi (If one gives money in the form of charity, it‟s value will 
increase manifold through divine blessings); or Gorib-derke daan korte hoi, karon 
dhonir takar upur o-dher hoq ache (It is important to donate to the poor; the poor 
have the religious right over the money of the rich). Religious responsibilities are also 
met through the obligatory zakat (religious tax to ensure poor‟s well-being).   
 
Figuratively, donors‟ money grows through daan. This relates to the Islamic belief 
that Allah is the ultimate owner of all wealth. The rich are merely its custodians.  
Allah creates the rich and it is their duty to distribute their surplus wealth for the well-
being of the poor. The rich engage in daan through religious events. In this way daan 
becomes part of the regenerative substance of the cosmic world through an invisible 
long-term process. Daan contributes to the reproduction of the social, ideological and 
cosmic orders. 
 
8.3. Traditional Saving Practice 
 
Bangladesh is the heartland of microfinance, but there is no linguistic equivalent for 
the word “credit” in Bengali.  Karim provides a detail description of traditional credit 
transaction below:   
 
Rural people use the term reen (loan) to speak of credit. In colloquial 
Bengali, the word that comes closest in meaning to credit is a word baki, 
that is, the purchase of goods based on social knowledge and familiarity. 
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The proper translation of baki is the word due. These transactions take 
place in situations where the borrower and the lender know each other; 
they usually involve small sums of money. The lender knows when the 
borrower will receive money, and extends goods based on social 
knowledge.  Another term used to describe a credit relationship is dhaar, 
which means to loan/borrow. Both the giving and receiving of a loan are 
based on the concept of trust and on the social relationship between lender 
and borrower. Traditionally these sorts of transactions do not involve any 
interest on the amount lent. Another related phrase no longer in common 
usage is korjo hashana, which means good work. It refers to the extension 
of loans without interest. In a Muslim society, korjo hashana is considered 
an act of piety (Karim 2010).  
 
Apart from the traditional notion of credit, poor people‟s ideas of money revolve 
around the notions of joma (savings). At the same time, their poverty hardly allows 
them to save from their meagre a-ii. Instead, they always retain nogod (cash) in hand 
or in most cases just keep the money hidden.  For the poor, the concept of a-ii relates 
to working for wages for their patrons through the labour market or from the sale of 
agricultural produce. After meeting kinship obligations, their meagre income must be 
saved in order to meet future contingencies, in order to safeguard the economic 
vulnerability of their households.  
 
In the subsistence village economy, people have the following three contingent 
strategies:  
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i) People hide money, for example, in bamboo poles that are used to support 
the walls of their houses, in small kolosh or ghoti (mud, iron or copper pots or 
jars), within the pages of holy Qu‟ran, in small sacs, etc. These forms of 
saving practices allow people to have instant "cash" when required. Such 
practices do not allow one to accumulate interest on savings.    
 
ii) People invest in capital goods like household materials such as tin-roofing 
sheets, roofing beams, etc (Malony and Ahmed 1998).  
 
iii) People invest in perishable assets such as livestock including hens, birds, 
etc. These investments enable their owners to accumulate cash through the 
breeding of animals or by selling them when needed. Productive animals are 
considered "hidden-cash-in-hand," possessing a high anticipated market value. 
 
Many hold the view these strategies continue to offer a monetary value which can be 
realised when sold or exchanged. To them, these strategies may help them to convert 
assets into cash in times of crisis. The generation of cash from such sources usually 
produces a low return as these have already been used, but it reinforces other 
contingency strategies available to households. A status-conscious person will often 
avoid buying used materials.  
 
8.4.  Micro-credit and Saving 
 
NGO micro-credit schemes flourish in the rural setting. They satisfy immediate and 
urgent cash requirements. In the words of one informant: "the poor need money. As a 
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result, they like the idea of getting an easy loan. They take the loan first and think 
about their decision later”.  Women receive loans from BRAC begin repayment 
before they receive returns from their investment. For projects such as aquaculture, 
vegetable cultivation, rearing cows, etc. they must wait four to eight months for a 
return.  On top of this, as a precondition for loans, women begin depositing money 
weekly in the form of savings long before they receive the benefits of microcredit. 
Proponents of credit never raise the question as to where the money required for 
earlier repayments are to come from. This suggests that women either mobilise 
resources from money saved as contingent strategies as discussed earlier, or from 
other sources. This is because women do not themselves earn the money they deposit. 
So where does this money come from?  
 
Table 8.1: Persons from whom women receive money* 
Category Number Percentage  
Self 4 7% 
Husband 33 61% 
Female Kin (mother, sister, 
etc) 
2 4% 
Male Kin (father, brother, 
etc) 
1 2% 
Relatives 1 2% 
Female Neighbours 11 20% 
Others 2 4% 
Total 54 100% 
*The observation is made prior to two weekly meeting on August 2007.  
 
Table 8.1 suggests that the majority of the women interviewed (61%) received money 
for saving and loan repayment from their husbands. When asked why they provide 
money to their wives, most husbands said they regarded BRAC as a source of cash. 
Men accessed loans through their wives; they were also the ones who ensured 
repayment. NGO credit is highly sought after as no collateral is required. An increase 
in the flow of money into households through their wives‟ participation in micro-
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credit schemes is appreciated, as men‟s incomes are often not sufficient to support 
their families.  
 
8.4.1 Women and Notion of Savings 
 
Many women evaluated their saving experiences with BRAC in a more positive way 
than their credit experiences. The targeted women, having joined BRAC, start to 
exhibit the habit of saving, no matter how small the amount. BRAC introduces two 
types of savings: weekly personal savings and enforced savings. In weekly personal 
savings, members of the village organisation deposit a minimum of Tk. 5 to a 
maximum of Tk.  20 per week. Many group members can save more than Tk.  20, but 
BRAC does not allow or provide for deposits greater than its policy limit in order to 
maintain a steady group-saving pattern. Under enforced savings, group members are 
required to deposit 5 percent of the principal amount of a loan at the time of 
disbursement.  (Mannan 2009a:221). The assumption is that forced savings will 
enable the poor to accumulate tangible and intangible capital, which they can use to 
climb out of poverty. In reality, BRAC does not return enforced savings to individual 
members (RDP Manual 1995).  However, BRAC beneficiaries would like to believe 
that the money deposited for savings is their own
85
. 
 
Many women feel that saving with BRAC protects them from unnecessary spending. 
In the words of one informant, "I can now save money. Previously, I was unable to 
                                                     
85
Over time, when it is realised that they are not entitled to a return on what has been saved, BRAC 
inevitably encounters protest. It is often the case that programme organisers mislead women, assuring 
them that they would be able to withdraw the forced savings after a period of five years.  Since 2006, 
BRAC has changed its policy and now allows women to withdraw their savings (Mannan 2009a).  
Restrictions were relaxed in 2005, and BRAC allowed its members to withdraw the whole of the  
savings amount (BRAC, 2006). 
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Photo 8.1. Women and Microcredit 
 
Source: BRAC 
 
save because I did not have the means; I didn‟t know where to save. Now I know how 
and where to save money." 
 
Once women start to save with BRAC, they construct their own cultural interpretation 
of savings which is sometimes radically different from the economic definition of 
savings. For instance, some consider savings as a-ii (income). This notion of income 
is measured against khoroj-hoi (expenditure). An informant remarked, "if I have cash 
„in hand‟, I end up spending it. I am unable to save as a result. If, however, I could 
save two to three takas regularly, it would accumulate over time. This deposit is my 
income."  Saving is now viewed as a contingency plan, as one informant explained: 
"three weeks ago, I joined BRAC because everyone was joining. BRAC gives taka-
poisha. I can now draw money from BRAC when I need to."  
 
Similarly, a woman said, “we can borrow money when we find ourselves in need." 
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Through loans, wives help their families to achieve economic stability, easing the 
burden on their husbands in the process. In the words of another informant: "my 
husband said we are poor and we need a cow to till the land. So my husband gives me 
money for saving." Savings mutually support income-generating activities which, in 
turn, meet the livelihood requirements of the poor. Moreover, many BRAC members 
consider savings both a source of security.  They observe that value accrues to their 
deposits, which increases their trust in BRAC. One member commented: "I save 
money because I trust BRAC; not because of what people say." Another woman 
offered: "I save money because I trust BRAC. No one can take away my iman 
(faith).”  The poor see advantages in BRAC's micro-credit scheme over that of the 
traditional practice. Many find that it is not safe to keep money in their households, 
owing to the risk of theft. More importantly, when women began to deposit their 
scarce savings with BRAC, they see the act as an "investment" (taka-khatano) since it 
would assure them future access to "cash." This cash in BRAC's jargon is known as 
"credit." By saving Tk. 40 ($0.87) with BRAC, women can now obtain a loan of up to 
Taka 3000 ($ 65).  
 
8.5. Credit and Households 
 
Credit-receiving households exist in a peculiar environment which blends increased 
economic security with cultural vulnerability.
86
  Participation in BRAC's credit and 
saving programme raises the hope of increased access to cash for the poor. They must 
conform to the rules set by BRAC. They understand the shift from traditional saving 
practices to more modern NGO practices. This shift can be thought of as part of the 
                                                     
86
Cultural vulnerability occurs when a household faces criticism for immoral activities which may lead 
to the ostracising, isolation or retribution against its members by the community.   
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first wave of success brought about by micro-credit. People gradually abandon 
traditional types of saving practices in order to divert more money to BRAC's saving 
and credit programmes. The consequence is that people save less money to maintain 
kinship and social relationship networks, saving more in NGO schemes.   
 
The payment of weekly instalments to wives by their husbands is often marked with 
tension between the spouses. Often husbands expect their wives to manage to pay 
weekly instalments on their own accord; wives tend to see it as their husbands‟ 
obligation to ensure repayment. I asked group members about the nature of tensions 
they experienced prior to weekly meetings. The results are given in Table 8.2.     
 
Table 8.2:  Tensions before the weekly payment* 
Tension Number Percentage 
No Tension 2 5 
Increased Tension [sleepless nights, 
quarrelling over money, complaining against 
husbands, failure to collect money for 
repayment, etc] 
6 15 
Quarrels in relation to repayment and 
borrowing money 
14 34 
Physical Assaults 8 20 
Did Not Reply 11 26 
Total 41 100 
*The observation is made prior to two weekly meeting on August 2007.  
 
 
Table 8.2 highlights so-called credit-related tensions, sometimes leading to quarrels 
and physical assaults which are considered new phenomena in the lives of women.  
Conflict arises in several ways when male kin used loans. Firstly, women bear direct 
responsibility for the return of the borrowed money. They must repay these loans in 
weekly instalments. Problems arise when male kin are unable or unwilling to hand 
over the money required for weekly loan instalments and savings. This creates 
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tensions within the family; women feel helpless. When they fail to repay their weekly 
instalments, they face the anger of and humiliation by NGO field workers. Whenever 
women fail to repay instalments, BRAC staff members put pressure on their peer 
groups to ensure repayment. This in turn spreads the tension within peer groups, as 
they are collectively responsible for repaying the loans. Each group member‟s access 
to future credit depends on other members‟ successful repayment of instalments. 
Thus, each woman's liability is, in essence, a joint liability.  Secondly, defaulting 
women may be unable to obtain new loans as expected and face the wrath of male 
relatives. Defaulting women experience unpleasant relations with their husbands and 
male kin, as well their peers. The cost of empowerment can thus make the lives of 
women more miserable than before, even as the family as whole benefits from an 
improvement in its economic condition (Khan 1998). 
 
Control over women‟s loans is not unique to BRAC; a similar situation is seen with 
other NGOs. In the case of Association for Social Advancement (ASA), another 
credit-lending NGO, men have accepted the role of creditors, instead of women, as 
members of the samity (ASA‟s equivalent of the BRAC VO) doing so on practical 
grounds (Rutherford 1995:115). A study of the Grameen Bank also revealed that men 
controlled women‟s loans. Furthermore, it was women who suffered the consequences 
of delayed loans, or loan amounts being lower than expected, due to their fellow 
members‟ unwillingness to approve their loan proposals (Rahman 1996:14).  
 
The saving of money has further implications for gender relations, reconfiguring the 
intra-household status balance between husbands and wives. NGO credit allows 
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women a degree of  symbolic‟ control87 over money. This is a new phenomenon that 
challenges the idea of men controlling money which they earned and had the right to 
spend. Traditionally, it is men who earn money and are symbolized as breadwinners, 
while women are assigned the role of consumers of the income of men.  Women who 
consume are described in terms of negative cultural connotations such sar-khaoary 
(eaters of essence), ha-vhata (rice-hungry), bhata khagar (husband-eaters), jamia khai 
(husband-eaters), etc.  
 
This negative notion is reduced with men depending on women‟s access to money, 
but such a reliance also threatens their sense of manhood. Access to micro-credit sets 
the scene for women to be valued positively within their households as money-
earners.  Moreover, women inevitably begin to develop a profit-making attitude 
(Mannan et al, 1995a) that goes hand in hand with BRAC's own strategy of fostering 
entrepreneurship (Mair and Marti 2007, Zaman 1995). Women‟s new power appears 
as a threat to the patriarchal social structure, leading to controversy within rural 
communities.   
 
8.6  Credit, Culture and Religion 
 
Micro-credit causes several problems. Many people question the source of NGO 
funds. People know that Western donors supply money to BRAC and other NGOs. 
People classify them as Christians, which leads to the formation of conspiracy 
theories questioning why Christians should help poor Muslim women of Bangladesh 
while they kill and rape Muslim women in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia and 
                                                     
87 The „symbolic‟ control of money by women differs from the „real‟ control of loans by male kin.  
Real control is defined as direct managerial oversight over economic activities, from making loan-use 
decisions to the management of proceeds (Goetz 2001:70).    
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support Jews against the Palestinians.  
 
Their suspicions become even stronger when they learn that BRAC receives interest-
free donations from largely Christian donors. BRAC converts these donations into 
credit, charging interest on the loans. This prompts question why BRAC charges 
interest on loans funded through interest-free donations. The expectation is that 
BRAC, as a welfare organisation, should distribute such funds through daan instead 
of credit. It is widely believed that credit itself nurtures anti-religious ideas.  The poor 
raise an ethical question:  Apnera shajjo korte achechen, Shud niben keno? (You 
came to help us, but why are you charging interest?). Taking interest payments from 
the poor is thought to be unethical.  
 
The opposition to interest is rooted in Islam. Traditional practices forbid people from 
charging interest on loans, cash or in kind, as such acts are considered socially 
undesirable and against religious teachings. Interest-free money or material 
transactions reinforce cohesion in social relationships.  Shud refers to any 
predetermined or fixed interest charged on money or goods lent.  The charging of 
interest is viewed as an un-Islamic act as viewed from the perspective of the Qu‟ran 
for three reasons. Firstly, the practise tends to generate greed and selfishness and also 
eliminates human compassion for others. Secondly, it promotes indolence since the 
lender, instead of seeking a return on labour, is inclined to profit from the labour of 
others. Thirdly, it places all the risk on the borrower, leaving lenders with a certain 
gain (Ghazanfar 1981:28). It threatens the social order since the repayment of interest 
(shud) results in less money available for daan. Religious leaders and ordinary people 
are convinced that BRAC‟s micro-credit policy is designed to de-Islamicise the poor; 
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women in particular. De-Islamisation is a process through which the Islamic faith is 
systematically shown as failing, for instance unable to free the poor from exploitation 
and poverty. It is believed that it is easier to convert women
88
 to Christianity once 
they have been de-Islamicised (Mannan 2004). Although not a Christian organisation, 
BRAC is believed to work in the interests of the Christian West. 
 
Furthermore, religious and political leaders reject the supply of money in the form of 
credit, especially if borrowed from Christians which makes it haram (sinful). The 
belief is that using haram money poisons the reproductive power of women, which is 
a complex cultural concept connected to belief in malevolent spirits, as well as to 
biological attributes of female blood. For example, kitchen items like kolosh 
(earthware vessel), hari (earthware cooking pot), etc., are used as metaphors to signify 
the female anatomy. When a daughter becomes a bride and is about to leave her 
father‟s house for her husband‟s house, a new kolosh is filled with rice to symbolise 
the transition from spinster to wife (Kotalova 1993:200). In post-marital copulation, a 
man symbolically supplies the bizz (seeds) of rice, that is, the substance (semen) to fill 
(vora) the reproductive organs of a woman, her metaphorical kolosh or hari. Now, 
when one uses shud earnings to buy food, both male bizz and female kolosh are 
poisoned by the haram money.  Sexual union, men ploughing and sowing bizz into 
the earth (women‟s bodies) will reap a bad harvest (children), giving birth to the devil 
(sudher takai satan jommay). Secondly, women further pollute din as they violate 
purdah to attend NGO meetings. And more exposed to the outside world, they 
become further vulnerable to attack from malevolent spirits like jinn, pori, bhut, etc. 
Thus, women who engage in micro-credit programmes may receive the disdain of 
                                                     
88
 Women are traditionally considered as active bearer of religion 
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wider society? 
 
8.7 Micro-credit and Women  
 
A critical question is: does credit reduce the vulnerability of households or does it 
result in new forms of susceptibility. When money contributes to social relations, such 
transaction are considered moral. The same money, when used to pursue profit, 
demoralizes human relations. In participating in NGO activities, NGO members are 
forced into immoral interaction. Many see micro-credit as representing a double 
immorality: women accept immoral money which in turn is invested by their male kin 
in the immoral market. Double immoralities affect investment decisions in the views 
of many: “taka-poisha is nothing but hater moila (dirty in hand).”  The new practices 
of credit transactions result in the erosion of social relationships and mutual 
obligations. This shift in attitude has negative consequences for traditional networks 
of mutual support, embittering relationships in the process.   
 
Women gradually learn from and gain considerable modern financial knowledge in 
dealing with issues such as loans, credit, investments, repayments, profit, credit-
associated savings as well as more pure savings schemes.  The poor, particularly poor 
women quickly begin to re-define their traditional notions of money. Many women 
begin to separate din from dunia and become disinterested in using micro-credit to 
provide services to their kin and samaj. Nowadays people hold the view that takai 
taka ane (money begets money). Group members' aspirations run high with access to 
credit.  When women join BRAC, they do so with the simple idea of receiving money. 
Once familiar with credit access to money, many women are tempted to borrow 
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money from several NGOs.  For example, 21 women (31 percent) out of 60 informed 
me that they take loans simultaneously from two or more NGOs.  There are several 
reasons. Having joined, as indicated, women face the perpetual pressures of 
repayment from field workers. In order to ensure repayment, many women, instead of 
directly investing the money borrowed, lend money to others, sometimes charging 
exorbitant rates of interest of up to 100% monthly. In the long run, the direct impact 
of money on the credit-receiving poor creates a new category of “touts” and gives rise 
to a new category of mini-moneylenders.     
 
While BRAC‟s credit targets women, it tends to ignore the gendered nature of society 
and the polity. The organisation remains largely unaware of the part that women play 
in their households and traditional relationships. To gender-insensitive NGOs, women 
may be preferred as participants in micro-credit programmes, because: 
 
 "...women are seen to be more reliable and tractable, and are easier for field 
workers to gain access to....tend to be found at home, and are more available 
than men for daytime group meetings as well as visits to monitor loan use and 
repayment" (Goetz and Gupta 1994:6).   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, most of the women members of BRAC‟s credit schemes 
are married; unmarried women are invariably excluded and denied access to credit. In 
the views of BRAC staff, credit discipline would be disrupted if a spinster married as, 
after marriage, she would move away to her husband‟s home. BRAC has learnt from 
experience that men's mobility in the job market, means many become wilful 
defaulters. Furthermore, confronting defaulting men in public may further worsen 
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BRAC‟s relationship with the elite and religious leaders (Mannan et al, 1994).  
 
Photo 8.2: A member counts her money before paying the weekly installment in a VO. 
 
Source: BRAC 
 
Sometimes successful borrowers are encouraged to borrow large amounts which they 
can not manage and become defaulters. Yet many others, to ensure repayment, use the 
loan of one NGO to repay another NGO loan. Some also find that the initial loan from 
the first NGO is not sufficient to meet their capital investment needs and thus, join 
other NGOs. Throughout this whole process, they are under the constant threat of 
defaulting. In a case study, Huq (2004) provides the tale of a Bangladeshi woman who 
became trapped by financial arrangements with RDRS, the Grameen Bank, CARE 
International and BRAC. Each NGO develops protective mechanisms to deal with 
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defaulters so as to provide the means for ensuring loan repayments
89
. BRAC even 
employs programme organizers whose main task is to locate the defaulters and 
threaten them with litigation and to recover the money through formal legal 
mechanisms.    
 
One study argues that micro-credit introduces a paradox as beneficiaries tend to 
default having achieved improved income and wealth, or higher education levels for 
their children (Chowdhury 1992:335-6). First-time borrowers tend to keep up with 
repayments, and only after repeated borrowing do they become defaulters (Rahman 
1999; Yaqub 1995:9).  The process through which one becomes a defaulter occurs 
over a period of four years or so; this is rooted in the process of sustainability of 
BRAC. Sustainability depends on a continuous transfer of the risk of investment to 
the beneficiaries; In the process of transferring risk, the amount accrues a capital 
surplus. Table 8.3 shows the profit-risk transfer mechanism to describe who gets 
what. 
  
Table 8.3: Risk-Profit Mechanism 
Timeframe BRAC Group Members 
First Year Risk Profit 
Second Year Risk-Profit Profit-Risk 
Third Year Profit Risk 
Fourth Year Capital Accumulation Vulnerable 
Source: Mannan (2009a:225) 
 
                                                     
89 
There are policies among NGOs to discourage beneficiaries from taking loans from other NGOs. It 
is, however, a difficult task for NGO staff to ensure that no-one takes loans from other NGOs as they 
always seek to operate in different villages. Operational boundaries between various NGOs become 
blurred in the high-density settlement patterns which characterise the countryside, even though such 
separation was not always evident in practice (Montgomery et al. 1996:125).  
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The profit-risk-profit-risk mechanism
90
, if placed in perspective, opens an interesting 
dimension of economic dependency between both BRAC and its beneficiaries as each 
party is perpetually locked into an economic transaction relationship. In the first year, 
when members borrow money, capital remains at risk for BRAC, while group 
members consider it as profit. In a distress situation, poor people consider any amount 
of cash in hand as profit. In the popular perception, the investment of BRAC is seen 
as risk. As one informant remarks, “I have taken a loan of Tk. 2000, but in my village 
there are two hundred group members. These members have borrowed more than Tk. 
500,000. It is therefore in BRAC‟s interest to work with us rather than for us to work 
with BRAC.” These comments should be viewed with the understanding that BRAC 
cannot withdraw its activities from localities once it invests and circulates money as 
loans to its group members. Until the end of the first-year loan cycle, when BRAC 
realises the full loan with interest, its capital remains at risk. (Mannan 2009a:225) 
 
BRAC‟s risk is gradually reduced as new borrowers understand the logic of savings 
and credit operations. Village organisations play an instrumental role in orienting and 
familiarising members with BRAC‟s philosophy of credit transactions through an 
indoctrination in the ideology of empowerment. The empowerment ideology 
emphasises the exploitation of the poor by the traditional structure (Desh, Kal, Samaj  
1990; Mannan, et.al. 1995a), but it does not explain to the poor how neoliberal market 
orthodoxy creates a new form of discrimination and inequality. BRAC‟s 
empowerment may be a case of making women visible without power to further the 
entrenchment of microcredit ideology (Fernando, 2006b).  
 
                                                     
90
 For a detailed discussion of profit-risk-profit-risk mechanism see Mannan (2009:224-227)  
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In this way, empowerment embraces a political economy that uses the culture of 
shame
91
 in a subtle way to exert pressure on women to repay the borrowed money to 
NGOs and required to ensure regularities for credit transation (Karim 2008).  Lamia 
Karim explains that NGOs appropriate these notions of rural women‟s honour and 
shame toward their loan recovery program. Loan recovery methods deployed by 
NGOs used public shaming as a form of social control. That is, if one is unable to pay, 
the NGOs have the power to shame that person in public to make one lose face. 
Women who were unable to pay their loans on time were often publicly humiliated, or 
threatened with public humiliation, both of which acted as a form of discipline in their 
lives. The NGO instrumentally deploys various forms of shaming in its own capitalist 
welfare, i.e., the recovery of loans. NGOs have governmentalised the concept of 
shame to guide the conduct of rural people toward certain ends (Karim 2010).   
 
The risk of capital becomes smaller in the second year for BRAC with the acceptance 
of follow-up loans by group members. Now the poor want to obtain further loans and 
engage themselves more with BRAC‟s project activities. The situation remains “risk-
profit” for BRAC, but the second loan becomes a “profit-risk” situation for members 
as they become entrapped in the second loan.  Borrowers gradually are forced to 
                                                     
91“In rural Bangladesh, men and women use the terms honour/faith (maan/imaan) and shame 
(lajja/sharm) in their daily discourse. The notions of honour/shame are gender-specific and denote 
subtle social hierarchies in the community. Women exhibit shame (lajja/sharm) and men possess 
honour/respect (maan/shamman). Women speak of their honour in terms of possessing shame. Shame 
is considered a desirable attribute because it regulates conduct, and prevents members from breaking 
the norms of rural society. This is particularly true for women.  The terms for honour denote masculine 
values, and they signify one‟s ability to protect the patriline, family, and one‟s women from dishonour. 
 In speaking to outsiders, women and men often invoke these terms to describe their essential 
humanity, goodness, and faith as Muslims.  The poor may be poor but they more favoured by Allah 
because of their piety, humanity, and honour. Moreover, the poor keep their word; they do not break 
their covenant with Allah. Implicit in these discourses of spirituality is the embedded notion of class, 
and a reference to the lack of entitlements due to poverty” (Karim 2010).  
 
 294 
 
surrender the freedom to manage their domestic economy and social life to the NGOs 
(Fernando 2006a).  
 
In the third year, BRAC profits as members accept a third loan, but the loan itself 
creates a risky situation for the large numbers of members in a highly imperfect 
market. BRAC‟s capital is protected in the third year when about 10 percent of 
borrowers reach a stage of critical mass. This occurs when borrowers have joined 
BRAC “more than two and a half years ago, and have taken cumulative loans to the 
value of Tk. 7,500 or more” (Mustafa et.al. 1996:34). Sustaining the BRAC model 
depends in large part on how it maintains the equilibrium between this critical mass 
and the size of village organisation. In 1991, BRAC calculated that a branch office 
becomes financially viable when it circulates money amounting to Tk. 7 million 
($175,000) (BRAC 1991). 
 
In the fourth year, BRAC continues to accumulate capital, but the amount of 
profitability depends on the cycle of the rise and fall of households in reaching the 
critical mass. Critical mass is also an important stage because not only do significant 
numbers of households fail to reach this stage, many households also show a decline 
after attaining critical mass once they borrow amounts in excess of Tk. 7,500 
(Mannan 2009a:226-227). The process of participation in village organisations leaves 
many group members vulnerable, and BRAC periodically expels the defaulting 
members. For example, BRAC has expelled 102,814 (16 percent) of defaulting 
members (BRAC 1992b:15). 
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Credit creates what could be thought of as a trap. On the one hand, women discard 
traditional saving practices in favour of borrowing (that is, credit) money from NGOs.  
Thus, the viability of traditional sources is eroded. On the other hand, borrowing fails 
to create a sustainable source of income
92
 owing to the problems associated with a 
rural market economy vulnerable to employment problems (unemployment, seasonal 
employment) and natural disasters (floods, droughts, cold spells). The uncertain 
returns on investment also create cash flow problems which prevent making secure 
profits. Overall, microfinance organisations create and structure savings and credit 
services in ways that help them to gain control, not only over the borrowers‟ 
resources, but also over their life-worlds (Lont and Hospes 2004:13). It is a matter of 
debate whether credit accrues benefits or mires the poor borrowers in debt (Rahman 
2004). The credit-lending arrangements create a new kind of female dependence, 
imposing loan responsibilities on women without extending to them any real control 
over the lending process (Rahman 1996:15).   
 
8.8. Multiple morality: causing debate on moral and immoral money 
  
NGOs effort to develop social capital focuses on protecting micro-credit and money at 
the expense of culture and community. This approach fragmentises the historically 
evolved composite morality which infuses Islamic and Bengali views of money. 
Micro-credit works to separate „money as economic phenomenon‟ from „money as 
social and religious phenomenon.‟  In this new equation, Islamic morality discourages 
shud and Bengali morality emphasises the collective control of money, while 
capitalistic micro-credit morality promotes individualism.  Fearful of this separation, 
                                                     
92 
There is a huge debate on questions of sustainability. Two recent studies reject the claim of pro-NGO 
studies which confirms sustainability (Ahmad 2007, Ullah, A.K.M. and Routray, J K. 2007). 
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many frequently express the view that “this world is for a few days; so avoid being 
lured by excess money.” These moralities, instead of offering clear pattern, 
complement each other at some points and oppose each other at others. Monetary 
forms of exchange per se trigger confusions over moral obligations. This happens in 
large part due to the transformative power of money which reinterprets mutual 
obligations of individuals to one other. 
 
The fragmentation also brings a lack of shared understanding on morality and is 
closely linked to the contrasting global and local cultural characteristics of the 
meaning of money and credit. At the same time, both the processes of fragmentation 
of composite morality and the emerging micro-credit empowerment ideology have 
contributed to the rise of multiple moralities, with often weak understanding and 
interpretation. Microcredit contributes to the rise of competing visions of morality 
present at any one time, which again depends on the social and economic position of 
persons in hierarchy and how they interpret and use money. The outcome is the rise of 
“different understandings of morality and the variety of cultural practices that 
interconnect with moral imperatives” (Wanner 2005:516).    
 
The introduction of money into rural societies engenders a particular devaluation and 
destruction of indigenous orders (Köhler 2005:43). Money devalues the indigenous 
order and carries the seeds of alienation with the potential to threaten the moral order 
(Parry and Bloch 1989:3-6).   Micro-credit systematically causes erosion in the 
traditional knowledge of money and monetary behaviour of the poor. In the process, 
two opposite interpretations occur. On the one hand, many people try to define money 
with their traditional understandings and notions. On the other hand, many newly 
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experience individualism, but unable to shun the older relationships, use the newly 
acquired knowledge of money to redefine tradition. Furthermore many people 
confusedly use these two opposite interpretations to suit their own purposes. It is no 
longer possible to assume that money is subjected to the moral law of society due to 
the existence of multiple moralities. Micro-credit fosters capitalism which sharply 
polarises moral and immoral uses of money.   Moral credit manifests itself when 
NGOs supply money to the poor to fulfil their immediate cash requirements, resulting 
in short-term economic transactions and immediate material well-being and food 
security. The poor endorse moral credit, and usually do not raise questions when they 
benefit from short-term economic transactions.  
 
8.9.  Women‟s new position in social structure and miskin 
 
The changing roles of women induced by micro-credit also contribute to the rise of 
multiple moralities. Money, retaining its impersonal values, moves between people 
who might not even know each other (Hart 2007:12; Morris-Reich 2003:135; Simmel 
1978). Village women leave their private spheres to engage in economic transactions 
with NGO staff, strangers to local society (see chap 9, section 9.4.5).   In such 
transactions, many people often remark that they “do not see any moral values (mullo-
bhod), but rather see more capital (mull-dhon).” This sort of money transaction 
consequently engenders alienation, detachment and impersonal relations whose 
origins lie beyond one‟s control (Hart 2007:13).     
 
Micro-credit results in a strong feeling amongst women that they granted equal status 
as a result of this new access to money. At the same time, they would admit that 
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everything seemed to be changing so rapidly that nothing lasts (Hamer 2009:7). The 
aspiration to acquire additional wealth might thus disappear as quickly as it was 
acquired. As is often heard, “dhoni hoiwer jonno taka anlam; kinto shuk chole gelo” 
(I accepted money to become rich, but now happiness has disappeared). However, the 
equalizing effects on households do not rule out the possibility of hierarchical power 
relations within the households (Sillitoe 2006:20). It is often the case that micro-credit 
subtly threatens male elders‟ authority in rural hierarchy. Male elders usually control 
the decision-making regarding women‟s loans; women come to learn that loan money 
is theirs individually and over which they reserve the right to make spending 
decisions. The problem is that loans given to individual women are expected to be 
utilised for the collective good. On many occasions, these tensions brew within 
households as exemplified below:    
 
Case 1: A son asked his mother to let him have control over her loan money. 
The mother agrees to this, but she tells the son that he would be responsible to 
repay the money and interest. The son became infuriated at her immoral 
demand concerning interest payments on the amount. The mother, as a result 
was forced to explain to her son that she was obligated to repay the money 
with interest to the NGO she borrowed from.  
 
Case 2:  A young man asked his elder brother for financial support in the form 
of the elder brother‟s wife‟s NGO loan. The elder brother agreed, and asked 
the younger brother to repay the loan with interest. Again, the young man was 
outraged at his brother‟s sinful demand for interest on the amount.    
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The issue of immorality and morality involving micro-credit is closely linked to the 
fact that it marginalises male kin who occasionally overreact to issues of women‟s 
empowerment. In the words of a woman who disagreed with this male opposition to 
micro-credit, mainshe koi hala; amar jonno bhala (people tells me it‟s bad, but I 
know it is good for me). Although this remark contains an element of empowerment, 
many interpret such empowerment as a shift from traditional relationships of trust 
between men and women to trust placed on NGOs by women.            
 
The elite oppose women‟s transactions as they fear losing their social control over 
women made independent through access to NGO resources (Mannan 2005). The 
control over subaltern classes is essential for the maintenance of hierarchical political 
orders because “those with power must have some hold over the livelihoods of others, 
controlling access to land and/or capital, and opportunities for labour” (Sillitoe 
2006:18).  As many elite feel they are losing control, their priorities are shifted to 
daan in the form of support to religious institutions and actors. This creates a 
vulnerable situation for many poor women and their households as they are deprived 
of financial support from the elite in times of need. Many women do not endorse the 
changing attitude of elites as expressed in following opinions:   
 
 “Before the rich used to support us and donate to their poor kin and neighbours. 
Now they donate to mosques to enhance their religious status. Before they were 
doi-a-lu (kind person); now they are dharmic (religious).”      
 “They stopped giving daan and zakat …..Now they donate more to mosques and 
contribute to religious events and functions. We hardly receive any of the spoils.”  
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 “Many people are reluctant to offer dan to us. They think that we are better off 
and affluent because of micro-credit and thus require no support. It is true that 
NGO credit has made us miskin.
93
 We are like “vhora kolshi vhora na; khali 
kholsi khali na” (Full vessels which are not full; empty vessels which are not 
empty).” 
 
The broader picture remains that micro-credit did not do much to improve the 
economic well-being of women to any significant extent (Mannan 2009a). Instead it 
released the elite from their religious and social obligations to help the poor and 
women in need. While depriving one‟s kin and the poor from daan and zakat is 
immoral, this immorality is made moral through donations to mosques and religious 
events. This also implies that the obligation to support poor kin is fading in relation to 
new obligations toward religion.     
 
8.10  Individualism vs Collectivism 
 
Micro-credit has brought about two important changes. Firstly, it promotes 
individualism with changing roles for women and men, but does not challenge the 
hierarchy itself. Secondly, short-term economic transactions may reduce the 
vulnerability of households, but it does not alleviate poverty per se (Morduch 1998a). 
These changes are new phenomena, and people remain unsure as to how to deal with 
these new experiences. As people begin to realise the consequences of economic 
exchanges which fail to change poverty status, they start to explain money in terms of 
immorality. Overall, money is instrumental in objectifying and depersonalising social 
                                                     
93 
Miskin is a category of the poor whose social status bars them from begging or requesting donations 
even though they may be in desperate need of financial help.  
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relations by bringing about a decrease in interpersonal dependency and an increase in 
the differentiation of people (Simmel 1978). It creates greater individualism, while at 
the same time, participants, as members of VOs are locked into circles of trust, 
enforced by group peer pressure. People‟s reactions are related to the de-personalising 
of social relations, which occurs when there is a shift from hierarchical values, 
embedded in the social person, to economic individualism. The rise of individualism 
also means the emergence of selfish behaviour at the expense of cherished collective 
notions of co-operation (Uphoff 1996:342).  
 
The effect of individualism is that the rich emphasise cultivating relationships with 
immediate kin and family while showing an increasing reluctance to fulfil obligations 
toward poor kin embedded in social collectivity. The basis for this loose obligation is 
related to the fact that people increasingly use money for individual consumption. 
They develop a fascination for material goods as well as reinforce the practice of 
monitoring what other people have acquired (Wanner 2005:520).   
 
The crux of the problem is that NGOs reproduce local knowledge like traditional trust 
relations and samaj collectivity in VOs in which they use peer group pressure to 
popularise and protect micro-credit schemes. This use of peer groups is designed to 
promote individualism, but NGOs remain unaware that they use people‟s culture 
against people‟s collectivity. In the long run, this fragmentation of collective 
behaviour fragments affects the practise of micro-credit and the micro-finance 
institutions themselves
94
.  
 
                                                     
94 
Many NGOs disappear, but there are hardly any studies on this phenomenon.    
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8. 11:  Discussion and Reflection 
 
People deal with money in different ways, but their existing world views give “rise to 
particular ways of representing money” (Parry and Bloch 1989:19). The world view 
of the non-capitalist village society begins to change under the influence of 
capitalism, a situation where money is one of the important instruments through 
which transitional capitalism overcomes local cultures (Roca 2007:320). The 
implication of micro-credit on the local economy is that it spreads commodity 
fetishism in different ways, resulting in myriad beliefs about money bringing peace 
and prosperity to the poor.    
 
People assume that community and kinship would act morally to contain micro-credit, 
but in reality money leads to a precarious struggle. New suspicions and tensions 
emerge precisely because the nature of money as a generalised means of exchange 
makes it so difficult to control (Geschiere 2000:59).  Money is more and more a 
symbol of economic value for exchangeable objects (Morris-Reich 2003:135, Simmel 
1978:127). Money emerges as too powerful, as reflected in the common saying: “one 
can buy tiger‟s milk with money.”     
 
Micro-credit starts a process which results in the fragmentation of the coherent nature 
of village morality. This occurs as micro-credit serves to separate cultural, social and 
cosmic orders from the economy via the market. Monetary forms of exchange begin 
to dominate relations.  They create two problems. While households‟ increasing 
engagement with money transactions reduces their reliance on traditional social 
networks of solidarity and economic arrangement, money fails to promote alternate 
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forms of social integration and moral obligations. The consequences are felt in many 
spheres and people find themselves caught in a trap between personal and impersonal 
money transactions.  Micro-credit proponents, without realising how money causes 
social and cultural problems, try to develop a shared consensus among borrowers in 
order to protect the system. If they did not do so, the success of micro-credit would be 
jeopardized.   
 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 showed how a polarisation takes place in both values and 
organisations of society and culture. As society is transformed, people begin to 
redefine the emerging values. This has spill-over effects on politics. The next chapter  
(chapter 9) examines the politics of NGOs and Islamists.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
BRAC AND THE MAKING OF RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION 
 
9.1.  Introduction 
 
NGOs have always found it difficult to understand the transformative culture of 
Bangladesh and the processes of social change.  This chapter explains how social 
transformation has created a situation which forces confrontation between the NGO 
community and Islamic groups/organisations. These clashes in turn, provide religious 
leaders with the opportunity to emerge as spokesmen for the disgruntled poor and also 
for the rural elite who oppose NGOs.  As a result of such clashes, in 1993 NGOs 
faced serious challenges for the first time, from not only Islamic groups, but also from 
wider society.  
 
The conflict is between two points of view. On the one hand NGOs, which want to 
further their development agendas, believing them to be of benefit to the poor, and on 
the other hand, the religious leaders, who see the NGOs as a threat to the legitimacy 
of Islam.   NGOs try to present themselves as a force for democracy and 
modernization by opposing Islam (Seabrook 2001).  The NGO approach to 
development is interpreted by some Muslims as an effort to “de-Islamise” poor men 
and women.   The de-Islamisation is a process that seeks to undermine the Islamic 
faith, belief, values, etc. of poor men and women by arguing that Islam cannot free 
them from either exploitation or their abject poverty.   
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Photo 9.1: Violence by Islamists    
 
Source: Star Weekly Magazine. Volume 7 Issue 16. April 18, 2008.  
  
The conflict has been seen as a „defining moment‟, or „turning point‟ in the evolution 
of the NGO movement in Bangladesh. Despite this, hardly anyone engaged in 
systematic research to capture the conflict process. Exceptions included an in-depth 
research study (Mannan et al. 1994) and three short rapid assessment studies by 
BRAC (Karim et al. 1994; Kalam et al.1994; TD 1994) addressing why its group 
members did not protest in support of BRAC, but rather extended their moral support 
to religious leaders. BRAC circulated these reports to selected donors and diplomats, 
but deliberately did not share findings with leaders of other NGOs
95
.  This chapter is 
built on my direct experience while conducting participatory research into the origin 
of the conflict and actively participating in mobilising NGOs in response. I have 
previously narrated my engagement in understanding the conflict (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.3.1).  Discussions of these events was widespread among the NGO 
community and widely circulated in communication media such as radio, television, 
daily newspapers, weekly magazines, posters, pamphlets, etc. This conflict featured 
rhetoric, propaganda and counter-propaganda all of which shaped a „phoney war.‟   
 
                                                     
95
BRAC assumed that NGO leaders might misinterpret research findings on religious backlash on 
BRAC and use these reports for political purpose.   
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The backlash against the NGOs in the winter of 1993 did not emerge suddenly; the 
environment was already disturbed by three events, which provoked the Islamic 
sentiment.  The first was related to the unpopular feminist and apostate Taslima 
Nasreen, who systematically defamed Islam and the Prophet Muhammad
96
.  The 
second was the accusation by the government that many NGOs were converting 
people to Christianity (Ishtiaque and Mannan 1992).  The third was the rise of 
orthodox Islam against the Islamic sect Ahmedia, who were declared to be kafir 
(sinners). 
 
9.2 Context of Conflict 
 
The grounds on which BRAC was opposed were very carefully prepared. The 
religious elite first published a fabricated story in the weekly Islamic magazine 
Shaptahik Muslim Jahan in June, 1993. The story asserted incorrectly, that BRAC had 
wrapped the corpse of a VO member's child in a “black cloth”97 and buried him. This 
story was subsequently picked up by many moulavis (priests) who took the story at 
face value. At the time, BRAC staff failed to take into account that this was the 
beginning of an inevitable conflict.  In October 1993, the monthly Islamic magazine 
Jago Mujahid published a similar story. The crisis was further aggravated after the 
publication of the following fictitious story in the Dainik Inquilab
98
 on 24th 
November, 1993: “Allah na Apa?”  
 
                                                     
96
I heard in numerous waaz mahfils in which moulavis brought a particular allegation against Taslima 
Nasreen and BBC.  They accused that Taslima during interview with BBC not only touched the holy 
Qu‟ran without ablution, but also opened pages of the holy book while she was smoking cigarette.  
Thus, they interpreted it as a ploy of BBC to pollute Islam and encourage infidels.           
97See section 9.5 for explanation of symbolic meaning of “black cloth.”   
98 
The daily Inquilab is owned by an Islamic organisation.  The Inquilab  has been hostile towards 
BRAC since its loss of a large business tender to BRAC Printers for the publication of an annual 
calendar for a government Bank.  
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“Allah na Apa?” (God or Teacher?) 
 
“A NFPE Apa (teacher) first asked the school students to close their eyes 
and beg for "chocolate" from Allah.  As usual, students prayed to Allah 
for chocolate but they did not receive any.  Now the teacher again asked 
them to request Apa for chocolates. While the students requested Apa for 
chocolates, their eyes closed, the teacher put chocolates into their hands. 
She then questioned the students as to who had given them chocolates: 
Allah or Apa? The students replied that Apa had given them chocolates 
and not Allah!”  In this way, Apa overpowers Allah.  
  
The above story of “Allah na Apa” was concocted from a old story relating to 
the Christianization process carried out by Baptist missionaries. They used a 
deceptive method to motivate uneducated poor people who visited missionary 
hospitals. They first asked the hospital patients to close their eyes and ask for 
"biscuits" from Allah. Naturally, they did not receive any biscuits. The 
missionaries then asked them to request Jesus for biscuits. With their eyes still 
shut, the missionaries put biscuits into the peoples‟ hands. They propagated the 
idea that Jesus Christ had given them biscuits and not Allah and thus that Jesus 
was true and Allah was false.  
 
The readers of these Islamic magazines and papers, mainly the local moulavis 
(religious preachers) and religious elite took these issues to different waaz mahfils
 
and 
weekly jummah (Friday) prayers.  The messages spread like wild fire across the 
country; rural people and NGO beneficiaries believed these stories to be true.  In the 
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aftermath, BRAC received a religious backlash which it never experienced before.  
Initially, opposition to BRAC took place in 21 out of 64 districts, at 16 area offices of 
the Rural Development Programme (RDP) and 21 area offices of the Non-Formal 
Primary Education program (NFPE) (Mannan et al.1994).  The opposition was so 
intense that in first the 15 days, 59 NFPE schools had been burnt down, 66 schools 
were closed, and the attendance of students 1,547 NFPE schools was reduced from 
30-35 to 10-0. The Sericulture program lost over 110,000 mulberry trees resulting in 
the direct loss of employment to more than 652 women (Mannan et.al. 1994:2). The 
value of these trees was estimated at about Tk. 4,500,000 ($94,000)
99.
   
  
Such reaction may be partly attributed to the massive developmental interventions by 
NGOs in the rural society, and partly to the broader social change caused by the 
ongoing processes of globalisation.  However, the NGOs had to face the following 
important questions:  
 
 Why were NGOs, after 21 years failing to convince the poor beneficiaries 
about the efficacy of development?   
 Why did it take 21 years to have an impact of NGO development (as claimed 
by the NGOs)?  
 Why were the religious elite so successful in creating opposition to the NGOs? 
 Have the development models of NGOs helped the poor to break out of their 
self-perpetuating poverty trap?     
 
 
                                                     
99
Personal communication with the Head of Sericulture Programme.   
 309 
 
9.3 The Network of Religious Organisations 
 
The religious elite, particularly moulavis, (priests) was, to a large extent, successful in 
rousing and mobilizing popular opinion against BRAC as well as other NGOs. The 
moulavis turned the Mosques into platforms to oppose NGOs and used popular waaz 
mahfil to invoke anti-NGO sentiment among people. Although these moulavis were 
highly politicised, they disassociated themselves from affiliation with any of the 
political parties. They are active in their mosque-based networks across the country.  
People, in general, believe in the preaching of moulavis because of the religious 
leaders‟ intellectual status in village communities.  
   
Many NGOs, while promoting such conflict with the aid of donor money, were 
complacent and did not fully appreciate the process whereby opposition to them 
strengthened diverse religious organisations and encouraged them to establish a 
common platform.  The groups that represent Islam have little common understanding 
among themselves.  There are, at least, five distinct religious schisms in Bangladesh, 
which sometimes complement each other; but at other times, vehemently oppose and 
contradict each other.  These five schisms are represented by: 1) the spiritual 
organisations of Pirs (or Sufis); 2) the puritanical form of orthodox Islam practised by 
Kuami Madrasha (a religious school); 3) the modern form of Islam by Alia 
Madrasha; 4) the apolitical puritan Tablig movement; and 5) the political Islam of the 
Jamaat i Islami i Islam, an Islamic political party in Bangladesh. Besides these, there 
exist many religious splinter groups and extremist organisations like the Jamaat-ul 
Mujahieen Bangladesh, Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islam Bangladesh, Hizbut-Tawhid  (Riaz 
2008). 
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Photo 9.2: Sufi Procession Celebrating Prophet Muhammad‟s Birth Day  
 
Source: Shah Alam 
 
Of  these religious schisms, Sufism is the oldest form of Islam in Bangladesh and 
South Asia. Sufis played an indispensable role in converting the population.  It gained 
popularity as the Sufis synthesized the spiritual power embedded in their super human 
agency and local cosmologies (Eaton 1997, Roy 1983).  This trend, although having 
been enriched by Sufism over the past couple of centuries, is now being rapidly 
transformed into a network of Islamic “meditation clubs” (Roy, 1994: 88).  Sufism is 
now the subject of frequent criticism by a section of the educated Muslim class as 
well as reformers and fundamentalists like the Kaumi Madrassahs, Jamaat i Islami  
and other Islamist groups (Ewing and Mannan 2009). 
 
The Kaumi Madrasha follows the principles based on the interpretations of Islam laid 
down by the Ulema of Deoband, a school of Islamic thought, located in New Delhi. 
The Deoband Madrasha in India was established in 1867 by several Indian 
"Wahhabi" maulanas who had participated/supported the Indian Mutiny. The 
Deoband Madrasha and its subsidiaries in the Indo-Bangladesh-Pakistan 
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subcontinent, follow the traditional Dars-i-Nizami curricula, developed during the 
Mughal period. Normally, they do not teach any modern subjects such as English, 
Maths, Science, etc.  Kaumi madrasha has more than 20,000 religious schools across 
rural regions, which are financed with around Taka 216 crore (US$2.16 billion)
100
, 
mostly from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries of the Middle East. The Taliban 
are students of the Deoband-style Kaumi Madrasha of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
 
The Alia Madrasha is a modern Islamic school, founded by the British colonial 
administration in an attempt to modernise the religious schools of Kolkatta. The 
Kolkatta Madrasha was established in the 1760s by Warren Hastings, one of the 
pioneers of British colonial rule in India, in order to secure a constant supply of 
Arabic and Persian speaking Muslims to help run the Judiciary, where Persian was the 
official language up until 1837. The Alia Madrashas are also known as the New 
Scheme Madrashas. They give religious education as well as instruction in subjects 
such as mathematics, English, sciences, social sciences, history, etc.  The academic 
degrees offered by these Islamic institutions are equivalent to high school, college and 
university diplomas and degrees
101
.  They have emerged as one of the moderate 
religious schools. One section of Alia Madrasha, namely, Jamiatul Moderisin (the 
Teachers‟ Association) opposes BRAC, if not all NGOs. Jamiatul Moderisin is 
headed Maulana M. A. Mannan, the owner of the Daily Inquilab.  However, BRAC 
has employed a number of Alia Madrasha graduates in its different socio-economic 
programmes.      
 
 
                                                     
100
 Personal interview with Kaumi Madrasha leader in 1994. 
101 
The equivalent of School Secondary Certificate (SSC) is Dakhil, of Higher Secondary Certificate 
(HSC) is Fazil, of Bachelor of Arts (BA) is Alim and of Master‟s of Arts (MA) is Kamil. 
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Photo 9.3:  Praying at Tabligue Congregation 
 
Source: Star Weekly Magazine, Vol.4 Issue 74, December 9, 2005. 
 
The Tablig movement is a fast growing Islamic movement both within and outside 
Bangladesh, especially India, Pakistan, Malaysia and many other countries which 
have Muslim populations.  The annual Tablig congregation held at Tongi, near 
Dhaka, is the second largest Muslim gathering after the Holy Hajj in Mecca. The 
Tabligh Jamat (movement for inviting people of other beliefs to Islam) was 
established by Maulana Iliyas in the 1920s to counteract the Hindu revivalist Shuddhi 
and Sangathan movements, which aimed at reconverting Indian Muslims back into 
Hindus. It was a defensive movement to keep the Muslim community in India intact 
and coherent. 
 
The Jamaat-i-Islami is a fundamentalist political party, which stands in ideological 
opposition to BRAC and the wider NGO movement rather than carrying out 
destructive activities against it. Like the Communist Party, Jamaat-i-Islami has a 
highly efficient cadre-based political organisation. Most of its funding is generated 
from its various associated organisations and businesses such as Islamic banks, micro-
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credit programmes, schools, university, etc.  Jamaat-i-Islami is involved in 
democratic politics and is an important alliance partner of one of largest political 
parties in the country, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (Kabir 2006). 
 
Table 9.1: Position of Islamic Organisations in relation to NGOs 
 Organisation  Schools of Thought Sources of Fund  Remarks 
Kaumi Madrasha 
 
1. Hatazari Madrasha, Ctg. 
2. Patia Madrasha, Ctg. 
3. Balia Madrasha, Mymensingh 
4. Saahaba Sainik Parisad 
5. Murtah Protorodh Committee 
6. Kharezi Madrasha 
7. Syed Md. Fazlul Karim 
(Islamic Shashontantro 
Andolon), Chor Monia Pir, 
Barisal 
 
 
Influenced by the 
philosophy of 
Deodand school, 
India. They teach 
purely Arabic and 
religious teachings. 
 
 
Middle Southern 
countries like 
Saudi Arabia, 
local elites 
endowments 
 
 
Vehemently 
oppose BRAC 
and NGOs 
through their 
Madrasha and 
Mosque 
network 
Quack Moulavis (Teachers of 
Moqtabs) 
With partial training in 
Kaumi Madrasha 
Local endowment Localized and 
have 
devaluating 
influence on 
group 
members 
Jamaat-i-Islami Theology of Moulana 
Moududi 
Saudi Arabia and 
Middle East 
JI economic and 
industrial 
establishment 
Oppose NGOs 
at ideological 
level 
Allia Madrasha Incorporated modern 
education with Arabic 
teachings 
Government Individual 
capacity 
Jamaitul Moderisin (a faction of 
Allia Madrasha Teachers 
Association) 
Moulana Abdul 
Mannan 
Iraq Total 
Opposition to 
BRAC, if not 
other NGOs 
Pirs/Sufi a. Theologian 
b. Orthoprax 
c. Heteroprax 
Disciples "a" category 
of Pir opposes 
BRAC 
Tabligue Jamat Metaphysical and 
apolitical religious 
movement  
Personal funds Indifferent to 
NGOs 
Source:  Mannan 1994. el.al.  p.44-46 
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9.4.  BRAC‟s Failure to Comprehend the Religious Situation 
 
From the inception of the crisis, many BRAC staff, particularly at branch offices, felt 
the heat of the opposition, but they could not communicate this to those higher up in 
the organisation because of its organisational culture (see chapter 5. As the opposition 
intensified, and threats and attacks on BRAC staff and property became rampant, it 
appeared that senior management at the head office had fallen into confusion. This 
was partially because of a lack of preparation in dealing with this new sort of 
problem, and partly because of a lack of communication between different 
programmes.  In many instances, the field staff were unable to convince their superior 
officers of the intensity of the problems. In the words of a PO: 
 
"our boro bhais (senior staff) run between Area and Regional 
Offices. We run between Area Office and villages. We do face 
opposition to our work.  However, we neither express our 
problems to our seniors nor are we able to cope with the 
situation. If we were to take independent decisions, the fear is 
that the Bhai will question our actions. We do no have the 
authority to act!" 
 
The result was that field staff suffered in most cases. In such an unbearable situation, 
in December 1993, a PO literally requested me:  
 
"please tell senior staff about our problems. We deliberately 
hide many facts. If we articulate our problems to them, we are 
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ordered to solve the problems by ourselves. Some of these 
problems are beyond our control." 
 
These communication problems within the organisational hierarchy imply that BRAC 
has developed an untenable bureaucracy and that many senior staff do not consider 
negotiating with religious representatives as part of their job. In doing so, they 
overlook the impact development can have on religion. They are complacent when it 
comes to investigating the socio-cultural impacts of their projects (Mustafa et 
al.1995)
102
, and they fail to understand the growth of religious and cultural opposition 
against the BRAC approach to socio-economic development. The opposition exists as 
hidden transcripts (Scott 1990) with the potential to manifest itself as an organised 
form of resistance (Adnan 2007, Mannan et al.1994).  One obvious area of conflict 
between the religious elite and NGOs involves the inclusion of „women‟ in the 
development process. This affects different strata of society differently. 
  
BRAC and other NGOs, endeavour to make women visible actors in development 
process, without taking into consideration the inherent contradictions implied in such 
a move and the strength of the traditional institutions and gendered society. Without 
addressing cultural questions the situation could worsen, and may be further 
aggravated when rural people become aware that BRAC staff of a different social 
class, education and culture, challenge social and cultural values that they believe to 
be true.  A few telling examples are cited below 
 
                                                     
102 
The Impact Assessment Study (Mustafa, et.al 1995) was conducted at a time when BRAC was 
facing a religious backlash in 1994-95. The IAS confirmed that women had benefited hugely from the 
programmes, at the same time that other studies reported that even the beneficiaries were opposing 
BRAC in protests (Kalam 1994; Karim et.al.1994, Mannan et al.1994; TD 1994).  
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9.4.1 Encountering  Village Power-Structure 
 
Rural society, in which BRAC intervenes with its secular development initiatives, has 
a power structure (Lewis and Hossain 2008, Makita 2007, Mannan 2005) different 
from that at urban and national levels (Mannan 2008, 2006b, 1992).  Many BRAC 
staff think that actors such as moneylenders, the powerful land owning elite and 
moulavis dominate the structure.  They consider the moulavis to be fundamentalists 
and illiterate (DKS 1990), not intellectuals who provide solutions to rural people's 
problems through rituals, traditions, etc. who uphold religious and Islamic values.  
 
BRAC believes that it is involved in transforming the oppressive historical power 
relations involving class, race, sexual preferences, etc. prevalent in the traditional 
rural setting. It believes, it can change the destiny of the poor through a reformation of 
the power structure, freeing the poor from the control of exploitative rural actors 
(NET 1979). Its programmes emphasize the transformation of gender relations within 
highly complex and changing sets of ethical, social, political and economic practices.   
 
9.4.2. Sericulture and the Common Resource  
 
The sericulture programme plants mulberry trees in rural areas. The mulberry leaves 
feed silkworms, from whose cocoons the silk is extracted.  This sericulture 
programme became one of the main targets of the religious violence.  In my 
investigations into the conflict, I visited Khalo thana in Bogra district, one of the 
hotbeds of opposition. One early morning, having offered my prayer in a local 
mosque, I experienced the fearsome nature of the direct opposition.  After prayers, 
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most of the mussulis (devout and practicing Muslim), under the leadership of a 
Islamist , participated in a large procession. The procession destroyed mulberry tress 
planted along the roadside, while chanting the slogan: “aik-ta doi-ta, BRAC dhoro; 
shokal bikal nasta koro” (catch a BRAC staff or two; feast on them day and night).  
Symbolically, they proposed outcasting BRAC staff from the local area as they had 
planted the trees. This deeply held anti-BRAC resentment indicates that the high 
profile sericulture programme had become a source of conflict within society at the 
cultural, economic and market levels. 
 
At the cultural level, many moulanas propagated the notion that the use of silk was 
haram (sinful) and un-Islamic. Mulberry trees were used to produce silk clothing, 
especially sarees (traditional women‟s‟ dress).  It was held that women‟s bodies 
remained exposed in thin transparent silk sarees.  Such exposure filled pious men 
with sexual temptation and impure thoughts, which polluted their ibadat (prayer).  By 
this logic it was the religious duty of all Muslims to chop down the mulberry trees as 
preventing kafirs (sinner) from producing  silk clothing, would  save men and women 
as well as the sanctity of Islam.  
  
Importantly, many religious leaders believed mulberry trees to be “omens of 
Doomsday.”  In village society the following is a popular story:   
 
“the sign for the coming of Doomsday is when seven sex-mad 
infidel women will chase a holy man for their sexual gratification. 
The holy man will climb a tree to save himself.  Sitting atop the 
tree, he will urinate and a fortunate woman will drink that urine. 
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The others will fight to try to pull the holy man down from the 
tree to take advantage of him.”    
 
Religious leaders link this story to mulberry trees; implying that mulberry trees are 
the Doomsday tree. In this way, it becomes religious obligation to destroy the 
mulberry tree before it destroys Muslims. Many villagers believed in such cultural 
fictions. This piece of fiction is a hybrid story with two implicit meanings.  Firstly, 
women are symbols of Eve whose dealing with the Devil relegated Adam to a life on 
Earth. Secondly, modern sericulture technology is a metaphor for the evil that engages 
women to destroy the piety of men.       
 
Behind the cultural fiction, there is an implicit economic conflict in this 
scenario. The economic conflict stems from the use of underutilized resources 
in the sericulture programme, e.g. the roadsides, where mulberry trees are 
planted. The roads are considered common property, because villagers use 
roadside grass on which to graze their cows and goats. Once mulberry trees 
are planted, the grazing land and space for village animals is reduced. The 
non-availability of grazing land, inevitably, leads to conflict with the affluent 
owners of animals. On many occasions, under the pretext of religious 
opposition, people chopped down the mulberry trees to express their anger at 
their planting.  So-called devotees did so at night, on their way to home from 
waaz mahfil.  On the question of benefits to the poor, an informant argued,  
"the mulberry trees yield benefits for only one per cent of the poor. But it is 
causing trouble to most of the villagers. Now rich people cannot graze their 
animals."  
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BRAC engages women in market.  The Sericulture Programme has established a 
production chain that integrates women to the market system.  The sericulture 
programme integrates the rural poor women into the market economy; not just locally, 
but also with the urban and international markets.  BRAC engages women at every 
level of silk production.  This ensures, firstly, a regular income for women at each 
level on the production line and, secondly, gradually edges women away from the 
traditional domains of control by the men.  Sericulture projects also secure the poor an 
income that appears to the eyes of a wealthy person “as making a class of rich women 
among the  poor men." 
 
9.4.3 Education 
 
Another important development intervention by BRAC is the empowerment of 
women and girls through its education programme. BRAC offers two types of 
education for women. The first is for older women, who receive Social Awareness 
Education (SAE)
103
. The Human Rights Legal Programme (HRLE/SAE) is designed 
to raise critical awareness amongst the targeted women. Moreover, such education 
changes women‟s outlook by increasing their ability to ask critical questions about the 
exploitative
104
 social and economic relations that exist in rural society.  
 
The second type of education is the Non Formal Primary Education (NFPE) 
programme for poor young girls and boys. The NFPE targets children aged between 
eight and eleven, 70% of the students are girls.    It employs female teachers. Such 
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 In 1995, SAE was incorporated into the Human Rights Legal Programme (HRLE) 
104 
NGO ideology is based on the assumption that traditional social, religious and economic structures 
are exploitative.  NGOs claim they can save the poor by empowering them. However, NGOs fail to 
account for the ways their projects and programmes create a new condition for exploitation.          
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female dominated programmes create two-fold problems in the programme areas. 
Firstly, many people oppose the employment of female teachers on the grounds that 
there are unemployed male teachers. Female involvement in public activities is 
construed to be against the predominant male rural ideology.  Secondly, the female 
teachers of NFPE set the stage for competition with two other school systems: 
Moqtab (primary religious schools) and state‟s primary schools. 
 
Moqtab teachers are males with an orthodox religious education, while BRAC‟s 
teachers are females with 10 years of modern education up to Secondary School 
Certificate (SSC) level. These female teachers, trained by BRAC, teach their female 
students how to dance and sing along with standard text.  This challenges the very 
norms of purdah, since religious education in the moqtab strictly forbids dancing and 
singing in the Muslim community. The BRAC NFPE curriculum is also designed to 
counter the submissive attitudes of poor children and eventually help them to develop 
cognitive skills for a critical analysis of the existing social structure. Once the girls 
and boys start to attend NFPE schools, they rapidly develop a dislike for moqtab 
education. The NFPE schools tend to be more interesting and entertaining than the 
moqtab.   Moreover, religious teachers fear that young girls who are receiving NFPE 
education may not give their own children a religious education in the future.  
   
The NFPE system is also believed to have a detrimental effect on state‟s primary 
schools. People recognize that NFPE students perform better in terms of verbal, 
reading and writing skills compared to students in other schools. Furthermore, the 
better academic performance of NFPE students contributes to a nurturing of class 
hostility; an idea that poor children are becoming more educated than elite children 
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studying in the other primary schools.  NFPE students can write, read and talk well 
within the first six months of attending school, whereas other children have a high 
rate of  failure even after attending four years of primary schools. Thus, the elite exert  
 
Photo 9.4: NFPE School 
 
 Source: Shahadu Zaman 
 
pressure on primary school teachers to improve their performances and to provide a 
better education for their children. Moreover, the lower teacher-student ratio of NFPE 
schools works as an added attraction. The teacher-student ratio in primary schools is 
around 1:66 while that of an NFPE school is 1:30. Naturally, many people prefer 
NFPE education, but their class position dissuades them from sending their children 
to NFPE
105
.  Many primary school teachers also become envious of the shift of 
preference to NFPE.  Furthermore, many teachers are concerned that the popularity 
and rapid expansion of NFPE may encourage donors to pressure the government to 
replace the Primary School System with the NFPE model. Thus, the teachers‟ fear of 
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 The rich people could not control the access of their children to NFPE school because these schools 
are strictly control by BRAC.  
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being unemployed in the future looms large, if the BRAC sponsored schools replace 
the present primary school system. As both religious and primary school teachers are 
affected by NFPE, they form an alliance in opposition to BRAC.   
 
9.4.4. Male Staff and Female Beneficiaries 
 
BRAC also faces opposition to the unmarried status of majority of male staff, while 
most of the beneficiaries are married women.  In rural society, women are strictly 
forbidden to enter into any sort of interaction with strangers, particularly unmarried  
 
 
 Photo 9.5:  BRAC Male Staff and Female Beneficiaries 
 
        Source: Shahudu Zaman 
 
males. This causes a dilemma for many young BRAC staff members, and many of 
them try to overcome it by pretending that they are married persons.   But it is 
difficult to hide their unmarried status.  Many rural people become suspicious at 
BRAC sending unmarried males to visit married women beneficiaries. Some people 
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believe that BRAC's male staff members are working to pollute the social values of 
villages by spoiling and indulging women.  Moreover, the religious elite feels 
threatened as, traditionally, women are known for upholding religion. Some BRAC 
staff members also behave insensitively towards rural sensibilities.  Usually fresh 
graduates from universities, they tend to be motivated by developmental ideology of 
social welfare and justice, and so fail to understand the religious and gendered nature 
of rural society (Mannan 2009b, Mannan et al.1994: 53-64). 
 
On one occasion, I was riding with a PO on the backseat of his motor cycle. It was 
noon and before I had realised, the motor cycle had “entered a bari courtyard.  There 
was a large pond inside the court yard where a few women bathed. A few men 
watched silently.  I asked the PO whether it was appropriate that we should be in such 
a private sphere.  He said that he knew most of the women and had a friendly 
relationship with them.  He assured me that they wouldn‟t mind. I nevertheless felt the 
potential danger of such a culturally insensitive approach to prevalent social norms.”     
 
9.5.   Hybridity, Fiction and Invoking Fear 
 
In order to invoke fear, religious leaders constantly produce hybrid stories to show how 
modernisation has polluted Islam and local beliefs. Some stories of hybrid beliefs along 
with their implicit meanings are given below: 
 
Hybrid Belief 1:   Many Moulavis in waaz frequently claim that Allah has charged 
husbands with the duty to make sure their wives maintain purdah. Wives are strictly 
forbidden to expose their bodies and faces to outsiders. If a wife exposes even a small 
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portion of her body, equivalent to a tiny hair, the exposed hair will transform into 70 
deadly serpents.  These serpents will bite her husband and male kin. So, it is 
obligation of husbands to control their wives‟ behaviour. The serpent is interpreted as 
a metaphor for the Christian Devil. Thus, control over women‟s chastity is a must 
because Muslim women are easily susceptible to the influence of the Christian Devil. 
 
Hybrid Belief 2: Women must keep long hair and should avoid short hair like that of 
BRAC female staff.  Trimming hair is a sin for which Allah punishes male kin.  If a 
woman with short hair dies before her marriage, or after marriage, then either father 
or husband will receive continuous punishment until the keyamat (Judgement Day) 
for failing to control their daughters or wives.  Men are innocent like Adam and 
women succumb to temptation like Eve. Female disobedience causes  men to fall 
from grace as Adam fell from heaven.       
 
Hybrid Belief 3: Religious leaders claim that when a VO member takes a BRAC loan, 
she must place the Holy Qu‟ran under her feet. It is also claimed that BRAC borrows 
money from donors by placing their feet on the Qu‟ran. This makes the money haram.  
The implicit meaning is that when women use this haram money to increase their 
income and buy food, everything that follows is haram.  
  
Hybrid Belief 4: Female staff  ride on motorcycles to get around. Often male staff 
drive motor cycles while females sit behind them. Moulavis promote the idea that 
women‟s riding on motorcycles is sinful as Islam forbids women from sitting atop of 
moving vehicles or animals. The implication is that religious leaders, unable to 
negotiate with technology, develop an anti-technology bias against that imported from 
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the West and the Christian world. Only male Muslims are able to control this 
Christian demonic technology.  When women use Christian technology, they become 
susceptible to the evil Christian influence.  
 
Hybrid Belief 5: My (I) dialogue with a 10-year old student (S) attending an NFPE 
school: 
 
S:  Now I am a Christian.  
I:  Why you think in this way? 
S: (Because) everyone says BRAC is Christian. 
I:  Then, why are you attending a Christian school? 
S:  (But) school is very good and it will assure me an income when I finish 
school. 
I: Do Moulavis try to stop you from coming to school? 
S:  Yes. But we told the Moulavis that if they can give us one seer (1 kg) of rice 
everyday, then we will stop attending Christian's schools! 
 
The hybrid values invoke „dharma vhiti‟ (fear of religion) and many people believe in 
such stories.  The success of moulavis in agitating the rural folk lies in their diagnosis of 
peoples‟ popular belief system.  Religious leaders tell these stories in order to implant the 
idea that the enigmatic NGOs, with support from the Western Christian world, are 
polluting and jeopardizing Islam. As a result, the poor will be unable to carry out their 
Islamic duties and daily prayers, which will have at detrimental effect on their future in 
this world and the hereafter.  Moulavis end up receiving the unequivocal support of 
peasants whose lifestyles are severely affected by modern technology. They helplessly 
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surrender to the negative consequences of modern technologies without knowing how to 
adjust their lifestyles and ideology.       
 
The ongoing religious propaganda confused women as to who to believe: BRAC or 
moulavis?   Women have faith in moulavis as the keepers of the religious, moral and 
social order. Their husbands subscribe to these religious fictions as they are hardly 
aware of the nature of engagement between NGOs and their spouses and female kin. 
One the contrary, women experience that BRAC offers them credit, economic 
opportunities and provide training on different skills, but BRAC is not preaching 
Christianity!  The confusion and conflict fume in the gap between the religious 
ideology and economic reality.   At economic order, BRAC and NGOs have clear 
advantage because moulavis do not offer any economic benefits to the poor.  But at 
cultural and religious orders, BRAC has clear disadvantages as they ignore religion 
and culture.   
 
As BRAC mobilizes poor rural women, the moulavis fear that they are losing control 
over the village women folk.  The moulavis, in an effort to re-exert their authority, 
spread suspicion among the husbands or male kin of the female beneficiaries.  They 
also try to propagate the idea that many senior BRAC staff are involved in 
promiscuous relationships, and that they encourage wives to challenge their husbands' 
authority. 
   
Religious leaders  typically propagated the following ideas:  
 
 Black Cloth:  Religious leaders are to a large extent able to induce the belief 
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that Christian-inspired NGOs bury the dead wrapped in black cloth.  This 
image of black cloth comes from western movies. Muslims, on the other hand 
use white cloth to bury the dead. Black is thought of as a symbol of dark 
forces and evil, while white is a symbol of forces of good and purity.  The tacit 
message is the dark force of Christianity is swallowing up the purity of Islam 
through the work of NGOs.  
 Swami (husband) or Shaheeb (Westernised person):  The moulavis assert that 
BRAC shaheebs are replacing the roles of swami.  Wives have to choose 
between the two. It is claimed that BRAC‟s shaheebs, who are sex experts, 
will sooner or later traffic begana (naked) wives to India. 
 Sex den:  BRAC‟s offices are sexual dens. Here unmarried male and female 
staff live and eat together, share common rooms and engage in illicit sex.  
Unmarried male staff meet their sexual needs through begana women.  
 Tattoos:  BRAC tattoos the breasts, buttocks and thighs of NFPE teachers and 
as well as those women who receive BRAC training 
 
This type of fiction naturally provokes the male ego, especially that of husbands or 
male kin of VO members. Men therefore grow suspicious of BRAC and the 
associations between their women and male BRAC staff.   The anti-BRAC 
provocation influences the male kin of  female beneficiaries to grow suspicious of 
their interaction and relationships with BRAC staff (Mannan et al.1994).   
 
9.6.  The Role of Pro-NGO Religious Leaders and small NGOs 
 
While anti-NGO propaganda was in full swing, many unorthodox religious leaders, 
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particularly from Alia Madrasha and Sufis, stood by and supported NGOs. These are 
pro-NGO religious leaders who positively evaluated BRAC‟s role in society.  The 
pro-NGO moulavi have three distinct views on the role of NGOs. Firstly, NGOs serve 
the poor irrespective of the beneficiary‟s religion. Secondly, since Muslims fail to 
perform their assigned religious tasks to serve the poor, Christians (the assumption 
being that NGOs are Christian) step in to take up their role.  There is essentially 
nothing wrong in such activities as they serve to benefit poor and destitute Muslim 
men and women. Finally, Christians have learnt how to serve humanity and benefit 
the poor from Muslims.  In this sense, Christians are playing the role of Muslims.    
 
Many Moulanas became convinced that the religious tirade did not have any valid 
religious grounds and was based on falsifications. One moulavi said: "before one 
criticises BRAC, one must know its activities and how it damages Islam."   Another 
moulavi remarked: 
"I have read the NFPE books. There is nothing in them against Islam. During a 
recent Jummah prayer, before the khotba (sermon), a university student asked 
me to declare a fatwa (religious edict) against BRAC. He argued that BRAC 
proselytises the poor to Christianity and that it had recently buried a dead 
member in a black cloth. Such nonsense made me furious. I challenged him to 
prove such allegations against BRAC within two months. If he failed, he 
should be punished for lying." 
 
In reality, the anti-BRAC propaganda continues in various forms. BRAC gains from 
such false propaganda in the long run as people begin to see these fictions for what 
they really are. A PO described an event in which villagers realised BRAC was 
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neither involved in converting its group members to Christianity nor had it wrapped a 
buried member's body in black cloth. The event as narrated by PO: 
  
On January 21, 1994, in Mobarokdi village at Matlab, a VO member died.  
Many thought that BRAC staff would wrap the death member's body with  
black cloth and bury her like a Christian. Hundreds of people flocked around  
the dead member's house to observe how BRAC staff treated the body. We too  
went to the member's house. The people saw nothing to support the popular  
rumours about BRAC and the body was buried according to strict Islamic  
rituals. After that event, many realised the malicious nature of rumours spread  
by a segment of local moulavis. We can now work in these villages without  
much problem.” 
 
Small NGOs distanced themselves from the controversy, interpreting the religious 
opposition to be the problem of larger NGOs.  BRAC‟s survey, followed by a survey 
conducted by the Association of Development Agencies, Bangladesh (ADAB)
106
 
seemed to confirm this notion. ADAB carried out a survey in March 1995
107
.
 
 They 
found that a branch office of FIVDB at Sylhet was burnt down during the time of 
conflict not by religious leaders, but by local elites.  An NGO from Barisal reported 
that religious leaders carried out a demonstration around its office, but no physical 
attack was carried out.  Apart from this, no NGOs other than large NGOs were 
affected.  Small NGOs were reluctant to support large NGOs. The non-cooperation of 
NGOs became clear when an ADAB chapter in Mymensingh district organised an 
emergency meeting for all NGOs.  I attended the meeting along with the Regional 
                                                     
106
 BRAC assisted ADAB with questionnaire to carry out survey. ADAB is an umbrella organisation 
for the NGOs and works as an apex body.   
107 
ADAB did not publish the survey result.   
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Manager on behalf of BRAC. To our surprise we found that there were no 
representatives from small NGOs in attendance. We later investigated the matter. We 
found that small NGOs held an antagonistic attitude towards larger NGOs. Larger 
NGOs have the resources to offer the poor greater opportunities and credit compared 
to smaller ones. The poor therefore tend to join the larger NGOs and as a result, 
smaller NGOs could not expand as rapidly.   
 
Secondly, small NGOs‟ activities tend to be more transparent and local NGO leaders 
are less bureaucratic. This helped to build rapport between these NGOs and the 
religious elite. Even at the height of the conflict, small NGOs pressured ADAB to 
withdraw support from BRAC in the face of the religious backlash
108
.
  
 
9.7 The Crisis in the Macro Context      
 
Bangladesh is undergoing a rapid transformation which is forcing both males and 
young women to migrate from rural areas to the big cities to take advantage of 
employment opportunities. New economic opportunities in urban garment factories 
and other industries, as well as the public and informal sectors, combined with 
developments in family planning and the increased scope for international migration 
have broadened the aspirational horizons for young rural women and men.  In most 
cases, migrants leave married women and family elders in the villages to take on 
family responsibilities (Huq-Hussain 1995; Khun 2003).  The loss of younger women 
and able-bodied males to the urban centres creates a vacuum in the villages. This 
gives the moulavis an opportunity to take on new social and moral roles in order to act 
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as male guardians of village women. They try to act as intermediaries between 
households, often headed by women, and wider society. 
 
The new roles of religious leaders as social guardians put them in conflict with 
households and women on two counts. Firstly, under the new conditions, women 
carry out many of household functions, which were earlier done by their male kin.  
Secondly, NGOs are emerging as organisational patrons that thwart the roles of the 
traditional elite in their control over the poor.  Poor women are in a continuous search 
for job opportunities in the rural areas, which they often find by associating 
themselves with NGOs. On both accounts, women acquire new identities.  Women 
acquire new identities as they grow with VOs.  In village society women are not 
called by their own names, but by that of their husbands‟ and sons‟ identities e.g. 
Rahim‟s bou (Rahim‟s wife) or Salmon‟s ma (Salmon‟s mother).  When they 
participate in VO interactions, urban-educated BRAC staff members call them by 
their personal names. Such direct forms of address to women are considered 
violations of the norms of society.  The point of objection is the assertion that staff 
would never show such disrespect to their own mothers or fathers by calling them by 
their names. Without an understanding of this new process of identity formation, staff 
members and also the local population become more and more uncertain of how to 
deal with women's newly found identities in the development process.    
 
9.8. Scaling up the Conflict: Towards the Phoney War 
 
Over time, BRAC appeared increasingly helpless against the continuous tirade of the 
religious backlash and its aggressive propaganda.  The reason is that, since 1990, it 
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has been undergoing an organisational transition from a social mobilisation NGO to a 
market driven NGO (see Chapter 3).  Its market orientation reduced its capacity to 
mobilise its beneficiaries as well as public opinion
109.
  
  
BRAC realised that it could not defuse the tension generated by the Islamic 
fundamentalists on its own.  Moreover, the intensity of the religious backlash against 
BRAC frightened many large and medium-sized NGOs, as they had thought that the 
Islamists  were going to make them their next targets. Many NGOs such as Gono 
Shajja Sangstha  (GSS), Feminist NGOs , PROSHIKA, ADAB, etc. contacted BRAC 
to find out what was happening, and how BRAC was dealing with or confronting the 
fundamentalists so that they could protect themselves from any future attacks.  
BRAC, however, did not respond to the queries.  It was not interested in NGO 
politicking, but felt the need for a broader NGO coalition in an attempt to defend itself 
against the Islamists. BRAC‟s initial reluctance to cooperate with other NGOs was 
due to the fact that, at the time, only BRAC had been singled out. BRAC believed that 
any cooperation with the other NGOs might lead to an escalation in the conflict and 
affect its various programmes across the country.  It was confident that it could tackle 
the religious elite by keeping a low profile and adopting appropriate strategies.  It 
realized that "the villagers and the poor people believe in the moulavis and not in 
BRAC"
110
. Thus, BRAC worked quietly to defuse the religious opposition. 
 
                                                     
109
 Prior to 1990, BRAC had a social mobilisation programme named the Outreach Programme along 
with the Rural Training and Credit Programme.   This donor-financed micro-credit operation includes 
“a social mobilisation aspect: how to form groups in ways that would most effectively enforce 
collectively responsibility? How to motivate women to form their own groups” (Abed and Matin, 
2007:1)?  However, the market imperatives gradually influenced BRAC to shift from donor financed 
micro-credit to market-financed micro-credit programs. As an outcome, BRAC now represents a more 
economical model, rather than a social model.  This economical model always searches for the 
alternative avenues to secure funding and financial sustainability (Mannan 2009a). 
110
 A BRAC director expressed this opinion.  
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BRAC‟s anti-fundamentalist strategy appeared to be ambivalent as it followed two 
opposing strategies.  Firstly, it tried to maintain a low profile, while at the same time 
its staff members were busy negotiating with the local elite and religious leadership, 
and making efforts to clarify its aims to beneficiaries as well as other local people.  
Secondly, BRAC was eager to receive support from the social mobilization NGOs
111
, 
led by ADAB and PROSHIKA, which was willing to put toward an anti-
fundamentalist strategy. These NGOs were eager to jump onto the anti-Islamic 
bandwagon to enforce resistance against the Islamists and establish secularism and 
democracy in the country over Islamic fundamentalism.   BRAC assumed that such a 
mobilisation effort would occur on its terms and conditions.  It needed the support of 
the socially mobilised NGOs to deflect the backlash away from BRAC. 
 
ADAB wanted a strategic role for itself in representing the NGOs voice.  It saw an 
opportunity amidst the religious conflict to transform itself into a legitimate force for 
democracy and secularism (Ashman 1997).  Taking part in the anti-fundamentalist 
movement provided such an opportunity. However, to achieve this it needed:  (i) to 
mobilise NGOs; and ii) to convince the donors that they were effective in carrying out 
anti-fundamentalist activities. 
 
ADAB and some of the larger NGOs without comprehending the rural character of 
religious opposition, managed unwittingly to escalate the conflict to a national scale. 
The anti-Islamic position of ADAB contributed to the rise of 16 obscure urban-based 
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 NGOs involved in social mobilization programmes believed less in micro-credit, but more on 
human rights, empowerment of women, policy advocacy, and limited confrontation on different social, 
political and economic issues.     
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apolitical Islamic organisations which formed an Islamic alliance
112
 against the NGOs 
in an effort to take advantage of popular sentiment on their side.   
 
Moreover, ADAB and PROSHIKA emphasised the idea that Jamaat-i-Islami had 
organized the Islamic opposition. Jamaat-i-Islami is highly active in urban and peri-
urban areas, but not in rural areas, and was therefore wrongly credited with organizing 
the opposition against the NGOs, which, in turn, reinforced a powerful image of 
Jamaat-i-Islami.  
 
In this way, the focus of the conflict began to shift from „rural opposition‟ to the 
„urban fiction of conflict‟.  Both the NGOs and the Islamic organisations were 
engaged in an intensive propaganda war through the media. This shift in focus not 
only reduced the pressure on BRAC, but also gave the conflict a broader dimension.  
BRAC now became more relaxed as it saw, on the one hand, a decrease in rural 
opposition
113
 to their activities. On the other hand, a new religious opposition was 
created in urban areas, where BRAC had hardly any activities at the time 1994-95. 
   
The religious tension that spread across the country began to ease in March and April 
1994, yet ADAB and the social mobilisation NGOs continued to make preparations to 
resist the religious forces in major cities and other urban areas. ADAB needed the 
support of both BRAC and other NGOs and the secular national political parties to 
popularise their anti-fundamentalist agenda.  ADAB pressurised BRAC to conform 
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 The alliance of 16 Islamic organisations eventually contributes to strengthen an insignificant Islamic 
political party known as Islamic Okkay Jote (IOJ).  IOJ eventually became an important member of 
four party alliance that ruled the country from 2001 to 2005.  
113 
The reason for the reduced rural opposition was that KuamiMadrasha, which orchestrated religious 
backlash, found that their opposition to NGOs was not supported by any other religious organisation 
and further, they had to face the wrath of local administration and state.  Moreover, the politics was 
shifted to urban areas where Kaumi Madrasha had little control.    
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with its strategy, but BRAC knew from experience that complying might expose the 
NGO to further religious backlash. As a result, BRAC remained reluctant to get 
involved, and avoided any sort of cooperation with ADAB.  
 
The Chief Executives of BRAC, PROSHIKA, Private Rural Initiatve Program (PRIP) 
Trust, Nijera Kori, etc met on 13
th
 July, 1994 in Koitta to form an NGO Task Force, 
with Executive Director of BRAC at its head.  PROHIKA and BRAC committed to 
mobilise between 300 and 500 hundred group members against the fundamentalists.  
However, within next few days, BRAC withdrew its commitment and began to 
“rethink” its strategy of confrontation114.  However, the NGO politicking quickly runs 
into its own problems. The Executive Director of BRAC hardly attended any Task 
Force meetings, but always sent a senior staff member as well as myself, in his place.   
 
His continued absence caused resentment among many leading NGOs. They felt 
betrayed, in that, despite helping to tackle the crisis, BRAC showed its arrogance by 
ignoring the wishes of the wider NGO community.  At one of the meetings, the 
feminist head of the Saptagram Nari Swanirvar Parishad (SNSP) criticised BRAC‟s 
Executive Director for manipulating ADAB behind the scenes and making the other 
NGOs his pawns. She later apologised for her remarks after a protest from the BRAC 
representative. The CARITAS representative said that the lack of agreement between 
the NGOs could damage the movement. The ex-Director of ADAB and representative 
of PROSHIKA defended BRAC, pointing out that the task force had only come into 
being at the behest of BRAC‟s Executive Director, and that ADAB would disappear 
without BRAC‟s cooperation.  The Director of ADAB forcefully reminded the NGO 
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 Personal Communication with Kazi Farook, Chief Executive of PROSHIKA. 
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representatives, that they had “to work with shima (boundary) and matra (degree). If 
there is no development work, then NGOs will disappear. If NGOs disappear, then 
ADAB will disappear." At this statement, many NGO representatives present at the 
meeting whispered comments such as: 
 
 What does she mean by saying that ADAB will disappear?  
 Would such a move bring more aid and donor support?   
 Does she mean that ADAB is interested in escalating the religious conflict?  
 
In another meeting, many questions were raised about the collaboration between 
BRAC and ADAB. Although at the national level, the relationship was 
complementary, at the local/urban/regional level, BRAC branch offices deliberately 
avoided and ignored the ADAB Chapters, antagonising the latter. Again, the deputy 
head of PROSHIKA defended BRAC, and pointed out that BRAC was a large 
organisation, and its employees had to carry out multiple programmes as well as busy 
in confronting fundamentalist. They were too busy to attend ADAB Chapter 
meetings. Secondly, many NGO representatives raised their suspicions over the 
involvement of PRIP Trust  in the anti-Islamic fundamentalist movement.  PRIP Trust 
was an NGO formed by PACT, a USAID project. As a creation of USAID, it was 
assumed that PRIP Trust was part of the anti-Islamic movement. The role of its 
foreign director and his local counterpart was frequently a subject for discussion 
amongst the NGO representatives. The Deputy Director of PRIP Trust was also the 
wife of the PROSHIKA Deputy Director; she was also a close friend of the head of a 
feminist NGO who played a critical role in anti-fundamentalist movements. Thirdly, 
the larger NGOs took over ADAB leadership, as there were no representatives from 
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smaller NGOs present at meetings. Smaller NGOs were known for taking a pro-
Islamic stance. ADAB anticipated that a large number of NGOs, particularly the 
smaller ones, were not interested in an anti-Islamic movement; rather they cultivated 
and supported relationships with Islamic organisations.   Thus, any movement against 
Islamic organisations might alienate the smaller NGOs from ADAB and ADAB‟s role 
might come into question. 
 
Above all, ADAB was clearly searching for an opportunity to counter criticism 
levelled against it.  It included accusations that ADAB had behaved like an NGO 
instead of playing the role of an apex organisation; it served the interests of large and 
medium NGOs; it proved to be ineffective in raising funds for small NGOs; it 
competed for projects with small NGOs, etc. Taking on board such criticisms, ADAB 
acted diplomatically and formed a consensus in the face of religious opposition.   
 
An ex-ADAB director pointed out that ADAB should ally itself with the all NGOs, 
civil society, and the political parties
115
.  In order to do so, the Task Force needed to 
lay down four principles for the formation of an alliance. The ADAB would cooperate 
with the (i) pro-liberation forces (e.g., the Awami League, a large political party), (ii) 
pro-people organisations (e.g., NGOs), (iii) pro-democracy groups (e.g., civil 
society
116
) , and (iv) pro-development agencies (e.g., donors). In order to implement 
                                                     
115 
Personal communication 
116
 Although NGO leaders talked about civil society, the concept was largely unknown in Bangladesh 
until the beginning of the conflict.  In 1994 there were some urban civil society groups such as the 
Engineer‟s Association, Lion, Leo or Rotary clubs that remained aloof in the conflict between NGOs 
and the religious organisations. A deputy director of PROSHIKA used the conflict to popularise his 
concept of civil society and „grassroots democracy‟.  He gave an operational definition for making 
alliances with civil society, claiming to “have taken measures to mobilise the media and members of 
civil society such as sympathetic school teachers, lawyers, local media, doctors, students and built 
alliances with others.”  In reality, the leadership of ADAB began to consider forging alliances with 
progressive elements of society and making a collective effort in the light of the Task Force‟s strategy. 
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these principles, ADAB developed a two-fold strategy aimed at the mobilisation of 
NGOs and the formation of external alliances with civil society and the political 
parties.  
 
9.9.  Mobilisation of NGOs 
 
The mobilisation of NGOs began on 16
th
 July, 1994, through workshops on "Shamajik 
Durjog Bhabosthapona O Protirodh Bisawak Orientation" (Social Disaster 
Management and Resistance Related Orientation) at the training centres of both 
PROSHIKA at Koitta, Manikganj district and BRAC at Savar, Dhaka district.   BRAC 
sent senior trainers as well as myself  to participated in the workshop with core 
trainers from PROSHIKA, GSS, CARITAS, Nijera Kori, ADAB, etc.   The purpose 
of the workshops was to locate the NGOs within the framework of alliance building 
and, also to help ADAB and the NGOs to answer two important questions: i) What 
was the present position of the NGOs in relation to the Islamic challenge? and ii) 
What were their future aims? On the prospect of alliance building by the NGOs, the 
Deputy Director of PROSHIKA commented:  
 
“NGOs do not have clandestine activities. .... Today questions have 
been raised about our existence. We have to survive. ... We have to 
understand why the fundamentalists are attacking NGOs...  We have 
to resist the fundamentalists through common understanding and 
strategic orientation.... This could be possible through collective 
action and collaboration of NGOs against the fundamentalists." 
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To achieve their aims, three goals were adopted for internal mobilisation. These goals 
were the training of trainers, module development, and identifying the elements of 
anti-progressive forces.   
 
9.9.1. Training of Trainers (TOT) 
 
ADAB decided to organise a workshop on the Training of Trainers (TOT) for 60 
trainers who would be equipped with the necessary training skills to orient a large 
number of NGOs towards the required goals of defending NGOs against 
fundamentalism. These trainers would further orientate 5,500 workers from different 
NGOs in the mobilisation.  These NGOs would be able to harness the strength of local 
NGOs working within the command area of the respective ADAB Chapters. 
  
9.9.2  Module Development   
 
The second goal of the workshops was to involve trainers in developing an anti-
fundamentalist module to be implemented by the NGOs.  An ADAB leader stated:   
"many NGOs have resented the fundamentalists. But what we need is a module with 
guidelines which they can use to fight back."  I shared my key research findings on 
the religious backlash to help develop the module.   This module would help to 
organize the rapid mobilization of "local NGOs" and had several components to 
enable the NGO staff to:  
 
 identify the fundamentalists 
 devise strategies to fight against them 
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 identify NGO strength in relation to civil society 
 identify NGO areas of operation and the number of peoples involved 
 
The module would also enable local NGOs to develop a cooperative relationship with 
national and international NGOs.  
 
9.9.3 Identification of Anti-Progressive Forces   
 
The third goal was to identify pro-fundamentalist elements in the local administration. 
ADAB chapters would also identify the pro-Jamati-i-Islam elements within different 
NGOs. They would send the list to the ADAB headquarters in Dhaka and then 
communicate the information to the heads of the respective NGOs.  It would also 
prepare a confidential list of pro-Islamic District Commissioners (DCs), Officers-in-
Charge (OCs), Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs), Thana Nirbhahi Officers 
(TNOs) and false NGOs.  The aim was to cleanse both NGOs and local 
administrations of the influence of Islamic forces.  
 
Many middle-sized and small NGOs, as well as the Church-based NGOs, refused to 
endorse the approach of ADAB and the larger NGOs in their opposition to all Islamic 
organisations.  Many of these NGOs saw large national NGOs as the real problem, as 
a threat to their organisations, placing demands on them to join the NGO alliance 
against the Islamic organisations and the fundamentalists.  
 
The phoney nature of the religious war was characterised as a „war with words‟ and 
its rhetoric was well understood by small NGOs.  These not only remained aloof from 
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the conflict, they also rejoiced in the attacks on large NGOs. Many Christian NGOs 
also refused to cooperate with ADAB‟s anti-fundamentalist campaign. When an 
ADAB-nominated trainer from GSS went to a Christian NGO, an interesting dialogue 
took place, in the presence of the author, between the trainer and staff of the said 
NGO. Below are extracts from the conversation: 
 
ADAB Trainer:   We came to orient your staff with tools and skills of the „Social 
Disaster Management and Resistance Related Orientation.‟ 
 
An NGO staff:   We are not affected by the fundamentalists. So why should we 
bother with it and create unnecessary animosities, and 
antagonise the religious elite?  When ADAB was preparing for 
the Task Force, we mobilized and organized meetings with the 
villagers. We engaged in dialogue with them and explained the 
purpose of our organisation and its programmes. The villagers 
appreciated our approach.  
 
ADAB Trainer:   How can you be sure that the fundamentalists will not attack 
you?  
 
Another NGO Staff: Your understanding of the conflict is based on false premises 
and perceptions of the situation. You criticise Moulana 
Mannan‟s daily paper Inquilab, but you do not respond to the 
criticisms made by other secular newspapers, like the Sangram, 
the Banglabazar, etc. They publish regular attacks on the 
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NGOs. We cannot accept the politically motivated „Social 
Disaster Management and Resistance Related Orientation.‟  If 
ADAB forces us to accept its package, then we will modify the 
contents of the handouts. We will modify them according to 
our needs. 
 
ADAB Trainer:   I am not in a position to change the contents of the modules. 
These are the decisions of the Task Force. We are 
implementing their decisions. 
 
9.10. External Mobilisation and Alliance Building  
 
The other aim was to seek the support of some secular political parties, but ADAB 
was careful not to ask for the support of the large political parties.  An NGO leader 
remarked, “since we (NGOs) are not political parties, we will not work with them. ... 
We will work with those political parties who do not have activists like like the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), but enjoy public 
support.”  
 
It looked in particular to the Left Democratic Front (LDF), a party which was 
ideologically opposed to the fundamentalists, and organisationally at par with ADAB 
and NGOs.   ADAB identified a "third force" within the LDF called the Sommilito 
Sanskritik Jote (collective cultural association) (SSJ).  The SSJ also represents leftist 
and atheist intellectuals who maintain a close liaison with ADAB and NGO leaders.  
The LDF was formerly a party of Marxists torn apart with the downfall of the Soviet 
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Union in the new era of globalisation.  It was one of the political parties of the left 
trying to reconstruct their identities in opposition to Islamic fundamentalism.  To 
quote a well-known SSJ poet: 
 
“the fundamentalists are against women, culture, humanity and 
progress... Those who are against fundamentalism are for secularism...  
If the blasphemy law is passed, they will kill us as they did in 1971.  
They will kill us because we write, we think freely, we sing, and we  
practice culture.  If we fear them, they will kill us... I know I might not  
survive, but I know that the enlightened person will win over the forces  
of darkness." 
 
The LDF historically opposed NGOs as agents of imperialism. Their struggle against 
the fundamentalists, however, gave the party a common platform with ADAB, 
proving the dictum: "enemy of my enemy is my friend".   
 
The LDF convened a day-long National Convention on July 27 1994 to oppose 
fundamentalism.  NGOs such as BRAC, Nijera Kori, GSS, Ain O Shalish Kendra, etc. 
sent their staff to attend the LDF convention. The LDF was looking for NGO partners 
since NGOs had not only become the victims of the fundamentalists, but also had a 
large number of organized beneficiaries. Indeed, both NGOs and the LDF needed 
each other to oppose fundamentalism. The LDF dilemma was clear, as 
philosophically opposed to both "capitalism" and "fundamentalism", yet making 
alliances with NGOs, who were considered to be agents of imperialism. Moreover, 
the Islamic organisations annoyed the Marxists as they had co-opted Marxist 
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terminology such as „Inquilab,‟ „participation‟, 'revolution‟, etc.   
 
The politics of the escalating conflict took a new turn when the newly formed alliance 
of 16 Islamic organisations announced a „Long March‟117 on 29 July, 1994, in 
opposition to the NGOs. On the agenda of the Islamic alliance meeting was how to 
put pressure on the government to pass a „blasphemy law‟ aimed at those who were 
working against Islam, namely, NGOs and Marxists.  This declaration of the Long 
March further polarised national politics into pro-NGO and anti-NGO supporters.  
Naturally, ADAB and the larger NGOs thought the proposed „blasphemy law‟ was 
directed against them. ADAB emerged as a prima donna in NGO politicking because 
it was able to bring NGO leaders together under a single umbrella to oppose the 16-
party Islamic alliance.  
 
The Government played an ambivalent role and tried to reduce the conflict. 
Government ministers spent much of their time on the subject. One minister met with 
NGO representatives; others went to visit religious organisations. The Government‟s 
approach was highly criticised by ADAB, implying that the Government was 
sympathetic to the fundamentalists.  The NGOs demanded that the pro-fundamentalist 
BNP Home Minister (1991-1995) be removed, and questioned the support for the 
fundamentalists. This attitude of ADAB‟s upset many government officials. An 
outraged District Commissioner remarked, “NGOs are losing their acceptability by 
escalating this conflict.
118” 
 
In order to counter the Long Islamic March, ADAB declared a national opposition to 
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 “Long March” is used by Islamic Organisations to mean a large demonstration. 
118
 Personal Communication 
 345 
 
the Islamic political parties and organised Trinomul Moha Samabesh (grassroots great 
assembly) to mobilise a hundred thousand women beneficiaries in front of the 
National Parliament at Manik Mia Avenue in Dhaka.  Although the social 
mobilisation NGOs brought thousands of group members from rural area to Manik 
Mia Avenue, BRAC refused to cooperate on three pretexts.  First, there were no 
toilets for women beneficiaries. Secondly, ADAB did not make clear who would bear 
the cost of transporting the beneficiaries to Dhaka.  Finally, ADAB did not make any 
preparations to provide security to the women in case of attack by Islamists .   
 
9.11. NGO Piliticking and Islamic Microfinance 
 
NGOs, heavily reliant on information from various politicised forms of media 
dominated middle class intellectual voices, rather than on villagers opinions 
misconstrued the whole conflict. The dependency of NGO leaders on western ideas 
leads to an anti-research-minded attitude (Mannan 2006), captured in the following 
remark by an NGO leader:    
 
“it is true that we work for the poor.  However, we feel comfortable to discuss 
the causes of poverty not with the poor, but with bideshis (foreigners). 
Bideshis have the money, ideas and real insights into poverty. This is what the 
poor need most.”    
 
The NGO leadership was able to convince donors that the opposition was the result of 
the secularising impact of development at the expense of Islamisation. Convinced of 
the truth of this claim, donors rewarded NGOs. The ADAB director informed me that 
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a donor promised to allocate funds so that ADAB could buy its own land and 
construct its own office
119
.   
    
The religious backlash had deep impact on the NGO movement, dividing into two 
clear streams. The first stream is led by BRAC and other NGOs with strong micro-
credit programmes. Micro-credit NGOs are quick to reach compromises with 
fundamentalists and Islamists.  They fear that any further religious conflict could 
jeopardise their credit programmes.  An informant remarked, “what we  fear  is anti-
NGO rumours spreading further, and the group member revolting and refusing to 
repay their loans. This would be disastrous for us. We cannot afford conflict.” The 
income from micro-credit not only ensures the organisational sustainability of NGOs, 
but also reduces dependency on donors.   
 
The second stream is led by social mobilisation NGOs under the leadership of 
PROSHIKA.  They saw the conflict as an opportunity to effectively neutralise 
fundamentalism and promote democracy, human rights and civil society. An NGO 
leader remarked, “the conflict is a rare opportunity for us. It exposed the dirty face of 
fundamentalism.  We must work to silence the Islamist voice forever by promoting 
democracy.”      
 
The irony of post-conflict developments is that the more micro-credit NGOs 
compromised with Islamists, the more they were able to transform into Micro-finance 
Institutes (MFI).  This in turn encouraged many Islamic NGOs to start their own 
micro-credit projects. Bangladesh is also one of the first to introduce Islamic 
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Later donors cancelled this decision to fund ADAB to avoid NGO politicking.  
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microfinance (Goud n.d. :1). The Islamic microfinance institution (MFI) unlike NGOs 
does not rely on the financial principles of profit-earning, interest-based debt, forced 
recovery through peer-group pressure, commercial motivation; instead it relies on 
sharia (religious law) to provide interest-free loan and charity (Kaleem and Ahmed 
2009:12). Islamic MFIs undermine riba (interest and usury), but focuses on profit, 
risk-sharing and rewards distributed between MFI and clients. Although Islamic 
scholars have developed several models like murabaha
120
, Mudaraba
121
, 
Musharaka
122
, Ijara
123
 and Istinsa
124
 (Segrado 2005), they have yet to go long way in 
developing appropriate management systems in relation to poverty and Islamic 
finance.  Islamic MFIs are prone to risk since do not rely on strictly financial formulae 
in disbursing money.  A study on three Bangladesh Islamic MFIs shows slow 
progress in disbursing money (Goud n.d.:1-2). The largest Islamic MFI Bangladesh 
Chashi Kalyan Samity (BCKS) run by Jamat-i-Islam collapsed in the wake of the 
global financial crisis (TDS, December 20. 2009).  On the contrary, the more social 
mobilisation NGOs oppose fundamentalism, the more they suffer the consequences. 
For example, the GSS and Saptagram Nari Swanirvar Parishad (feminist NGOs) 
faced organisational dissolution in the aftermath of the conflict.  The government 
blocked the donors‟ fund to PROSHIKA since 2001. This funding blockage not only 
threatened the organisational existence of PROSHIKA, it also affected over 200 small 
NGOs that receive partnership funds from PROSHIKA.  
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MFI buys goods and resells them to clients for the cost of goods plus a markup for administrative 
cost 
121
 MFI and client is partner, with the MFI investing money and the client investing in labour. 
122
 It is joint projects and profits are shared in pre-agreed ratios but loses are born in proportion to the 
equity participation 
123
MFI leases an asset to its customer agreeing on lease payments for a certain period of time, but 
excluding the option of ownership for the client. 
124
 It is pre-delivery financing and leasing structured mode that is used mostly finance long term 
projects. 
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9.12:  Discussion and Reflection 
 
The low level of understanding of the cultural problems associated with social 
transformation has led to high-level political conflicts. It is obvious that the social 
transformation induced by globalisation, along with local changes brought about by 
NGOs has resulted in a new crisis. Having seen NGOs‟ influence in terms of the 
changes taking place, while unaware of the influence of the market and globalisation, 
people tended to blame NGOs for the unpopular aspects of social change. At the same 
time, the elite NGO leadership misunderstood  the social origins of the conflict 
despite their closeness to their beneficiaries: they misinterpreted the reality on the 
groud. It is NGO activities who have created conditions for their own opposition. It 
seems that NGO intervention, especially their micro-credit programmes, has had a 
deep impact on transformations in the rural social structure and poverty which, in 
turn, has spawned a clash of values.   
 
The strategic choices made by NGOs in dealing with fundamentalists have polarized 
the development community and civil society into two broad streams. The first stream 
is represented by the social mobilization-NGOs, which consider Islamic 
fundamentalism as a threat to development.  The second stream is represented by 
NGOs that have credit and health programs. They believe that social mobilization-
NGOs are merely making exaggerated claims about Islamic opposition.  The real crux 
of the problem is that while NGO projects are transforming structures and 
relationships in society, most of these projects produce disappointing results in terms 
of alleviating poverty and so tend to generate cultural and religious crises.   
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Such debate is generic to development not only because NGOs are involved in the 
transformative politics of empowering women which works to thwart the male 
dominated power structure in rural society, but also because of reflection of a 
complicated global polity that intrudes into local situations under the shade of a “clash 
of civilisations” (Huntington 1993)125. As a result, NGOs claim to represent a 
progressive force while all religious groups were lumped together in a regressive 
force symbolised by Jamati-i-Islam. They failed to not only distinguish between pro-
NGO and anti-NGO religious groups, but also failed to recognize opposition between 
the Kuami Madrassah, the true architect of the conflict, and Jamati-i-Islami, which 
remained passive throughout.  The next chapter (chapter 10) concludes by discussing 
the relationships within the NGO-nexus to wider social transformation.  
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 350 
 
CHAPTER TEN 
 
DEVELOPMENT,  DISCONTENT AND DISCOURSE 
 
10. Introduction 
 
Social transformation in Bangladesh involves interaction between diverse ideologies 
(Western, Bengali, Christian, Islamic), institutions (state, donors, market, civil society 
etc.) and individuals (families, communities, culture, agencies) that influence one 
anothers‟ realities. Sometimes these forces complement and cooperate with each 
other, at other times they engage in contests and conflicts. Through this process of 
interaction and response, engaging with each other‟s existing ideologies, institutions 
and individual views they create new orders and transformations.   This takes place 
within the context of capitalist framed development, which is a „geographically 
uneven, profoundly contradictory‟ set of processes, which came to dominance in a 
context of decolonization and the Cold War (Bebbington et al. 2008:5). This spreads 
Western concepts and values - such as democratization, the free market, human rights 
and individual freedom - and is occurring in various guises across the globe, effecting 
rapid change (Rio and Smedal 2009:2). 
 
The role of NGOs in social transformation is complex as they often have their own 
approaches to development.  On the whole, they are unconcerned about how to 
control and monitor the social and political forces that their transformative activities 
unleash.   They tend to undermine existing arrangements with their development ideas 
and issues.  The NGO approach to social transformation is through projects often seen 
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as alternative to the state and market, such as microfinance, empowerment of the poor 
and women, community development etc.. In particular, NGO interventions, such as 
those of BRAC, feature more „micro-informed‟ people-centred thinking that views 
social transformation in terms of participation, empowerment and capacity building 
(Tembo 2003:19). This sort of approach is an improvement over earlier ones, where 
the planners neither met the people, nor were people‟s views reflected in the planning 
process (Justice 1986:1). 
 
Following BRAC‟s lead, the current approach employed by NGOs is to implement 
numerous small projects in different development areas.  The success of one NGO 
over another depends to a large extent on how it scales up projects in order to expand 
its coverage of the country, increasing its impact on society and the economy. The 
scaling up of projects requires the recruiting of more personnel, opening more branch 
offices and village organizations, and developing further projects to engage with 
beneficiaries. Two types of scaling up occur. The first is „additive scaling up‟, which 
has several forms, ranging from simple replication of activities, to vertical integration, 
which strengthens an existing activity by establishing forward or backward linkages 
between production and the market, and horizontal integration, where a program that 
begins with one or two components has other components added to it. The second 
type is „multiplicative scaling up‟, where each additional activity by the sponsor 
results in a more than proportional return (Howes and Sattar, 1992). 
 
The NGO project approach may appear impressive, with its scope for innovation, but 
if not balanced with research capacity and negotiation skills, it will have problems 
countering any negative outcomes and managing potential conflict.  The underlying 
 352 
 
assumption is that if NGOs can improve the capabilities of the poor to access assets 
and build up resources, the poor and wider society will benefit. As an example, 
BRAC seeks to create an enabling environment to improve the access of the poor to 
food, education, health care, etc. (Chowdhury and Alam 1997, Chowdhury and 
Bhuiya 2004) in contexts where religious forces may violate the human rights of the 
poor (Rafi and Chowdhury 2000).  Such an approach may alleviate the material 
poverty of the poor, but NGOs tend to overlook how it profoundly affects social 
relationships among the poor and between them and more affluent social and religious 
groups. A common outcome is a negative reaction, sometimes in the form of violent 
opposition, from communities. 
 
NGOs are quick to view any opposition to development as informed by religion, 
namely Islam.  Such religious opposition to NGOs is linked to the myth of religious 
violence, which is a Western construction (Cavanaugh 2009). The antagonism 
between NGOs and religious groups is well known.  Its origins lie in the processes of 
transformation of values that are an outcome of NGO interventions. NGOs, as bearers 
of Western „universal‟ values intervene in a society where the underlying values 
system is based on hierarchy.  NGOs often overlook that their interventions challenge 
these hierarchical social arrangements.  Consequently, they encounter strong reactions 
because religious values inform these arrangements where “purity would not only 
encompass impurity, but by extension religion would encompass politics as religious 
status would encompass political power” (Rio and Smedal 2009:8). As a result, when 
protests occur, religious leaders come to the forefront as their support is rooted in the 
community, including the poor.  The hierarchy that governs values and practices of all 
kinds may crumble if it fails to withstand the NGO onslaught. Apparently, modern 
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NGOs supported by donor finance and ideologies confront weaker hierarchical 
arrangements, However, old values do not completely disappear, and new values are 
not entirely dominant. There is a mixture of Western ideas that come with 
development with local hierarchical values.  There are problems agreeing how to 
accommodate to these new values, sometimes with confrontation, confusion and 
conflict. 
 
The Western ideology and ethos of development are not the problem; the problem 
relates to two distinct weaknesses in NGOs as agents of development.  Firstly, NGOs 
choose to ignore the fact that the foundational concepts of development ideology and 
its assumption of universal values are part of the Western belief and value system. 
Secondly, NGO dependency on donors inhibits them from analysing their own society 
and culture. NGOs adopt the guise of secularism, and choose to ignore that while 
religious beliefs and practices may change they are on the whole a conservative force 
(Béteille 2006:39). The outcome is that NGOs fail to contextualise development and 
question its universal values in a culturally sensitive way. Lately, many NGOs have 
applied participatory research methods to collect local information without knowing 
how exactly to incorporate these into the planning process when they challenge the 
Western development paradigm. Failure to adapt projects to local culture leads to at 
least three difficulties.  Firstly, the development agenda is itself de-contextualised as 
Western universal values are taken as mere development “ideas.”, which may threaten 
the lifestyle, culture, religion and behaviour of people. Secondly, when development 
ideas claim to be all-encompassing, they promote a Western sense of totality which 
leaves nothing outside of itself, whereas in a hierarchical ideology, each element is 
related to others as, to a large context, one totality needs another totality to encompass 
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it. Thus, with hierarchical values, “totalities are, therefore, not closed, but open” 
(Iteanu 2009:340). Finally, NGOs nurture a Western idea of equality that promotes 
individualism, setting conditions for competition, which may result in new capitalist-
style inequalities. 
 
NGOs are important development agents along with other forces of change, but 
because of their indifference to local culture, people may blame them for all their 
problems and confusion. This has consequences for the NGOs. For example, when 
BRAC encountered conflict and confrontation, it reacted by trying to maintain a low 
profile and weather the storm. But smaller NGOs with fewer resources have faired 
less well.  Leading NGOs that promoted conflict through a lack of analysis have 
negatively affected these other NGOs, some of which are now on the verge of 
dissolution. 
 
This thesis shows how NGOs have become a factor in social transformation in 
Bangladesh promoting the dependency of the poor on their projects.. The encounter 
between Western universal value and Bengali hierarchical value syatem initially takes 
place within the context of NGOs‟ activities, but it may spill over into the wider 
society.  I have argued that adherence to development concepts and theories (see 
Chapter Three) results in an amalgation of diverse cultures within NGOs (see Chapter 
Five) and local villages (see Chapters Seven and Eight).  Projects largely fail to take 
into account traditional values and inherited knowledge of local people.  Every few 
years, new concepts and ideas are introduced replacing the earlier ones. These do not 
originate from earlier experiences of the NGOs, but are imported from the West and 
put forward as „universal values‟.  
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A new situation has emerged in which people engaged in development adhere neither 
to old values nor to new ones.  Firstly, they seek to reproduce old values in such a 
way as to fit with the new values embedded in development. Secondly, the acceptance 
of developmental values brings about, to a certain extent, some changes in social 
arrangements. Thirdly, Western values may bring about the erosion of local 
knowledge, the product of the historical accumulation of experiences.  Fourthly, 
NGOs encourage people to adapt to the changing development paradigms, only for  
 
Photo 10.1. Hybrid Culture 
 
Source: Shah Alam 
 
them to discover that the system is modified or even changed in five to six years time. 
Western and Bangladeshi values arise from two different ideological systems which 
 356 
 
have different histories and cultures. When projects laden with Western ideas of 
equality come into contact with Bangladeshi hierarchical values, there are three 
consequences. Firstly, some local values are assimilated with project values; 
secondly, some hierarchical values interact negatively with project values and, thirdly, 
projects may meet with opposition and provoke a religious backlash. 
 
NGOs started their development journey with an anti-market rhetoric more in tune 
with local values, but gradually changed to promote a market policy contrary to the 
morality they promoted earlier.  The criticism of NGOs is that, whether they 
incorporate Bengali morality or market principles in projects, they always justify their 
interventions by portraying them positively; they subsequently ignore or fail to 
recognise the possible consequences of their projects. The swing in NGO approaches 
comes about because mechanisms to check NGO accountability by the state are weak. 
Furthermore, NGOs can decide their own agendas because the state has failed in the 
past to deliver the resources and provide minimum welfare for the millions of poor.  
But NGOs, which claim that they are working to alleviate the poverty, cannot provide 
evidence for this either, even after thirty five years in Bangladesh 
    
The project management of the NGOs seeks to follow Western precepts. The West 
sees itself as initiating positive social change in the underdeveloped and crisis prone 
South, regions characterised by hunger, poverty, natural disaster, etc. The poverty 
focus produces two powerful images: the economically and technologically advanced 
West and the poverty-stricken South. The need to reduce poverty in the South has 
created the space for Western-style development. The understanding of development 
of the privileged West differs significantly from the experience of development in the 
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South. Development is a complex process.  The notion of poverty is now contested. 
For instance, Bangladesh ranked 41st among the 178 countries in the “Happy Planet 
Index (HPI)” leaving behind  many “advanced” countries of the world (TNN 2006:1).    
 
This thesis explored how development is „managed‟ by focusing on the culture, 
practice and social organisation of NGOs and the role of actors such as managers, 
researchers, project beneficiaries, etc. The Western development paradigm is 
established in the minds of the NGO elite, who have internalised its beliefs, categories 
and modes of thinking. Development has created a class of actors in developing 
countries, which still fits the colonial description of Lord Macaulay, who in 1835 
described in his “Minute on Indian Education” educated Indians as “a class of 
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian 
in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” 
(Bhabha 1994:87).  These development personnel seek to reduce poverty according to 
the ideas promoted by Western donor agencies (see Chapter Three). The Bengali 
elite‟s perception of poverty does not match the experience of the indigenous poor.  
This elite “internalize the blue print of the western model to the point where it 
becomes part of their make-up (their world-taken-for-granted), and they follow it 
without question” (Bhuiyan et.al.  2008:232).   
 
Terje Tvedt goes on from this to write, “many NGOs do not have any particular 
mission, except for one – they are in it for business” (Tvedt 1998:215). The integrity 
of NGOs is now in question. This raises the question:  Are NGOs interested in seeing 
poverty continue so that they can attract foreign funds? The noble laureate 
Muhammad Yunus said, “the seed of poverty are not in the people but in the 
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institutions, policies and concepts made by the people” (Yunus 2007:16). Bhuiyan 
et.al. argue that the western intervention give rise to numerous institutions and 
strategies for development that could neither liberate the masses from hunger and 
starvation nor bring about their political freedom (Bhuiyan et.al.  2008:232).      
  
The management of development contributes to the shaping of the organisational 
culture of NGOs (see Chapter Five). This culture develops through the interlinking 
and interaction of several layers over development issues. These are transferred to 
indigenous NGOs through a complex international bureaucracy. The NGOs translate 
these issues and ideas into projects. The process of introduction, implementation, 
coordination and completion of projects serve to build up the organisation‟s culture. 
Once a project is completed, another begins.  With each new project, new staff are 
recruited. Some experienced staff, from completed projects, are made redundant, even 
though they may wish to work on the new projects. Those fortunate enough to secure 
positions in the new projects may feel that their experience is being used to build the 
careers of new staff and fear that once they have acquired the necessary skills, their 
own expertise will be redundant and their employment terminated. This can result in 
tensions in organisations and projects.  Another source of tension is where 
conventional Western development management theories do not fit with actual 
management of an NGO in developing countries.  The work of most NGOs‟ is 
undertaken in non-Western contexts; this requires a culturally appropriate 
management system. We find that development interventions frequently take the form 
of a cultural encounter at the level of both the organisation and the individual (Lewis 
2001:103). 
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Many Bangladeshi NGOs are moulded by neo-liberal market forces and focus on 
micro-credit operations (Zaman et al. 2006). In the process of implementing this 
agenda informed by “universal” values and preoccupations, NGOs transform their 
organisations, which have  wider implications for society. The development values 
that NGOs promote may not always fit in with the local culture. These values are 
narrow compared to Bangladeshi culture, which comprises at least three cultural 
dimensions: the Islamic, the traditional and the modern
126
. It is possible that while 
Western ideas may match one of these dimensions, they may  also ignore culture and 
religion. In ignoring fundamental differences, Western development discourse acts as 
an anti-politics machine, “depoliticising everything it touches” (Ferguson 1990: xv).  
Escobar speaks of “a space in which only certain things could be said and imagined” 
(Escobar 1995:39). This can lead to a religious backlash on NGOs in the Bangladeshi 
context (see Chapter Nine).   
 
Chapter Eight uses the micro-credit system to illustrate the way in which neo-liberal 
market philosophy and ideas have come to „colonise‟ the development sector into 
Bangladesh;heavily promoted by donor organisations,  they are now on the agenda of 
practically every development NGO (Mawdsley et al. 2002:1). The introduction of 
associated values has occurred gradually, leading to a process of change in local 
values and their meaning systems. NGO credit has changed the traditional meaning of 
Taka-poisha (money), which was previously used to maintain social relationships. 
Money has lost its role in social relationships, acting now as an all encompassing 
force (see Chapter Eight). The reason why money seems to have a new power is 
because it can buy innumerable, formerly unknown objects (Simmel 1978:244).   
                                                     
126
 The population of Bangladesh is predominantly Muslim and around 15 percent population are 
Hindu, Buddhist, Christians, tribal, etc.   
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Development discourse establishes the control and dominance of Western ideas 
through various sophisticated strategies. It may be that ever-changing development 
issues, agendas and strategies indicate the tenuous hold of Western power over the 
process.  Escabor (1995) contends that since the Second World War a global language 
has emerged that  encompasses development, underdevelopment and the subjects of 
development. A body of practices has followed, centred around planned interventions. 
There are two hegemonic views of such development. In the first, developing 
countries are shown as low on the scale of progress by which societies are mapped 
(Tucker 1999:8). In the second, many speculate that the society and history of 
non-Europeans that arises is ethnocentric in that such people exist without history and 
with a diminished cultures (Wolf 1982).    
 
It has become popular, of late, to discredit the idea of a hegemonic discourse of 
development. Claims about the existence of such a discourse fall short on two 
grounds. In the first place, “there have always been a multiplicity of voices within 
development, even if some are more powerful than others” (Grillo and Stirrat 
1997:22). Development actors are not moulded within a single frame of discourse. 
Even where one discourse appears dominant, there are always parallel, residual or 
emerging alternatives. In the second place, any foreign discourse is interpreted 
differently at the local level. “It is now recognised that there is an interplay of 
discourses” (Hilhorst 2003:9-10). The relation between dominant and counter-
discourses is dynamic and leads to negotiations at the interfaces of the encounters.  
The meaning of development is renegotiated in the local context (Hilhorst 2003:81).  
For example, when BRAC‟s Non-Formal Primary Schools (NFPE), which promoted 
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secularism were burnt down by Islamists, it quickly introduced the verses of the holy 
Qu‟ran to be recited everyday at the start of the school day. This policy neutralised 
religious oppositions and school participants were happy to claim that NFPE 
promotes Islam.   
 
The development narratives, that this thesis describes, have some important 
consequences. Firstly, while development takes place in developing countries, its 
management is a global process. Development is a multi-layered and multi-sited 
phenomenon.  It starts in the West with ideas and models that are translated into 
projects and programmes to be implemented in the South. The process of their 
translation into projects involves many actors and stakeholders interacting in different 
organisations on both global and local scales.  
 
Secondly, a critical factor to NGOs and development agencies is the management of 
the presentation of poverty discourse (see Chapter Five).  In seeking to tackle the 
problem of poverty, NGOs create new sets of problems. To solve these new problems, 
they implement new interventions, approaches and projects (see Chapter Six).  In this 
way, the poverty discourse allows development agencies to import foreign ideas and 
theories into Bangladesh.   
 
Thirdly, the development funds and capital that flow into the NGO sector come from 
the West: the capitalist world. Western capitalism  is both exploitative and humane.  
The exploitative face is evident in neo-liberal market practices, particularly in profit-
seeking behaviour (Mannan 2005). For example, many NGOs organize and train the 
poor to produce for the market. These NGOs pay low wages to these producers, while 
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selling their products at a good profit.  As a result, often the products  of NGO 
affiliated poor remained unsold.  When one NGO failed to sell its product, it forced its 
staff to buy back the unsold products.  An ex-staff member writes
127
:     
 
“after the Eid128 of 1996, I went to NGO‟s Kishoregonj area office to 
expose myself to field activities. One afternoon, after returning back from 
a distant village, I was chatting with the Branch Manager in his office. In 
the midst of our chat I noticed a few full sacks lying on the floor in the 
corner of the office. I couldn‟t resist my curiosity. These sacks were full of 
luxurious garments made by Berong
129
. This seemed to me a strange sight 
in a development office. I racked my brain but could not come up with a 
guess as to why they were there. The manager relented only after forceful 
insistence. The sacks contained leftover products from the Dhaka Berong 
that were not sold during the last Eid. Head Office had sent these to area 
offices with an instruction to sell these to the locality. Who would buy 
such expensive garments in a locality where most of the people struggled 
for a marginal level of survival? The manager succeeded in selling a few 
to his family members and to pay for the rest he collected money from the 
NGO members by charging them an extra service fee though no service 
was provided. The money was sent to Head Office where it was recorded 
that the people, who once were poor, were now affluent enough to afford 
such expensive garments.  
 
                                                     
127 
The ex-staff sent me an email on 11 July 2006 narrating his experience in NGO 
128
 Eid is a Islamic religious festival 
129 
Berong is a marketing outlet which is comprised of chain of shops of NGO 
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To a development researcher, who might base his research on the recorded 
information found at NGO head office, this would undoubtedly confirm 
the dazzling development achieved by NGO in its endeavour towards the 
eradication of poverty.” 
 
The humane face of capitalism is seen in the generous donations to governments and 
NGOs in developing countries (Silk 2004).  Development agencies and NGOs seek to 
cover up the exploitative face of capitalism and present its humane face. NGOs thrive 
on the humane face of capitalism.     
 
Finally, development pulls poor people into its projects in a way that dis-empowers 
them, destroying their independent spirit, knowledge and skills to engage in local self-
help initiatives. In other words it leads to dependency. This dependency results from 
Western scientifically informed projects eroding the indigenous knowledge of the 
poor. Furthermore projects may favour the rich over the poor and promote conflict 
between them. The resulting dependency of the poor is metaphorically described by 
Paul Sillitoe as the expectation that the poor should “eat cake.” But that “making the 
cake bigger paradoxically reduces the poor ever more to scavenging for crumbs” 
(Sillitoe 2002b:6). This situation could be overcome by promoting a development 
based not on western-informed projects, but on an indigenous knowledge approach 
that “introduces other cultural perspectives on the direction of change, voices which 
anthropology fights to make heard” (Sillitoe  2002a:7).  
 
NGOs are not in a position to offer new avenues and alternatives to bring the poor out 
of their poverty (Ullah and Routray: 2007).  Indeed, the disempowerment of the poor 
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sustains the development process upon which NGOs depend. Over the last thirty five 
years, poverty in Bangladesh has not decreased; rather the huge development efforts 
by government and NGOs have changed the nature of poverty itself.  For example, 
thirty years ago, half-naked poor people could be seen everywhere. Now this is rare, 
but still poverty persists with many poor living on streets and slums. The NGOs have 
flourished without being able to dent the nature of poverty.         
 
NGOs are the bearers of a hybrid identity. Hybridity acquires a new meaning in 
Bangladesh with the interference of development agencies and NGOs in the „cultural 
domain‟ which covers women, family, religion, social and economic identity, etc. that 
people jealously guarded from colonial intrusions, particularly with the nationalist 
movement (Chatterjee 1993:6).  NGOs are attempting to transform the cultural 
domain for material gain through development. People acknowledge that the NGOs‟ 
contribution to the development of a hybrid culture has resulted, to a large extent, in 
the stigmatisation of NGOs by the wider civil society.  
 
NGOs present themselves as a positive force of development (World Bank 1996; 
Shailo 1994), while, at the same time, they are subject to severe criticism in the local 
media
130
. In the same way, this thesis aimed „not to describe the moon as a moon‟ but 
tried to explain what lies behind the moon
131.‟  Traditional hierarchical relations and 
exchanges are converted into hybrid ones to the benefit of NGOs. In this hybrid 
culture everyone acts according to the imperatives of development. No one has 
control. It is a „cultural system‟ responding to a global process.  NGOs have 
developed socio-political structures through which they gain access to material, social 
                                                     
130 
The local daily news papers, particularly in Bengali, regularly publish and criticise the negative roles 
of NGOs in Bangladesh  
131 
This phrase is used by Professor B.K.Jahangir.   
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and ideological resources to further their power, rather than concentrating on their 
originally expressed aim to alleviate poverty in underdeveloped countires.  There 
appears to be a distinct lack of basic research into the local problems, prior to the 
NGO‟s intervention.  
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APPENDEX-1 
The Project History of BRAC‟s Rural Development Programme 
Year Programmes Nature of Projects Remarks 
1980 1. Outreach 
Programme 
2. Rural Credit 
and Training 
Project 
(RCTP) 
Class Awareness-Raising 
1.Consciousness-Raising 
Projects 
Saving and Credit 
2.Training and Supply of 
credit for Income 
Generation 
Outreach Programme 
was built on the Freireian 
concept of „pedagogy of 
the oppressed‟. Target 
group would become 
conscious of exploitation 
by starting their income-
generating activities and 
control over own 
incomes.    
1986 Rural 
Development 
Programme 
(RDP) 
RDP through economic 
activities and supply of 
credit 
RDP has evolved by 
merging both the 
Outreach and RCTP as 
donors felt  Outreach was 
making the poor to adopt 
violent means of change 
1991 RDP 
Rural Credit 
Project (RCP)  
Class Awareness-Raising 
1.Functional Education 
Saving and Credit 
2. Savings and Credits 
Projects 
3. Sectoral Projects:  
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery 
1.RCP would evolve 
from RDP with 
assumption that RDP 
would reach 
sustainability and self-
finance its activities. 
2. Savings and Credit 
projects supported the 
sectoral projects. 
 
1992 RDP 
RCP 
Boar Fishing 
IGVGDP 
Class Awareness-Raising 
1.Functional Education 
Saving and Credit 
2.Savings and Credits 
Projects 
Sectoral Projects: 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable 
Cultivation  
Turning point in BRAC 
as it systematized its 
credit and savings policy 
by introducing an 
Accounts Manual 
 
Boar Fishing in 
collaboration with 
Fishery Ministry 
 
Introduced new projects 
of Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, 
Cottage Industry, 
Vegetable Cultivation 
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1993 RDP (RCP) 
IGVDP 
SLDP 
Social Awareness-Raising 
1.Social Awareness 
Education (SAE) 
2. Paralegal Project 
Saving and Credit 
Savings and Credits 
Projects 
Sectoral Projects: 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable 
Cultivation 
1. SAE introduced by 
modifying Functional 
Education.  SAE focused 
not on class exploitation, 
but on social change 
process                  
 
3. Paralegal Project 
provided training on law 
matters 
3. SLDP started in 
collaboration with 
government with FAO 
support. 
1994 RDP (RCP) 
SLDP 
(+IGVDP) 
Awareness-Raising 
1. Social Awareness 
Education (SAE) 
2. Gender Awareness and 
Analysis Course 
(GAAC) 
3. Human Rights and 
Legal Education 
(HRLE)  
Saving and Credit 
Savings and Credits 
Projects 
Sectoral Projects 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery  
1. HRLE replaced the 
Paralegal Project. HRLE 
exclusive focused on law 
and legal right issues. 
2.Housing Project and 
Maize Cultivation 
introduced. 
3. Shuruchi Restaurant 
and  Shuponno Grocery 
run by women. 
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1995 RDP (RCP) 
SLDP  
Legal and Gender 
Awareness Raising 
1. HRLE  
2. Gender Quality Action 
Learning (GQAL) 
Saving and Credit 
Savings and Credits 
Projects 
Sectoral Projects: 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery 
Financing  
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU) 
SAE dropped from the 
RDP 
GQAL replaced GAAC 
1996  Awareness Raising 
1. Gender Quality Action 
Learning (GQAL) 
2.HRLE  
Saving and Credit 
 Savings and Credits 
Projects  
Sectoral Projects: 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery 
Financing 
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU) 
Trading: BRAC observed 
that a major portion of 
credit is invested in 
trading. Thus, it prepares 
its members to enter into 
the food and grocery 
business. 
 
Poultry emerge as largest 
income-generating 
project (1996:25). 
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1997 BRAC‟s 
Mission 
RDP 
Legal and Gender 
Awareness Raising 
GQAL 
HRLE 
Saving and Credit 
Saving and Credit 
Sectoral Projects 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery 
Financing 
Micro Enterprise Lending 
and Assistance (MELA) 
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU);  Programme 
Support Enterprise (PSE) 
Mission emphasizes its 
goal of empowering and 
poverty alleviation of the 
poorest people.  
  
RCP discarded 
NCU provides credit to 
many small NGOs. 
1998  Politico-Legal Awareness 
Gram Shoba 
HRLE 
Popular Theatre 
Polli Shomaj (Ward 
Federation)  
Saving and Credit 
Saving and Credit 
Sectoral Projects 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery 
Financing 
Micro Enterprise Lending 
Polli Shomaj is a ward 
federation to be used 
advantageously in UP 
election. (Outreach 
discourage election) 
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and Assistance (MELA) 
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU);  Programme 
Support Enterprise (PSE) 
 
Tissue  Culture Plants  
1999  Politico-legal Awareness 
Polli Shomaj 
Gram Shoba 
HRLE 
Popular Theatre 
Legal Aid Services 
Local Communty Leaders 
workshops  
Saving and Credit 
Saving and Credit 
Sectoral Projects 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery 
Financing 
Micro Enterprise Lending 
and Assistance (MELA) 
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU);  Programme 
Support Enterprise (PSE) 
 
Tissue  Culture Plants 
Ward Federation (Gram 
Porishad) into Polli 
Shomaj (elected 
representatives 3-7 from 
all VOs). 
2000 RDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Politico-legal Awareness 
Polli Shomaj 
Gram Shoba 
HRLE 
Popular Theatre 
Legal Aid Services 
Local Communty Leaders 
workshops  
Saving and Credit 
Saving and Credit 
Sectoral Projects 
Rural Trade, Livestock, 
BRAC now defines it as 
a national private 
development 
organisation, rather a 
NGO. 
Polli Shomaj prepare 
leadership among its 
beneficiaries, who may 
compete in UP 
 
Micro-Credit to Micro 
Finance 
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URBAN 
Programme 
Food Processing, Irrigation, 
Agriculture, Rural 
Transport, Rural Industry, 
Fishery, Sericulture, Social 
Forestry, Poultry, Cottage 
Industry, Vegetable and 
Maize Cultivation,  
Housing. 
Rural Enterprise 
Shuruchi Restaurant, 
Shuponno Grocery,  NEER 
and MED 
Financing 
Micro Enterprise Lending 
and Assistance (MELA) 
 NGO Cooperation Unit 
(NCU);  Programme 
Support Enterprise (PSE) 
 
Tissue  Culture Plants 
 
Rural Enterprise (NEER) 
and (MED) 
Source: Compiled from various internal documents and reports. 
 Italic indicates new project is introduced 
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APPENDIX-2  
The Project History of Five small NGOs  
NGOs Funding 
Period 
Project (s) Remark Donor‟s 
Expectation 
BIA 1986-
1991 
Apiculture NGOs enabled its group 
members to produce 
honey and NGOs took 
responsibility to market 
the products.  This gave 
sustainability to NGOs 
NGO suffered as 
its CEO went to 
Europe and 
never returned.  
As a result its 
management 
suffered and was 
unable to submit 
evaluation report 
to meet the 
donors‟ 
requirements. 
KS 1986-
1991 
Training in 
tailoring; 
Production for 
sale; and lastly, 
organizing small 
family. 
After completion of 
training, NGO provided 
start-up capital but there 
was no mechanism to 
maintain liaison with 
beneficiaries.    
Donors assumed 
NGO would 
develop a 
market-based 
mechanism  for 
sustainability 
through its 
beneficiaries 
DBGKS 1987-
1992 
It provided 
training and 
teaching to 
Ulemas (religious 
preachers and 
teachers) about 
Islam and family 
planning. 
Failed to show impact Donors realized 
that it cannot 
fund religious 
training until this 
NGO prove that 
its training yields 
market benefit 
and earns 
sufficiently from 
training.  
YWCA 1984-
1992 
Free School and 
Training Centre to 
help slum-
dwelling youths 
(boys and girls) to 
attain a better 
quality of life by 
securing 
employment and 
thus provide for 
themselves and 
their families 
Organisation planned to 
appoint better 
management, but this did 
not materialise due to 
failure to put aims into 
practice. 
Donor was 
willing to fund 
this NGO. It 
received funds 
for about ten 
years for the 
same project, but 
also failed to 
scale up the 
project 
COBSDP  Tree Planting and 
Social Forestry 
Projects 
Church-based 
development activities 
Funding stopped 
because donor 
discovered that 
the fund was 
misappropriated 
Source: Mannan (1993) 
  
 373 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abbey, E M. 2008. “Constructive regulation of non-government organizations.” The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 48. pp.370–376 
 
Abed, F H. 1988.  “Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee.”  In: ANGOC, NGO 
Strategic Management in Asia: Focus on Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
Manila: Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.    
 
Abed FH and Chowdhury AMR .1997. “The Bangladesh Rural Advancement  
Committee: How BRAC Learned to Meet Rural People‟s Needs Through Local 
Action.”   In:  Krishna, A. et al. (eds) Reasons for Hope. Instructive Experiences in 
Rural Development.  New Delhi:Vistaar Publications    
 
Abed, F.H and Matin, I. 2007. “Beyond Lending. How Microfinance Creates New 
Forms of Capital to Fight Poverty.” Innovations. pp. 3-17 
 
Abecassis, D. 1990. Identity, Islam and Human Development in Rural Bangladesh Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd. 
 
ADAB. 1991. Unnayon O Gonotantrayoner Nun-no-tomo Kormochuchi: Besarkari 
Unnayon Songsthashumuher Prostabona.  Dhaka:ADAB 
 
Adhikary, R.C. and Rahman H, 1999.  Cultural Practices and Rice Yield. An Image of 
the Level Barind.  Bogra:Rural Development Academy. 
 
Adnan, S. 2007. “Departures from Everyday Resistance and Flexible Strategies of 
Domination:  The Making and Unmaking of a Poor Peasant Mobilisation in 
Bangladesh,” Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 7. No. 2, pp:183-224.  
 
Adnan, S. 1997. “Class, caste and Samaj relations among the peasantry in 
Bangladesh. Mechanisms of stability and change in the Daripalla villages, 1975–86.”  
In: J. Breman, P. Kloos and A. Saith (eds.), The Village in Asia Revisited, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
 374 
 
 
Adnan, S and Rahman HZ.  1979. “Peasant Classes and Land Mobility: Structural 
Reproduction and Change in Rural Bangladesh.”  In: Islam, M et al.   Studies in Rural 
History.  Dacca: Bangladesh Itihas Samity.      
 
Agarwal, A. et.al. 2007. “Philanthropy and Law in South Asia.  Recent Developments 
in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.” Asia Pacific Philanthropy 
Consortium.  ISTR (http/www.istr.org) accessed on 11.01.2008.    
 
Ahmad, I. 1978. “Introduction”. In: Ahmad, I (ed) Caste and Social Stratification 
among the Muslims.  Delhi: Manohar Book Service 
 
Ahmad, Q. K. (ed). 2007. Socio-Economic and Indebtedness-Related Impact of 
Micro-Credit in Bangladesh. Dhaka: Action Aid, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, and 
University Press. 
 
Ahmad, M M. 2002. NGO Field Workers in Bangladesh.  Hants: Ashgate 
 
Ahmad, M and Jahan, R. 2002.  Investing in Ourselves. Giving and Fund  
Raising in Bangladesh. Philippine: Asian Development Bank 
 
Ahmed, I. 1985. "Bangladesh Aid Group and the Question of "Political Stability". 
Critical note," in Khan, M.S (ed).  Politics and Stability in Bangladesh: Problems and 
Issues. Jahangirnagar: Jahangirnagar University, pp. 89-91. 
 
Ahmed, M. 1999.  Bottom Up. NGO Sector in Bangladesh.  Dhaka: Community 
Development Library 
 
Ahmed, R. (ed). 2001. Understanding the Bengal Muslims. Interpretative Essays.  
New Delhi:Oxford University Press 
 
AR. 1987.  “Shimer Bhahira Daetoo Deya Hocche” Weekly Akota. 10 July.         
 
 375 
 
Alam, M.  2008. „Who Benefit at What Cost‟. Farmers‟ Experiences of Rice 
Cultivation in Bangladesh. Case Stories Collection on Rice Cultivation in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka: Bersha Pvt. Ltd.  
 
Alam, M.  2001. Slaves of water: Indigenous Knowledge of fisheries on the  
floodplain of Bangladesh.  PhD Thesis. University of Durham 
 
Ali, S I. 1990. “Haor Basin Eco-System. In: Rahman et.al. (eds).  Environmental 
Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh.  Dhaka:The University Press Ltd   
 
Amin, R. 1997.  Development Strategies and Socio-Demographic Impact of Non- 
Governmental Organisations. Evidence from Rural Bangladesh. Dhaka:University 
Press  
Ltd.  
 
Aminuzzaman, S. 1998. “NGOs and the Grassroot Base Local Government in 
Bangladesh: A Study of their Institutional Interactions.”  In Hossain, F and Myllylä, S 
(eds) NGOs Under Challenge. Dynamics and Drawbacks in Development.  Helsinki: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.   
 
Aminuzzaman S, Baldersheim H and Jamil I. 2003. “Talking Back! Empowerment 
and Mobile Phones in Rural Bangladesh:  A Study of the Village Phone Scheme of 
Grameen Bank.” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No.3.   
 
Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Verso:London 
 
Appadurai, A.  1990. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy”. 
In: Featherstone, M. (ed).  Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and 
Modernity. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
 
Arce, A and Fisher, E.  2003. “Knowledge Interfaces and Practices of Negotiation: 
Cases from a Women‟s Group in Bolivia and an Oil Refinery in Wales.” In Pottier, 
 376 
 
John, et.al. (eds) Negotiating Local Knowledge. Power and Identity in Development.  
London, Sterling.Virginia: Pluto Press 
 
Arce, A and Long, N.  2000.  Anthropology, Development and Modernities. Exploring 
Discourses, Counter-tendencies and Violence. London and New York: Routledge  
 
Archetti E P. 1983.  “Comments on Social Anthropology and Underdevelopment.”  
In: Melhuus, M and Klausen (eds): Sosialantropologers Rolle I Bistandsarbeid. Oslo: 
Department of Social Anthropology. University of Oslo. 
 
Ardener, S. 1964.  “The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Association.”  
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 94, pp. 201-209. 
 
Arefeen, H.K.  1986. Changing Agrarian Structure in Bangladesh: Shimulia - a Study 
of a Periurban Village.  Dhaka: Center for Development Studies. 
 
Arens, J and J van Beurden. 1977.  Jhagrapur: Poor Peasant and Women in a Village 
in Bangladesh.  Birmingham:Third World Publication. 
 
Arizpe, Lourdes (ed.). 1996. The Cultural Dimensions of Global 
Change.  An Anthropological Approach.  Paris: UNESCO Publishing 
 
Asad, T.  1973. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. New York: Humanity 
Press 
 
Ashman, D. 1997. “Democracy Awareness Education Program of the Association of 
Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB).  Vol.1, No.2, 1997. pp.31-47. 
  
Aufrecht, S E and Bun L S. 1995.  “Reform with Chinese Characteristics: The 
Context of Chinese Civil Service Reform.” Public Administration Review. Vol.55, 
No.2 March/April 1995   
 
Avina, J. 1993. “The Evolutionary Life Cycles of Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations,”   Public Administration and Development, Vol.13, No.5, pp.453-474. 
 377 
 
 
Azad, L. 1997. Biponno Bangladesh. Rastra, Samaj o Unnayoner NGO Model. 
Dhaka:Vidya Prakashani 
 
Aziz, K.M. A. 1979. Kinship in Bangladesh. Dhaka: ICDDR,B  
 
Bamberger, M (ed). 2000. Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research in  
Development Projects.  Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
 
Bardhan, P  (ed.). 1989. Conversations between Economics and Anthropologists.   
Methodological Issues in Measuring Change in Rural India. New Delhi:Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Barker, C. 2004.  The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies. London/Thousand 
Oaks/New Delhi:  SAGE 
 
Barnett, A.S.  1977.  The Gezira Scheme: an Illusion of Development.  London: Frank 
Cass  
 
Barth, F. 1996. “Global Cultural Diversity in a „Full World Economy‟” In: Arizpe, L 
(ed).  The Cultural Dimensions of Global Change: An Anthropological Approach.  
Paris: UNESCO.   
Bebbington, A J., Hickey, S., Mitlin, D C. (eds). 2008. Can NGOs Make a 
Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives.  London & New York: Zed 
Books.   
 
Bebbington, A., Lewis, D., Batterbury, S., Olson, E., & Siddiqi MS. 2005. “Of Texts 
and Practices: Empowerment and Organizational Cultures in World Bank-funded 
Rural Development Programmes.”  Journal of Development Studies.  43(4), 2005, pp. 
597-621. 
 
Begum, A. 2000. Government-NGO Interface in Development Management.  
Experiences of Selected Collaboration Models in Bangladesh.  Tampere: University 
of Tempere   
 378 
 
 
Begum, S A. 1994. Grameen Mohilader Artho-Samajik Unnoyone BRAC-er Rindhan 
Kormochuchir Provab: Jamalpur Jillar Puchti Gramer Sommikkha.  Dhaka: Research 
Report, BRAC. 
 
BENF. 1998. Bangladesh. Evaluation of Netherlands-Funded NGOs, 1972-1996.  
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sub-Report 1998. 
 
Bertocci, P J. 2001. “Islam and the Social Construction of the Bangladesh 
Countryside” in Ahmed, Rafiuddin (ed) Understanding the Bengal Muslims. 
Interpretative Essays.  Oxford University Press:New Delhi  
 
Bertocci, P J. 1984. "Bengalis" in  Weekes, RV. (eds).  Muslim Peoples: A World 
Ethnographic Survey.  
 
Bertocci, P J. 1970.  Elusive Villages: Social Structure and Community Organization 
in Rural East Pakistan.  Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Michigan State University. 
Béteille. A. 2006.  Ideology and Social Science. New Delhi: Penguin Books 
 
Bhabha, H K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London & New York: Routledge  
 
Bhuiya, A and Chowdhury, AMR (eds). 2007.  Tackling Social Determinants of Health. 
Fifteen Years of Learning from BRAC-ICDDR,B Project in Matlab, Bangladesh. Volume 
One.   Dhaka: BRAC-ICDDR,B. 
 
Bhuiyan, A H A.,  Faraizi, A H and Mcallister, J. 2008. “Planning for the Deployment 
of Development in Bangladesh”.  Progress in Development Studies. Vol. 8, No. 3, 
pp.231-40. 
 
Bhuiyan, A H A.,  Faraizi, A H and Mcallister, J. 2005. “Developmentalism as a 
Disciplinary Strategy in Bangladesh”.  Modern Asian Studies. Vol. 39, No. 2, pp.349–
368 
 
 379 
 
Biswas, S. 2001. Brahmanbariay Trinumul Manusher Muktijuddha Utsab O 
Samabeshe Moulabadi Hamla: Ekti Parjabekshan.  Dhaka: Centre for Bangladesh 
Studies.  
 
Black, M. 1992. A Cause for Our Times. Oxfam: the First 50 Years. Oxford: Oxfam 
 
Blair, H .1997. “Donors, Democratisation ad Civil Society: Relating Theory to 
Practice.”  In: Hulme D and Edwards M (eds)  NGOs, States and Donors.  Too Close 
for Comfort?  London: Save the Children 
 
Blanchet, T. 1996. Lost Innocence, Stolen Childhoods. Dhaka: University Press Ltd.  
 
Bourdieu, P. 1977.  Outline of a Theory of Practice.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
BRAC. 2006. Annual Report.  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
BRAC. 2001. Annual Report.  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
BRAC. 1994.  A Five Year Strategy for BRAC.  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
BRAC. 1992. Annual Report.  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
BRAC .1989. Peasants Perceptions. Vol.2.  Dhaka: BRAC Publications  
 
Britan, G M and Cohen R. 1980. Hierarchy and Society. Anthropological 
Perspectives  
on Bureacracy.  Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues  
 
BSS. 1999. Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh. Dhaka:Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics. 
 
Carmen, R. 1990. Communication, Education and Empowerment.  Manchester: 
Manchester Monographs, University of Manchester 
 380 
 
 
Carroll, L. 1978. “The Reception of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, in a 
Bangladeshi Village: a Critique of Jean Ellickson, „Islamic Institutions Perception and 
Practice in a Village in Bangladesh‟”  Contribution to Indian Socioalogy. 
Vol.12.No.2. 
 
Casper, K L. n.d.  A Case Study on the Impact of Group Formation and Credit on  
Traditional Social Security.  Network and Exchange Relations of Women.  
Dhaka:PACT 
 
Cavanaugh, W.T. 2009.  The Myth of Religious Violence. Secular Ideology and the 
Roots of Modern Conflict.  Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press   
 
CDF. 2007. Bangladesh Microfinance Statistics. Dhaka: Credit and Development 
Forum and  Institute of Microfinance  
 
Cernea, M (ed.).  1985.  Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural 
Development.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chambers, R. 1995.  "Paradigm shifts and the practice of participatory research and 
developments." In:  Nelson, N and Wright, S (ed). Power and Participatory 
Development: Theory and Practice.  London: Intermediate Technology Publications 
 
Chambers, R. 1987.  „Normal professionalism and the early project process: problems 
and solutions‟,  mimeo,  Brighton: Institute for Development Studies. 
 
Chambers, R.  1983.  Rural Development: Putting the Last First. London, Longman. 
 
Chambers, R and Richards, P. 1995. “Preface.”  In: Warren, D M., Slikkerveer, L J 
and Brokensha, D. (eds).  The Cultural Dimension of Development. Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems.  London:Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd.      
 
 381 
 
Chang, W-W. 2005. “Expatriate Training in International Nongovernmental 
Organizations: A Model for Research.” Human Resource Development Review. Vol. 
4.No.4 
 
Chatterjee, P. 1993. The Nation and Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories.  New Delhi: Oxford University Press 
 
Chen, M A. 1995. “Building Research Capacity in the NGO Sector” (mimo) 
Chen, M A. 1986. A Quite Revolution. Women in Transition in Rural Bangladesh. 
Dhaka:BRAC 
 
Chhetri, R B. 1995.  “Rotating Credit Associations in Nepal: Dhikhuri as Capital, 
Credit, Saving, and Investment.”   Human Organisation, Vol.54, No.4, 1995 
 
Chowdhury, A. 1978. A Bangladesh Village: A Study of Social Stratification Dhaka: 
Center for Social Studies. 
 
Chowdhury, O.H. 1992. “Credit in Rural Bangladesh.”   Asian Economic Review, 
 Vol.34, No.2 
 
Chowdhury, AMR and  Alam, MA .1997. “BRAC's Poverty Alleviation Programme: 
What it is and what it achieved?”  In Wood, GD and Sharif IA (1997)  Who Needs 
Credit? Poverty and Finance Bangladesh.  Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Chowdhury, AMR and Bhuiya, A.  2004. “The Wider Impact of BRAC Poverty 
Alleviation Programme in Bangladesh,”  Journal of International Development. 16:369-
386. 
 
Chowdhury, A M R and Cash, RA. 1996. A Simple Solution. Teaching Millions to 
Treat Diarrhoea at Home.  Dhaka: The University Press Ltd.  
 
Chowdhury,  Z. 1996. The Politics of Essential Drugs. The makings of a Successful 
Health Strategy: Lessons from Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Ltd. 
 382 
 
Chowdhury, AMR and Bhuiya, A.  2004. “The Wider Impact of BRAC Poverty 
Alleviation Programme in Bangladesh”, ”,  Journal of International Development, 
No.16, pp.369-386 
 
Clad, J.  1986.  „The Asian Development Bank Rumbles with Discontent‟, Far East 
Economic Review 134 (48), pp. 60-66.   
 
Clay E J and Schaffer, B B.  1984. Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public 
Policy in Agricultural and Rural Development.  London, Heinemann 
  
Conyers, D. 1981.  An Introduction to Social Planning in the Third World.  
Chichester, Wiley. 
 
Cracknell, BE.  2002. Evaluating Development Aid. Issues, Problems and  
Solutions. New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications 
 
Crewe, E and Harrison, E. 1999.  Whose Development?  An Ethnography of Aid.  
Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Crooke, M. 1997. "Development Dilemmas. Understanding the Difficulties of 
Practical Altruism."  ACFOA Development Issue 1. 
 
Crow, B. 1999. “Why is agriculture growth uneven? Class and the agrarian surplus in 
Bangladesh”. In: Rogaly, B, Harriss-White, B and Bose, S (eds.), Sonar Bangla? 
Agricultural Growth and Agrarian Change in West Bengal and Bangladesh.   
Dhaka:University Press Ltd. 
 
Cusworth, J W and Franks, T R (ed).  1993. Managing Projects in Developing 
Countries. Essex:Longman Scientific & Technical 
 
Dar, S and Cooke, B. 2008. The New Development Management. London and New 
York: Zed Books 
 
 383 
 
Das, A. 1969. Bangla Shahiteya Boudhha Dharma O Samskriti. Calcutta: Calcutta 
Book House.  
 
Davies, A.  2000. Managing for a Change.  How to Run a Community Development  
Projects.  London: Intermediate Technology Publications &Voluntary Service 
Overseas 
 
Davies, M W. 1988. Knowing One Another. Shaping an Islamic Anthropology.  
London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited. 
 
Davies, D.  1987. “Public Policy-Making”, EDI Seminar Paper No.4. Washington 
DC, Economic Development Institute, World Bank   
 
Davis, M. 1983. Rank and Rivalry: The Politics of Inequality in Rural West Bengal. 
Cambridge University Press:Cambridge 
 
Desai, V and Potter, R.B. (ed). 2006. Doing Development Research. 
London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
 
Devine, J. 2009. “An Extreme Poverty Manifesto”.  Forum. Vol. 3. Issue. 11. 
Accessed on 12.12.2009. 
 
Devine, J. 2006. “NGOs, Politics and Grassroots Mobilisation: Evidence from 
Bangladesh” Journal of South Asian Development,  Vol.1, No.1.  
 
Devine, J. 2002. “Ethnography of a Policy Process: A Case Study of Land 
Redistribution in Bangladesh”.  Public Administration and Development. Vol.22. 
pp.403-414.  DOI:10.1002/pad.245  
 
Devine, J. 1996. NGOs: Changing Fashion or Fashioning Change? Occasional Paper 
02/96. Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath. Bath, UK. 
 
DKS. 1990.  Desh, Kal, Samaj (Country, Time and Society).  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
 384 
 
 Doi, A R. 1993. Women. In the Qur'an and the Sunnah. London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd. 
 
Dumont, L. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus. The Caste System and Its Implications. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Dumont, R and Paquet, C. 1983.  Self Reliant Rural Development by Full Employment 
of all Local Resources in the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh.  Dhaka:Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forest, Bangladesh. 
 
Das, A. 1969. Bangla Shahiteya Boudhha Dharma O Samskriti. Calcutta: Calcutta 
Book House.  
 
Eade, D, 1997. Development and Patronage.  London:Oxfam 
 
Eaton, R M. 1997.  The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760.  New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press 
 
Edelman, M and Haugerud, A (eds). 2005. The Anthropology of Development and 
Globalisation. From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neolibralism.  
Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Balckwell Publishing 
 
Eggers, H W. 2002. “Project Cycle Management: A Personal Reflection”.  
Evaluation. Vol 8. No.4. pp.496–504 
 
Elias S M. 1994. Koto Achenera.  Dhaka: Kashbon 
 
Elyachar. J. 2002.  “Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmentl 
Organizations, and the Value of Culture in Egypt”  Public Culture.  Vol.14. No.3.  
pp.493-513 
 
Eriksen, T H. 2007.  Globalization. The Key Concepts.  Oxford and New York: Berg 
 
Escobar, A.  1997. “Anthropology and Development” International Social Science 
Journal Vol.49. No.4. :497-515 (Quoted in Edelman and Haugerud 2005, p.40). 
 385 
 
 
Escobar, A. 2005.  “Imaging a Post-Development Era.” In: Edelman, M and 
Haugerud, A (eds.). The Anthropology of Development and Globalisation. From 
Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neolibralism.  
Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing 
Pp.341-351 
 
Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development. The making and Unmaking of the 
Third World.  Princeton University Press: Princeton and New Jersey 
 
Esman M and Uphoff, N. 1984. Local Organisations: Intermediaries in Rural 
Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
EU. 2004. Aid Delivery Methods. Vol. 1, Project Cycle Management Guidelines. 
Brussels: European Commission 
 
Evans, M. 1986. "In the Company of Skeptics: Anthropologists and Other 
Professionals", Manchester Papers on Development. Vol. II, No. 2, July   
 
Ewing, K P (updated by Mannan, M.)  2009.  “Pir.”  In: John L. Esposito 
(ed) The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World.  Oxford University 
Press, UK.  
 
Eyben, R. 1991.  The Process Approach.  Paper presented at Getting the balance right: 
How should ODA deal with cross-disciplinary issues? Natural Resource Advisers 
Conference, Bangor, July 1991).  
 
Faaland, J and Parkinson J R. 1976. Bangladesh. The Test Case of Development.  
London: C. Hurst and Company 
   
Feldman, S. 2003. “Paradoxes of institutionalisation: the depoliticisation of  
Bangladeshi NGOs”  Development in Practice, Vol.13, Number 1. 
 
 386 
 
Feldman, S. 1992. "Crisis, Islam and Gender in Bangladesh. The Social Construction 
of a Female Labor Force" in  Beneria, Lourdes and Feldman, Shelly (eds), Unequal 
Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty, and Women's Work, (Boulder: 
Westview Press Co.).  
 
Fehmin, F. Mannan, M.  Khan, MR. Akhter, S, Chowdhury, AMR.  1997. Gender 
Quality Action Learning (GQAL): From Rhetoric to Reality? Dhaka: Research and 
Evaluation Division, BRAC. 
 
Ferguson, J.  1990.  The Anti-Politics Machine: „Development‟, Depoliticisation and  
Bureaucratic State Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
Fernando, J.L. (ed). 2006a. Microfinance. Perils and Prospects.  London and New 
York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
Fernando, J.L. 2006b. “Microcredit and Empowerment of Women: Visibility without 
Power.”  In Fernando, J.L. (ed) Microfinance. Perils and Prospects.  London and 
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
Freire,  P. 1972. Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. 
 
Fruttero, A and Gauri, V. 2005. “The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location Decisions 
in Rural Bangladesh”, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.41, No.5, 2005, 
pp.759-787. 
 
Fuglesang, A. Chandler, D and Akuretiyagama, D. 1993. Participation as Process –
Process as Growth. What We can Learn from Grameen Bank Bangladesh.  Dhaka: 
Grameen Trust. 
 
Fukuyama, F. 1995. Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.  
London: Penguin Books. 
 
 387 
 
Gardner, K. 1997.  “Women and Islamic Revivalism in a Bangladeshi Community.” 
In: Jeffery, P and Basu, A (eds) Appropriating Gender: Women‟s Activism and 
Politicized Religion in South Asia.  New York: Routledge  
 
Gary, Marion L. 1999.  A People‟s History of Development. 25 Year‟s in Northern  
Bangladesh. The University Press Limited. 
 
Gauri, V and Galef, J.  2005. “NGOs in Bangladesh: Activities, Resources, and 
Governance”, World Development, Vol. 33, No. 12, pp. 2045-2065. 
 
Geertz, C.  1973.  The Interpretation of Cultures.  New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers 
 
Geertz, C.  1962. The Rotating Credit Association: A `middle rung' in development.”   
Economic Development and Cultural Change. 10, 241-263. 
 
Gellner, David N. and Hirsch, Eric (eds).  2001. Inside Organizations.  
Anthropologists at Work. Oxford, New York:  Berg 
 
Geschiere, P. 2000.  “Money versus Kinship: Subversion or Consolidation?”  The 
Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology. Vol.1, No.1. pp.54-78.     
 
Ghazanfar, S.M., 1981.  Development, Ethics, and Economics: Socio-Economic 
Justice in  Islam.  Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, 
No.2,17-32 
 
Ghimire, K.B. (ed) 2001. Whose Land? Civil Society Perspectives on 
Land Reform and Rural Poverty Reduction. Rome:IFAD/PC/UNRISD 
 
Gibb, H A R. 2002. [1929] The Travels of Ibn Battuta. Goodword Books:New Delhi 
 
Gido, J and Clements, J P. 2003. Successful Project Management. (second edition) 
Thompson South-Western: Ohio.  
 
 388 
 
Gittinger, J.P. 1982.  Economic Appraisal of Agricultural Projects.  Baltimore, John 
Hopkins Press.  
  
GOB. 1987.  Bhumi Sansker Avizan. Bhumihinder Moddey Khas Krishi Jomi 
Bontoner Niti Mala. Dhaka: Land Ministry, Peoples Republic of Bangladesh 
 
Godelier, M.  1996. “Is the West the Mirror or the Mirage of the Evolution of 
Humankind?” in Arizpe, L (ed) The Cultural Dimensions of Global Change. An 
Anthropological Approach. Paris:UNESCO Publication  
 
Goud, B. n.d. Islamic Microfinance. http://www.investhalal.org.  Accessedon 
03.10.2010. 
 
Goetz, AM. 2001. Women Development Workers. Implementing Rural Credit 
Programmemes in Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Limited 
 
Goetz, AM and Gupta, RS. 1994.  Who takes the credit? Gender, power and control 
over loan use in rural credit programmemes in Bangladesh.  Working Chapter 8. 
Sussex: Institute of  Development Studies. 
 
González, R.J. 2007. “Towards mercenary anthropology? The new US Army 
counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24 and the military-anthropology complex”.  
Anthropology Today. Vol 23 No 3, pp.14-19. 
 
Goodman L J and Love, R N (eds).  1980.  Project Planning and Management. An 
Integrated Approach.  New York/Oxford/Toronto/Sydney/Frankfurt/Paris:Pergamon 
Press 
 
Goonatilake, S. 2006. Recolonisation. Foreign Funded NGOs in Sri Lanka. New 
Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London.  
 
Greenough, P R. 1983. “Indulgence and Abundance as Asian Peasant Values: A 
Bengali Case in Point.” The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 42. No. 4. pp. 831-850.  
 
 389 
 
Grillo R and Rew, A (eds). 1985. Social Anthropology and Development Policy. 
London:Tavistock. 
 
Grillo R.D and Stirrat, R.L (eds). 1997. Discourses of Development. Anthropological 
Perspective. BERG: Oxford, New york 
 
Gunewardena, V.  1980. “Bangladesh” in  Gunewardena, Victor (ed) South Asia-
China Dialogue. Marga Institute:Colombo 
 
GUP-ACFOD. 1989.  Onudaner Bikolpo. (Alternatives to Donation).  Gonno 
Unnayan Prochesta and ACFOD-Bangladesh. 27-29 October 1989 
 
Gupta, S. 2006. “Notions of Nationhood in Bengal: Perspectives on Samaj, 1867-
1907” Modern Asian Studies. Vol.40. No.2, pp. 273-302.   
 
Gupta, A. 1997. “Discipline and Practice: “the field” as site, method, and location in 
Anthropology.”  In: Gupta, A and Ferguson, J (eds). Anthropological Locations: 
Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science, 1–46. 
 
Halder, S R and Mosley, P. 2004.  “Working with the Ultra-Poor: Learning from 
BRAC Experience”,  Journal of International Development, No.16, pp.387-406 
 
Hamer, J.H. 2009. “Money, Modernization and Ambivalence Among the Sidāma of 
Northeastern Africa. History and Anthropology. Vol.20. No.1. pp.1-14. 
 
Handy, C. 1993. Understanding Organisations. London:Penguin Books (fourth 
edition) 
 
Harper, R. 2000. “The Social Organization of the IMF‟s Mission Work: An 
Examination of International Auditing.”  In: Strathern, M (ed) Audit Cultures. 
Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy.  London & New 
York: Routledge 
 
 
 390 
 
Hart, K. 2007. “Money is always Personal and Impersonal.”  Anthropology Today.  
Vol.23. No. 5.  pp. 12-16. 
 
Hashemi, S and Ali, SA. 1996.  Internal Evaluation Report.  Institutional Evaluation 
of SMDP.  Dhaka,  Gonoshahajjo Sangstha 
 
Hashmi, TI. 2000. Women and Islam in Bangladesh.  Beyond Subjection and Tyranny.  
London & New York: Macmillan Press Ltd & St. Martin‟s Press. 
 
Hashmi, TI. 1992. Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: the Communalization of Class 
Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947.  Boulder: Westview Press 
 
Haq, AKF. 2004. “Bangali Jati” (Bengali Nation) in Musa, Monsur (ed) Bangladesh. 
An Anthology. Dhaka:Agamee Prakashani 
 
Haq, M E. 1975.  A History of Sufism in Bengal. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of  
Bangladesh 
 
Hassan, R. 1994, "Women's Interpretation of Islam." In: Thijssen, Hans (ed). Women and 
Islam in Muslim Societies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation 
Information Department, The Hague, The Netherlands 
 
Hassan, R. 1991a. "The Issue of Woman-Man Equality in the Islam."  In Hassan, R and 
Gordon, G (eds) Of the Spirit. Connecticut:Greenwood Press. 
 
Hassan, R. 1991b, "Muslim Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam" in Cooey, P M, Eakin, W R 
and McDaniel J B (eds),  After Patriarchy. Feminist Transformations of the World Religions. 
Orbis Books: Maryknoll and New York 
 
Headland, T N., Pike, K L and Harris, M. (eds). 1990.  Emics and Etics. The 
Insider/Outsider Debate.  Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
 
Heaver, R and Israel, A. 1986.  „Country commitment to development projects‟ World 
Bank Discussion Paper 4,  Washington D.C., World Bank 
 391 
 
Herbon, D.  1994.  Socio-economic Dynamics in Rural Bangladesh.  
 Aldershot, Brookfield USA,Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney: Avebury   
 
Hewitt T. 1992. “Developing Countries – 1945 to 1990.” In:  Allen, T and Thomas, A 
(eds.).  Poverty and Development in the 1990s.  Oxford: Oxford University  Press 
 
Hilhorst, D. 2003. The Real World of NGOs. Discourses, Diversity and Development.  
London, New York: Zed Books Ltd.   
 
Hinchliffe, K and Allan, B. 1983. „Public expenditure planning in Papua New Guinea: 
an evaluation of innovation‟,  World Development 11 (11), pp.957-969. 
 
Hirschmann, D.  1999. “Customer Service” In the United States Agency For  
International Development An Example of Designing a Democracy Programme in 
Bangladesh”,  Administration and Society, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 95-119 
 
Hirst, P H. 1981. “The Forms of Knowledge Revisited” in Brown, S. Fauvel J and 
Finnegan R.  Conceptions of Inquiry. A Reader.  London, New York: Methuen & The 
Open University Press. Pp.233-246. 
 
Hobart, M. 1993. An Anthropological Critique of Development. The Growth of 
Ignorance. London: Routeledge 
 
Hofstede, G. 2003 (1991). Cultures and Organizations. Intercultural Cooperation and 
Its Importance for Survival. Software of Mind.  London:Profile Books 
 
Holloway, R. 1998. Supporting Citizen‟s Initiatives: Bangladesh‟s NGOs and Sociaty.  
Dhaka: University Press Limited 
 
Holloway, R. 1997. "NGOs Losing the Moral High Ground: Corruption and  
Misrepresentation"  Discourse. Vol.1, No.2. 
 
 392 
 
Hossain, F.  2001.  Administration of Development Initiatives by Non-Governmental 
Organisations.  Tempere: Acta Universitatis Temperensis 822, University of 
Tampere. 
 
Hossain, N. 2005. “Productivity and Virtue: Elite Categories of the Poor in 
Bangladesh” World Development, Vol. 33, No.6, pp.965-977. 
 
Hossain, N. 2005. Elite Perceptions of Poverty in Bangladesh.  Dhaka: The 
University Press Ltd.   
 
Hossain, I. Sakhawat, J. Quinones, B and Rutherford S.  2000.  “Bangladesh: The 
Pioneering Country”  in Remenyi J and Quinones B (eds) Microfinance and Poverty 
Alleviation. Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific.  London and New York:Pinter 
 
Howes, M., and Sattar, M. G. “Bigger and Better? Scaling-Up Strategies Pursued by 
BRAC 1972–1991.” In M. Edward and D. Hulme (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs 
and Development in a Changing World. London: Earthscan, 1992. 
 
Hulme, D and Edwards (eds). 1997. NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for 
Comfort? London:Macmillan Press Ltd and Save the Children.  
 
Hulme, D. 1988.  “Project planning and project identification: rational, political or 
somewhere in between?”  Manchester Papers on Development, vol. IV, NO. 2 
pp.272-293.   
 
Hussain, A. 1980. Birth of Bangladesh. The Political Role of Missions.  London: The 
Islamic Foundation. 
 
Huntington, S P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate”  Foreign Affairs, 
Vol.72.No.3,pp.22-49. 
 
Huq-Hussain, S. 1995. “Fighting Poverty: The Economic Adjustment of Female 
Migrants in Dhaka.” Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.51-66 
 
 393 
 
Huq, H. 2000. People‟s Practices. Exploring Contestation, Counter-development, and 
Rural Livelihoods. Cases from Muktinagar, Bangladesh.  Wageningen: Grafisch 
Service Centrum. 
 
Indra, DM and Buchignani, N. 1997.  Rural Landlessness, Extended Entitlements and 
Inter-household Relations in South Asia: A Bangladesh Case.  The Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 24 (3),  25-64.' 
 
Ingersoll, J. 1990.. "Social Analysis in AID and the World Bank." In:  Finsterbusch, K., 
Ingersoll,J. & Llewellyn, L (eds). Methods for Social Analysis in Developing Countries.  
Boulder and London: Westview Press. 
 
Irish, L E and Simon, KW. 2005.  NGOs in Bangladesh: Legal and Regulatory 
Environment.  Dhaka: UNDP  
 
Ishtiaq, I and Mannan, M. 1996. “A Study of Government-NGO Relations in 
Bangladesh in the Period 1992-1993: Collaboration or Confrontations” in Tvedt 
Terje, Analysis of NGO Assistance in Some Selected Countries.  Center for 
Development Studies. Bergen. 
 
Islam, A.K.M. A. 1978. A Bangladesh Village. Conflict and Cohesion: 
Anthropological Study of Politics. Cambridge:Schenkman Publishing Company 
 
Islam, M and Ahmad, P. 1984. “Bangladesh: Tradition Reinforced.” In: UNESCO, 
Women in the Villages, Men in the Towns. Paris: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
 
Iteanu, André. 2009. “Hierarchy and Power. A Comparative Attempt under 
Asymmetrical Lines.”  In: Rio, M.R and Smedal,O.H. (ed.). Hierarchy. Persistence 
and Transformation in Social Formation. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
 
Jackson, A.  1987. “Reflection on Ethnography at Home and the ASA” in Jackson, 
Anthony (ed).  Anthropology at Home.  London and New York: Tavistock 
Publications 
 394 
 
 
Jahan, R. 1973. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration.  Dacca:Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Jahangir, B K. 1979. Differentiation, Polarisation and Confrontation in Rural 
Bangladesh, Dhaka: Center for Social Studies. 
 
Janes, C R.  2004. “Criticizing with Impunity? Bridging the Widening Gulf between 
Academic Discourse and Action Anthropology in Global Health.”  In: Morris, B and 
Bastin, R. (eds.) Expert Knowledge.  First World Peoples, Consultancy and 
Anthropology.  New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
 
Jamil, I.  1998a. “Transactional friction between NGOs and public agencies in 
Bangladesh: culture or dependency?”  Contemporary South Asia 7(1), 43-69. 
Jamil, I.  1998b. “Good Governance”: Tensions between Tradition and Modernity  
in Bangladeshi Public Administration.”  Asia Profile, Vol.26, No.5 
 
Jamil, I and Mannan, M. 1996. “A Study of Government-NGO Relations in 
Bangladesh in the Period 1992-1993: Collaboration or Confrontations.” In Tvedt, T, 
Analysis of NGO Assistance in Some Selected Countries. Bergen: Center for 
Development Studies. 
 
Jansen, E G. 1990. “Process of polarization and the breaking up of patron-client 
relationships in rural Bangladesh.”  In Norbye, O.D.K. (ed.), Bangladesh Faces the 
Future. Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Jansen, E G. 1993.  “Interest Groups and Development Assistance. The Case of 
Bangladesh.  The Journal of Social Studies, No.59 
 
Jansen, E G. 1987. Rural Bangladesh: Competition for Scarce Resources. 
Dhaka:University Press Ltd. 
 
 395 
 
Jansen, EG. Dolman, AJ, Jerve, AM and Rahman, RN. 1989. The Country Boats of 
Bangladesh. Social and Economic Development and Decision-Making in Inland 
Water Transport.  Dhaka:University Press Ltd. 
 
Johnson, K. 1985. “Conflicting Images and Realities in Project Planning.” Third 
World Planning Review, 7(4), pp. 351-355. 
 
Jonakhontho.  2001.  “BRAC Dairy Project Fined Taka 99 lakh.” Daily Jonakhontho. 
April 3.  
 
Jumma, M and Nasir, A. 2007.  Micro-credit Regulatory Authority Ain, 2006. (In 
Bengali). Dhaka: Aligarh Library       
 
Jun J S and Muto H. 1995. “The Hidden Dimension of Japanese Administration: 
Culture  
and Its Impact” Public Administration Review. Vol.55, No.2 March/April 1995  
 
Justice, J. 1986. Policies, Plans, and People. Foreign Aid and Health Development. 
Barkley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. 
 
Kabeer, N. 2002. „We don‟t do credit‟. Nijera kori social mobilisation and the 
collective capabilities of the poor in rural Bangladesh.  Dhaka:Nijera Kori 
 
Kabir, B M M. 2006. Politics and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. 
Dhaka: AHDPH 
 
Kafi, S A. 1992. Landless Peoples Organization in Bangladesh. NGO Experience.  
Dhaka:BDPC 
 
Kalam, A, et.al.  1994.  Impressions of BRAC Clients about the Services of BRAC: 
Results from Quick Field Visits to 8 Areas.  Dhaka: Research and Evaluation 
Division, BRAC. 
 
 396 
 
Kalimullah, N A. 1992. “Unnayan Kormokande NGO abong Sorkari Uddog: Aikti 
Bishsleshon”,  Rashtro Biggan Dorpon, Vol.3. 
 
Kalimullah, N A. 1991. ”Bangladesh Sorkar-NGO Somporkko: Mujib theke Ershad 
Shashon Bebostha”, Rajniti Orthonithi Journal. No.1  
 
Kamaluddin, M. 2000.  Gonotontronaone NGO (Role of NGOs in Democracy), 
Dhaka: Printtek 
 
Kapferer, B. 1998. “The Anthropologist as Hero. Three Exponents of Post- 
Modernist Anthropology.”  Critique of Anthropology, vol. 8, no.2, pp.77-104  
 
Karim, F. et.al. 1994. VO Members' Perception of BRAC. Dhaka:BRAC 
 
Karim, L. 2010. Microfinance and Its Discontents: Gender and NGOs in Bangladesh. 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press (in press) 
 
Karim, L. 2008. “Demystifying Micro-credit:  The Grameen Bank, NGOs and 
Neoliberalism in Bangladesh.” Cultural Dynamics, Vol.19, No.3. 
 
Karim, L. 2004. “Democratizing Bangladesh. State, NGOs, and Militant Islam”  
Cultural  
Dynamics. Vol.16, No.2/3. 
 
Karim, L.  2001. “Politics of the Poor? NGOs and Grass-roots Political Mobilisation 
in Bangladesh”,  PoLAR, Vol.24, No.1.  
 
Karim, M.  1999. “NGOs Spreading Civil Society‟s Struggle for Democratization and 
Good Governance: The Case of Bangladesh.”  Paper present at the Third International 
NGO Conference, University of Birmingham, Birmingham. January.  Cited by 
Devine, J. 2006. “NGOs, Politics and Grassroots Mobilisation: Evidence from 
Bangladesh” Journal of South Asian Development,  Vol.1, No.1.  
 
 397 
 
Karim, M. 1996. “NGOs in Bangladesh: Issues of Legitimacy,”  in Edwards M and 
Hulme D (eds) Beyond the Magic Bullet. Connecticut: Kumarian Press  
 
Karim, A.H.M. Z. 1990. The Pattern of Rural Leadership in an Agrarian Society. A 
Case Study of the Changing Power Structure in Bangladesh. New Delhi:Northern 
Book Centre 
 
Keenan, J.2008. “What anthropologists should know about AFRICOM”. 
Anthropology Today Vol 24 No 5.pp.16-20 
 
Khan, A A.  1996. Discovery of Bangladesh. Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden 
Nation.  Dhaka: University Press Ltd 
 
Khan, F. et.al. 2009.  Recreating the Commons?  NGOs in Bangladesh.  Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd   
 
Khan, M.J. 1987. “Bangladeshe Markin Sorkari Unnayan Shoyota Rash o Besorkari 
Shahajjo Brithi Prosongo” Preksit. No.1. 3 October.  
 
Khan, A A. 1993. “Freshwater Wetlands in Bangladesh: Opportunities and Options.” 
In: Nishat, A et.al. Freshwater Wetlands in Bangladesh: Issues and Approaches for  
Management.  Dhaka:IUNC-The World Conservation Union 
 
Khan, MH.  1998.  Women in Micro-Credit. Empowerment or Enchantment? The 
Bangladesh Observer, July 28. 1998. 
 
King, V T (eds). 1999. Anthropology and Development in South-East Asia. Theory 
and Practice.   Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press 
 
Kottak, C P. 1985. “When People Don‟t Come First: Some Sociological Lessons from 
Completed Project.” In:  Cernea, M (ed.).  Putting People First: Sociological 
Variables in Rural Development.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 398 
 
Korten, D C. 1990. Getting to the 21
st
 Century. Voluntary Action and the Global 
Agenda.  Kumarian Press: Connecticut 
 
Korten, D C. 1980. “Community organisations and rural development: a learning 
process approach” Public Administration Review Vol. 40, No. 5, pp.480-511. 
 
Kotalova, J. 1993. Belonging to Others. Cultural Construction of Womenhood in a 
Village in Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Köhler, A. 2005.  “Money makes the World Go Round? Commodity Sharing, Gifting 
and Exchange in the Baka (Pygmy) Economy.” In: Widlok, T and Tadesse, W G 
(eds). Property and Equality.  Encapsulation, Commercialisation, Discrimination. 
Volume II.  New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books 
 
Kraidy, M M. 2005. Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalization. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press  
 
Kramsjo, B and Wood, G D. 1992.  Breaking the Chains. Collective Action for Social 
Justice among the Rural Poor in Bangladesh.   London: Intermediate Technology  
Publications.  
 
Kuhn, R. 2003. “Identities in Motion: Social Exchange Networks and Rural-Urban 
Migration in Bangladesh” Contributions to Indian Sociology. (n.s) Vol.37, No. 1 & 2. 
pp. 311-337 
 
Lang, H (eds) 1989. Managing On-site Project Implementation. A Guideline.  
Eschborn:GTZ 
 
Laws, S., Harper, C and Marcus, R. 2003. Research for Development: A Practical 
Guide.  London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
 
Leve, L and Karim, L. 2001. “Privatizing the State: Ethnography of  Development, 
Transnational Capital, and NGOs.”  PoLAR, Vol.24.No.1 
 
 399 
 
Lewis, D.  2004. “On the Difficulty of Studying Civil Society: Reflections on NGOs, 
State and Democracy in Bangladesh” Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.) Vol. 
38, No. 3.  
 
Lewis, D.  2003. “NGOs, Organizational Culture, and Institutional Sustainability” The 
Annals of the American Academy, ASPSS, 590, pp.212-226 
 
Lewis, D. 2001. The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations. 
An Introduction. London, New York: Routledge 
 
Lewis, D and Hossain, A. 2008.  “A Tale of Three Villages: Power, Difference and 
Locality in Rural Bangladesh.”  Journal of South Asian Development, Vol.3.No.1. 
pp.33-51 
 
Lewis, D and Sobhan, B.  2000.  “Routes of Funding, Roots of Trust? Northern 
NGOs, Southern NGOs, Donors, and The Rise of Direct Funding” in  Eade, Deborah 
(ed)  Development and Management. Oxford: Oxfam and the Open University. 
 
Ling, T.  1968.  A History of Religion East and West. Macmillan:London 
 
Lont, H and Hospes, O (eds). 2004. Livelihood and Microfinance. Anthropological 
and Sociological Perspectives on Savings and Debt.  Delft: Eburon Academic 
Publishers 
 
Lovell, C H. 1992. Breaking the Cycle of Poverty. The BRAC Strategy.  Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd. 
 
Ludden, D. 2003. Where is Assam? Using Geographical History of Local Current  
Realities. Ceniseas Paper 1. Sanjib Baruah. Series Editor, Guwahati: Center for  
Northeast India, South and Southeast Asia Studies.  
 
Mair, J., and Marti, I. 2007.  “Entrepreneurship for Social Impact: Encouraging 
Market Access in Rural Bangladesh” Corporate Governance, Vol. 7. No.4. pp.493-
501.    
 400 
 
 
Makita, R. 2009.  “New NGO–Elite Relations in Business Development for the Poor 
in Rural Bangladesh” Voluntas. 20, pp.50–70.  
 
Makita, R. 2007.  “Changing Patron–Client Relations Favourable to New 
Opportunities for Landless Labourers in Rural Bangladesh”  Journal of South Asian 
Development. Vol.2, No.2, pp. 255–277 
 
Maloney, C and Ahmed, ABS.  1988.  Rural Savings and Credit in Bangladesh.  
Dhaka: The University Press Ltd. 
  
Maloney, C.  1988. Behaviour and Poverty in Bangladesh.  Dhaka: University  
Press Ltd. 
 
Manger, L.O. 1985. "The Role of Basic Research" in Serkkola, Ari and Mann, Christine. 
The Cultural Dimension of Development. No.33. Helsinki: Finnish National Commission 
for UNESCO. 
 
Maniruzzaman, T. 1980. The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath.  
Dacca:Bangladesh Books International Ltd. 
 
Maniruzzaman, T. 1975.  Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh.   
Dacca:Bangladesh Books International Ltd. 
 
Mannan, M. 2009a. “BRAC: Anatomy of a Poverty Enterprise.” Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, Vol. 20. No. 2.   
 
Mannan, M. 2009b. “Islam, NGO and Development: The Shaping of 
Conflict Models in Bangladesh”.  In: Khan, F. et.al. Recreating the 
Commons?  NGOs in Bangladesh.  Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Mannan, M. 2008. “Bangla Democracy”  Forum. Vol.2.No.9. 
 
 401 
 
Mannan, M. 2007.  “Fluid Child Right and Representation of 
Underprivileged Children in Development Discourse.”  Paper presented at 
regional seminar Strengthening Child Rights as Academic Discourse in 
South Asia, 25-26 February, 2007. Regional Seminar Organized by Save 
the Children (Sweden-Denmark), Jahangirnagar University, University 
Grant Commission of Bangladesh. Save the Children (Canada).  
 
Mannan, M. 2006a. “Cooperative Antagonism in Development Research. A 
Perspective from Bangladesh”.  Anthropology in Action, Vol.3. No.3. 2006. 
 
Mannan, M. 2006b. “All in the Families”.  The Daily Star.  November 6, 
2006.  
 
Mannan, M.  2005. “Rural Power Structures and Evolving Market Forces in 
Bangladesh.” In: Ghimire, K.B (ed), Civil Society and the Market Question, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London.  
 
Mannan, M.  2004. “International Organizations”, Encyclopaedia of Women and 
Islamic Cultures, Volume II, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers  
 
Mannan, M. 2002. “Bangsha: Islam, history and the structure of Bengali Muslim 
descent”, in N. Alam (ed.), Contemporary Anthropology of Bangladesh: Theory and 
Practice, Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
 
Mannan, M.  2001a. "South Asia's Experience in Land Reform: NGOs, State and 
Donors."  In: Ghimires, K.B (ed), Whose Land? Civil Society Perspectives on Land 
Reform and Rural Poverty Reduction, IFAD/PC/UNRISD, Rome. 
 
Mannan, M. 2001b.  “Water, River and Culture: The Violence of 
Modernization in Delta Bangladesh.”  Paper presented at 2nd conference 
organized by International Water History Association held at University 
of Bergen, Norway, 10-12 August.  
 
 402 
 
Mannan, M. 2001c. Government - NGO Cooperation and Health Management. The 
Case of Bangladesh. Paper presented at 3
rd
 International Conference on Social Work 
in Health and Mental Health. Vision from Around the Globe, July 1-5, Tampere, 
Finland. 
 
Mannan, M. 2000a. “Engaging Deshi Anthropologist in Development:  A  Reflection 
on Current Practices.”  In: Alam, N. A Nahar and Chowdhury (eds). Contemporary 
Anthropology.  Dhaka: Department of Anthropology, Jahangir Nagar University 
Publication. 
 
Mannan, M. 2000b. Islam, Gender and Conflict Models: NGOs and the Discursive 
Process. Paper presented at Sixth Workshop of European Network of Bangladesh 
Studies, May 14-16,  Oslo, Norway.  
 
Mannan, M.  1998a. “Children and Perspective Forming: a Prognosis for Participation 
in Development Process”, Development Communiqué, Vol.1, Issue.2. 
 
Mannan, M. 1998b. "Culture, Cash and Credit: The Morality of Money Circulation" 
Paper Presented at European Network of Bangladesh Studies Workshop, University 
of Bath, UK, 16
th
-18
th
 April. 
 
Mannan, M.  1996.  "Women targeted and women negated. An aspect of the  
environmental movement in Bangladesh",  Development in Practice. Vol.6, No. 2.  
 
Mannan, M. 1995a.  "An Anatomy of Traditional Weaving Community and the 
Tradition of Technology in Bangladesh", Grassroots. Issue XV, Vol. IV. 
 
Mannan, M.  1995b. "Tradition and Technology. The Boatmen and Boats of 
Bangladesh”, Grassroots. Vol. V. Issue XVII. 
 
Mannan, M. 1993a. "An Anthropology of Power Structure: The Making of Tribunes 
and Dictators in Bangladesh", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 16, No. 2. 
 
 403 
 
Mannan, M.  1993b.   A Short Report on the Performance of Five NGOs. Dhaka: 
NORAD. 
 
Mannan, M. 1990a. "The State and the Formation of a Dependent Bourgeoisie in 
Bangladesh", South Asia Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4. 
 
Mannan, M. 1990b.  Kinship Nexus and Class-Politics: the Case of the State in the 
Post-Colonial Bangladesh Society.  Cand. Polit (M.Phil) Thesis, Institute of Social 
Anthropology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 
 
Mannan, M and Monira, S.  1998. “Sex Business and the Morality of Development 
Intervention”, Development Communiqué, Vol.1, Issue.1 
 
Mannan, M. et al. 1995a.  “Formation of Village Organizations: the First Three 
Months” Working Paper No.4, BRAC-ICDDR,B Joint Research Project, Dhaka. 
 
Mannan, M et al. 1995b. "Need Assessment Study for the Proposed Post Graduate 
Course on Development Leadership and Management." Paper presented at 
international workshop organized by ORAP, Zimbabwe, SIT, USA and BRAC. 
 
Mannan, M and Bush, A. 1992. Progress Report on GUP Sugarcane Project 1991. 
PMR 005, ITDG, UK. 
 
Mannan, M. Chowdhury, AMR and Karim F. 1994. Fatwabaz Against BRAC: Are they Alone?  Dhaka: BRAC.  
 
Mannan, M and Ali, S. 1991.  A Profile of the Boat People: An Anthropological 
Prognosis. A research report submitted to the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD), Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
 
Marcus, G E. 1995.  “Ethnography In/Of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-
Sited Ethnography.”  Annual Review of Anthropology. 24. pp.95-117.  
 
Marsden, D. 1994. “Introduction” (Part 1). In: Wright, S (ed)  Anthropology of 
Organizations. London and New York: Routledge. 
 404 
 
 
Marsden, D. 1994. “Indigenous management and the management of indigenous 
knowledge.” In: Wright, S (ed)  Anthropology of Organizations.  London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Marx, K. 1978 (1975). The Poverty of Philosophy.  Moscow: Progress Publishers 
 
Mascarenhas-Keyes, S. 1987. “The Native Anthropology: Constraints and Strategies 
in Research.” In: Jackson, A (ed).  Anthropology at Home.  London and New York: 
Tavistock Publications 
 
Mathews, J.T. 1997.  “Power Shift”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1. pp. 50-66 
 
Mathur, H M. 1996.  Anthropology and Development in Traditional Society.   
New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Matin, I and Hulme, D. 2003. “Programs for the Poorest: Learning from the IGVGD 
Program in Bangladesh” World Development Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 647–665 
 
Maurer, B. 2006. “The Anthropology of Money.”  Annual Review of Anthropology.   
35. pp.15-36.  
 
Mawdsley, E. Townsend, J. Porter, G and Oakley, P (eds). 2002. Knowledge, Power 
and Development Agendas. Oxford: INTRAC 
 
McGrew. A. 1992.  “The Third World in the New Global Order.” In:  Allen, T and 
Thomas, A (eds.).  Poverty and Development in the 1990s.  Oxford:Oxford University  
Press 
 
McNee, P.  1976. Crucial Issues in Bangladesh. Making Missions More Effective in 
the Mosaic of Peoples.   California:William Carey Library 
 
Menike, K. 1997. “People‟s Empowerment from the People‟s Perspective.” In: Eade, 
D, Development and Patronage.  London:Oxfam. 
 405 
 
 
 
Mercer, C. 2002. “NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of 
the Literature”, Progress in Development Stdies Vol.2. No.1. 
 
Mikkelsen, B. 1995. Methods for Development Work and Research. A Guide for 
Practitioners.  New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications 
 
Miles, M B and Huberman, A M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. Newbury Park: 
Sage Publications 
 
Mokammel, T.  1987.  NGO: Fifth Column of Imperialism? (in Bangla).  Dhaka: 
Jattiyo  Shahitto Prokashoni 
 
Montgomery, R. Bhattacharya, D & Hulme, D. 1996.  “Credit for the Poor in 
Bangladesh – The BRAC Rural Development Programme and The Government 
Thana Resources Development and Employment Programme.”  In Hulme, David and 
Mosley, Paul (eds) Finance Against Poverty.  Vol.2. London: Routledge. 
 
Moodie, M. 2008.  “Enter Microcredit:  A New Culture of Women‟s Empowerment in 
Rajasthan?”  American Ethnologist. Vol.35. No.3. pp.454-465. 
 
Morduch, J. 1998a. The Microfinance Promise.  Manuscript, Standford University, 
USA.  
 
Morris, B and Bastin, R. (eds.). 2004.  Expert Knowledge.  First World Peoples, 
Consultancy and Anthropology.  New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Moris, J and Copestake, J.  1993.  Qualitative Enquiry for Rural Development. 
London: Intermediate Technology Publications and Overseas Development Institute 
 
Morris-Reich, A. 2003. “The Beautiful Jew is a Moneylender: Money and 
Individuality in Simmel‟s Rehabilitation of the „Jew‟”  Theory Culture Society.  
Vol.20. No.4. pp.127-142. 
   
 406 
 
Morrow, S. 1997. "The Changing Roles of International Development Non 
Government Organisations in Australia," ACFOA Development Issues, Issue 2.  
 
Moser, Caroline O.N. 1993. Gender Planning and Development. Theory, Paractice 
and Training.   London and New York: Routledge 
 
Mosse, D.  2005. Cultivating Development. An Ethnography of Aid Policy and 
Practice. London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press 
 
Mosse, D. 2001.  “Social Research in Rural Development Projects.” In: Gellner, D N. 
and Hirsch, E (eds). Inside Organizations.  Anthropologists at Work. Oxford, New 
York:  Berg 
 
 Muhammad, A. 2007. Fulbari, Kansat, Garments, 2006. Dhaka: Shrabon Publications 
 
Muhammad, A. 1988.  Bangladesher Unnayan Sonkot abong NGO Model (Crises of 
Development  in Bangladesh and NGO Model) Dhaka: Prochinta Prokhashoni 
 
Mukherjee, R. 1957. The Dynamics of a Rural Society. Akademic-Verlag, Berlin, 
1957. 
 
Mustafa, S. Ara I.  Banu, D.  Hossain, A and Kabir, A. 1996.  Beacon of Hope. An 
Impact Assessment Study of BRAC's Rural Development Programme. Dhaka:BRAC 
 
Myrdal, G. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. Periodicals 
Service Co. 
 
NET. 1979. The Net: Power Structure in Ten Villages. Dhaka:BRAC 
 
Nkwi, P N. 1996.  "The ethnography of development: an African anthropologist's 
vision of the development process."  In: Arizpe, L (ed.). 1996. The Cultural 
Dimensions of Global Change.  An Anthropological Approach.  Paris: UNESCO 
Publishing 
 
 407 
 
Nicholson, T. 1994. “Institution Building:  Examining the Fit between Bureaucracies 
and Indigenous Systems.”  In: Wright, Susan (ed) Anthropology of Organisation.  
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Nolan, R.  2002. Development Anthropology. Encounters in Real World.  Boulder: 
Westview Press 
 
NORAD.  1993. The Logical Framework Approach (LFA).  Handbook for Objectives-
oriented Project Planning.  Oslo:NORAD 
 
Novak, J J. 1993.  Bangladesh. Reflections on the Water.  University Press Limited: 
Dhaka 
 
Nunez C E A.  1985. Liberation Theology Chicago: Moody Press 
 
ODA.  1995. A Guide to social Analysis for Projects in Developing Countries. 
London:HMSO.  
 
Ofstad, A.  1984. Some Aspect of the Conditions for Development Research in  
Norway. A Statistical Survey of Norwegian Development Research 1982-1984.  
Bergen & Oslo: Chr. Michelsen Institute & Ministry of Development Cooperation  
 
Parry, J and Bloch, M.  1989. Money and the Morality of Exchange.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Perera, J.  1997. “In Unequal Dialogue with Donors: The Experience of the 
Sorvodaya Shramadana Movement.”  In: Hulme, D and Edwards, M (eds). NGOs, 
States and Donors. Too Close for Comfort.  London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and Save 
the Children. 
 
Petton, M Q. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods.  Newbury Park,  
London, New Delhi:Sage Publications (second edition) 
 
 408 
 
Perry, H B. 2000. Health for All in Bangladesh.  Lessons in Primary Health Care for 
the Twenty First Century.  Dhaka: The University Press Ltd. 
 
Petras, J. 1997.  “Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America.” Monthly Review. Vol.49. 
No. 7. 
 
Perkins, J.  2005. Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. San Francisco. BK 
Bfrrett-K.Oeher Publishers Inc.  
 
Pfeiffer, J.W. 1994.  “Processing Experiential Learning.”  In: Pfeiffer, J.W. Library 
Presentation and Discussion Resources: Training Technologies. Pfeiffer and 
Company: San Diego. 
 
PFRB. 1994. The Present and Future of Research at BRAC. Deliberations and  
Recommendations from a Workshop. Research and Evaluation Division, Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Dhaka. 
 
Pottier, J (ed). 1993. Practicing Development: Social Science Perspective.  London, 
NewYork: Routledge. 
 
PP. 1990. Peasant Perceptions. Law. Dhaka.BRAC 
  
Pratt, B and Boyden, J. 1985. The Field Director‟s Handbook: An Oxfam Manual for  
Development Workers. Oxford, Oxfam Publications 
 
Price, D H. 2003. “Subtle Means and Enticing Carrots. The Impact of Funding on 
American Cold War Anthropology”.  Critique of Anthropology Vol 23, No. 4. 
pp.373–401. 
 
Rafi, M and Chowdhury AMR. 2002. “Human Rights and Religious Backlash: the 
Experience of a Bangladeshi NGO.”  Development in Practice Vol 10, No.1 
 
Rafi, M and Chowdhury ARM. (eds). 2001. Counting the Hills: Assessing the 
Development in Chittagong Hill Tract.  Dhaka: The University Press Limited.  
 409 
 
 
Rafi, M., and Mallick, D. 2002. “Group Dynamics in Development of the Poor: 
Experience from BRAC.”  Voluntas, Vol.13. No. 2. 
 
Rahim, M A. 1963. Social and Cultural History of Bengal. Vol. I, (1201-1576). 
Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society. 
 
Rahman, A. 2004. “Micro-credit and Poverty Reduction: Trade-Off between Building 
Institutions and Reaching the Poor.” In Lont, H and Hospes, O. (eds). Livelihood and 
Microfinance. Anthropological and Sociological Perspectives on Savings and Debt.  
Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers. 
 
Rahman, A. 2000.  “Micro-credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable 
Development: who Pays?”  World Development 27(1). 67-82 
 
Rahman, A.  1999. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh. An  
Anthropological Study of Grameen Bank Lending.  Westview Press:Boulder 
Rahman, A. 1996. “Micro-Credit for Women in Rural Bangladesh: Retrenchment of  
Patriarchal Hegemony as a Consequence.”  Chicago Anthropology Exchange, XXIII 
 
Rahman, H Z. 2001.  Re-Thinking Local Governance toward a Livelihoods Focus.  
Dhaka: PPRC Policy papers 
 
Rahman, H Z.  2000.  Poverty: the Challenges of Graduation.  Dhaka:BIDS 
 
Rahman HZ and Islam SA. 2002.  Local Governance and Community Capacities.  
Search for New Frontiers.  Dhaka: The University Press Ltd. 
 
Rana, A K M M and Ahmed, S M. 2000. Recent Financial Crisis in BRAC and the 
Rule of Rumors.  Dhaka: BRAC Research and Evaluation Division  
 
Rao, A and Kelleher, D. 1998.  “Gender Lost and Gender Found: BRAC's Gender 
Quality Action-Learning Programme.”  In Development in Practice, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 
173 – 185. 
 410 
 
 
Rao, A and Kelleher, D. 1997. “Engendering Organizational Change: The  
BRAC Case” in Goetz, Anne Marie (ed).  Getting Institutions Right for Women in 
Development.  London: Zed Books pp.123-139 
 
Rao, A and Kelleher, D. 1995.  “Engendering Organisational Change: The  
BRAC Case”, IDS Bulletin, Vol.26.No.3  
 
Rashid, H. 1991.  Geography of Bangladesh.  Dhaka: University Press Ltd  
 
Ray, J K.  1986. Organizing Villagers for Self-Reliance. A Study of Gonoshasthya 
Kendra in Bangladesh. Orient Longman Ltd: Calcutta 
 
Ray, N .1994. History of the Bengali People.  Calcutta: Orient Longman 
Redfield, R. 1956.  Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
 
Reza, H M and Ahmmed, F. 2009. Structural Social Work and the Compatibility of  
NGO Approaches: A Case Analysis of Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC).  International Journal of Social Welfare. 18.  
 
Riaz, A. 2008. Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh. A Complex Web.  London and New 
York: Routledge 
 
Rippin, A. 1993. Muslims. Their Religious Beliefs and Practices. Volume 2: The 
Contemporary Period.  Routledge:London and New York. 
 
Roca, R.S. 2007.  “„Dinheiro Vivo‟: Money and Religion in Brazil” Critique of 
Anthropology. Vol.27. No.3.  pp.319-339.  
 
Rohde, J.E. (ed) (2005) Learning to Reach Health for All.   Dhaka:The University Press 
Ltd.  
 
 411 
 
Roy, A. 1983. The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal. Prinston: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Roy, O. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. London: I.B.Tauris Publishers 
 
Rozario, S. 2006. “The New Burqa in Bangladesh: Empowerment or Violation of 
Women‟s Right” Women‟s Studies International Forum. 29. pp.368-380. 
 
RDP III.  1993.  Rural Development Programme III. 1993-1995.  Project Document   
Dhaka: BRAC     
 
RDP Manual. 1995. Rural Development Programme.  Dhaka: Operations Manual. 
BRAC. 
 
Rondinelli, D.A. 1994 (1983) Development Projects as Policy Experiment.  London, 
Methuen. 
 
Rutherford, S. 1997. “Informal Financial Services in Dhaka's Slums.” In: Wood, GD 
and Sharif IA (ed).  Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance Bangladesh.  Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd. 
 
Rutherford, S. 1995.  ASA: The Biography of an NGO.  Dhaka: Association for Social 
Advancement. 
 
Saha, B K. 1997. Study and Networking on Land Reforms in South Asia, Discussion 
Paper for Brainstorming Meeting at IFAD (Rome, 2–3 September, 1997). 
 
Salem-Murdock  M,. Horowitz MM, Sella, M (eds) 1990. Anthropology and 
Development in North Africa and the Middle East.  Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: 
Westview Press 
 
 
 
 412 
 
Samshir, S. 1996. Sar Sonkote Krishak Andolon: Rajnoitic Dal O NGO-eder Bhumica 
(Peasants‟ Movement during Fertilizer Crisis: The Role of Political Parties and 
NGOs). Working Paper No: 14.  Programme for Research on Poverty Alleviation, 
Grameen Trust: Dhaka 
 
Sanyal, B. 1991.  “Antagonistic Cooperation: A Case Study of  
Nongovermental Organizations, Government and Donors‟ Relationship in Income-
Generting Projects in Bangladesh”,  World Development. Vol.19. No.10 
 
Sattar, G. 1993. “Comilla Models for Rural Development: Significance and 
Relevance.”  In: Quddus, M A. (ed). Rural Development in Bangladesh. Strategies 
and Experiences.  Comilla:Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development.   
 
Schaffer, B.B.  1984.  “Towards Responsibility: Public Policy in Concept and 
Practice.”  In: Clay, EJ and Schaffer, BB (eds.), Room for Manoeuvre: an Exploration 
of Public Policy in Agriculture and Rural Development. London, Methuen, pp. 142-
190.    
 
Schendel, W V. 2009. A History of Bangladesh. Cambridge:Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Scheper-Huges, N. 1995.  “The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant 
Anthropology.”  Current Anthropology 36:409-440. Quoted by Morris, Barry and 
Bastin, Rohan (eds.). 2004.   
 
Scott, J. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcript.  New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press.  
 
Scott, JC. 1985. Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.  New  
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Scott, J. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
South Asia.  New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
 413 
 
Seabrook, J. 2001. Freedom Unfinished. Fundamentalism and Popular Resistance in 
Bangladesh Today.  Zed Books: London & New York 
 
Streefland, PH. et.al. 1993.  “Credit and Conscientization: Effects of different 
Development Approaches in Bangladesh.” Public Administration and Development, 
13 (2),153-169. 
 
Seidel, G and Vidal, L. 1997. ”The Implications of ‟medical‟, ‟gender in 
development‟ and ‟culturalist‟ discourses for HIV/AIDS policy in Africa” in Shore, C 
and Wright, S (eds) Anthropology of Policy. Critical Perspectives on Governance and 
Power.   Routledge: London and New York 
 
Sen, A. 1981. “Famine in Bangladesh.” In: Sen, A Poverty and Famines.  An 
Eassy on Enitlement and Deprivation.  New Delhi:Oxford University Press.  
pp.131-153 
 
Sen, B. 2003.  “Drivers of Escape and Descent: Changing Household 
Fortunes in Rural Bangladesh” World Development. Vol.31. No.3.  
 
Sengupta, N. 2001.  History of the Bengali-speaking People.  UBSPD: New Delhi 
 
Shahidullah, M. 1999. Bangla Bhashar Itibritta (Origin of Bengali Language). Dhaka: 
Mowla Brothers.  
 
Shailo, I (ed). 1994.  “NGOs For a Better Bangladesh.” Grassroots (special issue). 
Vol. IV, Issue XIII-XIV 
 
Shailo, I.  1990. “New Era Begins: NGOs for Democracy,” ADAB News, November-
December.   
  
Shiva, V. 1988.  Staying Alive. Women, Ecology and Survival in India. New Delhi: 
Kali for Women 
 
 414 
 
Siddiqui, K. et al. 1990. Social Formation in Dhaka City. Dhaka: The University 
Press Ltd.  
 
Siddiqui, K.  1985. “An Evaluation of Grameen Bank.” In: Mukhopadhyay, S (ed), 
Case Studies on Poverty Programmes in Asia.  Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific 
Development Centre.   
 
Siddiqui, K. Ahmed KA, Ahmed J. 1987. Benefit Package Received by Functionaries 
of GOs and NGOs in Bangladesh: A Comparison.  Dhaka:ADAB.   
 
Sidel, M. 2004. “States, Markets, and the Nonprofit Sector in South Asia: Judiciaries and 
the Struggle for Capital in Comparative Perspective.” Tulane Law Review.  78:1611-
1670.    
 
Silk, J. 2004. “Caring at a Distance: Gift Theory, Aid Chains and Social Movements,” 
Social and Cultural Geography, Vol.5, No.2. 
 
Sillitoe, P. 2006. “Why Spheres of Exchange?”  Ethnology. Vol.45. No.1. pp.1-27 
 
Sillitoe, P. 2004. “Interdisciplinary Experiences: Working with Indigenous 
Knowledge in Development”,  Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol.29.No.1 
  
Sillitoe, P.  2002a. “Globalizing Indigenous Knowledge” in Sillitoe, P. et.al. (eds) 
Participating in Development. Approaches to Indigenous Knowledge. 
Routledge:London and New York 
 
Sillitoe, P. 2002b. “Let Them Eat Cake: Indigenous Knowledge, Science and the 
„Poorest of the Poor‟”,  Anthropology Today. Vol.16.No.6. 
 
Sillitoe P. Dixon P, Barr J. 2005. Indigenous Knowledge Inquiries.  A Methodologies 
Manual for Development.  Rugby: ITDG 
 
Simmel, G. 1978 [1907]. The Philosophy of Money. London, Henley and Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 415 
 
 
Smillie, I. 2009.  Freedom from Want. The Remarkable Success Story of BRAC, the 
Global Grassroots Organisation That‟s Winning the Fight Against Poverty. Dhaka: 
The University Press Ltd.  
  
Smillie, I. 1997.  BRAC at 25.  Words and Deeds.  Dhaka:BRAC  
 
Smillie, Ian and Helmich, Henny (eds.). (1993).  Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Governments: Stakeholders for Development. Paris:OECD 
 
Smith, P. 1987.  „Identifying Better Development Projects: A Systems Approach,‟  
Agricultural Administration and Extension 25, pp.13-23 
 
Sobhan, B.  1997. “Partners or Contractors? The Relationship Between Offcial 
Agencies and NGOs: Bangladesh,”  Occasional Paper Series, Number 14. Oxford: 
INTRAC  
 
Sobhan, R.  1979. “Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh”, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 14.       
 
Sobhan R and Ahmed, M. 1980. Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime: A 
Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh.  Dhaka:BIDS 
 
Steier, Frederick (ed). 1991.  Research and Reflexivity. London, Newbury Park, New 
Delhi: SAGE Publications 
 
Stern, G. 1976. „SOSIPing‟, Operational Research Quarterly.  27(4), pp. 915-929 
 
Stiles, K.  2002. “International Support for NGOs in Bangladesh: Some Unintended 
Consequences”, World Development, Vol. 30, NO. 5, pp. 835-846 
 
Stirrat, R.L. 2008.  “Mercenaries, Missionaries and Misfits.  Representations of 
Development Personnel”. Critique of Anthropology. Vol 28, No.4, pp. 406–425  
 
 416 
 
Strathern, M. 1987. “The Limits of Auto-Anthropology.” In Jackson, A (ed). 1987.  
Anthropology at Home.  London and New York: Tavistock Publications 
 
Streefland, PH. et.al. 1993.  “Credit and Conscientization: Effects of different 
Development Approaches in Bangladesh”, Public Administration and Development, 
vol.13, No.2.  
 
Stuart, R. et.al.  1996. An Action-Learning Approach to Gender and Organisational 
Change.  BRAC: Dhaka  
 
Suzuki, N. 1998. Inside NGOs. Learning to Manage Conflicts between Headuarters 
and Field Offices. Intermediate Technology Publication:London 
 
TD. 1994. BRAC Somporke Kotipoy Prosno (Certain Questions about BRAC).  
Training Division.  Dhaka: BRAC 
 
TDS. 2009. “Over 23,000 NGOs‟ activities Unknown.”  The Daily Star. July 11.  
TDS. 2008a. “Poor control of unlicensed micro-credit institutions. Regulatory body 
admists in wake of scams.”  The Daily Star.  March 17, 2008.  
 
TDS. 2008b. “BRAC not „NGO-nising‟ any primary school.”  The Daily Star. June 
12, 2008 
 
TDS. 2008c. “BRAC Supervision. Primary Teachers reject government decision.” 
The Daily Star. May 28, 2008. 
 
TDS. 2007a. “Chief Adviser asks NGOs to be lenient with borrowers.” The Daily 
Star. December 5, 2007. 
 
TDS. 2007b.  “Akbar questions most NGOs‟ transparency.”  The Daily Star.  
November 7, 2007.   
 
TDS. 2007c. “Biman flights schedule about to crash-land.”  The Daily Star. August 3, 
2007.  p.20. 
 417 
 
TDS. 2007d. “From hay day to doomsday.”  The Daily Star. August 1, 2007. p.1. 
 
TDS. 2006a. “Good Governance. Enact code of conduct for NGOs.”   The Daily Star. 
April 25, 2006 
 
TDS. 2006b.   “Awami League to resist Proshika chief Kazi Faruque”  The Daily Star. 
December 26,2006. 
 
TDS. 2004. “Government plans to cancel Proshika‟s registration” The daily Star, 
April 28, 2004. 
 
TDS. 2003a. “ADAB split climaxes next week.”  The Daily Star. February 18, 2003.  
 
TDS. 2003b. “Government to float Tk 100cr fund for small NGOs.” The Daily Star. 
October 17, 2003. 
 
TDS.2003c. “Tk 350 cr NGO fund stuck in incomplete „political link‟ probe.” The 
daily Star, February 16, 2003. 
 
Tegegn, M. 1997. “Development and Patronage.”  In Eade, D. Development and 
Patronage, Oxfam: London 
 
Terry, RC and Mueller, RK.  1997. BRAC‟s Governance and Management,  
1997-2007.  Dhaka:BRAC  
 
Thornton, P. et.al. 2000. “Partners in Development. A Review of Big NGOs in 
Bangladesh.”  DFID:Dhaka 
 
Thorp, J P. 1978. Power among the Farmers of Daripalla. A Bangladesh Village 
Study. Dhaka:Caritus. 
 
TIB. 2009.  NGO Related Activities. Mimo.  Transparency International 
Bangladesh:Dhaka 
 
 418 
 
Timm, R.W et.al. (eds)  1993. Asian Workshop. From Assistance to Partnership in 
Self-Reliance.  Aachen/Germany:Misereor 
 
TNN.  2006.  “Happy Planet Index: Bangladesh ranks 41st out of 178.” The New 
Nation, 21 July 2006, Dhaka   
 
Townsend, J et.al. 1999. Women and Power: Fighting Patriarchies and Poverty.  
London/New York: Zed Books 
 
Tucker, V.  1999. "The Myth of Development: A Critique of a Eurocentric 
Discourse." In: Munck, R and  O'Hearn, D (ed.). Critical Development Theory: 
Contributions to a New Paradigm.  Dhaka: The University Press Limited 
 
Tvedt, T.  1998. Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign 
Aid.  Trenton and Oxford: Africa World Press, Inc. & James Currey Ltd 
 
Tvedt, T. 1995. NGOs as a Channel in Development Aid. The Norwegian System. 
Evaluation Report 3.95. A Report submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs by the Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, 
Bergen.     
 
United Nations. 1954. Progress In Land Reform.  New York: U.N Department of 
Economic Affairs. p.iii.  
 
UBINIG. 1998.  http://ubinig.multimania.com/monsanto.htm 
 
Uddin, S M. 2006. Constructing Bangladesh.  Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in 
an Islamic Nation.  New Delhi: Vistaar Publications 
 
Uddin, F. 1984. “Non-Government Organisation in Bangladesh: A Few Aspects of 
their Operation”. Bangladesh Development Dialogue. June No.1.   
 
 419 
 
Ullah, A. K. M. A., and Routray, J. K. 2007.  “Rural Poverty Alleviation Through 
NGO Interventions in Bangladesh: How Far Is the Achievement?” International 
Journal of Social Economics. Vol. 34. No. 4. Pp. 237–248. 
 
Uphoff, N. 1996. Learning from Gal Oya.  Possibilities for Participatory 
Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science.  London: IT Publication   
 
Verhelst, T G. 1992. No Life Without Roots. Culture and Development. London and New 
Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. 
 
VSC (1997)  Songhoton, Sanchoy O Rin Bhevehastapona Shoyaka (Institution, 
Savings and Credit Management Manual).  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
Wanner, C. 2005.  “Money, Morality and New Forms of Exchange in Postsocialist 
Ukraine.”  Ethnos. Vol.70, No.4, pp. 515-537 
 
Weil, Shalva and Weil, Michael. 1987. “Anthropology becomes Home; Home 
becomes Anthropology.” In:  Jackson, A (ed).  Anthropology at Home.  London and 
New York: Tavistock Publications 
 
Wield, D.  2000. “Tools for Project Development within a Public Action Framework.”  
In: Eade, D.  Development and Management.   Oxford: Oxfam 
 
White, S. 1999.  “NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of 
Representation the Poor.”  Development and Change. Vol. 30. No.2. pp.307-326.  
 
White, S C.  1995. “Bangladesh.” In Riddell, R et.al. Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation.  London and Oxford: Overseas 
Development Institute and Clarendon Press 
 
Wolf, E R. 1982. Europe and the People without History.  Berkeley and London: 
University of California Press. 
 420 
 
World Bank. 1996.  Bangladesh. Pursuing Common Goals.  Strengthening Relations 
Between Government and Development NGOs.  Dhaka:The University Press Ltd   
(published for the World Bank). 
 
Wood, G. 1985. “Targets Strike Back – Rural Works Claimants in Bangladesh”, 
Development and Change, Vol.16.    
 
Wood, G.D. 1976. “Class differentiation and power in Bandakgram: The minifundist 
case.” In:  Huq, A (ed.), Exploitation and the Rural Poor. Comilla:BARD. 
 
Worseley, P (ed.). 1971.   Two Blades of Grass: Rural Cooperatives in Agricultural 
Modernization, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  Quoted in Mathur, H M 
1996.  Anthropology and Development in Traditional Society.   
New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Wright, S (ed). 1994. Anthropology of Organizations. London and New York: 
Routledge 
 
Yaqub, S. 1995. “Empowered to default? Evidence from BRAC's micro-credit 
programmes.”  Small Enterprise Development. 6 (4). 
 
Yunus, M. 2007.  “Bank must be a tool to fight poverty.”   The Daily Star. February 3, 
2007, p.16. 
 
Zafarullah, H and Rahman, M.H. 2002. “Human Rights, Civil Society and 
Nongovernmental Organizations: The Nexus in Bangladesh”. Human Rights 
Quarterly 24. pp. 1011–1034. 
 
Zaman, H. et.al. 2006. Economics and Governance of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in Bangladesh.  Bangladesh Development Series Paper No: 11. Dhaka: 
The World Bank 
 
 421 
 
Zaman, H. 1995.  “Micro-enterprise as a means to empowerment: the BRAC model.” 
Paper presented at an international workshop organized by South Asia Partnership 
(SAP), Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
  
Zaman, S.  2005. Broken Limbs, Broken Lives.  Ethnography of a Hospital Ward in 
Bangladesh. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis 
 
Zaman, S. 2001. Life in a Health Centre: An Ethnography from Rural  
Bangladesh.  Dhaka:BRAC 
 
